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Abstract 
 
Economic crime and corruption has been an issue throughout Chinese history. While 
there may be scope for discussion as to the significance of public confidence in the 
integrity of a government, in practical terms the government of China has had to focus 
attention on maintaining confidence in its integrity as an issue for stability. Since the 
establishment of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and its assumption of power and 
in particular after the ‘Opening’ of the Chinese economy, abusive conduct on the part 
of those in positions of privilege, primarily in governmental organisations, has arguably 
reached an unprecedented level. In turn, this is impeding development as far as it 
undermines public confidence, accelerates jealousy and forges an even wider gap 
between rich and poor, thereby threatening the stability and security of civil societies. 
More importantly, these abuses undermine the reputation of the CCP and the 
government. China naturally consider this as of key significance in attracting foreign 
investment and assuming its leading role in the world economy. 
 
While there have been many attempts to curb economic crime, the traditional 
capabilities of the law and particularly the criminal justice system have in general terms 
been found to be inadequate. This thesis examines the existing law relating to fraud and 
corruption, as a mechanism for reducing the incidence and impact of such abuses and 
offers appropriate recommendations for rendering it more efficient and efficacious.  The 
author discusses the legal history of economic crime control, followed by the various 
initiatives that have been undertaken at different levels of government to curb economic 
crime and corruption since the foundation of the People’s Republic of China. This thesis 
also assesses the existing legal and institutional regime for the protection of victims of 
economic crime. China’s stand against corruption is then placed in the context of 
various international initiatives, in particular those involving the United Nations.  
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The primary objective of this thesis is to assess the law and its administration in China 
in the fight against economic crime and corruption and to facilitate a better 
understanding and control of the issues relating to the prevention of this phenomenon, 
in the promotion of China’s economic and political stability. 
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Introduction 
 
Over the last thirty years, it has become increasingly clear economic crime is, and 
remains, a major concern for governments throughout the world. This concern has 
concentrated on differing issues, since the effect of economic crime varies in different 
contexts. Nevertheless, it is widely recognised that the prevalence of crime that is 
economically motivated in many countries is a substantial threat to the development of 
their economies and stability. 1  Indeed, economic crime, in particular fraud and 
corruption, poses a considerable risk to the public sector with potential damage 
extending beyond financial losses. This, unfortunately, is precisely what modern day 
China is facing. 
 
China is emerging as the most dynamic economy in the world and is widely perceived 
to be the dominant economy within the next decade. Even though China has attracted 
enormous business and investment since its economic reform – a sound and trustworthy 
legal system in line with international standards – it remains, in many aspects, 
underdeveloped. As the world’s largest emerging market, the lack of a consistent legal 
regime curbing dishonest practice, creates problems. It undermines China’s economic 
growth, discourages foreign investment, and disrupts the effective distribution of 
economic resources. Socially, when paying bribes becomes the tradition, there will be 
unfair and unequal competition, citizens lose trust and faith, and it will accelerate 
jealousy and forge an even wider gap between rich and poor, thereby threatening the 
stability and security of civil societies. Most importantly, this undermines the 
institutions and values of democracy, ethical values and justice – jeopardising the rule 
of law. Even more serious is the fact that it brings substantial damage to the Chinese 
government and the ruling party, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). As former 
                                                
1 Barry Rider, Haiting Yan and Lihong Xing (2010), Guoji Jinrong Fanzui Yufang yu Kongzhi (The 
Prevention and Control of International Financial Crime), Beijing: China Financial Publishing House, 
p. 1.  
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president Hu Jintao warned, the party’s survival and popular support depends upon the 
integrity of party officials, and the acts of corruption and related crimes by party 
members will cause public distrust and is doing great damage to the reputation of the 
CCP.2 
 
The CCP recognises that corruption has undermined the credibility of its own objectives 
ever since its foundation. It has launched innumerable initiatives against corruption and 
various associated forms of economic abuse and devoted considerable resources to the 
problem. However, there is still a widespread perception, at all levels of Chinese society, 
that corruption is rampant.3 
 
Corruption has existed in Chinese history for thousands of years. It cannot be 
considered as an isolated phenomenon, but should be placed within a broader political, 
social and cultural context. Corruption is not purely a problem of administrative or 
political ethics but also a reflection of political development and changes in regime, 
and for this reason, the issue should be studied in the widest possible context. This 
thesis, however, does not seek to address the phenomenon across such a broad spectrum. 
It is intended to examine the legal history of the control of economic crime, in particular 
corruption, and to focus specifically on the numerous initiatives – both nationally and 
internationally – that have been undertaken since the founding of the People’s Republic 
of China. It must be noted that analysis of many of these initiatives involves more 
political aspects than legal concepts, given the nature of the political environment in 
reference to various periods of China’s history. My primary concern in this thesis, 
nevertheless, is to review the legal measures and actions that have been undertaken 
against fraud and public sector corruption, with a view to determine how it can be 
                                                
2 BBC News (2012), ‘China’s Hu Jintao in corruption warning at leadership summit’, BBC News, 
08.11.2012, available at: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-china-20233101. 
3 Barry Rider (2013), ‘When Chinese whispers become shouts’, Editorial, Journal of Financial Crime, 
Vol. 20, Iss. 2. 
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monitored and controlled. The discussion also extends to an international perspective 
and analyses of the various international measures that have been taken. China has 
assumed its full role among the nations in this context and has, and will continue, to 
have a significant impact in the development of international mechanisms to combat 
corruption. 
 
The issue of economic crime is dynamic, and it becomes more so, and more 
complicated, when examined in the context of China’s economic reform. It is true that 
the ‘opening’ of the economy has broadly facilitated China’s economic development, 
however, it has also provided unscrupulous individuals with greater opportunities to 
exploit the state. Furthermore, corrupt officials become more expert in moving their ill-
gotten gains beyond the reach of the domestic courts and hiding their bribes and 
misappropriations in overseas bank accounts. Unfortunately, Chinese law enforcement 
has not kept pace with money laundering control and the globalisation of business with 
relative freedom of capital movement. 
 
China is a socialist country with a long history of bureaucratic culture, and the structure 
of its political, governmental and judicial systems are complex and inter-related. 
Therefore, this thesis addresses various initiatives, not only undertaken by the 
government, but also the CCP and legal authorities. It should also be noted that China 
is geographically enormous, hence orders issued from the central government, through 
its hierarchical distribution – provincial, city and town levels of government, may not 
be fully implemented throughout.  
 
The carefully crafted legislation may not be China’s true concern in today’s world; 
rather it is its administration and enforcement practices that exacerbated the problem. 
This work draws on a degree of experience from the UK, and to a lesser extent, that of 
the US and Hong Kong, with its unique depth and breadth of review, to provide an in-
depth examination of China’s legal and institutional development in the fight against 
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economic crime.  
 
In the first chapter, a criminological analysis of economic crime is provided. It begins 
with various definitions of economic crime, where corruption has been given particular 
attention, as it has become the most prominent issue within Chinese society in recent 
years. It then relates to China’s current war against corruption in discussing the 
economic and social implication of economic crime and corruption. More theories 
relating to the definition is worth exploring, but this thesis focuses rather more on the 
practical world and aims to present a forward-looking discussion of strategies that 
might be best advocated to address the prevention and control of economic crime. 
 
In the second chapter, a historical review of the legal control of economic crime on 
corruption in China is presented, following the strict timeline from the ancient period 
of Chinese slavery societies (2070 B.C.) to the late 1970s before China launched its 
profound economic reform. While there have been discussions of specific codes and 
measures, this material has not been assimilated in detail. If time and resources 
permitted, it would be interesting to devote more attention to this. However, this thesis 
looks forward, as does China, not back. A brief historical review provides a base and a 
context, particularly given the historical perspective in Chinese culture. 
 
The third chapter provides an examination of the condition of economic crime and 
corruption in the context of the ‘opening’ of China. Economic crime grew sporadically 
during this period, as the country and the government placed their utmost attention on 
implementing economic reform and crafting economic policy. Loopholes within the 
system and the law are observed and specific cases are analysed. Also, a few short-lived 
anti-corruption campaigns were initiated by the party due to the rigorous voices raised 
from the public. It is candid in its comments and evaluation since it is important that 
mistakes made in the past do not occur again in the future. 
 
 
 
19 
The fourth chapter focuses specifically on the core and protein concept of economic 
crime – fraud. It focuses on the definition and characteristics of fraud and selects the 
UK as an exemplar, with this being the origin of the common law system. This chapter 
makes a comparative analysis on the legal regime against fraud in the UK and China. 
There is much that can be learned from the fertile UK experience, but the fundamental 
difference between these two legal systems is that common and civil law systems create 
both theoretical and practical difficulties. However, sensible recommendations were 
made in the legal and practical senses, in terms of establishing an improved anti-fraud 
regime in China. 
 
In the fifth chapter the evolvement of not only China’s criminal justice system, but also 
its laws and institutions in protecting the victims of economic crime, is explored. There 
must be limits to such a discussion and it has not been possible to examine all areas of 
the law and practice in depth. In particular, it has not been practical to examine 
developments in reforming the general corporate, company and commercial laws. As 
in China, given the unique structure of its political system, corruption related crimes 
are associated with party members and public officials. Accordingly, the cooperative 
work between the party built-in supervisory organ and judicial departments will be of 
key significance in the fight against corruption. Indeed, our society and economy moves 
dynamically, perhaps more than our institutions of government! 
 
The sixth chapter studies in detail the various international initiatives that have been 
undertaken in the fight against economic crime and corruption. It also relates to China’s 
very recent steps on the international stage in hunting out corrupt officials who have 
fled overseas with their laundered proceeds. China has been active in the international 
arena and is ready to be one of the leading countries in the worldwide fight against 
corruption. 
 
Finally, in the seventh chapter, the future path in the fight against economic crime is 
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discussed. There are no clear set answers to the problems that have been raised. 
However, the determination of the top leadership in China is clearly apparent in the 
efforts they have made in recent years. China learns from its past and it will now learn 
from the experience of other countries. 
 
History has taught China the consequence of unbridled greed – an old Chinese maxim 
states: “while the waters can bear a boat, they can also sink it.” 
 
 
Chapter 1:  A Criminological Discussion and Analysis of 
Economic Crime, with Particular Reference to Corruption 	
In the past, the commission of crime was circumscribed by the distance over which 
people might travel on foot or by horse, the ports to which they might sail by ship and 
the borders they had to pass. The rapid development of sophisticated means of 
communication has brought about positive effects of integrating markets and the 
concept of the ‘borderless world’. However, such advancement has also offered no 
barriers to those who would deem to exploit our financial institutions, destroy the 
economic stability of our commercial system or corrupt our public officers. With the 
benefit of globalisation, economic crime is of rising world-wide concern, particularly 
after the 2007 global financial crisis. 
 
Economic crime has become the crime of choice;1 – it is a crime with low risk and high 
return, and generally, access to a computer and a telephone are sufficient tools with 
which to perpetrate massive frauds. A recent survey carried out by PwC (one of the Big 
Four2 accounting firms) on global economic crime 20163 has concluded that “more than 
one in three organisations are being impacted upon by economic crime; economic crime 
such as fraud, IP infringement, corruption, cybercrime, or accounting fraud continues 
to be a major concern for organisations of all sizes, across all regions and in virtually 
every sector”. The survey also indicates that asset misappropriation is the most 
commonly reported example of economic crime, at a rate of 64%, with cybercrime  
taking second place at 32% and crimes of bribery and corruption ranking third, at 24%.4 
                                                
1 See Rosalind Wright (2007), ‘Developing effective tools to manage the risk of damage caused by 
economically motivated crime fraud’, Journal of Financial Crime, Vol. 14, Iss. 1, pp. 17-27. 
2  The “Big Four” are the four largest international professional services networks, offering audit, 
assurance, tax, consulting, advisory, actuarial, corporate finance, and legal services. They are Deloitte, 
PwC, Ernst & Young and KPMG.  
3 PwC: Global Economic Crime Survey 2016, accessed at: http://www.pwc.com/gx/en/economic-crime-
survey/ 
4 Ibid. 
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This study will present a forward-looking discussion of optimum strategies that may be 
advocated to address the prevention and control of economic crime. Rather than 
reviewing and analysing the huge variety of published literature and discussion on the 
criminological analysis of economic crime, the author aims to emphasise the practical 
issues, particularly those concerns that require action and re-action to protect our 
society and economy. 
 
The immoral phenomenon 
In the present day, the corrosive effect of various economic crimes has been witnessed 
and recognised worldwide. With corruption as an example, the United Nations 
Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC), the first globally binding international anti-
corruption instrument,5 clearly stated on the first page of its provision that corruption 
“undermines democracy and the rule of law, leads to violations of human rights, distorts 
markets, erodes the quality of life and allows organised crime, terrorism and other 
threats to human security to flourish. Corruption also hurts the poor disproportionately 
by diverting funds intended for development, undermining a government’s ability to 
provide basic services, feeding inequality and injustice and discouraging foreign aid 
and investment. Corruption is a Key element in economic underperformance and a 
major obstacle to poverty alleviation and development.”6 We have witnessed over the 
years that there have been innumerable regulations and laws passed specifically to 
tackle corruption, nevertheless corruption continues to be a rampant force, particularly 
in developing countries. Accordingly, this chapter discusses the benefit of comparative 
experiences, allowing for a more practical context, by limiting analysis of the relevant 
laws and regulations. 
 
Although economic crime has been a phenomenon of commercial life in the past, it has 
                                                
5 UNCAC, United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, available at http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/cor
ruption/index.html 
6 UNCAC, Forward, by Secretary-General Kofi A. Annan, 2004, New York, United Nations. 
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become a growth industry in the latter half of the 20th century, being a relatively new 
threat to emerging countries. 7  Until the early 1990s, very few individuals in the 
evolving world were aware of the term ‘money laundering’, let alone understand how 
it works and the harmful consequences it brings. This is the case in China, where two 
major Chinese stock exchanges were established in the early 1990s, yet only recently 
has the public recognised crimes of insider dealing and other ‘white collar’ economic 
crimes.  
 
In the heart of developed western countries, many scholars believe free-market 
capitalist economies present a fundamental paradox.8 It is identified by the need to 
provide maximum commercial freedom for the market to enable entrepreneurial 
business to flourish. While, at the same time, it is one of the biggest ironies of western 
capitalism that in uncountable cases, the most attractive, innovative and entrepreneurial 
financial schemes are all too often the brainchild of the white-collar criminal. For those 
countries whose free-market economies are still evolving, it becomes extremely 
difficult to strike the balance between the imposition of a strong bureaucratic regulation, 
which would certainly inhibit new commercial development, and deliberately 
refraining from the introduction of any prudent Act of Law, thus allowing criminals to 
infiltrate the emerging markets, offering tempting short-term profits, but with long-term 
subversive effects. As Professor Barry Rider stipulated: “the present devastation of the 
social, political and economic fabric of the developing world through, among other 
things, the phenomenon of international economic crime is hardly perceived, let alone 
acknowledged. There is compelling evidence that some national economies … are 
coming under such an attack from organised crime groups and those engaged in 
                                                
7  See more at George Gilligan (2015), ‘Financial Crime: A Historical Perspective’, in Research 
Handbook on International Financial Crime, edited by Barry Rider, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar 
Publishing Led, pp. 32-34. 
8  See Rowan Bosworth-Davies and Graham Saltmarsh (1995), ‘Definition and Classification of 
Economic Crime’, in The Regulation and Prevention of Economic Crime Internationally, edited by 
Jonathan Reuvid, Kogan Page Ltd, pp. 3-5. 
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economic crime that their political institutions have been significantly weakened and 
corrupted”.9 
 
The definition of economic crime 
 The man on the Clapham omnibus so to speak, might well characterise conduct as 
unfair and even describe it as fraud.10 However, by virtue of its complexity, and given 
the fact that varying global contexts means a variation of circumstances, a clear-cut 
definition of economic crime remains problematic. As argued by Professor Al-Sarraj, it 
is difficult to have a single comprehensive legal definition of economic and financial 
crime for the whole world, as criminal policy, especially in differing economic contexts, 
varies from one country to another.11 Indeed, in the practical world it may be questioned 
whether devoting a substantive amount of time and energy to analysing relevant and 
related literature on the definition of economic crime serves any meaningful purpose. 
The author instead, shall enter into a brief discussion of its general definition and more 
importantly, a summary generated from relevant and practical national and international 
organisations, as this has had more impact on the ground and especially in China. 
 
Black’s Law Dictionary defines the term economic crime as “a nonphysical crime 
committed to obtain a financial gain or a professional advantage”. It categorises such 
crime into two types: the first is often called white-collar crime, consisting of crimes 
committed by businessmen as an adjunct to their regular business activities, for example, 
embezzlement and tax evasion. The second type of economic crime is the provision of 
illegal goods and services or the provision of goods and services in an illegal manner, 
                                                
9  Barry A. K. Rider (1986), ‘Combating International Commercial Crime – A Commonwealth 
Perspective’, 4th International Symposium on Economic Crime, Jesus College, Cambridge. 
10 The phrase was first put to legal use by Sir Richard Henn Collins MR in the case McQuire v. Western 
Morning News [1903] 2 K.B. 100. 
11 Abboud Al-Sarraj (2005), ‘Concept of Economic Crime as Perceived Across the World – Typology, 
New Trends and Countermeasures’, Presentation Papers of Panels 1 and 3, Measures to Combat 
Economic Crime including Money-laundering, 11th United Nations Congress on Crime Prevention and 
Criminal Justice, Bangkok, 18-25 April 2005. 
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where the provision requires coordinated economic activity, similar to that of normal 
business, but all engaged are involved in crime.12 
 
In England and Wales, financial crime includes “any offence involving fraud or 
dishonesty; misconduct in, or misuse of information relating to, a financial market; or 
handling the proceeds of crime.”13 The Financial Conduct Authority provides a more 
concrete definition, by stating it is “any offence involving money laundering, fraud or 
dishonesty, or market abuse.”14 The Federal Bureau of Investigation in the United 
States of America, however, gives a much wider definition, providing that such crimes 
include the criminal activities of fraudulent corporate, securities and commodities, 
mortgage, healthcare, financial institutions, insurance, mass marketing and money 
laundering. 15  The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) both go further by stating economic and financial 
crime can refer to “any non-violent crime that generally results in a financial loss”.16 
This, as a result, can include fraud, tax evasion and money laundering, but essentially 
encapsulates all crimes that cause a financial loss. The UNODC also emphasised the 
difficulty in its definition, stating “the category of ‘economic crime’ is hard to define 
and its exact conceptualisation remains a challenge. The task has been further 
complicated by rapid advances in technology, which provide new opportunities for such 
crimes”.17 
 
                                                
12 Black’s Law Dictionary (2009), 9th edition, Bryan A. Garner, editor in chief, Thomson Reuters, p. 427. 
13 Financial Services Act 2012, Section 1H (3).  
14 Financial Conduct Authority, previously known as Financial Services Authority, ‘Fighting Financial 
Crime’, accessed at http://www.fca.org.uk/about/what/protecting/financial-crime  
15  The Federal Bureau of Investigation, ‘Financial Crime Report to the Public’, accessed at 
http://www.fbi.gov/stats-services/publications/financial-crimes-report-2010-2011 
16  International Monetary Fund (2001), Financial System Abuse, Financial Crime and Money 
Laundering – Background Paper, IMF: Washington, DC, 12.02.2001, p. 3; United Nations Office on 
Drugs and Crime, ‘Economic and Financial Crimes: Challenges to Sustainable Development’, 11th 
United Nations Congress on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice, 18-25 April 2005, Bangkok, 
Thailand. 
17 UNODC (2005), Ibid, p. 1. 
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Economic and financial crime has also been referred to as ‘white collar crime’ – a term 
first penned by Professor Edwin Sutherland, and defined by him as “a crime committed 
by a person of respectability and high social status in the course of his occupation”.18  
White collar crime has since become synonymous with the full range of frauds 
committed by business and government professionals.19 Despite his seminal status, 
Sutherland’s definition has been subject to a great deal of debate. For example, 
Bookman argued that Sutherland’s definition was too narrow20 and Podgor went as far 
as to say: “throughout the last 100 years no one could ever figure it (white collar crime) 
out”.21 
 
Definitions of financial crime have, of course, also been attempted by other academics. 
For instance, Dr Gottschalk states that it is “a crime against property, involving the 
unlawful conversion of property belonging to another to one’s own personal use and 
benefit”, emphasising that it is often “profit driven … to gain access to and control over 
property that belonged to someone else.”22 Spencer Pickett and Jennifer Pickett define 
financial crime as “the use of deception for illegal gain, normally involving a breach of 
trust, and some concealment of the true nature of the activities.”23 This can include 
fraud, insider trading, embezzlements, tax evasion, paying or receiving kickbacks, 
cyber-attack and money laundering. 
 
                                                
18 Edwin H. Sutherland (1949), White Collar Crime, New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, p. 9. For a 
more detailed commentary on the definitions of white collar crime see Sally S. Simpson (2013), ‘White 
collar crime: a review of recent developments and promising directions for future research’, Annual 
Review of Sociology, 39, pp. 309-331, at pp. 310-313. 
19  Federal Bureau of Investigation, ‘White Collar Crime’, available at: http://www.fbi.gov/about-
us/investigate/white_collar/whitecollarcrime 
20 Zachary Bookman (2007), ‘Convergences and omissions in reporting corporate and white collar crime’, 
DePaul Business and Commercial Law Journal, Vol. 6, Iss. 3, pp. 347-392, at p. 355 
21 Ellen S. Podgor (2008), ‘White collar crime: a letter from the future’, Ohio State Journal of Criminal 
Law, Vol. 5, No. 1, pp. 247-255, at p. 247. 
22 Peter Gottschalk (2010), ‘Categories of Financial Crime’, Journal of Financial Crime, Vol. 17, Iss. 4, 
pp. 441-458. 
23 K. H. Spencer Pickett and Jennifer M. Picekett (2002), Financial Crime Investigation and Control, 
New York: Wiley; see also more discussions at Peter Gottschalk (2010), Ibid. 
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In China, the terminology of ‘economic crime’ (jingji fanzui) appeared in print by the 
Standing Committee in its official document ‘Decision on the Severe Punishment of 
Serious Economic Criminals’, at the 5th National People’s Congress in 1982, as 
“smuggling, illicit currency exchange, seeking exorbitant profits, stealing public 
property, speculation and profiteering, stealing and selling valuable cultural relics, and 
demanding or receiving bribes”.24 Further, in 1985, the Supreme People’s Court and 
the Supreme People’s Procuratorate defined the core component of economic crime –   
corruption (tanwuzui) – as “activities by state personnel who use positions to acquire 
public property by misappropriation, embezzlement, theft, fraud or other illegal 
methods”,25 and the regulations relating to economic crime and corruption are mainly 
embodied in the Criminal Code of the People’s Republic of China. 
 
Over the years of legal development, economic crime as a legal term, has not yet 
received a universal definition in China.26 There are scholars who maintain upholding 
the definition of economic crime should be considered within the scope of economics, 
which, in short, covers all crimes that were carried out in an economic context. This 
could include acts against regulations of industry and commerce, business, agriculture, 
finance, tax, custom… and also theft, misappropriation, swindling, looting, illegal 
possession of public and private property and all others which have disrupted economic 
activities and resulted in serious losses (collectively or personally).27 Other scholars 
have argued the definition should be more focused on the behaviour of the offender. 
                                                
24  ‘Guanyu Yancheng Yanzhong Pohuai Jingji de Zuifan de Jueding’ (Decisions on the Severe 
Punishment of Serious Economic Criminals), 22nd Plenary Session of the 5th National People’s Congress, 
8 March 1982. 
25 ‘Zuigao Renmin Fayuan dui Ruogan Wenti de Jieda’ (Answers to Several Questions by the Supreme 
People’s Court), 1985. 
26 See Baibi Liu and Yongsheng Liu (1988), Jingji Xingfa Xue (Economic Crime in the Criminal Law), 
Beijing: Qunzhong Publisher, pp. 55-58; and Baogui Xie and Qiong Zhang (1987), Jingji Fanzui de 
Dingzui yu Liangxing (Conviction and Punishment of Economic Crime), Beijing: Law Press, p. 18 
27 This theory mainly follows the way the term ‘economic crime’ was introduced in the ‘Decisions on the 
Severe Punishment of Serious Economic Criminals’ in 1982, can be found at Editorial Board (1983), 
Jingji Fanzui Wenti Jianghua (Dialogue Concerning Economic Crime), Beijing: Xinhua Press, pp. 1-2; 
and Hanming Xu, Jie Guo and Furong Yang (1996), Jingji Fanzui Xinlun (New Theory on Economic 
Crime), Beijing: China Procuratorate Press, p. 1. 
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The definition refers to the acts, for the purpose of obtaining illegal benefits that abused 
legitimate methods of economic transaction, which directly or indirectly violated 
relevant economic regulations and disrupted the socialist economic order.28 This is an 
ongoing debate among academics while many others have realised that it is the 
implication of economic crime that is more important, and we have to deal with it in 
different contexts under which the crime has occurred. 
 
In 1973, the issue of economic crime gave rise to serious discussions among European 
member states29  and the Council of Europe. Their concern as to the problems of 
economic crime resulted in the undertaking of a detailed study into this matter. Having 
analysed the discussion of ‘the criminological aspects of economic crime’30, the work 
on ‘Contribution of Criminal Law to the Protection of the Environment’31, and the work 
programme for 1977-1978 of the European Committee on Crime Problems (ECCP)32, 
the Council of Europe promulgated the ‘Recommendation of the Committee of 
Ministers to Member States on Economic Crime’33. The recommendation provided a 
comprehensive list of economic offences from cartel to stock exchange and bank 
                                                
28 Jixian Xia (1987), ‘Xi shangpin jingji tizhixia de jingji fanzui’ (Analysing economic crime within the 
economic system), Law Science, 1987, No. 2; and Zhenpan Zhang (1989), Jingji Fanzui yu Duice 
(Economic Crime and its Countermeasure), Beijing: China University of Political Science and Law Press, 
p. 1; and Xiaobing Gong (1991), ‘Jingji fanzui gainian xintan’ (Exploring the definition of economic 
crime), China Legal Science, 1991, No. 2, pp. 97-102. 
29 The mater of economic crime was discussed at the 8th Conference of European Ministers of Justice, 
Stockholm 1973.  
30 The 12th Conference of Directors of Criminological Research Institutes, held in Strasbourg in 1976, 
reports submitted by MM. Tiedemann, Kellens, Leigh and Cosson.  
31 See Report of the European Committee on Crime Problems on Economic Crime (prepared by the Select 
Committee on economic crime). A Select Committee of the European Committee on Crime Problems on 
the Contribution of Criminal Law to the Protection of the Environment concluded its work in 1977 by 
drawing up a report and a draft resolution which was subsequently adopted by the Committee of 
Ministers (Resolution (77) 28). The Select Committee’s work was very much concerned with the question 
of economy.  
32  The question of economic crime was included in the ECCP’s work programme. The Steering 
Committee set up a Select Committee under the chairmanship of Mr P. H. Bolle (Switzerland) to study 
the matter. The Select Committee, with representatives from the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, 
Iceland, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom and 
two consultants began work in 1977. UNSDRI and Interpol are represented by observers.  
33 Adopted by the Committee of Ministers on 25 June 1981 at the 335th meeting of the Ministers’ Deputies.  
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offences, considering that economic crime: “causes loss to a large number of people 
(partners, shareholders, employees, competitors, customers, creditors), to the 
community as a whole and even to the state, which has to bear a heavy financial burden 
or suffers a considerable loss of revenue; harms the national and/or international 
economy; causes a certain loss of confidence in the economic system itself.”34 It was 
mainly due to the considerable growth of economic activity in the Council of Europe 
that member states have started to be aware of such wrongdoing.  
 
In terms of the nature of economic crime, it is proposed that economic crime can be 
divided into two essentially different, but highly related kinds of conduct.35 Firstly, 
there are those activities that dishonestly and unfairly ensure profits fall into the hands 
of, or under the control of, those who engage in the conduct in question. For example, 
the exploitation of inside information or the acquisition of another person’s property by 
deceit with the intention of securing material benefit. A common example among these 
activities may be a person, in possession of inside information, deciding to sell his 
shares before the market price plunges, thereby avoiding a loss. In short, this type of 
conduct guarantees direct material benefit for that person or another affiliated body. 
Secondly, there are also crimes that do not directly involve the unfair taking of a benefit, 
but which are concerned with protecting the benefit that has already been obtained or 
facilitated. A good example is the attempt to protect the proceeds of a crime beyond the 
reach of the law, through money laundering. Therefore, we can see that in general terms 
economic crime involves conducts with an acquisitive character and those of a 
facilitative nature. However, all tend to be motivated directly or indirectly by greed.36 
 
                                                
34 See recommendation No. R (81) 12.  
35 Barry Rider, Haiting Yan and Lihong Xing (2010) Guoji Jinrong Fanzui Yufang yu Kongzhi (The 
Prevention and Control of International Financial Crime), Beijing: China Financial Publishing House, 
p. 3. 
36 Greed was found to be one example of the pleasure component of the rational choice model, in Santon 
Wheeler (1992), ‘The problem of white collar crime motivation’, in White Collar Crime Reconsidered, 
edited by K. Schlegel and D. Weisburd, Boston: Northeastern University Press, p. 112. 
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The concept of financial crime let alone economic crime is far too broad and given the 
constraints of time and space this thesis will only focus on certain specific, albeit 
connected types of economic crime relevant to present day China. 
 
Economically motivated crime  
Although it would be trite to state that economic crime is all about economics and the 
misuse of economic agents, obviously there is some truth in it.37 The objective of almost 
all economically related crimes is to acquire and retain material benefit, as we have 
noted earlier, either by making an illicit profit or avoiding a loss improperly that would 
otherwise have occurred. While the scope and substance of economic crime may vary 
depending upon the sophistication of the environment and legal systems within which 
it occurs, an eternal feature is motivation.38 
 
We can generally claim that the choice of an economic agent to invest his resources in 
illegal activities, thus becoming criminal, will depend largely on two specific conditions, 
given the possible returns: the probability of being incriminated and the punishment he 
will suffer if found guilty.39 Criminals will weigh the possibility of gaining rewards 
against the possibility of incurring punishment. The pattern of individual choice will of 
course vary, as the rewards and punishments accompanying the alternatives vary. As 
Lemert noted: “costs are important variables in analysis because changes in the costs 
of means can modify the order of choices, even though the ‘ideal’ order of the individual 
                                                
37 See generally Gianluca Fiorentini and Sam Peltzman (eds.) (1995), The Economics of Organised Crime, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
38 See Richard A. Cloward and L. E. Ohlin (1960), Delinquency and Opportunity, Chapter 4: Goals, 
norms and anomie, New York: The Free Press; and Diane Vaughan (1982), ‘Toward understanding 
unlawful organizational behaviour’, Michigan Law Review, Vol. 80, pp. 1377-1402; and in the case of 
China’s transitional period, it is argued by Liu that economic motivation is a primary source of increased 
economically motivated crime, in Jianhong Liu (2004), ‘Social transition and crime in China: an 
economic motivation thesis’, Australian & New Zealand Journal of Criminology, Vol. 37, pp. 122-138. 
39  E. M. Lemert (1964), ‘Social Structure, Social Control and Deviation’, in Anomie and Deviant 
Behaviour: A Discussion and Critique, edited by Marshal Barron Clinard, New York: The Free Press, pp. 
62-71; and Arthur L. Stinchcombe (1975), ‘Merton’s Theory of Social Structure’, in The Idea of Social 
Structure, edited by Lewis A. Coser, Routledge, p. 17. 
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remains constant”.40 An analysis of the choices of organised crime undoubtedly follows 
the same approach.41 
 
History records the quest for money has been associated with avarice and thirst for 
power. Hernando Cortez, the conquistador who destroyed the Aztec empire, expressed 
his political adventurism by stating that “we Spaniards suffer from an affliction of the 
soul which can only be cured by gold.”42 Over the years of economic, political and 
social developments, such a motivation in the vast majority of cases remain unchanged. 
Although many criminologists may have hesitated to concern themselves greatly with 
motivations, it is not because they did not exist or were hidden from our eyes, but 
because their attention was focused more intently upon the actual crime and its 
associated punishment than the criminals themselves.43 
 
Opportunities presented in a given society to commit crime vary often depending upon 
the criminal’s social status44 and, of course, not all individuals will recognise, let alone 
act on, the opportunities they encounter.45 This raises the issue as to what motivates 
certain people to seize criminal opportunities while others would dare not think of so 
doing. A former insider trader, Dennis Levin, characterised his seizing of opportunities 
thus: “something deep inside me forced me to try to catch up to the pack of wheeler-
dealers who always raced in front of me… It was only in time that I came to view 
myself as an insider trading junkie. I was addicted to the excitement, the sense of 
                                                
40 Ibid, Lemert (1964), p. 63. 
41 Donato Masciandaro, Elod Takats, and Brigitte Unger (2007), Black Finance, Edward Elgar Publishing 
Ltd, p. 5.  
42 Leften Stavros Stavrianos (1981), Global rift: The Third World comes of age, New York: William 
Marrow, p. 53. 
43 See David Abrahamsen (1946), ‘Motivation of crime’, Boston University Law Review, 26, pp. 91-118. 
44 Nicole Leeper Piquero and Alex Piquero (2001), ‘Characteristics and Sources of White-Collar Crime’, 
in Crimes of Privilege: Reading in White-Collar Crime, edited by Neal Shover and John Paul Wright, 
New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 329-330. 
45 See Sally S. Simpson (1986), ‘The decomposition of antitrust: testing a multi-level, longitudinal model 
of profit-squeeze’, American Sociological Review, Vol. 51, No. 6, pp. 859-875; and Marshall B. Clinard 
and Peter C. Yeager (1980), Corporate Crime, New York: The Free Press. 
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victory.”46 A similar adrenaline rush was enjoyed by Michael Milken and those who 
worked with him.47 The pursuit of fun and excitement swept Levin into insider trading 
and Milken into junk bond trading, which is akin to the excitement described by 
offenders of various criminal domains.48 
 
Having said this, the vast majority of criminal activity that could be described as 
economic crime today is motivated by the desire to acquire or protect financial wealth. 
That is to say, those who engage in economic crime desire more than the allocation of 
markets and in most cases their greed becomes infectious.49 This is all the more true 
when the criminal activity, such as an enterprise, inevitably demands capital to operate, 
with which to facilitate its ambitions. Therefore money, or rather wealth, in its 
dispensable nature, is not only the goal of criminal enterprises but also the lifeblood of 
the enterprise.50  
 
Of course, it is not only in typical economic crimes that the motivation is financial 
advancement. Most corporate crimes are profit driven, and those who engage in 
trafficking activity, whether drugs, arms, people or cultural heritage, do so with the 
objective of economic benefit.51 As a result, until the profits of crime are taken away 
from criminals, we have little chance of effectively disrupting abusive conduct that 
                                                
46 Dennis Levine (1991), Inside Out: An Insider’s Account of Wall Street, New York: Putnam, p. 390. 
47 Dan G. Stone (1990), April Fools: An Insiders’ Account of the Rise and Fall of Drexel Burnham, New 
York: Donald Fine Company, p. 45. 
48 See for example, Jack Katz (1988), Seductions of Crime: Moral and Sensual Attractions in Doing Evil, 
New York: Basic Books; Irving Piliavin, Rosemary Gartner, Craig Thornton and Ross L. Matsueda 
(1986), ‘Crime, deterrence, and rational choice’, American Sociological Review, Vol. 51, No. 1, pp. 101-
119. 
49 See Petter Gottschalk and Robert Smith (2011), ‘Criminal entrepreneurship, white-collar criminality, 
and neutralization theory’, Journal of Enterprising Communities: People and Places in the Global 
Economy, Vol. 5, Iss. 4, pp. 300-308. 
50 Barry A. K. Rider (2004), ‘Law: the war on terror and crime and the offshore centres: the ‘new’ 
perspective?’ edited by Donato Masciandaro, Global Financial Crime: Terrorism, Money Laundering 
and Offshore Centres, Ashgate Publishing Limited, p. 62.  
51 See generally Gary Slapper and Steve Tombs (1999), Corporate Crime, Harlow: Longman. 
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produces great wealth or allows power to be acquired through its profits.52 In terms of 
motivation, the drug lord is essentially no different from those corporate fraudsters or 
insider dealers, and in order to discourage such misconducts, identification of the 
motivation is of key importance. 
 
The element of motivation in crime has now been broadly emphasised in many 
jurisdictions. A very good example is the UK Fraud Act 2006, where new fraud offences 
involve a discernible shift from the previous focus on the crime of ‘deception’ – 
requiring not only that the prosecution prove that the defendant behaved dishonestly 
and with intent to gain or cause loss, but also that there were economic interests 
imperilled by their conduct. Now the focus is towards criminalising conduct which 
imperils economic interests, with greater emphasis on the mens rea of the defendant 
rather than on any actual harm caused.53 The offence is committed if it is carried out 
dishonestly, with fraudulent intention.54 As a result, in the context of modern fraud, it 
is the state of mind (mens rea) that is the determinant factor in liability. 
 
The objective of the Fraud Act 2006 is arguably to widen the law of fraud so as to make 
it easier for the prosecution of fraudsters and to render the law clearer in its application. 
As Judge Alan Wilkie QC, then Law Commissioner of England and Wales, said in July 
2002 when the Law Commission report was published: “our aim, by these technical 
changes to the law, is to make the law of fraud clearer and simpler… (and) as a result 
all concerned whether jurors, police, victims, defendants or lawyers, will be better 
placed to understand who has committed a crime and who has not.”55 The aim is also 
to improve justice and in particular to reduce the amount of time and money wasted in 
                                                
52 See David Chave (2017), ‘Proceeds of crime training: bringing it up to date’, Journal of Financial 
Crime, Vol. 24, Iss. 3, pp. 437-448. 
53 David Ormerod (2011), Smith and Hogan’s Criminal Law, 13th Edition, Oxford University Press, pp. 
871-872. 
54 Ibid, pp. 875-876. 
55 Law Commission, Fraud, Law Com No 276, 2002, available at: http://www.lawcom.gov.uk/app/uplo
ads/2015/03/lc276_Fraud.pdf. 
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handling the current ‘complexity and vagueness of the law’.56 In so far as the new Fraud 
Act bases liability significantly on the concept of ‘dishonesty’, it remains to be seen 
whether there is any greater certainty. 
 
Focusing on the acquisitive nature of many crimes – counteracting criminals through 
their assets is widely underlined by countries throughout the world. The establishment 
and development of financial intelligence has made a positive contribution to the fight 
against serious crime, both in the financial world and the more conventional areas of 
organised crime.57 The use of such strategies is increasingly apparent in the fight against 
corruption and in particular in the provisions of the United Nations Convention Against 
Corruption (UNCAC) 2003, which is promulgated solely for preventing corruption and 
economic crime at both domestic and international levels. China in particular, has put 
itself forward in signing an alliance with the UNCAC. 
 
As discussed above, economic motivation of criminals indicates that one of the 
optimum strategies in combating profitable crime is to render it relatively unprofitable. 
The deterrence model of criminal behaviour assumes people engage in specific modes 
of behaviour, only after careful and rational consideration of the costs (or risks) and the 
benefits (or rewards) of particular courses of action.58 In this context emphasis is on 
risk of exposure rather than actual costs in money. For instance, when a legal writ 
requires the reporting and recording of all financial transactions over a certain amount, 
such as under the Currency Transaction Reporting (CTR) regulations, it will impose 
additional risks and costs for those transferring ‘black money’.59 Thus, engaging in 
                                                
56 News from the Law Commission 30 July 2002, available at: http://www.lawcom.gov.uk/docs/lc276su
m.pdf. 
57 See J. F. Thony (1996), ‘Processing financial information in money laundering matters: the financial 
intelligence units’, European Journal of Crime, Criminal Law and Criminal Justice, Vol. 4, pp. 257-282; 
and Milind Sathye and Chris Patel (2007), ‘Developing financial intelligence: an assessment of the FIUs 
in Australia and India’, Journal of Money Laundering Control, Vol. 10, Iss. 4, pp. 391-405. 
58 See John E. Conklin (1981), Criminology, New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., Inc. and London: 
Collier Macmillan Publishers, p. 392. 
59 David Chaikin (2009), ‘How effective are suspicious transaction reporting system?’, Journal of Money 
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‘smurfing’ and relying on structured transactions just below the reporting threshold, 
will necessitate the involvement of additional contacts and perhaps the creation of 
numerous accounts. This represents a direct cost and effectively increases the risk of 
the launderer being exposed. The primary objective of many disrupting strategies 
operated either by law enforcement or security agencies, is to render involvement 
financially unattractive in that particular jurisdiction. However, this would not inhibit 
displacing serious criminal practices to other locations – perhaps to areas where it is 
more problematic to monitor activities.60 
 
When we focus on the financial aspects of crime and attempting – through a variety of 
deterrents, to render crime comparatively unprofitable, it is often argued that society 
often loses awareness of the seriousness of criminal activity that gives rise to illicit 
wealth.61 Therefore, in countries where law enforcement focuses excessively on asset 
interdiction and removal operations in fighting criminal enterprises, the process 
becomes simply one of taxation or licensing.62 In practice, obviously, the criminals 
would not terminate their wrongdoings until they must pay a significant additional cost, 
which cannot easily be passed onto the consumer. Governments have increasingly 
attempted to facilitate the strike on economic criminal assets, due to the practical 
                                                
Laundering Control, Vol. 12, Iss. 3, pp. 238-253; and Barry Rider (2013), ‘Intelligent investigations: the 
use and misuse of intelligence – a personal perspective’, Journal of Financial Crime, Vol. 20 Iss. 3, pp. 
293-311. 
60 See for example, reported by Nick Mathiason (2010), ‘Dubai's dark side targeted by international fina
nce police’, 24.01.2010, The Guardian, available at: https://www.theguardian.com/business/2010/jan/24
/dubai-crime-money-laundering-terrorism; and also a speech given by the head of the National Crime A
gency UK, Mr. Keith Bristow, reported by Kunal Dutta (2015), ‘London: a global heaven for criminal fi
nancial activity’, Channel4, at: https://www.channel4.com/news/london-tax-haven-financial-crime-terro
rism. 
61 See for example, HM Government (2013), Serious and Organised Crime Strategy, indicated raising a
wareness of the reality and consequence of serious and organised crime is of key importance as a preve
ntive measure, available at: https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/fi
le/248645/Serious_and_Organised_Crime_Strategy.pdf. 
62 See Barry Rider (2009), ‘Old Weapons for New Battles – the Role of Stewardship in the Development 
of Common Law in its Fight Against Corruption and Self-dealing’, Centre of Anti-Corruption Studies, 
ICAC, Hong Kong; and also Barry Rider, Haiting Yan and Lihong Xing (2010) Guoji Jinrong Fanzui 
Yufang yu Kongzhi (The Prevention and Control of International Financial Crime), Beijing: China 
Financial Publishing House, p. 34 
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difficulties faced by law enforcement in many countries, by scaling down the standards 
of proof and promoting civil and administrative legal procedures.63 New laws have also 
placed an increasing burden on private sectors to report suspicious activity to support 
law enforcement. The UK parliament has made meaningful advancements to the 
Bribery Act 2010, where they included a new offence for corporates as: “failure of a 
commercial organisation to prevent bribery”. 64  The Bribery Act also provides a 
statutory defence if the organisation can prove that it had put in place adequate 
procedures to prevent persons associated with it from engaging in bribery. 65  To a 
significant extent, these new laws have shifted risks and responsibilities to those who 
conduct themselves in the ordinary course of their business. 
 
There are also offences which may be described as ‘financially motivated’ where the 
motivation is not purely enrichment. Illegal fundraising for subversive and terrorist 
organisations has been of increasing concern in countries throughout the world, 
following the attacks in New York on September 11, 2001.66 Since then, with strong 
support from many countries – the US in particular, governments have initiated the 
‘Financial War on Terror’, and various laws and regulations have been developed to 
criminalise the financial activities of organised crime, drug, human and arms trafficking 
and smuggling.67 It is worth noting that although the activities of terrorist organisations 
                                                
63 See for example Abraham S. Goldstein (1992), ‘White-collar crime and civil sanctions’, Yale Law 
Journal, Vol. 101, pp. 1895-1900; and Barry A. K. Rider (1995), ‘Civilising the law – the use of civil 
and administrative proceedings to enforce financial services law’, Journal of Financial Crime, Vol. 3, 
Iss. 1, pp. 11-33. 
64 The UK Bribery Act 2010, Section 7. 
65 Ibid, Section 7. 
66 See Nicholas Ryder (2011), Financial Crime in the 21st Century: Law and Policy, Chapter 3: Terrorist 
Financing, p. 51, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd; Barry A. K. Rider (2004), ‘The War on 
Terror and Crime and the Offshore Centres: The ‘New’ Perspective?’ in Global Financial Crime: 
Terrorism, Money Laundering and Offshore Centres, edited by Donato Masciandaro, London and New 
York: Routledge; and Jayesh D’Souza (2012), Terrorist Financing, Money Laundering, and Tax Evasion: 
Examining the Performance of Financial Intelligence Units, Boca Raton: CRC Press. 
67 See Barry A. K. Rider, (2003) ‘Financial regulation and supervision after 11th September 2001’, 
Journal of Financial Crime, Vol. 10 Iss. 4, pp. 336-369; Patrick Hardouin (2009), ‘Banks governance 
and public-private partnership in preventing and confronting organized crime, corruption and terrorist 
financing’, Journal of Financial Crime, Vol. 16, Iss. 3, pp. 199-209. 
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are regarded as organised crime, their motivation is not purely the acquisition of profit. 
In many countries and international organisations, the laws and regulations that have 
been developed, particularly to deal with profit motivated crime, have also been 
adopted to address the issue of terrorist financing.68  For example, the anti-money 
laundering international body the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) has been 
extended to combat terrorist finance, and this has been prominently witnessed by the 
issuance of the FATF’s nine special recommendations on terrorist financing, in addition 
to the existing 40 recommendations on money laundering.69 
 
A criminological analysis 
The rapid growth of transactions and diversification of economic activities have 
elevated economic crime to a global concern.70 The transnational nature of economic 
crime hampers detection and thus hinders investigation and prosecution.71 A collapse 
of one financial institution can soon spread to the rest of the world and may 
consequently contribute to a global crisis. The Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission 
concluded among other causations, the global financial crisis of 2007 was mainly 
caused by “widespread failures in financial regulation and supervision”.72 As the then 
UK Solicitor General Oliver Heald noted in his opening speech of the 31st Cambridge 
International Symposium on Economic Crime: “since the global financial crisis began 
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in late 2007 it seems that financial institutions, markets and businesses have endured 
years of perpetual crisis. Rarely has a week passed without the emergence of some new 
allegation of financial misfeasance, fraud or corruption.”73 Ryder has examined this in 
further detail, stating that white collar crime is considered a key variable that 
contributed to the 2007 financial crisis.74 There have been an increasing number of 
commentators that have concluded that white collar crime either triggered the global 
financial crisis75 or was one of the significant contributory factors76. 
 
In the mid twentieth century, criminal statistics collated in the US indicated 
unequivocally that crime, as popularly conceived and officially reported, had a high 
incidence among the ‘lower classes’ and a low incidence among the ‘upper classes’, 
based on criminals handled by the police, the criminal and juvenile courts and the 
prisons. 77  As a result, a general theory has been forwarded that since a higher 
percentage of crime is concentrated around lower class individuals, it is mainly caused 
by poverty or by personal and social characteristics believed to be associated 
statistically with poverty, such as feeblemindedness, psychopathic deviations, slum 
neighbourhoods and ‘deteriorated’ families.78 However, Sunderland overturned this 
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theory by stating that conventional explanations are invalid, principally because they 
are derived from biased samples that have not included vast areas of criminal behaviour 
of persons not from the lower classes, and he further pointed out one of these neglected 
areas was the criminal behaviour of business and professional men.79  
 
Professor Sutherland stated in his inspirational paper that “the present-day white-collar 
criminals, who are more suave and deceptive than the ‘robber barons’, are 
represented … by many other merchant princes and captains of finance and industry, 
and by a host of lesser followers. Their criminality has been demonstrated again and 
again in the investigations of land offices, railways, insurance, munitions, banking, 
public utilities, stock exchanges, the oil industry, real estate, reorganization committees, 
receiver-ships, bankruptcies, and politics”.80  Indeed, modern criminological efforts to 
enquire into and define economic offences are stem from the work of Sunderland, an 
American sociologist, who invented the term ‘white collar crime’, describing a crime 
committed by a person of respectability and high social status in the course of his 
occupation.81 
 
It is true that certain types of criminal activities are much more likely to be perpetrated 
by persons working in an office rather than in a manual environment. Blue-collar 
workers might engage in stealing stock and equipment, but it may be the clerks who 
engage in fraud. Fraud, generally defined as use of deception to secure unfair or 
unlawful gain, is the core component of many white collar crimes. Others include abuse 
of organisational position or public office. When judges demand secret profit in return 
for favourable bail decisions, they commit white collar crime; when employers 
knowingly or negligently subject their workers to an unsafe work environment, they 
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commit white collar crime too.82 It is evident that human beings, when motivated by 
greed, will take advantage of whatever opportunities exist in their immediate 
environment.83 
 
Before we examine the ‘white collar’ criminals, it is useful to refer to the categorisation 
of certain crimes as ‘white collar’. Sutherland’s definition and the debate surrounding 
it led to much conceptual and linguistic confusion. As Nelken stated, “if Sutherland 
merited a Nobel prize, as Mannheim thought, for pioneering this field of study, he 
certainly did not deserve it for the clarity or serviceableness of his definition”.84 The 
key words of his definition including ‘crime’, committed by ‘persons of respectability 
and high social status’, ‘in the course of’ an ‘occupation’ all lead to issues in 
determining which activities should be included. 
 
Professor Sutherland sought to distinguish crimes associated with respectable or 
legitimate occupations from those ordinary crimes such as murder or rape of high status 
individuals, and from the crimes of those whose occupation under organised or 
professional criminal groups could generally be described as ‘criminal’. This poses the 
immediate problem as to the definitions of ‘high social status’ and ‘respectability’.85 
Even though white collar crimes are often associated with senior managers and 
executives, the term white collar is designed to describe all non-manual workers, and 
any specific form of crime associated with occupations is likely to include a wide range 
of employment levels. Customers can be defrauded by junior or senior sales persons, 
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and corporate executives, secretaries or porters can sell inside information.86 As a result, 
Shapiro argued the definition of white collar crime should be based on an abuse of 
occupational trust because people can lie, cheat or commit sins of omission up and 
down the occupational hierarchy, irrespective of status.87 Croall also stated although 
Sutherland’s focus is mainly on major corporations, small businesses can also be 
responsible for similar offences; consumers can be ‘ripped off’ by local corner shops, 
market stalls or large manufactures, and environmental pollution or safety issues in the 
workplace can be linked with ‘cowboy’ operators or large multinational 
conglomerates.88 Even though the debate on the definition of white collar crime has not 
yet concluded, as most examples of economic crime necessitate a relative degree of 
planning and access, and may only be committed by persons with access to systems for 
recording and transmitting money, many commentators and authors who utilise this 
terminology include economic crime within the class of ‘white collar’ crime. 89 
 
As we have seen, from the perspective of those responsible for preventing and 
controlling crime, it might be worth placing more emphasis upon the economic aspect 
of these offences, and, on the economic motivation of the offender. Sutherland in his 
seminal work, explored this area of activity, and acknowledged that in the case of ‘white 
collar crime’ the main determinant of whether a given individual, provided with the 
opportunity to engage in a crime, is predominantly his perception of the costs and 
benefits involved.90 It is whether the risks of exposure, detection, apprehension and 
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punishment outweigh the benefits they would reasonably expect to receive as fruits of 
the crime.91 When viewed through the crime-as-choice theory, crime unambiguously is 
a purposeful and calculated action.92 
 
Rational choice theory is of key importance, because it not only explains the variation 
in crime, but also justifies a changed emphasis in crime control practice.93 Much of 
what we have previously discussed i.e. the motivation of crime, comes from the rational 
choice perspective. Risks, or the costs of crime, generally include formal sanctions – 
probability of detection and severity of punishment, informal sanctions – loss of 
reputation for both the individual and the company and self-respect, and the cost of 
executing the crime – including time, energy and know-how. Benefits, among other 
things, include increased income, higher status within the organisation, the thrill of 
engaging in the act, obtaining market shares, and reducing organisational expenses.94 It 
needs to be born in mind that opportunity is an important factor in the rational choice 
model, as it varies by type of corporation and position of employment within the given 
corporation.95 
 
It was argued, however, that since the root causes, identified in some theories of crime, 
are perhaps beyond the reach of ameliorative action taken by the state, a more 
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appropriate focus is on policies and practices intended simply to increase the risks of 
choosing crime.96 As we have already acknowledged, compared to street crimes, which 
are typically committed by confronting victims or entering their homes or businesses, 
white collar or economic crime occurs in a much more complex and sophisticated 
environment and is normally committed by using guile, deceit, or misrepresentation to 
exploit illicit advantage with the appearance of a routine legitimate transaction.97 All 
this complicates the analysis in controlling and criminalising such misconduct. 
 
This is not to say that all white collar crimes are morally neutral. However, it does 
suggest that if not everyone, most members of society have a price.98 Although the 
above analysis has been challenged, it generally explains the incidence of certain crimes 
and in particular, many economic crimes. For example, when we say ‘they have a price’, 
they would be prepared to engage in illegal activities for a price which may range from 
a few hundred dollars to millions. It has always been of some surprise when public 
officials and particularly enforcement officials are willing to be exploited for a price.99 
As previously analysed in cases of corruption, the amount of the bribe is not 
commensurate with the benefit received by the briber, and the balance is not weighed 
only by the prospect of additional economic gain – it may also include favours or perks 
placed in the balance. The decision of each individual is influenced by many factors, 
but not least, moral and ethical stance, self-esteem and vulnerability.100 In accord with 
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this view of white collar crime, it is worth emphasising that individuals are all potential 
‘white collar’ criminals, and it is simply a matter of opportunity and the balance of risk 
to reward. 
 
The moral issues in determining at what point the balance tips in favour of crime are of 
key significance not lease to control and prevention. While most people would not 
anticipate murder, rape or other serious crimes of violence, would the same moral rules 
apply in the case of taking advantage of unpublished price sensitive information.101 The 
Federation Against Copyright Theft has directly addressed this issue by stating that 
purchasing a counterfeit video or downloading music or a film without authority, is just 
as much theft as stealing someone’s car or handbag.102 One of the toughest hurdles 
facing those who are concerned with controlling white collar crime is persuading the 
police and judiciary, let alone the public, that there are serious issues at stake.103 
 
Regarding certain technical and regulatory crimes, it is not always easy to find a moral 
content. Indeed, in a civilised society where democracy and the rule of law are 
cherished, there should be a clear moral obligation to obey the law no matter whether 
there is moral content or not.104 However, in reality, the majority obey laws without a 
clear moral content, simply because they have no compelling reason to disobey them 
and may fear punishment.105 Moreover, many of those technical and regulatory laws 
only apply to persons in a specific environment, trading platforms or professions; this 
is particularly so in cases of economic crime. Consequently, observance can be 
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reinforced by a set of inter-related rules and procedures, which make non-compliance, 
at best, inconvenient. 106  Many such rules give certain individuals privilege at 
management level, so that they would rather follow the rules in their own self-interest. 
Everything could change when a substantial and disproportionate benefit or profit arises, 
and the balance could inevitably be broken. 
 
It is important to remember when dealing with economic and financial crime, that many 
of the rules and procedures will not necessarily be within the scope of criminal law. In 
particular in jurisdictions with a civilian tradition, where laws and their procedures are 
more organised and often confined within codes, problems inevitably occur. To amend 
this, it is necessary to promote the diversity of rules to ensure integrity within the 
financial and business world. While common law systems are not immune from such 
difficulties, the approach of the legal system and the courts seem to be rather more 
pragmatic. This is a factor that requires consideration in the context of parallel 
proceedings. 107  It is desirable to note that in developing an effective system to 
discourage and prevent economic crime, all the weapons of the legal system, including 
the civil law and compliance procedure, are of key importance.108 In the business world, 
an individual working in a bank or other financial institution, is more likely to be 
influenced and controlled by the in-house compliance system and the terms of their 
contract of employment, instead of the provisions of the criminal law.109 In today’s 
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world, the majority of relevant criminological analysis tends to be confined to violations 
of the criminal law, neglecting the rather more important non-criminal controls. It is 
perhaps partly for this reason that criminological discussion has tended not to concern 
itself with the prevention and control of economic crime.  
 
Economic and social implications of economic crime 
Even though economic crime is often deemed to be victimless, this is in fact far from 
true.110 In actuality, it is often the case that a great deal of economic and white collar 
crime goes unreported due to the fact that many of its victims are unaware they have 
been victimised.111 Differing from robbery, burglary, and other street crimes, acts of 
white collar crime do not commonly stand out in victims’ experiences – they often have 
the image of routine legitimate transactions. As noted, economic crime and white collar 
crime lead to an astronomical toll in deaths, physical health, emotional suffering, and 
fiscal costs, one that beyond any losses caused by street crime. 112  However, this 
assertion has not been seriously challenged, given the difficulty in determining those 
costs with any precision or confidence. Furthermore, the victim of economic crime, in 
general circumstances, may not be a specific individual but one of many. For example, 
the collapse of America’s once renowned enterprise, Enron Corporation, in November 
2001: the crime committed had huge implications; its stockholders and the relevant 
industrial area were deeply affected, and nearly 20,000 Enron employees lost or 
suffered severe reductions in their retirement funds.113 Indeed, this has been further 
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explained by the FATF: “Criminal proceeds have the power to corrupt and ultimately 
destabilise communities or [even] whole national economies”.114 
 
Based on the inter-relationship of actors and institutions within the economy and from 
one economy to another, financial risk can have grave and relayed effects. Various 
investigations into the causes of the tsunami of United States financial markets in the 
1920s, contributing greatly to the Great Depression, discovered many cases of financial 
fraud, insider dealing and market manipulation.115 As in the collapse of the financial 
markets in the 1990s in South East Asia and the Far East, such misconduct significantly 
contributed to the vulnerability of institutions and investors.116 The collapse of the 
Indian financial market in the late 1980s was another case of massive speculation and 
manipulation. The prevalence of unregulated and illegal practices in the financial 
markets undoubtedly contribute to their potential instability and leads to economic and 
social damage within the society.  
 
Despite the enormous efforts made by such agencies as the UN, the FATF and nation 
states, it is still impossible to accurately quantify the extent of economic crime. It is 
partly because there are too many methodological difficulties when dealing with 
statistics of this type,117 but it is also due to the fact that almost all of the criminal 
behaviour is clandestine and thus undiscovered and unreported.118 However, analysis 
of the official documentation offers an intriguing insight into the estimated level of 
various types of economic crime. For instance, the FATF, quoting the IMF, indicated 
that between 2 and 5 per cent of the world’s gross domestic product (GDP) is associated 
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with money laundering, ranging from between $590bn and $1.5tn.119 According to the 
Treasury Department, the estimated amount of money laundered in the US is $600bn 
per year.120 
 
The National Fraud Authority in the UK estimated that for the period of 2011/2012, the 
cost of fraud to the UK’s economy was in the region of £73 billion; this can be broken 
down into losses of £20.3 billion from the public sector (primarily through tax, benefits 
and tax credits and government frauds), £45.5 billion from the private sector (including 
financial services, professional services, construction and engineering, natural 
resources, retail, wholesale and distribution and manufacturing), £1.1 billion from the 
non-profit sector and £6.1 billion from UK individuals (mass marketing, rental and 
online tickets).121 HM Treasury reports “organised crime generates over £20bn of social 
and economic harm in the UK each year”.122 In 2004, the Home Office declared that 
organised crime “reaches into every community, ruining lives, driving other crime and 
instilling fear”.123 The FATF states “UK law enforcement estimates the economic and 
social costs of serious organised crime, including the costs of combating it, are upwards 
of £20bn a year. It is estimated that the total quantified organised crime market in the 
UK is worth about £1.5bn per year as follows: drugs (50%); excise fraud (25%); fraud 
(12%); counterfeiting (7%); organised immigration crime (6%).”124 
 
One other cost that of increasing importance is the investment financial institutions 
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have placed in their compliance and regulatory office. In 2014, research carried out by 
the Forum of Private Business estimated total UK business compliance costs of more 
than £19.2 billion – a 4% increase on the 2013 figure.125 Taking one example, the 
London-based HSBC holdings disclosed in 2014 that it has set aside more than $1.6 
billion to cover legal and compliance costs in connection with several on-going 
regulatory investigations and improvements to its compliance operations. Furthermore, 
the HSBC Group Chief Executive Officer, Stuart Gulliver, added that nearly one in 10 
of the bank’s 257,900 employees – or 24,800 employees – were working for risk and 
compliance teams. With the increase in the headcount in compliance space over the last 
two years, he stated, “we are not through the regulatory change agenda quite yet.”126 
HSBC is not the only bank increasing its expenses and staff on compliance offices127 
and following the financial crisis, and the inevitable cost, this expansion will continue 
to rise in the foreseeable future. This nonetheless increases the expenditure of financial 
institutions and certainly needs to be considered when assessing the economic 
implications of economic crime.  
 
Further costs associated with elements of economic crime include the damage caused 
by financial abuse of poor regulatory frameworks, which undermines confidence in a 
country’s financial system and may subsequently result in financial crisis. Such losses 
relating to the total costs of the crises are impossible to quantify. There are also similar 
difficulties in attempting to estimate the effects of tax evasion, harmful tax competition 
and corruption.128 Economic crime clearly has a heavy negative and costly influence on 
                                                
125 HSBC (2014), Business hot news, “Small firms’ compliance costs continue to rise”, available at: 
https://www.knowledge.hsbc.co.uk/business-news/article/small-firms-compliance-costs-continue-to-
rise. 
126 Jaclyn Jaeger (2014), “HSBC Legal, Compliance Costs Surpass $1.6 Billion”, November 4, 2014, 
Compliance Week, available at: http://www.complianceweek.com/blogs/the-filing-cabinet/hsbc-legal-
compliance-costs-surpass-16-billion#.VPR6xUJj7dk 
127 See also Jaclyn Jaeger (2013) “JPMorgan to Spend $4 Billion on Compliance and Risk Efforts”, 
September 13, 2013, Compliance Week, at http://www.complianceweek.com/blogs/boards-
governance/jpmorgan-to-spend-4-billion-on-compliance-and-risk-efforts#.VPSa6UJj7dm 
128 International Monetary Fund (12 February 2001), Financial System Abuse, Financial Crime and 
Money Laundering – Background Paper, p. 11. 
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the economies of countries world-wide.  
 
In recent years, terrorism has become a further area that has brought significant 
attention to both national and international organisations. The effect of terrorist attacks 
is hugely disruptive, for example the terrorist attacks in London; the disruption to the 
transport system caused by the bomb attacks of 7 and 21 July 2005 alone is estimated 
to have cost the nation in excess of £3bn.129 Similarly, the Bishopsgate bomb in London 
in 1993 caused damage to property totalling over £1bn.130 
 
To a narrower degree, the impact of economic crime can also be seen on an individual 
level, although the losses may be minimal compared to the public and private sectors. 
For example, this may include a reduced flow of wealth between generations in families, 
subsequently resulting in a loss of tax revenue for the government through inheritance 
tax. Indeed, Deem insists that victims of economic crime can suffer as much as those 
who have been victims of violent crimes.131 Spalled emphasised that outrage, anger, 
fear, stress, anxiety and depression were experienced by victims of the Maxwell pension 
fraud and many victims of this fraud thought that their husbands’ death had been caused, 
if not accelerated, as a result of these events.132 
 
The US National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders stated in 1968 that the 
quality of life in a community rests on a sense of personal security that is more 
influenced by crime than by anything else.133 Crime has a greater impact on society 
                                                
129 Gary Scanlan (2006),"The enterprise of crime and terror – the implication for good business", Journal 
of Financial Crime, Vol. 13 Iss. 2 pp. 164 - 176. 
130 HM Treasury (2002), Combatting the financing of terrorism, London, p. 11.  
131 See Debble L. Deem (2000), “Notes from the Field: Observations in Working with the Forgotten 
Victims of Personal Financial Crimes”, Journal of Elder Abuse & Neglect, Vol. 12, Iss. 2, pp. 33-48. 
132 See Basia Spalek (1999), “Exploring the Impact of Financial Crime: A Study Considering the Effects 
of the Maxwell Scandal Upon the Maxwell Pensioners”, International Review of Victimology, 6, pp. 210-
220. 
133 US National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders (1968), Report of the National Advisory 
Commission on Civil Disorders. New York: Bantam Books, 1968, p. 266.  
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than can simply be estimated. In particular, crimes such as white collar crime, involves 
major social costs in addition to the exorbitant financial losses to the public. The US 
President’s Commission on Law Enforcement and the Administration of Justice stated 
in 1967 that white collar crimes are “the most threatening of all – not just because they 
are so expensive, but because of their corrosive effect on the moral standards by which 
American business is conducted.”134  
 
When considering the economic aspects of economic crime, the influence and conduct 
of the crime may have a far greater impact than the actual monetary value of the 
property in question. This is particularly so in the case of corruption and bribery. For 
example, when a bribe is paid by a businessman to accomplish a certain objective, 
neither the briber nor the recipient may feel that he has suffered a loss. However, society 
certainly suffers from such transactions. One observer has thus assessed the costs of 
bribes: “if a buyer for an automobile manufacture takes a $25,000 bribe from a supplier 
of shock absorbers in connection with a $1 million contract, what is the true social and 
economic cost? It is not the $25,000. It is not the difference between the contract price 
and what someone else would have charged. The true loss might be measured in these 
ways, of course, or by a qualitative evaluation of the shock absorbers supplied, but the 
major loss might well be the erosion of the integrity of the buying operation itself which 
could contribute to further losses in other transactions”.135 
 
In a western capitalist economic system that relies on public investment, even though a 
common reaction by businessmen to revelations of white collar crime is defensiveness 
rather than condemnatory, the structure of the economy is seriously weakened by white 
collar crime.136 However, focussing on the issue of corruption on the other side of the 
                                                
134  The President’s Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice (1967), The 
Challenge of Crime in a Free Society, Washington, D.C., U.S. Government Printing Office, p. 5. 
135 Herbert Edelhertz (1970), The Nature, Impact and Prosecution of White-Collar Crime, Washington, 
D.C. U.S. Government Printing Office, 1970, pp. 8-9. 
136 John E. Conklin (1981), Criminology, New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., Inc. and London: Collier 
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globe, China – a communist country with the fastest growing economy in the world, 
this would certainly make the situation much more complicated and even threatening.  
 
The situation in China 
China, the most dynamic economy in the world, and widely predicted to be the 
dominant economy within the next ten years, has attracted enormous business and 
investment from many nations. However, as the world’s largest emerging market, the 
lack of a consistent legal regime to sufficiently deal with economic crime undermines 
China’s economic growth, discourages foreign investment and disrupts the effective 
distribution of economic resources. Also, in a society where paying bribes is embedded 
in its tradition, there is no equality of competition and ultimately no trust among citizens, 
and most importantly, it undermines the institutions and values of democracy, ethical 
values and justice – jeopardizing sustainable development and the rule of law.137 
Moreover, corruption brings about substantial damage to the Chinese government and 
the ruling party, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Former president Hu Jintao has 
warned on numerous occasions138 that the party’s survival and popular support depends 
upon the integrity of party officials, and the acts of corruption and other related crimes 
by party members would cause public distrust and is causing great damage and 
disrepute to the reputation of the CCP. 
 
The current President Xi Jinping has taken a fast and robust action, and initiated a 
campaign to fight corruption immediately after he took over as the party leader in 2012. 
This campaign has prompted many high-profile cases, involving Zhou Yongkang (once 
headed party’s Central Commission for Discipline Inspection and China’s Ministry of 
Public Security), Bo Xilai (former Communist Party Chief in Chongqing and a member 
                                                
Macmillan Publishers, pp. 59-60 
137 United Nations Convention against Corruption, Preamble, United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 
United Nations, 2004, p. 5. 
138 These include his speech at 18th Communist Party Congress (2012), 90th anniversary of the founding 
of the Communist Party Congress (2011). 
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of CCP Central Politburo), and Xu Caihou (former Vice-Chairman of the Central 
Military Commission and top-ranking General of the People’s Liberation Army). 
Indeed, President Xi has left society, as well as the rest of the world, with a strong signal 
and in no doubt, as to how serious the new leadership considers the situation.  
 
We need to bear in mind that corruption and economic crime exist in virtually every 
country in the world, and the question the government and the enforcement agencies 
are facing, is perhaps not the elimination, but rather the extent to which the social 
society and the people within that society can tolerate it. Along with this robust anti-
corruption movement led by President Xi, there have been many commentators, 
businessmen and perhaps some politicians complaining that this reaction has gone too 
far – from the top to the bottom of the political hierarchy inside China, no one really 
knows who is going to be accused next. Foreign companies undoubtedly become 
hesitant to invest in China since they have no interest in getting involved in any 
allegations regarding corruption offences, such as the British multinational healthcare 
company GlaxoSmithKine being fined $490m (£297m) for ‘massive and systemic 
bribery’.139 
 
When we consider the economic implications of corruption, we need to differentiate 
between the short and long-term effects. Historical literature suggests that corruption 
may promote economic growth in the short-term as it relaxes inefficient and rigid 
regulations imposed by the government,140 and bribes in a bidding process can promote 
efficiency since most established firms are often those who can afford the highest 
bribe.141 On the other hand, corruption has a negative effect on the economy’s long-
                                                
139 BBC (2014), “GlaxoSmithKline fined $490m by China for bribery”, BBC News, 19.09.2014, available 
at: http:// www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-29274822. 
140 See Nathaniel H. Leff (1964), ‘Economic development through bureaucratic corruption’, American 
Behavioural Scientist, Vol. 8, Iss. 2, pp. 8-14; see also Samuel P. Huntington (1968), Political Order in 
Changing Societies, New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press. 
141 See Da-Hsiang Donald Lien (1987), ‘A note on competitive briber games’, Economics Letters, Vol. 
22, Iss. 4, pp. 337-341; see also Paul J. Beck and Michael W. Maher (1986), ‘A comparison of bribery 
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term growth rate. 142  Likewise, recently in China, Nobel Laureate in Economics, 
Michael Spence, is publicly against those who believe China’s war on corruption has 
gone too far, stating “I do not think one should assume this is a failure at all but rather 
a very important first step and my expectation is it will lead to pretty decent healthy 
structure change and healthy growth prospects in China”.143  
 
Finally, we also need to consider that the vast figures involved in financial statements, 
as we have discussed previously, may only be the tip of the iceberg. With such far-
ranging impacts, it is vital that the national government has effective regulatory systems 
and legislation in place, which can efficiently prevent and reduce the commission of 
such activities. 
 
The distinction between facilitative and non-facilitative crime 
As discussed, regarding the nature of criminal behaviour, there is a distinction between 
criminal activity which is designed to make a direct profit and criminal activity that 
facilitates the process or safeguards illegal wealth. Structuring and running money 
laundering operations is deemed as an essential procedure in providing criminals with 
protection of their illegal gains. Criminals would not get caught by simply carrying out 
money transferring activities; they would not even commence laundering money until 
they have secretly received or been promised illegal proceeds. Accordingly, as the FATF 
emphasised, money laundering is the facilitative process by which criminals disguise 
the original source and control of the proceeds of criminal activity, by making such 
proceeds appear to have derived from a legitimate source.144  
 
                                                
and bidding in thin markets’, Economics Letters, Vol. 22, Iss. 1, pp. 1-5. 
142 See Francis T. Lui (1996), ‘Three aspects of corruption’, Contemporary Economic Policy, Vol. 14, 
Iss. 2, pp. 26-29. 
143 ‘Ani-corruption crucial for China’s long-term growth: Nobel laureate’, Xinhua News, 09.10.2014, 
available at: http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2014-10/09/c_133702322.htm 
144  ‘What is Money Laundering’, Financial Action Task Force, available at: http://www.fatf-
gafi.org/pages/faq/moneylaundering/  
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It is interesting to consider the distinction between the crime of money laundering and 
other crimes. We understand that most crimes eventually have a clear effect such as a 
dead body (murder), missing property (theft) or a counterfeit product, whilst money 
laundering, which has a facilitative nature, may have no trace or impact. In addition, 
most crimes have a clear victim whereas in the case of money laundering it is unclear 
who the specific victim is, other than in a broad sense, the public, financial institutions 
and a country’s economy.145  
 
In considering the extent to which criminals engage in money laundering to avoid the 
confiscation of the proceeds of their criminal conduct by the authorities, it is vital to 
consider that the more criminals consider their assets are at risk, the more likely they 
will justify the costs and risks of laundering.146 This is perhaps one of the reasons why 
London became so significant in laundering operations, due to its sophisticated 
intelligence unit.147  China’s recent Anti-Money Laundering Law148  promulgated in 
2007, has placed particular emphasis on Chinese financial institutions to record and 
report suspicious transactions. In recent years, several notable cases reporting multi-
national financial institutions being fined for failure to maintain an effective money-
laundering programme were commended for their efforts by several governments. For 
example, in December 2012, HSBC paid a record $1.9 billion fine for laundering 
hundreds of millions of dollars for drug traffickers, terrorists and sanctioned 
governments such as Iran;149  
 
                                                
145 See generally Dennis Cox (2014), Handbook of Anti-Money Laundering, Chichester: John Wiley. 
146 See Hans Geiger and Oliver Wuensch (2007), ‘The fight against money laundering: an economic 
analysis of a cost-benefit paradoxon’, Journal of Money Laundering Control, Vol. 10, Iss. 1, pp. 91-105. 
147 See Jack A. Blum, Michael Levi, Thomas Naylor and Phil Williams (1999), ‘Financial havens, 
banking secrecy and money laundering’, Criminal Justice Matters, Vol. 36, Iss. 1, pp. 22-23. 
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Today, in the context of developing jurisdictions, it should be considered that the 
laundering process itself is essentially an uneconomic and wasteful process, and 
therefore it is vital to consider adopting and implementing crime control strategies; the 
practical profits and the costs of addressing the problem merely facilitate economic 
crimes. 
 
The crime of corruption is also known to be, by nature, facilitative in its various forms. 
Indeed, in society, criminals do not bribe or wrongfully enrich others as a means to an 
end. Those who try to corrupt others, whether by bribery or blackmail, do so with the 
intent of gaining an advantage that has significant economic benefits. To make the act 
of corruption meaningful, generally, the financial significance of such misconduct will 
vastly exceed the financial benefit to the recipient of the bribe. Indeed, the amount of 
the bribe will often be wholly disproportionate to the benefit acquired by the briber. The 
conduct of corruption however, is to facilitate other crimes, as it inclicts massive 
damage to the country and most importantly, it undermines the integrity and the 
credibility of its own society.150 This is the reason why President Xi Jinping embarked 
upon a serious campaign in fighting corruption as soon as he took over as the party 
chief. He stressed, “We must have the resolution to fight every corrupt phenomenon, 
punish every corrupt official and constantly eradicate the soil which breeds corruption, 
so as to earn people’s trust with actual results”.151 
 
In comparison, in the economic world, one of the best examples of non-facilitative 
crimes is perhaps the conduct of those who purposefully take advantage of privileged 
information in their own field within the economic market, also known as insider 
dealing. The classic case that is often cited of abuse of inside information is where a 
                                                
150 See generally Rose-Ackerman Susan (2016), Corruption and Government: Causes, Consequences, 
and Reform, 2nd Edition, New York: Cambridge University Press; see also Barry Rider (ed), Corruption 
– The Enemy Within, 1997, The Hague and London: Kluwer Law International. 
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director of a company learns, in a private board meeting, that his company’s profit 
forecasts are about to be revised to a significant extent and then trades in the stock 
market based on this information, before it is made publicly available. In such 
circumstances, the director has clearly and purposefully taken advantage of his position 
and the information that came to him due to his seat on the board. Most jurisdictions 
have, in recent years, enacted legislation particularly to deal with the issue of directors 
and officers within companies. Insider dealing is not only confined to those holding 
office in a company; many regulatory systems impose prohibitions on anyone who 
acquires such information, with knowledge that it comes from a privileged source.152 
However, despite the legal measures that have been enacted, there is still considerable 
scepticism as to whether it provides sufficient protection to investors and the markets. 
 
Overall, it is deemed that facilitative economic crimes do not refer to crimes such as 
insider dealing, with an acquisitive intent of acquiring direct benefits, but are more often 
to be seen as important or even requisite components in constituting the whole process 
of crime. This however introduces even more complexities to both the international 
community and domestic enforcement agencies, in respect of the extent to which 
society should consider addressing and punishing merely facilitative economic crimes.  
 
Conclusion 
In this chapter we have attempted to emphasise the threat that economically motivated 
crime presents to the stability of China. In so far as economic misconduct directly 
interferes with the proper operation of markets, especially those in which confidence is 
an important factor, with the opening of the Chinese economy both the CCP and the 
government have had to be mindful of the risks. Indeed, given essentially the elitism of 
the Chinese political system the possibility that society – perhaps influenced by 
criticism from outside China, will brand the leadership as corrupt or engaged in 
                                                
152 See Barry Rider, Kern Alexander, Stuart Bazley and Jeffrey Bryant (2016), Market Abuse and Insider 
Dealing, 3rd Edition, Heywards Heath: Bloomsbury Professional, p. 1. 
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economic abuse the dangers in terms of political and social stability are all the more 
serious. 
 
While underlining these vitally important issues for China and for that matter all states, 
especially those with developing economies, we attempt to provide some degree of 
specificity to our discussion and analysis of the law. We refer to the academic discussion 
that has taken place in and around defining economic crime and financial crime. We 
make the point, however, that little stands by precise definitions and tend to place more 
emphasis on the work of Professor Sutherland. His analysis as to the characteristic 
motivation of crime presents a useful tool to those seeking to discourage economically 
motivated misconduct, whether this be at the level of law or compliance. Consequently 
we do not attempt a thorough literature review of the definition of economically 
motivated misconduct, but rather focus on those issues of particular relevance to China.
Chapter 2: A Historical Review of the Control of Corruption 
on Economic Crime in China 	
Professor Barry Rider once said: “attitudes to corruption in China are about as mixed 
as a good chop suey!” 1  China becomes the focus of this study not because it is 
particularly prone to corruption. Corruption exists in all societies, whether it is socialist 
or capitalist, developed or underdeveloped. However, China is unique in its means of 
understanding, identifying and combating corruption, given that China is a socialist 
country with a long history of bureaucratic culture.2 The Chinese Communist Party 
(CCP) has placed many constrains on bureaucracy since its foundation due to the party’s 
egalitarian ideal among its society. Having said this, the party continues to rely heavily 
on the bureaucracy to manage the centrally planned and hierarchically ordered economy. 
Consequently, administrative power and its associated privileges essentially turned the 
bureaucracy into a powerful social class.3 
 
Many of the oldest and draconian laws against corruption can be found in China in 
various forms, and over the long and rich tapestry of Chinese cultural development 
there have been instances where harsh and sometimes effective actions have been taken 
against individuals and even the system. However, throughout history, those measures 
failed more often than succeeded in those fights, and no dynasty has ever escaped the 
cycle of rise and fall that was linked to the phenomenon of corruption.4 An ancient 
                                                
1 Barry A. K. Rider (2013), ‘When Chinese Whispers become Shouts!’, Journal of Financial Crime, 
Editorial, Vol.20, Iss. 2. 
2 See Ting Gong (1994), The Politics of Corruption in Contemporary China: An Analysis of Policy 
Outcomes, Westport: Praeger Publishers, p. 15. 
3 Ibid; see also Jiangnan Zhu (2017), ‘Corruption networks in China: An Institutional Analysis’, in 
Routledge Handbook of Corruption in Asia, edited by Ting Gong and Ian Scott, London and New York: 
Routledge, pp. 27-32. 
4 Feng Ye (2002), ‘The Chinese Procuratorates and the Anti-Corruption Campaigns in the People’s 
Republic of China’, in Implementation of Law in the People’s Republic of China, edited by Jianfu Chen, 
Yuwen Li and Jan Michiel Otto, The Hague: Kluwer Law International, p. 114. 
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Chinese idiom ‘yi shi wei jian’5 describes that we should always take history as a mirror. 
Indeed, China has a very long history of fighting corruption and it is significant to 
consider the past before we move on to discuss various initiatives against economic 
crime that are being taken in modern China, given the political, social and culture issues 
that this topic raises. Within this chapter, the author proposes to examine the legal 
history of corruption control in China, from its ancient times up until 1978 – the year 
China launched its ‘open-door’ policy. 
 
Corruption control in ancient China 
Chinese Slavery Societies (2070-476 B.C.) 
A famous economist once stated: “the entire Chinese history was a history of 
embezzlement”6. Despite an exaggeration of the facts, it does suggest that corruption 
has been a serious issue throughout China’s history. Indeed, the history of China’s legal 
system is long standing and well established, and the content of its legislative culture is 
fertile and colourful. Anti-corruption laws formed an important part of the ancient 
Chinese legal system, and the systematisation, legalisation and institutionalisation of 
the punishment of corruption-related crimes appeared as early as in the slavery era.7 
During the slavery societies of Xia, Shang and Zhou Dynasties, there were already 
written records of laws and regulations to punish officials committing offences of 
bribery and corruption.8 Over 2000 years ago, during the Yao Shun Yu period, when the 
judiciary enacted rules for the emperor, there were provisions to punish corrupt officials, 
given the label ‘Ink Penalty’9, meaning if the official was found guilty of corruption, 
                                                
5 ‘以史为鉴’ in Chinese. 
6 Yanan Wang (1987), Zhongguo Guanliao Zhengzhi Yanjiu (A Study of Chinese Bureaucratic Politics), 
Beijing: Chinese Social Sciences Press, p. 117. 
7Liming Xu (1995), ‘Zhongguo Gudai Fantan Fangtan de Zuofa’ (Practice in fighting corruption in 
ancient China), CassJournal of Political Science, 1995, No. 1, pp. 18-25; see also Barry Rider, Haiting 
Yan and Lihong Xing (2010) Guoji Jinrong Fanzui Yufang yu Kongzhi (The Prevention and Control of 
International Financial Crime), Beijing: China Financial Publishing House, p. 182. 
8 According to the record of ‘Zuo-Zhuan Zhao-Gong 14 Nian’ (Classical Annals of Lu, Zuozhuan 14 
Years of Zhao Duke). 
9 ‘Mo Xing’ or墨刑 in Chinese. 
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the punishment was to ‘tattoo his or her face’. This is the earliest record of legal content 
regarding corruption in Chinese history, and this was subsequently inherited by China’s 
first dynasty, the Xia Dynasty10.  
 
The Book of Documents of the Xia Dynasty11 provides that anti-corruption regulations 
were part of the fundamental laws made by then Minister for Law, Gao Tao. At that 
time, there were three types of crimes that could result in the death sentence: ink (Supra), 
theft and murder. When the next dynasty, Shang, was founded in 1600 B.C., having 
observed the fall of its previous dynasty, Xia, Shang soon formulated provisions of anti-
corruption as a means to warn its officers. The ‘Officer’s code’12 was promulgated and 
specifically provided three bad tendencies and ten crimes; among these three tendencies, 
one was greed for money and goods.13 It further stated that once an official violated any 
of these provisions, he and his entire family shall be sentenced to death, and if it was 
committed by the emperor, his kingdom shall be replaced.14 
 
Corruption in the Shang Dynasty was regarded as a serious crime that concerned the 
survival of the nation. In the Western Zhou period (1046-771 B.C.), legal rules were set 
in place, and anti-corruption regulations were more unequivocal than in the past. Lu 
Code was forwarded at that time and is regarded as the earliest legal rule in relation to 
the fight against judicial corruption in Chinese history.15 In 927 B.C., Mr. Lu, appointed 
by the emperor Zhou Mu Wang as the Minister of Justice of Western Zhou, was assigned 
to reform the legal system and supplement the criminal legal rules and draft the code – 
                                                
10 Xia Dynasty or夏朝 (2070 B.C. – 1600 B.C.) is the first dynasty in China to be described in ancient 
historical chronicles such as Bamboo Annals, Classic of History and Records of the Grand Historian. 
11 ‘Xia-Shu’ or《夏书》 in Chinese. 
12 ‘Guan Xing’ or《官刑》in Chinese, general regulations for public officials. 
13 Meiqing Xue (1996), ‘Zhongguo Gudai Chengtan Falu de Shijian jiqi Zhaoshi’ (Implementation of 
Laws for Punishing Corruption in Ancient China and its Enlightenment), Jurist Review, 1996, No. 4, pp. 
33-40. 
14 ‘Book of Documents of Yi Code’ (‘Shangshu Yixun’ or《尚书·伊训》in Chinese). 
15 ‘Criminal Punishments of the Marques Lu’ (‘Lu Xing’ or《吕刑》in Chinese), it is the earliest extant 
criminal law literature and contains rules related to corruption and bribery. 
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the Lu Code. The code provided that if judicial officials were found guilty of corruption, 
they would receive punishments as harsh as those criminals and the prerogative of 
mercy should not be taken into consideration.16 Another development in the Western 
Zhou Dynasty was the establishment of special state organs to combat corruption, 
although the legal system at that time was not generally regarded as perfect nor 
advanced. There were two state organs relating to the prohibition of corruption, namely 
‘Sikou’ (司寇) which was known as the Ministry of Justice at that time. The officers 
within were ‘Sishi’ (司士); the other organ being the Finance and Accounting 
Department, which supervised the finance and expenditure of all the state departments 
as well as all levels of local government.17 
 
Instruments curbing corruption were further evolved through the Spring and Autumn 
period (771-476 B.C.) and the Warring States period (475-221 B.C.). Li Kui (李悝 455-
395 B.C.), who was then Prime Minister of the Wei State in the period of the Warring 
States, compiled the ‘Classic Law of Li Kui’18 – the first complete written law in 
Chinese history which contained the earliest legal articles regarding the punishment of 
corruption-related crimes. One of its primary six sections was ‘Law of Miscellaneous 
Provisions’19, containing crimes of stealing of official seals, obstruction of state affairs 
and corruption. One article among the selection was entitled ‘Prohibition of Gold’20; 
this was to prevent officials from taking bribes. The article also stated that if the prime 
minister took a bribe, his subordinates shall also be punished, and the sentence to them 
could be as harsh as the death penalty; other officials could also be sentenced to death 
if the amount of bribes they received reached a certain level.21 
                                                
16 ‘Book of Documents of Lu Code’ (‘ShangshuLuxing’ or《尚书·吕刑》 in Chinese). 
17  Xiaoguang Xu and Baojun Lu (1998), ‘Zhongguo Gudai Fanfu Chengtan Falu Zhidu Sshuyao’ 
(Summary of the Legal System on Combating Corruption and Bribery in Ancient China), Modern Law 
Science, 1998, No.4, pp. 115-120. 
18 Also known as the ‘Cannon of laws’, ‘Fa Jing’ or《法经》in Chinese. 
19‘Za Lu’ or《杂律》in Chinese. 
20 ‘Jin Jin’ or禁金 in Chinese. 
21 ‘Jin Jin’, ‘Za Lu’ in ‘Fa Jing’. 
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Chinese Feudal Society (221 B.C.-1911 A.D.) 
China has had a long lasting feudal society which lasted for more than 2000 years. In 
order to maintain the rulers’ interests and ensure the safety of the state, emperors from 
different dynasties enacted various anti-corruption laws and used substantive measures 
to penalise corrupt officials. In the Qin Dynasty (221-260 B.C.), the first imperial 
dynasty and the start of the long feudal period in Chinese history, the founding Emperor 
Qin Shi Huang (260-211 B.C.) set up an autocratic centralised feudal rule and unified 
all the laws and regulations which were previously used by other states through the 
Warring States period. He also enacted extreme laws and regulations on combating 
crimes including corruption.22 For example, the Qin code provided that anybody who 
stole leaves from other mulberry trees worth less than one qian23 would be sentenced 
to 30-days compulsory labour service, and if five people or more engaged in the same 
theft, they would lose their left legs as a punishment. Emperor Qin Shi Huang also 
attached great importance on exposing corrupt officials. In the ‘Questions and Answers 
to Law’24 of the ‘Rules of Qin’25, corruption was regarded as theft, and was punished 
based on the provisions of theft. According to the rule, officials who misappropriated 
public funds and who borrowed money from local governments without advance 
approval would be deemed guilty of theft, and would be punished as thieves. Both 
giving and receiving bribes was prohibited, and anyone who gave, accepted or helped 
someone to keep the bribes would be punished severely. Peculation was also strictly 
prohibited, where the Qin Emperor enacted the ‘Rules of Efficiency’ 26 , in which 
ombudsmen in the capital were sent to supervise local officials on a regular basis. The 
                                                
22 Meiqing Xue (1996), ‘Zhongguo Gudai Chengtan Falu de Shijian jiqi Zhaoshi’ (Implementation of 
Laws for Punishing Corruption in Ancient China and its Enlightenment), Jurist Review, 1996, No. 4, pp. 
33-40. 
23 Qian is an old currency denomination used in China and East Asia; one qian equals to 10 candareens 
and is 1/10 of a tael. 
24‘Falu Wenda’ or《法律问答》in Chinese. 
25‘Qin Lu’ or《秦律》in Chinese. 
26 ‘Xiao Lu’ or《效率》in Chinese. 
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Emperor of Qin also placed great emphasis on the promotion and demotion of public 
officials to ensure integrity. To do this, he promulgated special laws such as the 
‘Administrative Law on Supervision’, ‘Rules on Appointment of Officials’ and ‘Rules 
on Removal of Officials’.27 
 
In the Han Dynasty (206 B.C. – 220 A.D.), laws for regulating corrupt practices 
appeared to be scattered within a variety of historical books. For example, the Western 
Han Emperor Yuan (r. 49-33 B.C.) adopted a regulation that anybody sentenced for 
corruption was banned from a future official post; the Eastern Han Emperor Zhi (r. 145-
146 A.D.) ordered that descendants of corrupt officials should never be recommended 
to take any official posts.28 In the Western Han Dynasty (206 B.C. – 8 A.D.), there was 
an independent special official supervision law, which formed the basis for dealing with 
officials involved in corruption, and the law prescribed that corruption included two 
categories – theft and bribery. Theft meant taking advantage of an official position to 
embezzle state assets, and bribery meant officials accepting bribes from their 
subordinates or ordinary people. The first official decree against corruption in Chinese 
history is the ‘Anti-Corruption Decree’29 of the Han Dynasty, which was co-drafted by 
the then Prime Minister and Chief Justice, in accordance with the order from the 
Emperor Jing, Liu Qi (刘启), in 156 B.C. It stated that officials would be dismissed if 
they accepted food or other benefits in their administrative district; officials would be 
dismissed or lose their rank of nobility if they accepted bribes or bought cheap and sold 
dear in their administrative district. Under further consideration, Emperor Jing amended 
those articles: if officials paid for the food they had accepted in their administrative 
district they would be free from criminal penalty; if any official accepted property, 
except food, or bought cheap and sold dear, he would be treated as a thief and the 
                                                
27 See further details at Chunyu Wang (2000), Zhongguo Fantan Shi (Chinese Anti-Corruption History), 
Chengdu: Sichuan People’s Publishing House, pp. 83-85. 
28 Hanping Qiu (1988), ‘Houhan Xingfa Zhi’ (The Criminal Annals in Later Han Dynasty) in Lidai Xingfa 
Zhi (The Criminal Annals in Chinese Dynasty), Beijing: Qunzhong Publishing House. 
29‘Fan Shouhui Ling’ or《反受贿令》in Chinese. 
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property should be confiscated. For those who had a title of nobility, they would be 
deprived of that title, those who had an official post would be dismissed, and those who 
had neither a nobility title nor official post would be heavily fined. Those who helped 
capture or report the corrupt officials would be awarded according to the bribe the 
official received.30 
 
In the following period of the Wei-Jin and Southern and Northern Dynasty (220-589 
A.D.), corruption and bribery among officials became even more serious. For example, 
the ‘Wei Code’31 was compiled in 229 A.D. with 18 chapters wherein two of them were 
particularly concerned with corruption. One chapter entitled ‘Soliciting Bribes’ 32 
provided details of the offence of corruption and its penalty; the other chapter 
‘Punishing Corruption’ 33  provided details of punishments of corrupt officials and 
confiscations of their ill-gotten gains. In 267 A.D. Sima Zhao promulgated the ‘Jin 
Code’34 which was regarded as a systematic criminal code containing 620 articles 
among 20 chapters. Sections of ‘Soliciting Bribes’ and ‘Rules on Impeachment’35 were 
inherited, and the ‘Rules of Officials’ was raised within a special chapter – ‘Rules on 
Officials Violating the Law’36 – wherein corruption crimes were standardized. Since 
then, a chapter concerning anti-corruption had been reserved in the penal codes of the 
later dynasties. When Emperor Wen founded the Sui Dynasty (581-618 A.D.) and re-
unified China in 589 A.D., he promulgated a new piece of legislation, the ‘Kai Huang 
Code’37, which was inherited from the Wei-Jin and Southern and Northern period. What 
is interesting was that the code provided different degrees of punishments for officials 
and civilians, and officials could have some privileges when receiving punishments, 
                                                
30 The Biography of Emperor Jing, Han Shu (Book of Han). 
31‘Wei Lu’ or《魏律》in Chinese; it also refers to “New Code” (“Xin Lu” or《新律》in Chinese). 
32‘Qing Qiu’ or《请赇》. 
33‘Chang Zang’ or《偿脏》. 
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35‘Gao-He Lu’ or《告劾律》. 
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which was not the case in previous dynasties. For example, for officials of 7th rank or 
above who committed corruption crimes, one level of punishment could be lessened, 
and officials of 9th rank or above committing corruption could use copper coins or their 
official post to offset their punishments.38 
 
In addition, Emperor Yang of the Sui Dynasty, put forward a systematic bureaucrat-
selection system labelled the ‘Imperial Examination System’, which had been popularly 
acquired throughout ancient dynasties since this period. Under such a system, State 
officials were recruited through a series of examinations that mainly consisted of 
Confucian classics in their orthodox interpretations. It was believed that using 
examinations to recruit officials would curb the privileged and allow for the rise of 
talented people. This was a landmark revolution in valuing and selecting public 
officials.39 
 
In the Tang, Song, Yuan, Ming and Qing dynasties, which are known as the last five 
continuous and prosperous unified feudal societies, laws for punishing corruption were 
accurate and precise. In the Tang Dynasty (618-907 A.D.), the Tang Code (Tang Lu) 
classified economic crime into six categories: ‘six bribery crimes’40 namely accepting 
bribes and breaking the law; accepting bribes without breaking the law; accepting goods 
and money from subordinates and ordinary people; robbery; theft and illegal possession. 
Among these six types, four were closely related to corruption. All six were highly 
adopted by subsequent feudal dynasties, such as the ‘Penal Code of Song Dynasty’41, 
which was largely inherited from the ‘six bribery crimes’ from the Tang Code in terms 
of regulating corrupt officials.  
 
                                                
38 ‘Kai Huang Code’ (‘Kai Huang Lu’). 
39 More details can be found at Victor Xiong (2006), Emperor Yang of the Sui Dynasty: His Life, Times, 
and Legacy, New York: State University of New York Press. 
40 ‘Liu Zang’ or’六脏’-- 受财枉法，受财不枉法，受所监临财物，强盗，盗窃，坐赃 in Chinese. 
41 ‘Song Xing’ or《宋刑》. 
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In the Yuan Dynasty (1271-1368 A.D.), there appeared a piece of legislation relating to 
corruption entitled the ‘General Act of Yuan’42, separate from crimes of robbery and 
theft and not included in the old six crimes. Severe punishment was included in the 
section ‘Ordinance for Positions and Responsibilities’ of ‘General Act of Yuan’, in 
which it stated an official in charge of a warehouse, who stole money and grain worth 
less than one guan (a string of 1000 holed copper coins), would be flogged with 57 
strikes, and for more than 300 guans would be hanged.43 Of course the extent of 
punishment was further increased depending upon the amount of goods stolen.44 
 
In the Ming (1368-1644 A.D.) and Qing (1636-1912 A.D.) dynasties, since corruption 
again became rampant, the penalties for criminals were much stricter and more severe. 
For instance, officials who broke the law and took a bribe of 80 strings of copper coins 
would be hanged, and when the regulators of the customs and laws committed the 
offence of corruption, they would be punished three degrees heavier. The articles in this 
regard were provided in two codes during these two dynasties, the ‘Code of Great Ming 
Empire’45 and the ‘Code of Great Qing Empire’46, in which not only ‘Ordinance for 
Positions and Responsibilities’47 was included in these two codes, but also ‘Ordinance 
for Officials Accepting Bribery’48 was firstly introduced into both codes. Indeed, during 
these two last dynasties in Chinese history, the legal system was more systematic, and 
the laws in regulating corruption and bribery were improved and enriched dynasty after 
dynasty. In the last feudal society Qing Dynasty, the ‘Code of Great Qing Empire’ has 
been recognized as the collection of all the laws and regulations of its kind in ancient 
China.49 
                                                
42 ‘Da Yuan Tong Zhi’ or《大元通制》. 
43 According to the ‘Ordinance for Positions and Responsibilities’ of ‘General Act of Yuan’. 
44 Ibid. 
45 ‘Da Ming Lu’ or《大明律》. 
46 ‘Da Qing Lu’ or《大清律例》. 
47 ‘Zhi Zhi Pian’ or《职制篇》. 
48 ‘Shou Zang Pian’ or《受脏篇》. 
49 Ling Yang (2001), ‘Zhongguo Lidai Sutan Falu Chuyi (The Attempting Discussion of Anti-Corruption 
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Primary methods used 
It is worth noting that in a similar vein to many other countries that are currently 
confronting the serious issue of corruption, in ancient China, bureaucrats did not just 
passively wait for gifts and bribes to come; they were sometimes actively engaged in 
extortion. For example, as recorded in the Veritable Records of the Qing Emperors 
(1796-1911)50 , extortion of public funds was the most frequent form of corruption 
during that period.51 In the Ming and Qing dynasties, the local officials were underpaid, 
so in some ways they had to create additional income; their official salary was entirely 
for their own use, but they also needed to finance office expenses, pay their assistants, 
offer lavish treatment to higher ranking officials and pay them a ‘regular fee’.52 In the 
Southern Song period (1127-1279), a Chengxiang (an official equivalent to a prime 
minister) could publicly request money or gifts from his subordinates who wanted to 
make petitions, and if no gift was attached, petitions would not be processed.53 
 
Another common illegal act frequently mentioned was misappropriating public funds 
– the state imposed heavy taxes and goods levies on the public, and officials then took 
advantage of tax collection for personal gains. Today, this is better regulated and 
monitored, while in the past, this double-edged exploitation spiraled the general public 
into dire poverty and allowed government officials to accumulate massive fortunes. For 
example, He Shen, a senior official in charge of the Boards of Revenue and the Civil 
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51 Chong-chor Lau and Rance P. L. Lee (1981), ‘Bureaucratic Corruption and Political Instability in 
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52 Shawn Ni and Pham Hoang Van (2006), ‘High Corruption Income in Ming and Qing China’, Journal 
of Development Economics, Vol. 81, pp. 316-336.  
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Office in the Qian Long period (1736-1795) in the Qing Dynasty, plundered state 
properties for twenty-five years. His confiscated fortune was estimated at 223 million 
taels, an amount five times more than the total state revenues of that year.54 
 
In China, losing power meant losing everything you ever had, therefore a common 
reaction among officials was to try to create as much fortune as possible while they 
were in power. 55  In terms of the history of Chinese bureaucracy, as a common 
observation provided by Samuel Huntington, in a society where opportunities for the 
accumulation of wealth through the private sector are limited by traditional norms, 
politics could easily become a path to wealth.56 Power was even more important than 
wealth in imperial China. The Chinese phrases ‘sheng guan fa cai’57 (get promoted and 
then become rich) and ‘zheng guan duo li’58 (scrambling power and then acquiring 
benefits) reflected the close relationship between power and fortune in Chinese history.  
 
Generally, in ancient China, numerous anti-corruption regulations and activities were 
designed as a soft weapon to ensure the stability of the states and to protect their 
fundamental interests, wherein the state consisted of royal families and various levels 
of bureaucrats and, consequently, corruption could in no way be eliminated as long as 
the basic contradiction existed between the ‘exploiting class’ and ‘the exploited class’. 
This contradiction has repeated itself ever since the foundation of the feudal society, 
and again, the state organs and all the institutions were primarily created to maintain 
the effectiveness of the ‘exploiting system’. Furthermore, the autocratic monarchy 
system in imperial China gave emperors ultimate power; they had complete privilege 
                                                
54Xingxi Zhang (1996), Tanwu Zhiwang– He Shen (The King of Corruption– He Shen), Beijing: China 
Social Science Press, p. 3. 
55 Ting Gong (1994), The Politics of Corruption in Contemporary China: An Analysis of Policy Outcomes, 
Westport: Praeger Publishers, p. 38. 
56  Samuel P. Huntington (1968), Political Order in Changing Societies, New Haven, Conn.: Yale 
University Press, p. 66. 
57升官发财 in Chinese. 
58争官夺利 in Chinese. 
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to be exempted from trials and regulations. The ancient empires were far from ‘being 
ruled by law’, and the law was designed only to supervise the state’s bureaucrats and 
ordinary people. Accordingly, the legislation would inevitably be misused and abused 
by the dictator or his trusted high-profile officials. Nonetheless, laws for punishing 
corrupt activities in ancient China had undergone substantive development, and in the 
Ming and Qing dynasties the basic features of the crime of corruption were formally 
formulated and the punishment of such crime was highly emphasised. 
 
The provisions before 1949 
Corruption in its various forms flourished in traditional China to such an extent that it 
repeatedly triggered rebellions. For example, the Taiping Rebellion (1850-1864) 
denounced the rules of the Qing Dynasty as favouring corrupt officials and allowing 
them to exploit the public.59 The most famous rebellion in Chinese modern history is 
the 1911 Xinhai Revolution, which successfully overthrew the last imperial dynasty, 
Qing, and with the aim of modernisation, established the Republic of China. 
Nevertheless, this has not put an end to corruption – China’s bureaucratic corruption 
continued to flourish throughout the following periods of the Republic (1911-1916), 
Warlord (1916-1927), and Nationalist (1927-1949).60 
 
However, the crime of corruption has also been given particular emphasis and various 
initiatives against corruption were constantly being raised by temporary leaders. Mr. 
Sun Yatsen, who established the temporary government of the Republic of China, 
experienced anti-corruption measures from western developed countries and integrated 
them into the Temporary Constitutional Law. He also set up the first special anti-
corruption agency within the temporary government. This said, during that unstable 
                                                
59 See generally Deman Shao (1983), The History of Chinese Modern Political Thoughts, Beijing: Law 
Publishing House. 
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period, due to the turmoil between warlords and the CCP and Kuo Min Tang (KMT), 
the special agency lacked grounds to enforce any laws. The first special anti-corruption 
decree in the history of China, named the Decree of Anti-Corruption, was issued by the 
KMT government on May 17, 1932. It provided that the Supreme Court and High Court 
should establish a unique tribunal to trial cases of corruption, and the chairman of every 
court should be the presiding judge of its associated unique tribunal. If the crime was 
severe enough the defendant could be sentenced to life imprisonment or the death 
penalty.61 
 
The first piece of official anti-corruption law that actually referred specifically to 
‘corruption’ was the Provisional Rules of Anti-Corruption, promulgated by the KMT 
government in 1938. It contained 11 rules and stated clearly that any military officer or 
public official who committed corruption during wartime, should be tried at a military 
tribunal; it also provided ten different crimes of corruption and their relative 
punishments. It was further amended and renamed by the KMT as the Rules of Anti-
Corruption which came into force on June 30, 1943.62 
 
At that time in the late 1920s and early 1930s, KMT’s rival party, CCP, having observed 
encumbered situations with corruption among the KMT government, decided to seize 
the chance to project a popular image of themselves. One such example was the 
Campaign against Embezzlement and Waste in the suqu (Soviet areas). The Central 
Worker-Peasant Democratic Government targeted its campaign at waste, negligence, 
bureaucratism and embezzlement amid cadres, after the official newspaper Hongse 
Zhongguo (Red China) reported that waste had become a common problem at all levels 
of government.63 A small southern county of Jiangxi province exposed over twenty 
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cases of embezzlement in less than one year, which involved the county’s Party 
Secretary, Chief Executive, Military Officer, Minister of Treasury and other high-level 
officials.64 
 
In reaction, the CCP central committee launched a movement to check this ‘unhealthy 
phenomena’. The Worker-Peasant Inspection Committee oversaw the movement and 
issued a series of orders in terms of the scope, targets, and reform methods. It also 
established a special governmental unit to accept and analyse complaints against 
corrupt cadres and government agencies. In various governmental departments, several 
cadres were sentenced to death while others were imprisoned. Also, for the first time, 
the CCP established auditing agencies at all levels of government. 
 
The first anti-corruption decree of the Communist Party was Mandate No. 26 – the 
Mandate of Anti-Corruption and Anti-Waste, promulgated by the Central Executive 
Committee of the Soviet Republic of China in December 15, 1933.65  The decree 
provided that anyone who embezzled more than 500 RMB should be sentenced to death; 
anyone who misappropriated public money for personal interest should be treated as a 
criminal. There were also many other provisions, both regional and central, following 
a similar path. These included: the Provisional Rules of Anti-Corruption of the 
Shandong Province (December 3, 1940), the Provisional Rules against Embezzlement 
of Public Grains (August 1, 1943), the Provisional Rules of Anti-Corruption of 
Northwest of Shanxi Province (September, 1941), the Provisional Measures of Anti-
Corruption of the Jin Ji Lu Yu Regions (February 11, 1942), the Supplemental Rules of 
Anti-Corruption of Jin Cha Ji Region (October 15, 1942), the Provisional Measures of 
Anti-Corruption of Bohai Sea Region (July, 1943), the Provisional Rules of Anti-
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Corruption of Northeast Liberated Area (May 6, 1947) and the Rules of Honouring 
Economy and Anti-Corruption of Northern Jiangsu Area (September 1, 1949).66 
 
The first official regulatory document concerning the crime of ‘bribery’ was the Rules 
of Officials Committing Corruption, promulgated by the government of the Northern 
Warlords (Bei-Yang Government) on March 29, 1921. This provided that any official 
soliciting or accepting bribes in exchange for any favours, within or beyond his 
responsibility, shall be convicted of the crime of receiving a bribe, and anyone who 
gives bribes or unlawful benefits to public officials in exchange for any favours shall 
be convicted of the crime of bribery.67 
 
It is stipulated that during the Chinese Civil War, the propensity for grievous corruption 
alienated the KMT government from its citizens; meanwhile the communists emerged 
from the countryside and obtained material support from tens of millions of peasants.68 
Scholars have argued, “if anything, the republican period was more misery and lawless 
than before”.69 The KMT even extorted small businesses for nominal ‘donations’ and 
confiscated them when they refused. Moreover, the criminals divided up the profits 
from the sale of drugs and from the ‘registration fees’ paid by regular addicts through 
the government’s Opium Suppression Bureau.70 In regional areas, local KMT officials 
were tyrants in tax collection and service demanding. It is therefore not surprising that 
corruption was one of the most important causes of the KMT’s defeat by the Communist 
People’s Liberation Army. Though initially, the Nationalist Army was better equipped 
and had superior numbers, the rampant corruption damaged its popularity, limited its 
support base, and assisted the CCP in their propaganda war. 
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After the modern foundation of the People’s Republic of China 
The Communist Party eventually survived the Civil War and subsequently founded the 
People’s Republic of China (PRC) on 1st October 1949. Having observed and learnt 
from previous experiences, the leading committee of the ruling party, the CCP, again 
attached great importance to legislation in fighting economic crime. Since then, several 
movements against economic crime were initiated and various regulations and laws 
were promulgated. 
 
During the period of the Communist Party establishing the basis of anti-corruption laws 
between 1949 and 1951, the government set up a series of governmental institutions 
with anti-corruption functions and activities. In creating a solid legal foundation to 
monitor anti-corruption campaigns, article 18 of the ‘Common Programme of the 
Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC)’, the provisional 
constitution in 1949, stated “all government institutions of the PRC should practice a 
revolutionary working style, and this should be uncorrupted, simple and in the service 
of the people; corruption should be severely punished, waste should be prohibited, and 
previous bureaucratic working style detached from the people should be opposed.”71 
This article became the basis for formulating anti-corruption regulation and policy in 
the early days of the PRC, and has been further incorporated in later constitutions.  
 
To implement those anti-corruption obligations, the CCP set up a special governmental 
organisation, the Commission for Discipline Inspection, solely for investigating and 
penalising Communist Party members who violated party discipline. The government 
also established a supervisory committee, which was designed for supervising the 
activities of government institutions and civil servants to ensure honest behaviour; and 
it had the authority to rectify improper activities and punish those who breached their 
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duties. The People’s Procuratorate was also established at that time, responsible for 
investigating and prosecuting those who were alleged to have enacted corrupt 
activities.72 These institutions were functional institutions for combating corruption 
after the foundation of the PRC. 
 
Those initial measures were mainly educational and party disciplinary punishments. 
For example, in 1950, 1760 people in 27 departments within the Central Government 
were punished by party discipline in the Party Rectification Campaign. 73  Legal 
measures were also utilised. The incomplete statistics collected by the Supreme 
People’s Procuratorate from Sichuan, Jiangxi, Xinjiang, Tianjin, Shenyang, Wuhan and 
thirteen other provinces and municipalities, illustrated that from July 1950 to June 1951, 
approximately 6,000 corruption cases were prosecuted by the people’s procuratorates, 
involving some RMB (old) 300 billion (about RMB 30 million) of state assets. 
 
Three and Five Anti’s Campaign 
The CCP believed that a capable and reliable state apparatus on the one hand, and the 
obedience and cooperative private enterprises on the other, were the two prerequisites 
for a successful socialist transformation.74 As a result, in order to eliminate the growing 
concern of corruption which had been hindering New China’s economic development, 
only two years after the CCP took power, between 1951 and 1952, China initiated its 
first large-scale anti-corruption campaign in PRC history – the Three and Five Anti’s 
Campaign. Due to the exposure of serious corruption, on December 1, 1951, the CCP 
issued the Resolution on Better Staff and Simpler Administration, Production Increase 
and Austerity, and initiated the campaign firstly with anti-corruption, anti-waste, and 
anti-bureaucratism among government officials. The main target, according to Teng 
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Daiyuan, then Minister for Railways, included “all actions in which public funds, 
property or materials are retained by individuals for private reasons, as well as the 
usurpation of power to steal, extort, and take bribes.”75 
 
The campaign soon turned its focus to those private enterprises through the Five-Anti’s 
movement against bribery, tax evasion, theft of state assets, cheating in labour and 
materials, and stealing national economic intelligence. Chairman Mao made it very 
clear that combating corruption, waste and bureaucratism should be viewed as 
important as suppressing counter-revolutionary movements, and they should encourage 
people to fight those misconducts thereby establishing a strong public voice – only this 
could threaten corrupt officials and eventually eliminate corruption.76 According to 
some statistics, about 80% of cases were reported by ordinary people.77 
 
As summarised by Ting Gong, this campaign could be divided into four stages – 
mobilisation (December 1-31, 1951), confession and accusation (January 1-25, 1952), 
expansion (January 26-March 1952), and disposition (April-June 1952).78 It is worth 
mentioning that the procedure of various Chinese campaigns ever since then follows 
this four-step routine. In the first stage, mobilization, the party and other leading 
government organs such as the CPPCC and the State Council issued a series of 
directives to encourage the public to take part in the campaign. Followed by several 
editorials published by The People’s Daily, people were then asked to gather together 
to study Chairman Mao’s works and documents, while cadres criticised waste, 
bureaucratism, and rightist tendencies. 
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As the campaign entered its second phase, confession and accusation, the party urged 
all its members who had engaged in corrupt activities to confess. At the same time, the 
party encouraged the general public to expose and denounce cadres who were involved 
in corruption, waste, and bureaucratism. The party made it very clear that people could 
expose individuals publicly or privately, orally or in writing, and anonymously or with 
their names, and the party guaranteed they would be protected against retaliation in any 
event. According to statistics, during the first month in Beijing, 556 people from 24 
different administrative units, and 250 from the army’s logistic units, confessed their 
crime of corruption; additionally, 823 people from 18 administrative units, and 566 
from military units informed against others and exposed a total of 359 cases.79  
 
With the campaign continuing, more cases were explored. It entered its third phase, 
‘expansion’, which further increased the party’s concern. On January 26, 1952, Liu Ren, 
the chairman of the Economy Inspection Committee of Beijing Municipality, claimed 
that 80 percent of the discovered corrupt related behaviour had connections with private 
industrialists: among them were agents of the bourgeois class or of bourgeoisie origin.80 
Thus, unsurprisingly, the campaign soon investigated private enterprises and business 
circles. On January 26, 1952, the party released the Directive on Launching a Large-
Scale, Resolute, and Thorough ‘Five Anti’ Struggle in Urban Areas. It requested all 
cities should begin the battle against the ‘Five Evils’ in the first ten days of February.81 
The campaign was immediately intensified and numerous ‘working teams’ or ‘tiger-
hunting teams’82 emerged, composed of workers and mass activists from ordinary 
members of staff. These teams soon investigated private entrepreneurs. The 
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investigative results of nine major cities involved 450,000 private enterprises, with 
340,000 (76 percent) engaged in corruption.83 
 
The final phase commenced in mid-March 1952, when the party published a series of 
documents relating to how to handle the exposed cases, including Provisions on 
Handling Corruption and Waste and Overcoming Bureaucratic Mistakes (March 8, 
1952), Provisions on the Establishment of the People’s Courts in the Three Anti’s 
Campaign (March 8, 1952), Provisions on Recovering Stolen Money and Properties 
(March 8, 1952) and the Act of Corruption Punishment of the People’s Republic of 
China (April 21, 1952). The Beijing People’s Government also issued the Criteria and 
Measures of Classifying Private Entrepreneurs and Merchants. These documents 
provided general principles and detailed guidelines in terms of dealing with corruption. 
For example, penalties for the crime of corruption were divided into several categories, 
depending on the amount of money: 1) under 100 yuan: no penalty; 2) 100-1,000 yuan: 
disciplinary sanction;84 3) 1,000-5,000 yuan: 1-5 years imprisonment; 4) 5,000-10,000 
yuan: 5-10 years imprisonment; 5) more than 10,000 yuan: from 10 years imprisonment, 
up to the death penalty.  
 
During this Three and Five Anti’s campaign, some 1,226,984 corrupt party and 
government members, including many high-ranking party officials, were penalised. 
Among them, over 100,000 people had embezzled over 10 million Yuan, and the total 
amount embezzled reached over 600 billion yuan. 85  The corruption case of Liu 
Qingshan and Zhang Zishan during the campaign was billed as the ‘first serious 
                                                
83 Yuping Ma and Yuchang Huang (1989), Zhongguo: Zuotian he Jintian (China: Yesterday and Today), 
Beijing: The Liberation Army’s Publisher, p. 739. 
84  Disciplinary sanction included six categories: warning, recording demerit, demoting position, 
dismissing from post, and discharging from job. 
85 Yifan Li (1993), We Can Jump Over this Periodic Law – Mao Zedong’s View on Clean and Honest 
Government, Beijing: China Politics and Law University Press, p. 99; Changshui Cai (2000), Manual on 
Self-discipline and Honesty Education to Party and Government Leading Cadres, Beijing: China Yanshi 
Press, p. 1768; Jiliang Yang (1997), On Anti-Corruption, Beijing: China Social Science Press, p. 87. 
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criminal case of New China’86. Liu, the party secretary of Tianjin Municipality, and 
Zhang, the administrative chief, were executed for misappropriation of huge sums of 
state funds.87 
 
Toward the end of the campaign, on June 13, 1952, the State Council of the CCP issued 
a Directive to Conclude the Five-Anti’s Campaign. The directive interpreted some 
policy issues in disposing of cases while declaring that the campaign had reached its 
concluding stage. In the following months, more emphasis was placed on the 
establishment of new and efficient work systems. The Three and Five Anti’s Campaign 
as a mass campaign concluded in June 1952. 
 
The period of disruption 
From 1957 to 1976, various issues meant anti-corruption movements in China were 
seriously disrupted. During this period, while such campaigns achieved some successes 
in the Socialist Education Movement between 1963-1966 (a nationwide movement to 
‘clean’ matters up in the fields of politics, economics, organization and ideology, also 
known as the ‘four-cleanups’ movement), the ‘Anti-Rightists’ movement and the 
‘Cultural Revolution’ seriously damaged the substantive anti-corruption efforts. 
Institutional developments stagnated, and governmental agencies specifically dealing 
with corruption were dissolved. Nevertheless, despite continual political movements, 
anti-corruption directives regularly appeared on the government agenda, even during 
the Cultural Revolution. For example, the CCP issued the Instructions against 
Corruption, Theft, Speculation and Profiteering, and the Notice against Waste.88 Many 
crimes of corruption and theft, speculation and profiteering throughout those political 
                                                
86 Bing Lu, Yuxin Shi, and Yongzhao Wu (1990), Zhongguo Fanfubai Diyi Daan (The First Serious Case 
of Corruption in the New China), Beijing: China Law Press. 
87 According to the ‘News of the Communist Party of China, Corruption Case of Liu Qingshan and Zhang 
Zishan’, Liu Qingshan embezzled 184 million yuan (old currency) and Zhang Zishan embezzled 194 
million yuan (old currency). Exchange rate: 10,000 old Chinese yuan equals to 1 new Chinese yuan. 
88 Gailong Liao (2000), Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Biannianshi (Chronicle of the People’s Republic 
of China), Zhengzhou: Henan People’s Press, p. 365. 
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movements were exposed and penalised. The spread of corruption and bribery was 
controlled but only to a certain degree. 
 
New laws and new approaches 
Generally, in the first thirty years of the PRC history, corruption persisted and serious 
cases manifested. The CCP accepted that fighting corruption would require a long-term 
strategy rather than short periodic movements. Having experienced the stagnation 
period of China’s reform and development, the period between 1977 and 1981 was a 
time when anti-corruption measures resumed. Following the ‘Cultural Revolution’ from 
August 1977 to December 1978, the Third Plenary Session of the Eleventh National 
Congress of the CCP convened, where the CCP central committee decided on ‘striking 
hard’ against economic crimes and once again directed the nation’s attention towards 
anti-corruption. 
 
Various directives and regulations that were designed to control economic crime, in 
particular, corruption, were promulgated throughout the unstable period of the PRC’s 
first thirty years. On 21 April 1952, under the provision of severely punishing 
corruption in the Common Programme of the Chinese People’s Political Conclusive 
Conference, which was the provisional constitution law of the PRC, the government 
promulgated ‘Rules on Punishing Corruption of the People’s Republic of China’. This 
rule was developed based on the legislation discussed in this chapter, before in the 
Democratic Revolution Period, and was the basic rule in punishing corrupt officials 
before the enactment of China’s first Criminal Law. On 1 July 1979, the National 
People’s Congress (NPC), the superior legislature within China, officially formulated 
the Criminal Law of the People’s Republic of China89, which clearly defined the crime 
of corruption and bribery. According to article 155 and 185, “any state functionary who 
                                                
89 Adopted by the Second Session of the Fifth National People’s Congress on July 1, 1979, promulgated 
by Order No.5 of the Chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress on 6 July 
1979, and effective as of 1 January 1980. 
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takes advantage of his office to embezzle public property shall be sentenced to fixed-
term imprisonment of not more than 5 years or criminal detention; if the amount 
embezzled is huge and the circumstances are grave, he shall be sentenced to fixed-term 
imprisonment of not less than five years; if the circumstances are especially grave, he 
shall be sentenced to life imprisonment or death. For the crime mentioned above, the 
offender shall be sentenced concurrently to confiscation of property or ordered to make 
restitution or compensation payments. If any person entrusted by state organs, 
enterprises, institutions or people’s organizations to perform public duties commits the 
crime mentioned in the first part of this article, he shall be punished in accordance with 
the provisions of the two preceding parts”, 90  “any state functionary who takes 
advantage of his office to accept bribes shall be sentenced to fixed-term imprisonment 
of not more than five years or criminal detention. The illicit funds or properties he 
received as bribes shall be confiscated, and public funds or properties shall be recovered. 
Whoever commits the crime mentioned in the preceding part and causes great damage 
to the state or its citizens shall be sentenced to fixed-term imprisonment of not less than 
five years. Whoever offers or introduces a bribe to a state functionary shall be sentenced 
to fixed-term imprisonment of not more than three years or criminal detention”.91 
 
In 1979, the NPC also formulated ‘the Ordinance on Arrest and Detention’, ‘the 
Criminal Procedural Law’ and ‘the Law on the Organisation of People’s Prosecution 
Services’, which provide the standard procedure for the Prosecution Service to 
investigate and prosecute crimes of corruption and bribery.92 Furthermore, article 13 of 
‘the Criminal Procedure Law’ robustly reflected the special attention that had been 
given by the legislature to the limits of jurisdiction in filing and investigating such cases 
of corruption and bribery. It stipulated that “cases involving crimes of corruption, 
                                                
90 Article 155 of the Criminal Law of the People’s Republic of China, 1979. 
91 Article 185 of the Criminal Law of the People’s Republic of China, 1979. 
92Compilation of Selected Laws of the People’s Republic of China, Volume 2, Changchun: Jilin People’s 
Press, 1984, at p. 52, p. 91 and p. 133. 
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violation of the citizens democratic rights and dereliction of duty (including bribery), 
as well as other cases which the people’s procuratorates consider necessary to handle 
directly themselves, shall be placed on file by the people’s procuratorates, and the 
people’s procuratorates have the right to decide whether to initiate a public 
prosecution.”93 
 
Prosecution system 
The restoration of the Prosecution system began on March 5, 1978. The ‘Constitution 
of the People’s Republic of China’ 1978 version was adopted at the First Meeting of the 
Fifth National People’s Congress. The People’s Prosecution Service was restored 
according to the Constitution, and the People’s Prosecution Service again began to 
shoulder the responsibilities to investigate and prosecute corruption and bribery cases. 
 
In the following year after the Criminal Law and Criminal Procedure Law was 
promulgated, the Prosecution Service in total investigated and prosecuted over 4,000 
cases of economic crimes, 43 percent of which were corruption cases, with 89 cases 
involving over one million Chinese yuan.94 In 1981, the prosecution service again 
directly investigated and prosecuted over 31,000 cases of economic crimes.95 It can be 
seen that the number of cases of economic crimes being prosecuted by People’s 
Procuratorates rose sharply in the following two years after the corresponding 
legislation and institutions were established and they had increasingly effective control 
of such crimes related to corruption. 
 
 
                                                
93 Article 13 of the Criminal Procedure Law of the People’s Republic of China, adopted at the Second 
Session of the Fifth National People’s Congress on July 1, 1979, promulgated by Order No.6 of the 
Chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress on July 7, 1979 and effective as 
of January 1, 1980. 
94 Huoqing Huang (1980), Working Reports of Supreme People’s Procuratorate, September 2, 1980. 
95 Ibid, December 7, 1981. 
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Central commission for discipline and inspection 
The Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI), which was dismissed 
during the Cultural Revolution, was restored at the Third Plenary Session of the 
Eleventh Central Committee in December 1978, under the leadership of Deng 
Xiaoping.96 The CCDI is regarded as the highest internal institution of the CCP, tasked 
with enforcing internal rules and regulations and combating corruption and malfeasance 
within the party. Interestingly, as the clear majority of government officials at all levels 
were also Communist Party members, as a result the commission is the dominant anti-
corruption body in China. The first plenary meeting of the commission was held in 
January 1979, in which it endorsed its mission, functions and powers and adopted its 
organizational framework. Since then, a series of directives against various 
malpractices, irregularities, and corruption were issued by the CCDI on behalf of the 
party; many directives have also been issued directly by the Central Committee of the 
Party.97 
 
Conclusion 
In the years following, the CCP attempted to bring order out of chaos and change the 
focus of the future from class struggle to economic construction.98 The party and the 
government did not fully understand the nature of corruption in China so they failed to 
adopt effective measures to control it; they believed that it was merely an unhealthy 
tendency and naively thought it could be rooted out once directives and summons were 
implemented. The People’s Daily issued an editorial entitled ‘Come out Boldly and 
Strike Firmly – Unhealthy Tendencies in Economic Arena!’ in 1981.99 The editorial 
                                                
96Compilation of Selected Important Documents since the Third Plenary Session of the National 
Congress of the Party, Beijing: The People’s Press, 1982, p. 2. 
97 Shiying Li (1987), The Current System of Procuratorates in China, Beijing: the Chinese Social Science 
Press, p. 184. 
98  Namely negating the “Great Cultural Revolution”, clarifying confusion of the Great Cultural 
Revolution, rehabilitating unjust, false and erroneous cases occurred in the various political movements 
since the Cultural Revolution and the founding of the PRC, bringing back the healthy and normal order. 
99People’s Daily, Editorial, 18 September 1981. 
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stated, “The main problem of eliminating unhealthy tendencies now is not that of lack 
of clarity between right and wrong, or is that of issuing directives and summons. It is 
whether the leaders are bold enough to strike out at those tendencies, and to self-criticise. 
It is a spiritual problem.” 
 
It is said that corruption in contemporary China is often seen as a function of changing 
political economy, in particular, the transition from state socialism to a market 
economy.100 In 1978, Deng Xiaoping enacted economic reform and the ‘open door 
policy’, which, on one hand stimulated China’s economic growth and created massive 
business activities, while on the other, economic reform had also involuntarily 
contributed a great deal of opportunities for public officials to seek private gain by 
abusing their position. The centrally planned economic system allowed public officials 
to procure illicit gains from selling goods and materials from state-owned enterprises 
to the market, due to the price margin. Therefore, in the next chapter, the author will 
examine the extent of economic crimes that occurred in the context of the opening of 
China’s economy, and provide a detailed analysis of both new opportunities and 
challenges that the country and the party were facing. 	
 
 
  
                                                
100 Xiaobo Lu (2000), Cadres and Corruption: The Organizational Involution of the Chinese Communist 
Party, Stanford: Stanford University Press, p. 190. 
Chapter 3: Economic Crime and Corruption in the Context 
of the Opening of China 
 
Introduction – the opening of the Chinese economy 
China’s closed mind in the past excluded the nation from involvement in international 
comprehension and solution-seeking forums regarding economic crime. It is fair to say 
that in modern Chinese history one of the most significant landmarks was the 1978 
Chinese economic reform. This is widely seen as a turning point following the 10-year 
dark period of China’s Culture Revolution. The Chinese economic reform1 commenced 
in 1978 and in general terms refers to the programme of economic reform by reformists 
within the ruling party, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) led by Deng Xiaoping, 
named ‘Socialism with Chinese characteristics’ in the People’s Republic of China 
(PRC). 
 
During the ten-year Cultural Revolution between 1966 and 1976, the PRC’s domestic 
production had become seriously dislocated. Chronic disproportions had appeared in 
various sectors of the economy, notably among agricultural, light and heavy industry. 
The economic organisations and institutions had proved to be a barrier to both human 
initiatives and material growth.2 Consequently, the CCP and the government authorities 
determined to push forward domestic production with the aim of fundamentally 
increasing people’s standard of living.3 
 
Having assessed the successes and failures in the past, economists and reformists 
                                                
1 改革开放 in Chinese, literally means Reform & Opening up. 
2 Zhuoyuan Zhang (1982), ‘Introduction: China’s Economy After the “Cultural Revolution”’, in China’s 
Economic Reform, edited by Lin Wei & Arnold Chao, Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, p. 
1; see also Dwight H. Perkins, ‘Reforming China’s economic system’, Journal of Economic Literature, 
Vol. 26, No. 2, pp. 601-645. 
3 See more at Joseph C. H. Chai (1996), ‘Consumption and living standards in China’, in The Chinese 
Economy under Deng Xiaoping, edited by Robert F. Ash and Y. Y. Kueh, Oxford: Clarendon Press, pp. 
247-276. 
 
 
86 
forwarded various ideas to change the pattern of China’s economy and reshape its 
economic setup.4 The general proposal was approved at the Third Plenary Session of 
the Eleventh Central Committee of the CCP in December 1978, followed by the 
announcement of a policy of readjustment, reform, consolidation, and improvement. In 
a brief explanation, readjustment is remedying the disproportions among different 
sectors of the economy, principally among agriculture, light industry and heavy industry, 
as well as between the allocations of funds for production, construction and those for 
people’s use.5 Reform is transforming the economic system, or management system, 
both nationally and within every enterprise, particularly those in a state of confusion. 
Improvement is defined as the achievement of a higher level of production, technology, 
and managerial skills.6 
 
The issue that the western press regarded as one of the most significant elements of 
economic reform, was that China after so many years finally decided to open its door 
to foreign investments.7 Market principle, introduced by the economic reform, was 
carried out in two stages. As well as opening its business to other countries, in the first 
stage of the reform between the late 1970s and the early 1980s, agriculture was 
decollectivized and entrepreneurs were permitted to run their own business, even 
though at that time, the majority of industry remained state-owned.8 In the second stage 
                                                
4 See Alfred K. Ho (2004), China’s Reform and Reformers, Westport: Praeger Publishers, pp. 81-114. 
5  See Gary H. Jefferson (1995), ‘Reforming China’s industrial sector: Mapping the transition’, in 
Productivity, Efficiency and Reform in China’s Economy, edited by Kai-yuen Tsui, Tie-tung Hsueh and 
Thomas G. Rawski, Hong Kong: The Chinese University of Hong Kong, pp. 1-18. 
6  Discussed at 3rd session of the 11th Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, 18-22 
December 1978; see also a general overview of the reform at Raphael Shen (2000), China’s Economic 
Reform: An Experiment in Pragmatic Socialism, Chapter 3: Reform: Macro-overview, Westport: Praeger 
Publishers, pp. 39-54. 
7 See generally Peter Nolan (2004), Transforming China: Globalization, Transition and Development, 
London: Wimbledon Publishing Company; and Nicholas R. Lardy (1992), Foreign Trade and Economic 
Reform in China: 1978-1990, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
8 See Shulian Zhou (1982), ‘The market mechanism in a planned economy’, and Yulin Zhang (1982), 
‘Readjustment and reform in agriculture’, both in China’s Economic Reform, edited by Lin Wei and 
Arnold Chao, Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, pp. 103-114 and 123-146; and Xiang Wu 
(1994), ‘Why did China’s reforms start in the countryside?’, China’s Human Resources Development, 
1994, No. 1, included in Christopher Howe, Y. Y. Kueh and Robert Ash (2003), China’s Economic Reform: 
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between the late 1980s and 1990s, the main features involved the privatisation and 
contracting-out of most state-owned enterprises, lifting price controls, and the 
promotion of policies and regulations, though state control in major sectors such as 
banking and petroleum remained.9 This was the beginning of a remarkable growth of 
the private sector in China; the figures illustrated that the private industry had 
contributed as much as 70 percent of China’s gross domestic product by 2005.10 As 
Golley and Song stated, the results were outstanding: “within just three decades, China 
has succeeded in transforming itself from a centrally planned closed economy into one 
of the world’s most dynamic and globally integrated market economies. The dynamics 
unleashed by Deng Xiaoping’s reforms, open-door policies and institutional changes 
have unleashed enormous entrepreneurial energy and propelled continuous capital 
accumulation, productivity gains and trade and income growth on a scale the world has 
never seen before. During this period, China’s total gross domestic product, industrial 
output, foreign trade and, importantly, its per capita income increased respectively by 
factors of 16, 27, 124 and 12. As a result, the incidence and severity of poverty has 
declined dramatically in China”.11 
 
The last few decades have seen a great deal of in-depth studies on China’s economic 
development. However, while the world is recognising and marvelling at China’s 
                                                
A Study with Documents, London and New York: RoutledgeCurzon, pp. 232-240. 
9 See Susan Young (1995), Private Business and Economic Reform in China, Chapter 2: Reviving private 
industry and commerce, New York: M. E. Sharpe, pp, 13-24; see also Alvin Rabushka (1987), The New 
China: Comparative Economic Development in Mainland China, Taiwan, and Hong Kong, Chapter 4: 
China goes to market, San Francisco: Westview Press, pp. 71-94; and Yongzheng Yang (2004), ‘SOE 
reform and private sector development in China’, in China’s Third Economic Transformation: The Rise 
of the Private Economy, edited by Ross Garnaut and Ligang Song, London and New York: 
RoutledgeCurzon, pp. 72-88. 
10  Peter Engardio (2005), ‘China is a Private-Sector Economy’, 21 August 2005, Bloomberg 
Businessweek.see more at Xiaowen Tian (2004), ‘Privatisation and economic performance in China’, in 
China’s Third Economic Transformation: The Rise of the Private Economy, edited by Ross Garnaut and 
Ligang Song, London and New York: RoutledgeCurzon, pp. 60-61. 
11 Jane Golley and Ligang Song (2010), ‘Chinese economic reform and development: achievements, 
emerging challenges and unfinished tasks’, in Ross Garnaut, Jane Golley and Ligang Song (eds), China: 
The Next Twenty Years of Reform and Development, Canberra: ANU E Press, at p. 1. 
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economic accomplishments since the economic reform, few, if any, works have 
examined its drawbacks. For example, the opening-up of the economy has provided 
unscrupulous individuals with greater opportunities to exploit the state, by moving their 
ill-gotten gains beyond the reach of the domestic courts or hiding their ‘dirty’ money in 
foreign bank accounts. It is the case that China’s criminal justice system has not kept 
pace with economic crime control. China only had its first comprehensive Criminal 
Code in 1979, when its economy was still centrally planned. It is still the case that 
through the transition to a market-orientated economy, local officials abusively misuse 
their power, taking enormous advantage of the two-tiered price system through 
speculation and racketeering. All these issues listed above will be discussed in detail 
within this chapter. 
 
The rest of the world may be amazed with what China has achieved so far. This chapter 
however, is not going to praise its economic results, nor reflect on how successful 
China’s economic development is, but will provide the reader with a detailed 
description and analysis of the overall problems this reform has brought and how the 
ruling party and government authorities have handled them, together with some 
outstanding issues. 
 
The relevance of crimes in terms of stability 
Before the ‘opening-up’ of the Chinese economy, the PRC was a socialist country under 
the tight political control of the CCP. The primary means of production were owned by 
the state or collective. Under this centrally planned economy, the government 
designated the qualities and quantities of production, designing production processes 
and controlling distribution lines.12 However, this centrally controlled system has been 
                                                
12 For a detailed discussion on China’s centrally planned system before the reform, see Christin P. W. 
Wong, Christopher Heady, and Wing T. Woo (1995), Fiscal Management and Economic Reform in the 
People’s Republic of China, London: Oxford University Press; Michel Oksenberg and James Tong (1991), 
‘The evolution of central-provincial fiscal relations in China, 1971-1984: The formal system’, China 
Quarterly, Vol. 125, pp. 1-32. 
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largely transformed since the economic reform, with new systemic features emerging. 
During the transition period to the market-oriented economy, central administrative 
control began to weaken as the CCP began to relinquish part of its control to local 
government.13 The subsequent increase in local autonomy on the other hand, created 
opportunities for personal and institutional corruption. In addition, the party in the 
1980s adopted a two-tiered price system in which identical goods were offered for sale 
at different prices and were available at two distinct distribution outlets: the government 
institutions and the market. This created its own range of economic crimes committed 
by insiders of the party such as speculation and arbitrage. Furthermore, regional 
imbalances and urban-rural wealth disparity became fundamental problems that came 
with the reform. Indeed, economic expansion came at a cost to social cohesion, as China 
had to confront problems of crime and corruption.14 
 
As a result, the reform in many ways stimulated an emergence of economic crime 
within society. Of course, the Chinese government did not leave these deleterious roots 
to grow. It enacted its first ever Criminal Law15 and Criminal Procedure Law16 since 
the founding of the PRC. Much emphasis had been given to economic crimes as they 
were mentioned among four out of a total of eight chapters of the Criminal Code, 
respectively: Chapter Three: Crimes of Undermining the Socialist Economic Order (e.g. 
speculation, smuggling, counterfeiting and tax evasion); Chapter Five: Crimes of 
Property (e.g. embezzlement and extortion); Chapter Six: Crimes of Obstructing the 
                                                
13 Muqiao Xue (1981), China’s Socialist Economy, 1st Edition, Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, pp. 
203-233 (discussion on the Maoist system of economic management). 
14 Roderic Broadhurst, John Bacon-Shone, Brigitte Bouhours and Thierry Bouhours (2011), Business 
and the Risk of Crime in China, Canberra: Australian National University E Press, pp. 6-8; see also Julia 
Kwong (1997), The Political Economy of Corruption in China, Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe, Inc, 
pp. 29-32. 
15 Criminal Law of the People’s Republic of China, adopted at the Second Session of the Fifth National 
People’s Congress on July 1, 1979, promulgated by Order No.5 of the Chairman of the Standing 
Committee of the National People’s Congress on July 6, 1979, and effective as of January 1, 1980. 
16 Criminal Procedure Law of the People’s Republic of China, adopted at the Second Session of the Fifth 
National People’s Congress on July 1, 1979, promulgated by Order No.6 of the Chairman of the Standing 
Committee of the National People’s Congress on July 6, 1979, and effective as of January 1, 1980. 
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Administration of Public Order (e.g. forging, altering, stealing or destroying official 
documents, certificates or seals of state, enterprises, institutions, or people’s 
organisations), and Chapter Eight: Crimes of Dereliction of Duty (e.g. state 
functionaries making it illegal to accept or offer bribes, and neglect official duties). 
 
Establishing the rule of law – the background 
Even though there were areas of society with improved conditions, the occurrence of 
massive inequality did little to legitimise the party’s founding ideals, as they faced 
increasing social unrest.17 Growing inequality, the near and final collapse of the Soviet 
Union and other communist states, and the pressure for political reform in China (e.g. 
4th June 1989 Tiananmen Square movement) urged vital regulatory and legal 
transformations to the political and policing arms of the country. 
 
The Chinese government and its public security organs have acknowledged the 
influence of rapid economic development on the emergence of illegal opportunities for 
economic crime. The Research Unit Number Five of the Ministry of Public Security of 
the PRC published an influential report entitled ‘The Basic Character of Crime in 
Contemporary China’ in 1989. This confidential report acknowledged that crime 
originated from social contradictions, which had been deepened by the commodity 
economy and the transition to a new system, which had conflicts and loopholes in social 
administration. 18  It also pointed out the changes in the criminals’ demography, 
particularly the rising number of perpetrators from the unemployed and the emergence 
of gangs. The deficient legal response and the inability to control and defend against 
crime was also recognised. The report states: “In recent years, there has been vigorous 
development of the socialist commodity economy. The commodity economy is a 
                                                
17 People’s Daily Online n.d., cited by Roderic Broadhurst, John Bacon-Shone, Brigitte Bouhours and 
Thierry Bouhours (2011), Business and the Risk of Crime in China, Canberra: Australian National 
University E Press, at p. 6. 
18 Michael Dutton (1997), ‘The basic character of crime in contemporary China’, China Quarterly, No. 
149, pp. 160-177. 
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powerful lever for improving social development, but it is also a major inducement to 
crime. With the development of a commodity economy, money has functioned as a 
‘battering ram’, knocking down traditional values and concepts. Accordingly, there 
have been great changes in people’s ideology. The historical tradition of looking down 
on trade has disappeared. In its place has emerged a new craze for trade and running 
business, and what most people now want is simply to make money. At the same time, 
there has been one wave after another of consumerism that has engulfed the country. 
The huge gap between the high consumption lust and existing buying power of the 
people has resulted in a serious contradiction emerging. Stimulated by the above factors, 
some people who cannot fulfil their personal desires for material enjoyment through 
proper and legal means have taken the other route – namely, getting money through 
criminal activity.”19 
  
The circumstance demonstrated in the above quote reflects Robert Merton’s ‘innovation’ 
adaptation phenomenon, in reference to his ‘strain theory’20 . It suggests that in the 
context of rapid economic and social changes in Chinese society, functionalist theories 
of crime to adapt to strain enhanced by institutional anomie are pertinent.21 Institutional 
and regulatory weakness arises together with institutional anomie when the rules are 
not clear, for example, in a transitional economy or a colonial order of dubious 
legitimacy. Under those situations, a permissive environment for crime emerges, 
deteriorated by the insufficient capabilities of anti-crime authorities and other forces of 
law and order. 
                                                
19 Ministry of Public Security Research Unit Number Five, cited in Michael Dutton (1997), ‘The basic 
character of crime in contemporary China’, China Quarterly, No. 149, p. 165. 
20 Robert King Merton’s Strain Theory explains in a society strain occurs when people faced with a gap 
between their goals (usually finances/money related) and their current status. They have five ways to 
adapt: Conformity; Innovation; Ritualism; Retreatism; and Rebelliona. See more details at Robert K. 
Merton (1932), ‘Social structure and anomie’, American Sociological Review, 3(5), pp. 672-682. 
21 Jon G. Bernburg (2002), ‘Anomie, social anger and crime: a theoretical examination of institutional 
anomie theory’, British Journal of Criminology, 42(4), 729-742; see also Steven Messner and Richard 
Rosenfeld (2009), ‘Institutional theory: a macro-sociological explanation of crime’, in Marvin D. Krohn, 
Alan J. Lizotee and Gina O. Hall (eds), Handbook of Sociology and Social Research, New York: Springer 
Publisher, pp. 209-224 
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In various political regimes throughout contemporary history, it has not been 
uncommon for top politicians and policymakers to claim that certain forms of justice 
should be side-lined in favour of fast economic development. Law and justice were 
sometimes portrayed as being a costly irrelevance to economic development. This view, 
for example, was prevalent in the former Prime Minister of Singapore, Lee Kuan Yew’s 
discourse and often reflected his political decisions, where for example, basic human 
rights were normally sacrificed in favour of rapid economic growth.22 Relevantly, the 
point that some forms of social justice, those implied in generous redistribution policies 
and a large welfare state, is undermining economic development. It is often assumed 
that distributive justice will result from prioritising economic development, a rationale 
that underlines the assumptions on the ‘trickle down’ effect of economic growth.23 
 
On the other hand, with the rise of New Institutional Economics in the 1980s, a 
consensus seems to have emerged among many economists and development experts 
regarding the undeniable importance of institutions in facilitating long-term socio-
economic growth of low-income countries.24 With this institutionalism resurgence, 
increasing emphasis has been on examining the role that legal and judicial institutions 
could possibly play in order to promote material improvements in the quality of 
people’s lives. A well-articulated summary of the economic benefits that could be 
extracted from an efficient and accessible judicial system was provided in a report 
produced by the United Nations Commission on Legal Empowerment, launched in 
2005: “Four billion people around the world are robbed of the chance to better their 
lives and climb out of poverty because they are excluded from the rule of law… it is 
                                                
22  See for example discussions at Amartya Sen (1999), Development as Freedom, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, pp. 231-233; and Fareed Zakaria and Lee Kuan Yew (1994), ‘Culture is destiny: a 
conversation with Lee Kuan Yew’, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 73, No. 2, pp. 109-126. 
23 Ibid; and also see generally Frances Stewart (1985), Basic Needs in Developing Countries, Baltimore, 
Maryland: Johns Hopkins University Press. 
24 See more at Douglass C. North (1990), Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, at p. 8 and pp. 112-113. 
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not the absence of assets or lack of work that holds them back, but the fact that the 
assets and work are insecure, unprotected, and far less productive than they might be”.25 
 
Examined in context, it is clear that far from being a costly irrelevance, the notion of 
justice is integral to a country’s sustainable development. 26  Furthermore, the 
importance of establishing the rule of law was also noted by Member States in the 
‘Declaration of the High-level Meeting on the Rule of Law’ hosted by the United 
Nations (UN), that “the rule of law and development are strongly interrelated and 
mutually reinforcing, and the advancement of the rule of law at national and 
international levels is essential for sustained and inclusive economic growth, 
sustainable development, the eradication of poverty and hunger and the full realisation 
of all human rights and fundamental freedoms, including the right to development, all 
of which in turn, reinforce the rule of law”.27 At national level, the UN further pointed 
out that the rule of law is essential to create an environment for providing sustainable 
livelihoods and eradicating poverty. The rule of law fosters development through 
strengthening the voices of individuals and communities, by “providing access to 
justice, ensuring due process and establishing remedies for the violation of rights”. 
Legal empowerment goes far beyond the provision of remedies and encourages 
improved economic opportunities.28 
 
Christine Lagarde, managing director of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), 
publicly stated that the underground economy is estimated at 30-40 percent of GDP in 
developing countries, and around 15 percent in advanced economies such as the US. 
She called upon people to consider the lost productive potential in an economy where 
                                                
25 United Nations Commission on Legal Empowerment of the Poor (2008), ‘Making the Law Work for 
Everyone’, pp. 1-2. 
26 See more at J.B. Ruhl (1999), ‘The co-evolution of sustainable development and environmental justice: 
cooperation, then competition, then conflict’, Duke Environmental Law and Policy, 9. 
27 United Nations and the Rule of Law: towards a just, secure and peaceful world, governed by the rule 
of law. Available at: https://www.un.org/ruleoflaw/rule-of-law-and-development/. 
28 Ibid. 
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almost half of the activities are unreported and nearly half the population is beyond the 
reach of public services.29 The IMF has emphasised the importance of strong legal and 
institutional framework for sustainable economic growth. This is also recognised by 
political scientists and economists, and above all by history – countries that have 
developed strong legal and institutional frameworks have improved performance in 
terms of sustained growth and human development.30 By the same token, the World 
Bank research department has concluded that the power of legal and judicial reform can 
spur economic development, which is strongly affected by the quality of institutions – 
including the quality of a nation’s legal institution.31 
 
In the United Kingdom, former Prime Minister David Cameron has on various 
occasions demonstrated the significance of upholding the rule of law. He wrote at the 
799th anniversary of the Magna Carta that “we should be proud of what Britain has done 
to defend freedom and develop these institutions – Parliamentary democracy, a free 
press, the rule of law – that are so essential for people all over the world”.32 In a recent 
landmark international anti-corruption summit hosted in London in May 2016, he took 
a robust stand against corruption and described it as eroding “public trust in government, 
undermines the rule of law, and may give rise to political and economic grievances that 
may, in conjunction with other factors, fuel violent extremism”.33 David Cameron, 
                                                
29 Christine Lagarde (2013), ‘Strong laws and institutions for a strong global economy’, Washington Fo
reign Law Society, June 4, 2013, available at: https://www.imf.org/external/np/speeches/2013/060413b.
htm. 
30 IMF working paper ‘What role do legal institutions play in development’, by Keven Davis and Michael 
J. Trebilcock, October 20, 1999. See also Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson (2013), Why Nations 
Fail: The Origins of Power, Prosperity and Poverty, Profile Books. 
31 Rule of Law and Development, ‘Economic development and the quality of institutions’, the World Ba
nk, available at: http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/EXTLAWJUSTINST/0,,con
tentMDK:20934363~menuPK:1989584~pagePK:148956~piPK:216618~theSitePK:1974062,00.html#r
ule_of_law. 
32 David Cameron (2014), ‘British values: article by David Cameron’, Prime Minister’s Office, published 
on 15 June 2014, available at: https://www.gov.uk/government/news/british-values-article-by-david-
cameron. 
33 Anti-Corruption Summit London 2016 – Communique, as agreed by the participating countries and, 
where appropriate, international organisations, published on 12 May 2016. 
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along with participating countries, issued the ‘Global Declaration Against Corruption’ 
on the same day and announced that legislation would soon be introduced to expose the 
beneficial ownership of UK companies.34 Under the new government, Prime Minister 
Theresa May is likely to go even further as she has made it a priority to trace those who 
undermine our society by fraud, tax evasion and corruption.35 
 
The rule of law, as its name suggests, refers to a system in which it is the law, and not 
some other body, that ultimately rules. As Thomas Paine stated, when the rule of law is 
present, it is the law that is King.36 It is also often presented as being the opposite of 
‘rule by law’, the idea that the government is above the law while, under such a concept, 
the government is subservient to it. Aristotle espoused similar ideas in ancient studies, 
disavowing personal rule and claiming, ‘rightly constituted laws should be the final 
sovereign’37. This point of view was certainly not limited to the Greeks and parallels 
can be found in a variety of ancient societies including China, which will be discussed 
in the following paragraph. However, the concept came to greater importance in 
western legal thought when it emerged as a response to the once dominant principle of 
‘divine rule of Kings’ in the sixteenth century. It was in fact during this period that the 
term itself was coined. Thomas Paine further illustrated that the rule of law was an 
important and foundational concept during the time of American independence and 
                                                
34 see G20 High Level Principles on Beneficial Ownership Transparency, 16 November 2014; and UK 
Implementation of G20 High Level Principles on Beneficial Ownership Transparency; see also Barry 
Rider (2015), ‘Rumblings in the corporate jungle’, The Company Lawyer, Vol. 36, Iss. 2, pp. 33-34; and 
Barry Rider (2013), ‘Exposing the modesty of companies!’ The Company Lawyer, Vol. 34, Iss. 9, pp. 
263-264. 
35 Note in particular Criminal Finance Act 2017 has been enacted in April 2017. The UK Government 
has since 2016 instituted a public register of beneficial ownership and in collaboration with UK Overseas 
Territories and Crown Dependencies has established a network of agreements which require effective 
disclosure and recoding of beneficial ownership of companies. In Europe the ‘systematic exchange’ of 
beneficial ownership established by the UK, Germany, France, Italy and Spain has now extended to over 
50 jurisdictions and covers trusts and other entities as well as companies. 
36 See Thomas Paine (1776), Common Sense, Salt Lake City: Infomotions Inc Press. 
37 See discussions at Antonin Scalia (1989), ‘The rule of law as a law of rules’, The University of Chicago 
Law Review, Vol. 56, No. 4, pp. 1175-1188 at p. 1176; Fred D. Miller (1997), Nature, Justice, and Rights 
in Aristotle’s Politics, Oxford: Oxford University Press; and Brian Z. Tamanaha (2001), A General 
Jurisprudence of Law and Society, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 11-16. 
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played a vital role in shaping the new country’s political system, which was among the 
first to contain three of the institutions now considered crucial for the existence of the 
rule of law: a written constitution, separation of powers, and judicial review.38 
 
With the pace of reform and opening-up policy since the end of the 1970s in China, 
fazhi, a translation of the western term ‘the rule of law’ has increasingly gained 
popularity among the Chinese, from intellectuals to common people.39 The concepts of 
fazhi (the rule of law) and its opposite, renzhi (the rule of man) are concepts readily 
established in China. Similar to the western world, history records that similar views 
led to heated debate among early philosophers in China, between Confucians and the 
Legalists.40 The first debate was possibly provoked in 536 B.C. by an order of Zi Chan, 
a representative of Chinese Legalists and the Prime Minister of state of Zheng, to have 
the written criminal law of the state inscribed on a bronze vessel put on public display. 
It was understood by his colleagues as a gesture to illustrate the permanence of the law 
and to ensure the people that the law would only be applied according to its letter, free 
of government intervention. 41  Following this thought, the Legalists subsequently 
suggested that in governing, leaders should not rely on their intellect but on laws, just 
as craftsmen relied on tools, such as the compass and the square. The leader should not 
make arbitrary decisions but instead let the law ‘rule’.42 
 
                                                
38  Jethro Lieberman (2005), A Practical Companion to the Constitution, California: University of 
California Press, p. 436; and Brian Z. Tamanaha (2005), On the Rule of Law: History, Politics, Theory, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
39 Albert HY Chen (2004), An Introduction to the Legal System of the People’s Republic of China, Third 
Edition, Chatswood: LexixNexix Butterworths, pp. 22-38. 
40 SeeJacques deLisle (2000), ‘China’s approach to international law: a historical perspective’, American 
Society of International Law, Vol. 94, pp. 267-275; Herrlee Glessner Greel (1970), Origins of Statecraft 
in China, Chicago: University of Chicago Press; see also Yongping Liu (1998), Origins of Chinese Law: 
Penal and Administrative Law in its Early Development, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
41 Jack L. Dull (2000), ‘The deep roots of resistance to law codes and lawyers in China’, in The Limits 
of the Rule of Law in China, edited by Karen G. Turner, James V. Feinerman and R. Kent Guy, Seattle: 
University of Washington Press, pp. 327-328. 
42  See Derk Bodde and Clarence Morris (1967), Law in Imperial China, Massachusetts: Harvard 
University Press, pp. 23-29. 
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Similar ideas were brought up in a speech given by Deng Xiaoping in 1978, following 
the success of Deng Xiaoping and his colleagues in consolidating their authority at the 
third plenary session of the Eleventh Central Committee. Deng stated: “in order to 
safeguard people’s democracy the legal system must be strengthened. Democracy needs 
to be institutionalised and legalised so that such a system and such laws would not 
change merely because of a change of leadership or a change in the leaders’ views and 
attention. The present problem is that the laws are incomplete; many laws have not yet 
been enacted. Leaders’ words are often taken as ‘law’, and if one disagrees with the 
leaders’ words, it is called ‘unlawful’. And if the leaders change their words, the ‘law’ 
changes accordingly.”43 Earlier in the same year, a new constitution was enacted at the 
first session of the Fifth National People’s Congress, and both Hua Guofeng, CCP 
Chairman and State Council Premier and Ye Jianying, Chairman of the Standing 
Committee of the National People’s Congress, emphasised the need to strengthen the 
socialist legal system.44 Indeed, after a ten-year lawless period of cultural revolution, 
no one was more demanding than China’s own citizens for a more stable legal 
environment; and of course, the reformist leadership had also realised that the country 
could not lure investments from abroad without creating a predictable legal framework 
to safeguard trade. 
 
Consequently, many formal laws and regulations were promulgated.45 China, in line 
with other developing countries, believed that creating an institutional environment is 
conducive to economic growth.46 However, they might just perceive law as a significant 
                                                
43 Xiaoping Deng (1983), Deng Xiaoping Wenxuan 1975-1982 (Collected works of Deng Xiaoping), 
Beijing: People’s Press, pp. 136-137. 
44 Collection of Documents of the First Session of the Fifth National People’s Congress of the People’s 
Republic of China (1978), Beijing: People’s Press, pp. 55, 122, 132-133. 
45 See a general overview at Keyuan Zou (1999), ‘Towards the rule of law: an overview of China’s legal 
reform’, in China: Two Decades of Reform and Change, edited by Guangwu Wang and John Wong, 
Singapore: Singapore University Press, pp. 41-66. 
46 James V. Feinerman (2000), ‘The rule of law imposed from outside: China’s foreign-oriented legal 
regime since 1978’, in The Limits of the Rule of Law in China, edited by Karen G. Turner, James V. 
Feinerman and R. Kent Guy, Seattle: University of Washington Press, p. 306. See also James Gwartney, 
Richard Stroup, Russell Sobel and David Macpherson (2009), Economics: Private and Public, 12th 
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ingredient within this environment, as exemplified by the widespread effort to make 
and modify laws to accommodate and encourage desired changes in Chinese economy. 
Indeed, there were concerns arising, such as lawmakers embracing laws that were 
hugely imported from the west. Feinerman argued that it is critical for China to ‘dig 
below the surface’ in assessing legal and economic development. He indicated the 
veneer of legalisation created since the late 1970s in China, created a legal ‘Potemkin 
village’, and over-reliance on promulgating formal law may have both diverted 
attention from necessary economic changes as well as creating misimpressions about 
the rapidity and extent of economic and legal change that has actually occurred.47 It is 
also the case that legalisation has only focused on issues of particular concern to the 
state and the party, while the foundational areas of law, vital to the legal development, 
were often neglected. For example, a Sino-Foreign Joint Venture Law was enacted in 
July 1979, before the more basic laws dealing with matters such as contract, status of 
legal persons and taxation. 
 
The efficiency of the rule of law has also been questioned by China’s own scholars. For 
example, a speech given by a distinguished Peking University law professor, He 
Weifang at his alma mater, Southwest University of Political Science and Law, where 
He mentioned that doubts and distrust about the Constitutional provision ‘all power in 
the People’s Republic of China belongs to the people’ rose among the students after 
their teacher made such highly supportive statements on the newly enacted Constitution. 
Professor He believed that the teacher also sensed this distrust from his students but he 
had no choice and dared not tell the students that the democracy is hypocritical. He 
further mentioned, during this ideologically fervent period, that everything they were 
taught about the Constitution was completely politicised and full of falsehoods. Every 
                                                
edition, Mason: South-Western College Publisher, pp. 330-344. 
47 James V. Feinerman (2000), ‘The rule of law imposed from outside: China’s foreign-oriented legal 
regime since 1978’, in The Limits of the Rule of Law in China, edited by Karen G. Turner, James V. 
Feinerman and R. Kent Guy, Seattle: University of Washington Press, pp. 304-324. 
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time they returned from class, constitutional law lecturers would speak to themselves 
with a sign: “Gosh, I again pulled the wool over the eyes of my students.”48  
 
The rule of law in China has always been a hotly contested topic. Though China’s 
leadership has not been slow in moving its first step towards legalisation, there is still 
great room for improvement. This chapter however, is not one on evaluating the 
progress China has made or is continuing to make on establishing its rule of law. This 
section intends to give readers some general background information on China’s initial 
efforts on establishing a legal framework. The following sections will examine 
specifically how the Chinese authorities confronted and dealt with economic crimes 
that coincided with economic reform. 
 
Worsening economic crime 
Economic crime grew dramatically in China by the 1980s, and such issues had been 
emphasised and discussed publicly through top party officials at various national 
meetings – many expressed the importance of curbing economic crimes, which they 
believed was absolutely vital to the party’s survival and the country’s future. Li 
Xiannian, Vice Chairman of CCP Central Committee, called worsening economic 
crimes a crucial issue for the future of the CCP and its regime, at a Spring Festival 
meeting on January 24, 1982. He promised to firmly handle economic and other 
offences, starting with making serious investigation and disposition of cases involving 
senior cadres. “Serious cases with sufficient evidence must be strictly and expeditiously 
handled by law; such offences will be vigorously dealt with and no area will be left 
untouched”, Li stressed.49 His statement is no doubt an explicit illustration of the 
explosion of economic crime at that time, which Li firmly indicated, was becoming a 
threat to the existence of the party and its regime. 
                                                
48 Weifang He (2012), In the Name of Justice: Striving for the Rule of Law in China, Washington D.C.: 
Brookings Institution Press, pp. 67-68. 
49 People’s Daily, full text of Li Xiannian’s speech, January 25, 1982, p. 1. 
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Detailed information disclosed by Chi Zhanyuan, Deputy Procurator of the Supreme 
People’s Procuratorate at the All Nation Procurators’ Conference, on October 18, 1981, 
illustrated that economic inspection organs had been set up since 1980 under the 
people’s procuratorates at various levels, given the responsibility to handle economic 
crimes. Within a year, ending in October 1981, these organs had already handled over 
20,000 cases.50  Of these 20,000 cases, Chi Zhanyuan pointed out, corruption made up 
43%, illegal tree cutting 35%, and the remaining 22% was shared by negligence, 
malfeasance, bribery, tax evasion, falsification and imitation of trade marks. Chi 
disclosed that between the period of January and June 1981, people’s procuratorates, 
working in conjunction with taxation departments, successfully prosecuted cases of tax 
evasion amounting to 720 million Chinese yuan.51 
 
Furthermore, on December 7, 1981, Huang Huoqing, Chief Procurator of the Supreme 
People’s Procuratorate, at the 4th session of the 5th National People’s Congress, 
presented a report concerning economic crime in China and measures taken to deal with 
it. He said: “the resolution of the 3rd session of the 5th NPC has called for efforts to 
strengthen justice in economic areas, and to carry out this resolution; the people’s 
procuratorates at all levels have stepped forward. They, in a serious manner, disposed 
of a mob of criminals for abuse of power and graft, theft and bribery that caused heavy 
losses to the state and collective property, and other cases involving disruption of 
national economy and negligence leading to injuries, deaths and illegal deforestation.”52 
Huang further added that in the period between January and September 1981, more than 
                                                
50 Wen Hui News, October 19, 1982, p. 3. See more at Richard Levy (1995), ‘Corruption, Economic 
Crime and Social Transformation since the Reforms: The Debate in China’, The Australian Journal of 
Chinese Affairs, No. 33, pp. 1-25; see also Andrew Wedeman (2012), Double Paradox: Rapid Growth 
and Rising Corruption in China, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, pp. 1-3. 
51 Ibid. 
52 Report by Huoqing Huang (1981), ‘Summary of the 5th National People’s Congress and the 4th session 
of Political Consultative Conference’, Taipei: Mainland Operations Board, Central Committee, 
December 1981, pp. 105-121. 
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31,000 cases of economic crime were investigated.53 
 
These cases would not be dealt sufficiently and efficiently without the cooperation of 
the people’s courts. Jiang Hua, President of the Supreme People’s Court, had also issued 
a report in this regard at the NPC meeting on December 7, 1981. “For over a year now, 
all levels of people’s courts have firmly carried out the resolution of the 3rd session of 
the 5th NPC on strengthening economic justice by setting up special organs to 
investigate and initiate the trials of economic abuse. At this point the Supreme People’s 
Court, local high courts, and 293 intermediate courts have all established economic trial 
courts, with a total cadre number of over 1,900, in accordance with the organic law of 
the people’s court”. Jiang further revealed that over the past year more than 14,700 
cases of economic abuse, most of which involving disputes and criminal offences, had 
been presented to the people’s courts.54 
 
Through the above figures presented by Chi Zhanyuan, Huang Guoqing and Jiang Hua, 
it is not difficult to testify the increasingly widespread incidence of economic crimes in 
China after the economic reform. It soon promoted the General Secretary of the CCP 
Hu Yaobang, to warn, at the 12th Party’s Congress, that “serious economic criminal 
activities are undermining construction projects, destroying the peace of  society, badly 
influencing moral standards, eroding people’s mentality and life, and endangering the 
edifice of socialism like termites.”55 
 
To control this, the party and the government periodically initiated major anti-crime 
and anti-corruption campaigns throughout the first decade after the economic reform.56 
                                                
53 Ibid, p. 108, see more discussions at Cynthia B. Schultz (1989), ‘Economic Crimes in the People’s 
Republic of China: A Swinging Door Policy’, American University International Law Review, 5 (1), pp. 
161-206. 
54 Report by Hua Jiang (1981), Ibid, pp. 98-104. 
55 Yaobang Hu (1982), ‘Open up a new horizon for socialist modernised constructions’, 1 September 
1982, at the 12th Party Congress, Wen Hui News, 8 September 1982. 
56 See for example, 1982 Campaign against economic crime in China, discussions at Keith Forster (1985), 
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These campaigns imposed significant pressure on the criminal justice system reform 
which had been essentially non-existent since the Cultural Revolution.57 Of course, the 
rapid increase in foreign investment, together with domestic market changes such as 
collective ownership and the beginning of private enterprises, have been another 
important impetus in China’s anti-crime campaigns and justice system reform.58 
 
The ruling party recognised that economic crimes were their major concern in 
maintaining stability of society. This is particularly the case with China in running a 
single party system. Rampant economic crime would undermine China’s economic 
growth, disrupt the effective distribution of economic resources and discourage foreign 
investment; but more importantly, it would jeopardise the reputation of the ruling party 
CCP and subsequently have a disproportionate impact on the trust and confidence of its 
people. As Professor Barry Rider witnessed, in socialist economies, where the state is 
a major or perhaps the sole player, economic abuse was, and to some degree still is, 
viewed as treason; more criminals were executed in the USSR during the last twenty 
years for ‘economic crime’ than any other form of crime.59 Indeed, we remember the 
shocking news that the Chinese government sentenced corrupt officials Liu Qingshan 
and Zhang Zishan to the death penalty in the early 1950s during the three and five anti’s 
movement. Even today, the new leadership of China governed by President Xi Jinping, 
called upon a war on economic crime and corruption as soon as he took over as the 
party leader at the end of 2012. He stated in his first public speech that corruption and 
bribery is the first and foremost problem that the party must address!60 
                                                
‘The 1982 campaign against economic crime in China’, The Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs, No. 
14 (July 1985), pp. 1-19. 
57 See details at Zhen Peng (1979), ‘Explanation on Seven Laws’, Beijing Review, July 13, 1979, p. 8. 
58 Qiyin Weng (1985), ‘Lun daji yanzhong jingji fanzui yu gaige kaifang de guanxi’ (A discussion on the 
connection between cracking down economic crime and economic reform), Hebei Law Science, 1985, 
No. 1, pp. 3-9. 
59 Barry Rider, Haiting Yan and Lihong Xing (2010) Guoji Jinrong Fanzui Yufang yu Kongzhi (The 
Prevention and Control of International Financial Crime), Beijing: China Financial Publishing House, 
p. 125. 
60  English version of the full text of President Xi Jinping’s speech is available at: 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-china-20338586, the speech was given on 15 November 2012. 
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How do they define economic crime? 
The CCP define economic crimes as “activities carried out by various illegal means 
making use of loopholes in socialist production, distribution and circulation, in order to 
badly disrupt socialist public ownership, embezzle large amounts of money, exploit the 
broad masses, in particular working class people, and imperil socialist constructions”.61 
It also included other illegal conducts such as smuggling and selling smuggled goods, 
illicit currency exchange, seeking exorbitant profit, speculation and racketeering, 
stealing of state and collective properties, stealing and selling valuable relics, and 
demanding or receiving bribes.62 
 
For speculation and racketeering, unlike other terms such as ‘stealing’ or ‘smuggling’ 
which are reasonably understandable, the party felt it was necessary to offer specific 
explanations by dividing these activities of speculation and racketeering into, in total, 
ten categories.63 It contains common and generic offences including engagement in 
illegal operations of industry, commerce, transportation and construction and in running 
underground factories, stores, transport teams, and contractors; illegal sales of state 
supplies for profiteering or acting as a middleman to receive kickbacks. This was one 
of the most prevalent wrong doings at that time, and will be focused on as an example 
for discussion in the following section. It also specifies activities that harm the grand 
market, such as manipulating the market or hoarding and illegally increasing 
commodity prices to falter the market. Finally, it provides details of offences of making 
and presenting counterfeit goods, illegally selling invoices or contracts, engaging in 
fraudulent transaction within enterprises, and illicit dealing in imported products, 
                                                
61 National People’s Congress on Punishing Serious Criminals, 8 March 1982, in Xinpian Qiye Falu, p. 
155; see also a more detailed discussion on the definitions at Richard Levy (1995), ‘Corruption, 
Economic Crime and Social Transformation since the Reforms: The Debate in China’, The Australian 
Journal of Chinese Affairs, No. 33, pp. 1-25. 
62 Ibid. See also Xiaoli Chen (2008), ‘Lun jingji fanzui de gainian’ (Exploring the definition of economic 
crime), Legal Science and Society, 2008, No. 21, pp. 107-108. 
63 Social Science Monthly, May 1982. 
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jewellery, foreign currency, cultural relics and drugs. 
 
Other than these listed activities of speculation and racketeering, there is a further 
problem of ‘second hand retailers’, meaning those who instead of selling their own 
manufactured products, buy in commodities and make profit on the resale. It was made 
clear that bodies who operated in contravention to state policies, engaging in activities 
of speculation and racketeering, price hiking and disrupting market order, were not 
permitted.64 As a simple example, some speculators may go to the production area to 
buy goods earmarked for planned purchase by the state, thereby hindering efforts of 
state purchase; while others would buy up essential commodities from state-owned 
stores or collective retail shops for the purpose of reselling them at a higher price to 
make an inordinate profit from the general public. The CCP emphasised that such 
activities must be resolutely banned, and in cases of serious violations, economic or 
criminal penalties will be imposed.65 Without a consistent and efficacious monitoring 
system, all regulations would be made in vain. We should not really have expected too 
much during this start-up period – but this was nonetheless the case in China during its 
first ten years after ‘opening up’. 
 
Two-tiered price system 
As noted, the CCP had taken a series of initiatives during the transition from its stagnant 
centrally planned economic system to a market orientation, whereas it has never 
determined to completely eradicate the state planning system and reduce its reliance on 
bureaucracy.66  This accordingly created the so called dual track phenomenon. For 
example, in the same workshop, doing exactly the same work, there were two types of 
                                                
64 Xuebing Zhang (2011), ‘The rise and fall of the ‘crime of illegal speculation and profiteering’ in 
contemporary Chinese history: a view from the development of China’s economic system’, Journal of 
Chinese Communist Party History Studies, 2011, No. 5, pp. 37-48. 
65 Renmin Ribao (People’s Daily), February 8, 1982, p. 4. 
66 See James T. Myers (1989), ‘China: Modernisation and Unhealthy Tendencies’, Comparative Politics, 
Vol. 21 No. 2, pp. 193-213. 
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workers. One held the job for life under the state job assignment scheme, while the 
other was a contract worker, working temporarily for a certain amount of time and on 
different pay and benefit schemes. Also, in the same steel factory, the same products 
were offered at two prices – the state purchasing price and the market price. The market 
price could be twice as high.67 
 
This two-tier price system (also labelled the dual track price system) was adopted in 
China between the period 1984 to 1992. Indeed, this system created more opportunities 
for Chinese people and furthered the modernisation of the economy. However, the same 
goods were offered for sale under different prices and availability conditions based on 
two distinct distribution mechanisms: the government organisations and the market. 
Very few could deny that this unequal system was a source of massive distortions.68 
 
During this period, a huge number of administrative corporations emerged to promote 
business and the term ‘official speculation’ was developed to describe the practices of 
buying and reselling, conducted by cadres working in these corporations. Official 
speculation became one of the most noticeable forms of economic crime due to this 
two-tiered price system.69 In theory, state-set price, floating price and the market price 
were restricted within their respective scopes: state-set price for the materials or 
products designed for mandatory planning; floating prices for those under guidance 
planning and market prices for the materials and products for the market. As Ting Gong 
observed, this arrangement stimulated the economy, between 1984 and 1987, for 
                                                
67 See for example at Jisheng Yang (1988), ‘Shuanggui xianxiang (The dual-track phenomenon)’, Liao 
Wang Weekly, 1988, no. 37, at pp. 10-12. In 1987 for a ton of thread-rolled steel was around 700 yuan, 
while out of planned price was 1,400 yuan. Of the 43.85 million tons of steel produced that year, 22.8 
million tons, accounting for 52 percent, were distributed at the state-fixed price; the prices of the rest 48 
percent were decided by the market. 
68 See generally Shengming Yang and Jun Li (1993), Jiage Shuangguizhi de Lishi Mingyun (The History 
of Two-Tiered Price System), Beijing: China Social Science Press. 
69 See Jinglian Wu and Renwei Zhao (1987), ‘The dual pricing system in China’s industry’, Journal of 
Comparative Economics, Vol. 11, Iss. 3, pp. 309-318; and Fan Gang (1994), ‘Incremental changes and 
dual-track transition: understanding the case of China’, Economic Policy, Vol. 9, No. 19, pp. 99-122, at 
pp. 108-111.  
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instance, China’s steel plants in total raised 12.4 billion yuan in funds for reinvestment, 
by selling extra-quota products at higher prices.70 
 
On the other hand, this also benefited those in public positions who acted as middlemen 
in market exchanges. These cadres connected suppliers and private consumers and drew 
high profits for themselves. Since state-owned corporations were usually run and 
administered by government officials, they were able to obtain the desired products at 
state-set (cheaper) prices, and resell them to local or private companies at market (much 
higher) prices. Normally such a transaction brought these corporations or individual 
cadres astonishing profits. For example, as the People’s Daily reported, a manager 
working for a trading centre in Xuzhou city made a 14,000 yuan profit by reselling 
18,000 tons of state-priced coal to local enterprises. 71  The Qingdao Wholesale 
Hardware Corporation made a total of more than 1.35 million yuan profit through 
buying and reselling some 23 million tons of state-planned products such as wire rods, 
round steel, and rolled plate.72 
 
This brought up another issue associated with official speculation. This speculation 
involved a series of transactions – not just one, and there were consequently more than 
one profiteer. Certainly, this complicated the situation as every transaction inflated the 
product price, and eventually the whole process could lead to an abnormally high price 
for the material. For example, a steel factory in Nanjing city bought thousands of tons 
of steel plate through its ‘back door’ connections at a cheaper price (normally this 
means they had connections with government officials and could buy materials at 
cheaper state-set prices) and then resold them to 31 small factories for a profit of 1.35 
million yuan. By the same token, these small factories duplicated the process and again 
                                                
70 Ting Gong (1994), The Politics of Corruption in Contemporary China: An Analysis of Policy Outcomes, 
Westport: Praeger Publishers, pp. 131-132. 
71 14 May 1989, Renmin Ribao (People’s Daily). 
72 28 October 1988, Foreign Broadcasting Information Service, daily report, p. 49. 
 
 
107 
sold the plate to others instead of using it for production. Such a process continued until 
after 129 transactions, with a final price raised from 1,750 to 4,600 yuan per ton.73 The 
question is, who were the winners and who were the losers? It was the ordinary people 
who, at the end, bought those inflated products and the profits received by those 
involved in these 129 transactions were actually from the broad masses!74 This certainly 
could not be tolerated in a nation with an aim of enhancing a socialist economy and in 
particular with a slogan of ‘renren pingdeng’ (everyone is equal). 
 
In light of the above examples, emerges the phrase ‘back door’. It exposed another 
corrosive problem in transitional China – guanxi, which was often described by western 
countries as ‘connection’ or ‘relationship’ between persons and can sometimes be used 
as a way to achieve desired services or benefits. Although it is not the case that this is 
unique to China, the author believes that such an activity has become far too rampant. .  
 
Guanxi in the reform context 
In recent years, the Chinese word ‘guanxi’ has become increasingly popular and well 
acknowledged among western countries – a word originated from China, often with 
negative connotations referring to corrupt practices in Chinese society. 75  Guanxi 
generally describes the basic dynamic in personal relations of influence and the 
relationships individuals cultivate with others. In the past, ‘connections’ or 
‘relationships’ was perhaps the most widely used English word to translate ‘guanxi’. 
However, as Gold, Guthrie and Wank observed, the pinyin romanisation of this Chinese 
word is becoming more widely accepted in western media, simply because neither of 
                                                
73 21 July 1989, Renmin Ribao (People’s Daily). 
74 See discussions at Lawrence J. Lau, Yingyi Qian and Gerard Roland (2000), ‘Reform without losers: 
an interpretation of China’s dual-track approach to transition’, Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 108, 
No. 1, pp. 120-143. 
75 See generally Y. H. Wong and Thomas K. Leung (2001), Guanxi: Relationship Marketing in a Chinese 
Context, New York: International Business Press; and Mayfair Mei-hui Yang (2002), ‘The resilience of 
guanxi and its new deployments: a critique of some new guanxi scholarship’, The China Quarterly, Vol. 
170, pp. 459-476. 
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those two English terms can sufficiently reflect the wide cultural implications that 
guanxi indicates.76 
 
Guanxi primarily originates from the Chinese philosophy of Confucianism, which 
emphasises the significance of associating oneself with others in a hierarchical manner, 
to maintain economic and social order. It has placed emphasis on implicit mutual 
obligations, reciprocity, and trust, which are the foundations of guanxi and its 
networks.77 
 
Analysing the theoretical context of guanxi in order to gain a better understanding of 
the Chinese term, however, is not recommended by the present author, since guanxi is 
a practical term, which exists in differing societies, functions under various 
circumstances and always has different effects and consequences. Indeed, in China, 
situations where the ability to achieve personal benefits for one’s family members or 
supporters is seen largely as confirmation of status and power, which itself is 
commended or at least condoned by members of that society or group. For example, a 
survey conducted in China78 among business executives revealed that they mostly 
retained what they considered to be traditional Confucian values. As a result, in the 
conduct of their business, advancement of personal and family interests came first. In 
fact, there was little knowledge of the fiduciary obligations on directors and officers 
imposed by China’s Company Law and a few respondents went as far as saying that if 
these obstructed the advancement of family interests, the law needed to be 
                                                
76  See Thomas Gold, Douglas Guthrie, and David Wank (2002), Social Connections in China: 
Institutions, Culture and the Changing Nature of Guanxi, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
77 Yadong Luo, Ying Huang, and Stephanie Lu Wang (2011), ‘Guanxi and organisational performance: a 
meta-analysis’, Management and Organisation Review, Vol. 8, No. 1, pp. 139-172; see also a historical 
development of guanxi at Mayfair Mei-hui Yang (2002), ‘The resilience of guanxi and its new 
deployments: a critique of some new guanxi scholarship’, The China Quarterly, Vol. 170, pp. 459-476. 
78 Raymond Chan, Daniel Ho, Alex Lau and Angus Young (2013), ‘Chinese traditional values matter in 
regulating China’s company directors: findings from an empirical research’, The Company Lawyer, Vol. 
34, Iss. 5, pp. 146-147. 
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reconsidered.79 It is also the case that there are still many societies where giving gifts 
is considered respectful and is not necessarily given in the expectation of a particular 
benefit.80 In such cases, failure to understand the expectation might contribute to a 
justification for criticism. It is true that the understanding of the cultural elements within 
a specific society is vital when scholars research to clarify one phenomenon occurring 
in that given society. In this context, guanxi occurs in various circumstances such as a 
personal, business, and government context, 81  and it is vital to consider different 
examples. 
 
Following the explanation of ‘back door’ previously in this chapter – ‘zouhoumen’ in 
Chinese – it is regarded as a common phenomenon throughout Chinese modern 
history.82 Zouhoumen entailed personal connections that facilitated access to the right 
person who could carry out desired actions, normally through unofficial or illegal 
channels.83 It can be seen from this example that people making profits by buying 
products at state-set prices and selling them at market prices, in order to proceed, guanxi 
and zouhoumen played a vital role. Profiteers needed firstly to have guanxi with state 
officials, so they needed to invest in cultivating and maintaining, and then they would 
have the chance to purchase those products through zouhoumen. The practice of 
zouhoumen originated in China as early as the 1960s when the disaster of the Great 
Leap Forward left its imprints on people’s daily lives. 84  Unbalanced industrial 
                                                
79 Further reading regarding the role of guanxi in the business context: Seung Ho Park and Yadong Luo 
(2001), ‘Guanxi and organisational dynamics: organisational networking in Chinese firms’, Journal of 
Strategic Management, Vol. 22, Iss. 5, pp. 455-477; and Y. H. Wong (1998), ‘The dynamics of guanxi in 
China’, Singapore Management Review, Vol. 20, Iss. 2, pp. 25-42. 
80  P. Steidlmeier (1999), ‘Gift giving, bribery and corruption: ethical management of business 
relationships in China’, Journal of Business Ethics, Vol. 20, No. 2, pp. 121-132. 
81 See Hilton Root (1996), section ‘Relationship-Based Trade – Guanxi’ in ‘Corruption in China: Has it 
become Systemic?’ Asian Survey, Vol. 36, No. 8, pp. 741-757. 
82 See discussion about guanxi and zouhoumen at Lowell Dittmer and Xiaobo Lu (1996), ‘Personal 
politics in the Chinese danwei under reform’, Asian Survey, Vol. 36, No. 3, pp. 246-267. 
83 Tulips Yiwen Wang and Alan B. I. Bernardo (2017), ‘Through the back door: personality factors 
predict acceptance of illegal zou hou men among Chinese people’, Personality and Individual 
Differences, Vol. 119, pp. 194-197. 
84  See generally David Bachman (1991), Bureaucracy, Economy, and Leadership in China: The 
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developments and agricultural failures resulted in a lack of basic necessities and 
consumer products in retail stores. Most of the consumer and food items were either 
supplied on ration or reserved in controlled access. 
 
Consequently, residents had to try other means to obtain these elusive items. These 
means included purchasing from acquaintances or relatives working in the commercial 
sector, through the ‘back door’, and this is the beginning of zouhoumen. The earliest 
evidence of zouhoumen is recorded in an internal directive from the Ministry of 
Commercial and Financial Work of the CCP Central Committee in June 1959.85 Since 
then, zouhoumen became an informal and alternative response by both individuals and 
institutions to economic problems caused by the failure of the economic system.  
 
However, zouhoumen was also in many ways used by the privileged group of high-
ranking officials who enjoyed ‘special supplies’ (tegong) during those difficult times. 
High-ranking officials had been provided with special supplies of goods that were 
usually in short supply. To acquire more of these goods, some local governments tried 
to include as many officials as they could on the special supply lists, which eventually 
gave the government officials enormous opportunities to make profits by selling them 
at very high prices to the people.86 As the vice premier in charge of finance and 
commerce under the State Council Li Xiannian pointed out: “Zouhoumen is caused by 
the shortage of commercial goods. There are different manifestations of zouhoumen: 
some are for personal need, some for eating and taking more than one’s own share, and 
the most serious ones are speculation, profiteering, and corruption.”87 The party soon 
                                                
Institutional Origins of the Great Leap Forward, Chapter 5: the panning and heavy industry coalition, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
85  Dangdai Zhongguo Shangye Bianjibu (Editorial board of Modern Chinese Commerce) (1990), 
Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Shangye Dashiji, 1958-1978 (A Chronology of Major Events in the 
Commercial Sector of the PRC, 1958-1978), Beijing: China Commercial Publishing House. 
86 Haizhong Zhang (1992), Xingshi Fanzui Anli Congshu – Touji Daoba Zui (Collection of Criminal 
Cases – Crime of Official Speculation), Beijing: China Procuratorate Press. 
87 Xiannian Li (1992), Li Xiannian Lun Caizheng Jinrong Maoyi, 1950-1991 (Selection of Li Xiannian’s 
work on Finance and Trade), Vol. 1. Beijing: China Financial & Economic Publishing House, p. 488. 
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realised the severe effects of zouhoumen and subsequently issued a series of directives 
to curb such practice.88 It certainly was not hard to see, though occurring in different 
periods of China, that the substance of various economic abuses is essentially the same 
with official speculation at the two-tiered price system.  
 
These activities could not have been carried out without the crucial element of guanxi.  
If one did not have guanxi with the officials, he could not exploit either ‘special supplied’ 
items or ‘state-set’ priced items, much less make profits from them. In the sense of 
market reform, the phenomenon of high-ranking officials’ special treatments and 
official privileges had gradually diminished along with the increasing availability of 
daily consumer goods. However, guanxi had not only survived the market change, but 
became more sophisticated, complex and commonly used than ever before. As Zhang 
mentioned in her article, a senior CCP official once contended in the mid-1980s that 
bureaucratism, usurpation of office for private gains, guanxi, and money fetishism were 
the four major ‘epidemics’ torturing the party – they were ‘the main features among all 
the unhealthy tendencies that many other deviances derived from”.89 In many ways, the 
prevalent practice of cultivating and exercising guanxi and the thriving guanxi networks 
were a continuation and refinement of the earlier zouhoumen practice. Lu observed, 
compared with zouhoumen, this occurred as a response to consumer product shortages 
which needed guanxi.90 The practice of guanxi in the 1980s was more proactive, open, 
and widely exercised. In the early 1980s, guanxi progressed to the point that it could 
not only be used by individuals, but also by units.91 He further conducted an interview 
                                                
88 See for example, ‘Reforming the system of special supplies for high-ranking officials and prohibiting 
backdoor dealing’ was issued in October 1960 by Central Committee, see more at Xiurong Huang and 
Songbin Liu (1997), Zhongguo Gongchandang Lianzheng Fanfu Shiji (A History of Anti-Corruption in 
the CCP), Beijing: China Fangzheng Press. 
89 Yun Zhang (1986), ‘Quanmian tigao dangyuan suzhi shi dangfeng ganben haozhuan de jianshi jichu’ 
(Improving the quality of party members is the foundation for improvement of the party’s orientation), 
Official CCP Central Committee journal: Hongqi (Red flag), No.10. 
90  See Xiaobo Lu (2000), Cadres and Corruption: The Organisational Involution of the Chinese 
Communist Party, Stanford: Stanford University Press, pp. 175-179. 
91 Ibid. 
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with a factory manager in a rural township, who indicated: “factories of our size and 
type often have to reserve a fair amount of money each year to spend on maintaining 
and developing connections. Without good guanxi, you will not have the chance to get 
too far. Sometimes we need materials that are hard to obtain, and sometimes we need 
to be shielded from inspections and fines for not meeting minimum standards. These 
all require some work in cultivating good guanxi with different parties”.92 
 
We can see that Guanxi was beneficial in securing state-owned bank loans and 
government construction contracts, as well as avoiding quality inspections and fines. A 
county party department divided guanxi relationships into four categories: 1) links of 
kinship; 2) links with classmates, comrade-in-arms, ex-colleagues, old friends, or 
acquaintances; 3) factional ties left over from the Cultural Revolution; 4) links 
involving exchange of money or materials. On the other hand, these relationships often 
intertwined and knitted into a web which involved large numbers of people, who could 
subsequently share useful information and mutual benefits within the group.93 The 
significance of guanxi can even be seen in publicised employment advertisements. A 
company in Zhengzhou, advertising to employ 200 public relations and sales persons, 
made it completely open that they prefer the children or relatives of high-ranking public 
officials, high-level managers, and officials serving on boards of directors of state 
firms.94 Of course, guanxi could also be found in foreign joint ventures, where the 
guanxi network could help managers to circumvent bureaucratic control.95 In the legal 
sector, guanxi, for a long time, was seen as a useful tool to help people escape attention 
when he or she faced criminal or disciplinary investigations.96 The web of guanxi not 
                                                
92 An interview conducted by Xiaobo Lu, cited in his book, Ibid. 
93 Zugong Tongxuan (Bulletin of organisational work), no. 384, 1985. 
94 Gongren Ribao (Worker’s Daily), Beijing, 10 December 1997. 
95 See Margaret Person (1991), Joint Venture in the People’s Republic of China, Princeton: Princeton 
University Press; see also Steven Dickinson (2008), ‘Avoiding mistakes in Chinese joint ventures’, China 
Brief, April 2008, pp. 20-21. 
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only provided meaningful ways for officials to achieve their financial or political goals, 
but also became their protector. Based on the information provided by employees of 
party and state control agencies, in almost every case that was investigated or 
prosecuted, people tried to intercede for those under investigation or after they were 
disciplined.97 
 
The transitional process of economic reform has inevitably been distorted by the 
widespread practice of guanxi. Some Chinese scholars have characterised China’s 
economy as one of “thirty percent power, thirty percent guanxi, and forty percent 
market”.98 Some extreme commentators even called China a ‘guanxi economy’99 or a 
‘renqing economy’100. It is fair to say that not all guanxi or informal connections are 
illicit. However, informal connections did, in many ways, create grounds for 
irregularities. In the period of market reform, informal relationships have gained almost 
as much influence as formal ones, which is an area that the party needs to seriously 
consider, since it is a threat to the formal organisational ties that the party have always 
intended to maintain.  
 
The other side of the power decentralisation 
It has already been noted that one of those key elements of the reform was the 
decentralisation of centrally controlled systems; local governments were granted more 
power in their autonomous administrations than in previous years. The decentralisation 
movement first became apparent when Deng Xiaoping attained power in 1978. The 
                                                
97  See Longze Jin (1988), ‘Xinshiqi dangyuan weiji fanfa de tedian, yuanyin ji fangfan cuoshi’ 
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trend then gained momentum when he embarked on his famous southern trip of China 
in 1992, during which he administered decentralisation and temporary economic 
disparities.101 One of the key reforms within this period included an amendment to the 
Constitution that allowed the nation’s economic power to be distributed among the 
provinces, which has subsequently become the driving force behind this transition. As 
planned, priority was given to the coastal provinces with the establishment of Special 
Economic Zones, serving as ‘laboratories’, where reform was first carried out.102 
 
The extension of decentralised control during the reform period was in many ways 
beneficial for China’s development. It allowed for flexibility and local initiatives in 
implementing new economic and governmental strategies.103  According to various 
empirical findings presented by scholars in economics, decentralisation of fiscal control 
made a significant contribution to China’s economic growth since the mid-1980s. The 
conclusion was reached that fiscal decentralisation could increase economic efficiency 
and consequently economic growth, mainly by improving the efficiency of resource 
allocation.104 The centre also decentralised investment power in order to make local 
authorities more responsible for productive projects. Prior to 1984, investment projects 
of over 10 million yuan were subject to central approval, whereas after 1988, the State 
Planning Commission only reviewed over 50 million yuan projects.105 The rest was left 
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entirely in the hands of provincial departments. Additionally, the local government’s 
control over banks and taxes also allowed them to intervene with investment activities. 
 
This change, however, has provided local officials with many more opportunities for 
abuse at subsystem levels.106 The centre became more dependent upon local cadres to 
implement its routine control; the local cadres were exercising much more influence 
and sometimes even monopolised power on local resource allocation and economic and 
business activity control – they became increasingly free from intervention.107 On many 
occasions, policy interpretation and enforcement fell completely into the hands of 
individual cadres. 
 
The proliferation of governmental agencies was probably the most obvious at local 
levels, even though the state government made substantive efforts to streamline 
organisations. The ‘organisational simplification’ commonly had a lesser impact at local 
levels than that at the centre, simply because the local government were reluctant to cut 
their administrative budgets.108 Along with institutional proliferation, the number of 
personnel increased dramatically. Figures show that between 1978 and 1990, the total 
number of party and government officials109 climbed by 90.7 percent from 1.8 million 
to 3.3 million.110 Administrative expenditures in line soared, where the budget for 
administrative management increased by 474 percent from 6.7 billion RMB to 31.7 
billion during the decade of 1980-1990.111 
 
                                                
106 See for example, Yongshun Cai (2008), ‘Power structure and regime resilience: contentious politics 
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107  See Kevin O’Brien and Lianjiang Li (1999), ‘Selective policy implementation in rural China’, 
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With the subsystem autonomy granted, the regional power and government budget have 
subsequently increased, hence the chances of various organisational and territorial 
players to seek private gain increased. Misappropriation of public funds was one of the 
most frequent areas. Even though the central government made numerous requests to 
save money, energy, and other production materials, local governments continued to 
carelessly spend regardless. Often, government cadres spent public funds in tourism 
under the label of governmental inspection. For example, as reported at that time, a 
group of six officials went to six work units to evaluate product quality. Their one-
month stay cost these government units 55,400 yuan, and one-fifth of the money was 
spent on banquets. Also, each person in the group received presents worth 1,100 
yuan.112 It became very common that officials held banquets with public expenditure, 
as was reported in 1988, 60-70 percent of the incomes of the large and medium sized 
restaurants throughout China came from feasts at the public expense.113 Su and Jia 
forward further statistics: over about 50 days in early 1987 (around the New Year and 
Chinese Spring Festival), 400 work units held banquets with public funds at a total cost 
of approximately 410,000 yuan at nine first-class restaurants in Shanghai.114 
 
In addition, the central government was especially upset about the ‘small treasuries’ 
(xiaojinku), referring to public funds that were deposited by local units without the 
authorisation of their superior governmental institutions.115 Based on official views, 
these ‘small treasuries’ were sources of corruption where funds could be either obtained 
illegally or spent improperly.116 Also, these ‘small treasuries’ caused a drain on state 
revenues and led to the expansion of consumption expenditure. For example, as 
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reported by Xinhua News, the state-owned Kaili Typing and Printing House in Shanghai 
cheated the state out of more than 32,000 yuan by falsely reporting their staff and 
worker numbers. The money in ‘small treasure’ they created was spent on drinking and 
dining.117 There was only 7,196 yuan left when it was discovered. The Petroleum and 
Natural Gas Corporation of China discovered in October 1989 that the ‘small treasuries’ 
run by its subordinate units, had taken in total 7,196 million yuan in deposits.118 
 
Local cadres also used public welfare funds to build private houses. It was reported 
since 1986, 90 percent of the cities throughout the country disclosed cases of this nature, 
involving 20,100 cadres. Some cadres took possession of public production bases to 
build houses for themselves or their families; some took advantage of their power to 
obtain labour and materials without compensation; and some directly used public or 
collective funds to buy private houses. Examples given include Wang Qinghai, deputy 
chief of Shenyang Municipal Farm Machinery and Automobile Industrial Bureau, who 
spent 56,000 yuan of public funds refurnishing his private house.119 A vice chairman of 
Guangdong People’s Congress Standing Committee built a house with twelve rooms 
and four living rooms for his family of four, in total 424 square metres.120 
 
The practice of misappropriation of public funds has always been an on-going issue in 
China. The anger against such misconduct has grown dramatically in recent years, 
perhaps due to jealousy and conflicts raised over the years between government 
officials and the general public. Nonetheless, the news has spread that due to a current 
intensive anti-graft campaign initiated by President Xi Jinping, hundreds of up-market 
restaurants were closing down. Restaurant owners hopelessly told journalists that they 
had lost many customers from the public sector.121 It has to be born in mind that this 
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was just one of the common methods that local officials used to misuse public funds 
distributed from their central organ. There were plenty of other ways, as long as officials 
were able to provide their government units with ‘proper’ invoices – it did not really 
matter from where they obtained the invoice. Indeed, to deal with such an issue, a 
competent, independent, and trustworthy national auditing team must be a prerequisite. 
 
Cases arising with the economic reform 
It is vital to consider typical selected cases that are tied to previous discussions 
concerning economic reform. 
 
(1) Case of Wang Weiqing, Director of Guangdong Telecommunication Bureau122 
Wang Weiqing, director of Guangdong Telecommunication Bureau and secretary of the 
party committee, had abused his position by engaging his wife in smuggling and 
fraudulent foreign exchange remittance, speculation and racketeering. Since 1978, the 
launch of ‘opening up’, Wang Weiqing and his wife Wang Min used various means to 
acquire foreign remittance of more than HK$ 8,000 from Hong Kong businessmen and 
through their relatives living in Hong Kong and Macao. Wang abused his position to 
stealthily and illegally exchange local currency to foreign exchange notes worth up to 
US$ 4,000. He also bought colour and black and white TV’s, radio-tape recorders, 
electronic calculators and wrist watches through various channels in Hong Kong, 
Macao and Guangdong, and shipped them to Yantai and Wendeng in Shandong 
province for sale with a lucrative profit.  
 
In April 1979, through blackmail and extortion, Wang Weiqing bought in a number of 
colour TV sets at low cost and resold them at a much higher price. Thereafter, Wang 
Min made a personal appearance and illegally purchased a batch of imported television 
                                                
02.12.2013, People’s daily, available at: http://finance.people.com.cn/n/2013/1202/c1004-
23709209.html. 
122 Reported at Renmin Ribao (People’s Daily), 5 February 1982, p. 1.  
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sets from smugglers in Shantou city. In January 1980, Wang Weiqing, Wang Min, their 
son and daughter in law went to Wendeng, Shandong, hometown of Wang Min, and 
sold a large number of TV sets, recorders, and wrist watches. They made a huge profit. 
In April 1980, Wang Min instructed foreign affair personnel to secretly trade for foreign 
exchange notes.  Under the guise of collecting electric circuit rentals from foreign 
businessmen’s houses, these contacts gained US$ 4,000. They then went to the Foreign 
Trade Centre and bought a large quantity of electronic calculators and top of the range 
furniture. 
 
In May 1980, as a member of the Guangdong telecommunications delegation, Wang 
Weiqing went to Hong Kong for a visit. He advised the Hong Kong businessmen that 
he was in partnership with Guangdong Telecommunication Bureau to buy colour TV 
sets in Hong Kong prior to the trip. He then brought these TV sets back for sale without 
paying any taxes. He also accepted radio cassette recorders from foreign businessmen 
in Hong Kong as ‘gifts’. In July the same year, Wang Min travelled to Shandong 
province again and made a huge profit on selling these smuggled goods in her 
hometown. 
 
In early 1981, the couple were exposed by the staff in Guangdong Telecommunications 
Bureau and local inhabitants with numerous letters written to the CCP discipline 
inspection commission, judicial organs as well as newspapers. They were subsequently 
arrested. It was not hard to see that Wang Weiqing, the head of Guangdong 
Telecommunication Bureau, was indeed excessively powerful and benefited from the 
governmental position he held. He and his family had undergone many illegal activities 
during his tenure and it was not until 1981 that they were eventually exposed. The lack 
of an independent supervision system, both at provincial and departmental level, 
resulted in this phenomenon. It was worth noting that Wang held not only the position 
of the director of the bureau, but simultaneously, the general secretary of the party 
committee within the bureau. He was the superior of the party discipline inspection in 
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the bureau. It would be nonsense that inspectors asked for permission to initiate an 
investigation into their own boss! In China today, there is still obscurity as to the clear 
boundary between a director and party secretary of a state-owned enterprise; sometimes 
these two posts were even occupied by one person.  
 
(2) Case of Zhong Jialun and Ren Qingsheng, fraud by offspring of high-ranking public 
officials123 
Zhong Jialun was originally a worker at the capital construction office, administrative 
bureau of the Ministry of Communications and the son of Zhong Fuxiang, former 
minister of the Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications. Ren Qingsheng was 
originally a clerk at the Beijing Electronic Education Video Centre and the son of Ren 
Zhuangsheng, former minister of the Ministry of Commerce. They both left their public 
posts and unlawfully founded Bei Huan Enterprise Service Company through their 
personal connection (guanxi) with the deputy chief of Production Service Association, 
Chaoyang district, Beijing, who allowed them to borrow the seal and the bank account 
of Zuo Jia Zhuang Community Association. The company had not been issued a 
business licence by the industrial and commercial state department, nor had it owned 
any initial capital or assets. This was a completely fraudulent and speculative setup. 
 
After Bei Hua was established, Zhong Jialun made himself the manager and Ren 
Qingsheng the deputy manager. In less than a year, they had sealed over 30 contracts 
and agreements on the supply of goods to state organisations, military forces and local 
enterprises. Through these deals they gained up to 2,950,000 yuan for the goods they 
were supposed to supply. They only provided their clients with a limited amount of 
goods – worth around one tenth of the payment they received in advance. Most of the 
contracts they did not deliver, while they used clients’ funds to engage in massive 
speculation and fraud. 
                                                
123 Reported at Renmin Ribao (People’s Daily), 17 April 1982. 
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With the huge amount of funds acquired by dishonest means, Zhong Jialun and Ren 
Qingsheng illegally bought in state-controlled supplies through their fathers’ 
background and connections, and resold them at a premium. The CCP disclosed that 
for example, they made over 72,700 yuan from the resale of seven automobiles alone. 
Some cars were resold at more than twice their purchasing value. To secure various 
merchandise in short supply, they openly offered bribes. The amount of cash and gifts 
they spent on bribes was valued up to 13,000 yuan. In a year and half since the 
establishment of their company, they squandered more than 210,000 yuan. 
 
When China gradually opened its market to the public, the phenomenon of power-for-
trade accelerated. Being children of powerful high-ranking officials in many ways gave 
them many more opportunities than other people, as it seemed they were born to be 
‘resourceful’, in particular guanxi, the informal and generally much more ‘efficient’ 
way of transactions that was prevalent. Rumours had spread that the case also involved 
others, whose fathers were even more influential, and it was due to this that no 
investigations were pursued. The popularity of children of top political leaders in China 
is nothing new; even today they publicly become hot targets of well-established and 
famous multinational financial institutions, who wish to open doors and secure deals in 
the world’s fastest growing economy.124 This reflects how deep the bureaucratic root 
still is inside the country. 
 
(3) Case of corruption by smuggling suppression personnel125 
Ever since China opened its door to the rest of the world, inward and outward foreign 
                                                
124 See for example, David Barboza (2013), ‘Many Wall St. Banks Woo Children of Chinese Leaders’, 
The New York Times, August 20, 2013, available at: http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/08/20/many-wall-
st-banks-woo-children-of-chinese-leaders/?_r=0; and Neil Irwin (2013), ‘Did JPMorgan Commit 
Bribery by Hiring the Kids of Chinese Politicians?’, The Washington Post, August 19, 2013, available at: 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2013/08/19/did-jpmorgan-commit-bribery-by-hiring-
the-kids-of-chinese-politicians/.   
125 Reported at Renmin Ribao (People’s Daily), 20 February 1982. 
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investment started to flourish. However, there had also been an increasing number of 
smuggling activities in the coastal area along with economic developments. The 
People’s Daily referred to a commentator’s statement on this phenomenon, stating: 
“serious smuggling activities in the fast developing economic area are eroding the 
reputation of the party cadres, poisoning social morality, undermining economic 
constructions and destabilising the society.”126 The CCP, to deal with such a rising 
activity, set up extensive smuggling suppression units in the coastal regions with 
particular emphasis on ‘the importance of establishing a smuggling suppression force’. 
Yet, these measures failed in limiting such activities; on the contrary, the suppression 
personnel had begun to collude with the smugglers. The party itself had admitted the 
corrosive problem, and stated: “the people working in the smuggling suppression force 
in many places are seriously impure. Some have been hit by sugar-coated bullets and 
collaborated with the smugglers. Others have been mentally unstable and neglected 
their duty. Even some have gone so far as to actually engage in smuggling activities in 
the name of suppression.”127 
 
The CCP had limited the case of collective corruption with four smuggling suppression 
boats in the Haifeng, Guangdong province. The four boats were numbered 05, 07, 08 
and 09, designed to serve the Maritime Smuggling Suppression Command of Haifeng, 
Guangdong. Since 1980, Zheng Xingu, second-in-command of Boat 07; Liu Yao, 
captain of Boat 05; Liu Guihuan, captain of Boat 08; and Liang Zheng, captain of Boat 
09, had on numerous occasions set smuggled vessels and crew free after being caught, 
and the personnel in those boats kept the smuggled goods to themselves and sold them 
for substantial profits. It was reported that the four boats collectively stole smuggled 
goods worth 670,000 yuan. The goods sold by the crew of Boat 07 alone were valued 
at 260,000 yuan.  
 
                                                
126 ‘Building a smuggling suppression force’, Renmin Ribao (People’s Daily), 13 July 1982, p. 4. 
127 Ibid. 
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The report provided us with one detailed example of the criminal activity of Boat 07. 
On December 21, 1980, Boat 07 interceded with a smuggled ship on the high seas. 
Having removed most of the cargo from the ship, 07’s chief engineer Yu Chen 
persuaded the second-in-command Zheng Xingu and staff member Lin Qinrun, to 
release the smugglers and their vessel, and they divided the seized cargo among 
themselves. By May 1981, they had made nine more catches of vessels laden with 
smuggled goods. The total goods were: 6,646 wrist watches, 70 cassette recorders, 678 
cassette recording tapes, 262 antelope horns, 1,079 silver coins, 1.5 catty silver bullion, 
962 metres of nylon fabric, 294 pieces of clothing, 12 silk-cotton quilts, 169 metres of 
plastic floor mats and other miscellaneous products. They sold the goods on the market 
and made a profit of 163,666 yuan. 
 
These corrosive practices had also infiltrated into the local public security bureau 
wherein the director and deputy director had also been offered smuggled goods that the 
smuggling suppression team unlawfully acquired, as an exchange for providing a 
‘protective umbrella’. The public were shocked by the case, in a small coastal city 
appertaining to so many public officials and various government institutions. The 
number of cases involving conspiracy of local officials involved in underground 
business began to rise due to the ‘benefit’ brought up by the ‘opening up’ policy.128 This 
had also given an ironic warning to the authorities on how these rural and remote cities 
actually followed the rules and laws promoted by the central government. By only 
blaming the personnel working at the smuggling suppression force was certainly not 
enough!  
 
 
                                                
128 See another famous smuggling case in Xiamen city in 1990s, at Ping He (2010), ‘A typological study 
on money laundering’, Journal of Money Laundering Control, Vol. 13 Iss. 1, pp. 15-32, and Shawn Shieh 
(2005), ‘The rise of collective corruption in China: the Xiamen smuggling case’, Journal of 
Contemporary China, Vo. 14, Iss. 42, pp. 67-91. 
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Crime prevention 
The party and the government did not just passively observe the increasing number of 
economic crimes, both in quantity and quality. Various initiatives had been taken against 
economic crimes and corruption, albeit seemingly not as efficient as people anticipated. 
The party leaders on various occasions, emphasised such pressing issues, and 
promulgated numerous state laws and disciplinary regulations. Many newly established 
government institutions were also specifically established to deal with economic crimes 
and corruption. 
 
The enactment of Criminal Law and Criminal Procedure Law 
China had realised that law and regulation could be a powerful policing mechanism 
when a country implements free market measures of economic reform. It was not until 
1979, however, thirty years after the foundation of People’s Republic of China, that a 
comprehensive criminal code was promulgated. This was partly due to the previous 
leader, Mao Zedong’s distrust of bureaucratisation and his preference for the ‘mass 
line’,129 and was also due to the party’s long emphasis on the societal, rather than the 
judicial and the model of law.130 Consequently, this societal approach left the Chinese 
people neither understanding nor experiencing the strength of the legal system. 
 
When Deng Xiaoping took over as the party leader, he proposed various plans to spur 
economic growth, known as the open-door policy, discussed previously. The party also 
attempted to promote and integrate the rule of law into society to regulate the newly 
proposed free market. The open-door policy had a positive effect on international trade 
and investment, however, as we have observed in previous sections, it also resulted in 
a surge of economic crime. 
                                                
129 See Shao-Chuan Leng and Hungdah Chiu (1985), Criminal Justice in Post-Mao China: Analysis and 
Documents, Albany: State University of New York Press, pp. 24-26, discussed the theory behind the mass 
line. 
130 Shao-Chuan Leng (1982), ‘Criminal justice in Post-Mao China: some preliminary observations’, The 
Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology, Vol. 73, Iss. 1, pp. 204-237, at p. 205. 
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The CCP enacted the first Criminal Code and Criminal Procedure Code in 1979, as two 
solutions to promote foreign trade and to prevent domestic criminal activity. Crimes 
were drawn up into eight categories: (1) counter-revolutionary activities, (2) public 
security, (3) socialist economic order, (4) personal and democratic rights, (5) property, 
(6) social order, (7) marriage and family and (8) dereliction of duties. Among these 
chapters, chapter three, five, six and eight, four out of total eight chapters, include 
articles relating to economic crimes. 
 
Soon afterwards the Supreme People’s Court and Supreme People’s Procuratorate 
jointly issued a document defining acts and elements necessary to constitute an 
economic crime, 131  to prevent further ambiguities of the definition of crimes of 
embezzlement, speculation, and bribery provided in the Criminal Code. Moreover, an 
amendment entitled ‘Decision on the Question of Approval of the Death Sentence’132 
imposed harsher sentences including the death penalty on criminal activity, in response 
to the prevalent economically motivated criminal activity in the early 1980s. 
 
By the same token, to curb the increase in corruption related activity, the National 
People’s Congress (NPC) amended the Criminal Law by adopting two resolutions in 
1982, namely the ‘Resolution for Severely Punishing Offenders Making Great Damage 
to the Economy’133 and the ‘Resolution on Severely Punishing Criminals Seriously 
Endangering Public Security’134. It is worth noting that one important aspect of these 
resolutions was to increase criminal penalties for economic crime. For instance, 
                                                
131 See 3 August 1985, China Daily, ‘Document clarifies bribery law’, p. 4. 
132 See ‘Decision on the Question of Approval of the Death Sentence’, adopted on June 10, 1981, 
reprinted in Renmin Ribao (People’s Daily), June 11, 1981, p. 1. 
133 ‘Resolution for Severely Punishing Offenders Making Great Damage to the Economy’, adopted on 
March 8, 1982, effective on April 1, 1982, 22nd session, 5th NPC, reprinted in Xinhua News, March 9, 
1982. 
134 ‘Resolution on Severely Punishing Criminals Seriously Endangering Public Security’, adopted on 
September 2, 1983, at 2nd session, 6th NPC, reprinted in Xinhua News, September 2, 1983. 
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compared with previously when the maximum penalty for criminals committing 
economic crimes was ten years imprisonment, the new resolution set a minimum 
penalty of ten years and a maximum of life imprisonment or even the death penalty for 
serious crimes of corruption.135 However, the NPC proposed an amnesty programme 
which granted lighter sentences to criminals who voluntarily surrendered themselves to 
the police prior to the promulgation of the new regulations on May 1, 1982.136 
 
The various laws and statutory documents, to some extent, formulated the foundation 
for the increased control of economic crime. Having said this, a societal transformation 
from anti-crime campaign-based policing to the rule of law, required time. Undeniably, 
it was the policies of these political campaigns that determined the extent of the severity 
and the degree of punishment. As Schultz observed, due to the absence of a competent 
legal system, inherent conflicts between the Criminal Code and the anti-corruption 
campaigns emerged in the areas of implementation and enforcement.137 
 
The issue of corruption 
The crime of corruption had been given particular emphasis in the 1979 Criminal Code. 
According to article 155 and 185 of the Criminal Law, “any state functionary who takes 
advantage of his office to embezzle public property shall be sentenced to fixed-term 
imprisonment of not more than 5 years or criminal detention; if the amount embezzled 
is huge and the circumstances are grave, he shall be sentenced to fixed-term 
imprisonment of not less than five years; if the circumstances are especially grave, he 
shall be sentenced to life imprisonment or death. For the crime mentioned above, the 
offender shall be sentenced concurrently to confiscation of property or ordered to make 
restitution or compensation. If any person entrusted by state organs, enterprises, 
                                                
135 See ‘Decision on the Question of Approval of the Death Sentence’. 
136 See ‘Resolution for Severely Punishing Offenders Making Great Damage to the Economy’. 
137 Cynthia B. Schultz (1989), ‘Economic crimes in the People’s Republic of China: a swinging door 
policy’, American University International Law Review, Vol. 5, No. 1, pp. 161-206, at p. 180. 
 
 
127 
institutions or people’s organisations to perform public duties commits the crime 
mentioned in the first part of this article, he shall be punished in accordance with the 
provisions of the two preceding parts”,138 “any state functionary who takes advantage 
of his office to accept bribes shall be sentenced to fixed-term imprisonment of not more 
than five years or criminal detention. The illicit funds or properties he received as bribes 
shall be confiscated, and public funds or properties shall be recovered. Whoever 
commits the crime mentioned in the preceding part and causes great damage to the state 
or its citizens shall be sentenced to fixed-term imprisonment of not less than five years. 
Whoever offers or introduces a bribe to a state functionary shall be sentenced to fixed-
term imprisonment of not more than three years or criminal detention”.139 Moreover, 
other supplementary regulations concerning corruption were published in the 1980s, 
such as ‘Several Answers to the Application of Law Relating to Economic Crime’ (1985) 
and ‘Supplementary Regulations Relating to Corruption and Bribery’ (1988). 
 
Despite all efforts the ruling party made, it is notwithstanding a widely held view that 
corruption had accelerated since the advent of reform.140  Wedeman from his own 
findings argued that in the early stage of the reform, corruption was characterised by a 
qualitative increase, while the later reform period witnessed an ‘intensification’ of 
corruption.141 Corruption intensified in the sense that high-level corruption increased 
more rapidly than any other forms of official malfeasance.142 
 
Eventually, public anger against corruption once again reached a new level in the late 
                                                
138 Article 155 of the Criminal Law of the People’s Republic of China, 1979. 
139 Article 185 of the Criminal Law of the People’s Republic of China, 1979. 
140 See for example, Michael Johnston and Yufan Yao (1993), ‘China’s surge of corruption’, Journal of 
Democracy, Vol. 6, No. 4, pp. 80-94; and Hilton Root (1996), ‘Corruption in China: has it become 
systemic?’ Asian Survey, Vol. 36, No. 8, pp. 741-757; see also Alan P. L. Liu (1983), The politics of 
corruption in the People’s Republic of China, The American Political Science Review, Vol. 77, No. 3, pp. 
602-623. 
141 Andrew Wedeman (2004), ‘The intensification of corruption in China’, The China Quarterly, No. 180 
(Dec 2004), pp. 895-921. 
142 See Yong Guo (2008), ‘Corruption in transitional China: an empirical analysis’, The China Quarterly, 
No. 194, pp. 349-364. 
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1980s. As reflected in a survey conducted by the Sociology Institute of the Chinese 
Academy of Social Science in 1987, 83.7 percent of a total of 2,348 respondents from 
30 cities described corruption as the problem which concerned them most.143 By the 
same token, another survey conducted the following year showed that among 12,000 
people from 16 cities, “embezzlement and bribery” was considered the most prevailing 
social crime; in terms of the party’s so called working style, only 22 percent of the 
respondents described it as ‘improved’, 50.4 percent thought it had “not improved”, and 
24.4 percent thought it was ‘even worse’.144 Furthermore, before the student movement 
in 1989, a nationwide survey by an authoritative magazine Ban Yue Tan, reported 
people’s resentment against corruption: corruption and  
 
Responding to this issue, the CCP politburo set up a meeting in early June 1988, where 
the leadership reached a conclusion that a new anti-corruption movement was necessary 
and it was “concerned with the party and state’s prestige and image among people, with 
the smooth implementation of party paths and policies, with the establishment of a clean 
and efficient government, and with the progress of economic reform.”145 Further, the 
party announced the ‘Notice on Keeping Party and Government Apparatus Honest and 
Clean’, calling on all state organisations to put anti-corruption at a high priority. At the 
Third Plenum of the Thirteenth Party Congress convened later in the same year, the 
party General Secretary, Zhao Ziyang, stated: “keeping the party and state apparatus 
clean is of extreme importance in the current stage of party construction… Today, 
embezzlement, bribery, extortion, speculation, extravagance, and waste that occurred 
among party cadres are what people hate the most… and harm the image of the party 
and the ruling government. If this problem continues, we shall finally lose the support 
                                                
143 Liao Wang (Outlook Weekly), May 23, 1988, p. 27, Beijing: Xinhua News Agency. 
144 Qinfang Zhu (1989), ‘The State of Mind of Urban Workers’, Liao Wang (Outlook Weekly), 1989, pp. 
8-10. 
145 See Mr Li Peng’s speech at the Party’s Working Conference of the Central Government Organs, March 
18, 1988, in Zhongguo Zhengfa Daxue (China University of Political Science and Law), Selected 
Readings on Government Integrity, 1989, p. 21. 
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of the people.” 146  Zhao Ziyang further stated that he believed corruption was an 
inevitable by-product of great economic and social development during this 
modernisation period. With the reform continuing, particularly with a further reduction 
of the state’s central manipulation, people could expect a breakdown of trade between 
official power and wealth. Soon afterwards, at the party’s annual summer retreat at 
Beidaihe in September 1988, the Party Central Committee adopted a retrenchment plan 
with anti-corruption as one of its core components, including postponing price reform, 
reducing capital construction, strengthening ideological rectification, and recentralising 
administration.147 
 
However, it was not until the famous 1989 student demonstration that the anti-
corruption movement was officially initiated, where the demonstrations released the 
prevalent hatred against government corruption.148 During the demonstrations, the most 
popular slogans were ‘Down with Venal Officials’, ‘Opposing Official Speculation’, 
and ‘Opposing Privileges’. Based on the western newspaper, the Boston Globe, one 
worker from Beijing told the media that the students had given the public the courage 
to raise their voice.149 Comments in the Worker’s Daily also reflected the public mood: 
“the people who should have got rich have not, but those who should not have, lined 
their pockets.”150 It was reported that the party General Secretary Zhao Ziyang had 
presented a four-point proposal to the party’s central committee in early May 1989, 
which included anti-corruption measures such as elimination of special privileges 
(tegong) for senior party members and investigation into high-level cadres and their 
relatives, aiming to avoid further escalation of the student-government conflict. Yet, the 
proposal failed to progress since other leaders considered this student movement as 
                                                
146 Fazhi Ribao (Legal Daily), December 12, 1988, Beijing. 
147 See Ting Gong (1994), The Politics of Corruption in Contemporary China: An Analysis of Policy 
Outcomes, Westport: Praeger Publishers, pp. 136-137. 
148 See Yan Sun (1991), ‘The Chinese protests of 1989: the issue of corruption’, Asian Survey, Vol. 31, 
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‘counterrevolutionary insurrection’ instead of an anti-corruption oriented protest.151 
While, after the Tiananmen incident, even Deng Xiaoping himself had to admit the 
stimulating impact of corruption along with this incident, as he told other senior party 
members that “the development from the student demonstrations to turmoil, and then 
to a counterrevolutionary rebellion, has a vital reason; that is, rampant corruption has 
made many people lose their faith in the ruling party and the government, and they 
actually believe that we are protecting corruption.”152 Thus, it was not surprising that 
Chinese mass media increased the exposure of corruption cases soon after the student 
demonstrations. 
 
Meanwhile, China’s procuratorial departments increased the number of corruption 
cases that they investigated and prosecuted. For example, in 1989, China’s procuratorial 
organs dealt with a total of 116,763 cases of embezzlement and bribery; of which 
58,926 were placed on file for investigation and prosecution. The cases accepted 
increased by 1.6 and the number of cases for investigation and prosecution increased 
by 1.8 compared with cases in 1988.153 
 
Furthermore, in contrast to previous anti-corruption campaigns, in the context of 
economic and social reform, the party, for the first time, applied rational and legal 
methods. Having observed the problems associated with the legitimacy based on 
traditional claims, the ruling party, the CCP, realised the necessity to rely on legal means 
to control corruption and consequently the party’s popular image could be restored on 
a new and rational basis. From January 1988 to March 1989, the party and the 
government issued approximately thirty documents connected with anti-corruption 
rules. As summarised by Ting Gong, these rules and regulations were classified into 
                                                
151 Ming Bao, June 1, 1989, p. 1, Hong Kong. 
152  Haimin Wu (1990), The Republic Gave an Ultimatum: How 50,000 Corrupt Officials Turned 
Themselves in, Beijing: Xueyang Publisher, p. 5. 
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three major categories154:  
1) Strengthening centralised control on certain commodities and production 
materials. For instance, it required any government units to report its purchase of 
important commodities to its superior; the number of categories of the 
commodities subject to pre-purchase approval increased from 19 to 29, which 
included automobiles, sofas, carpets, office furniture, blankets, washing machines, 
refrigerators, TV sets, vacuums, clocks worth over 50 yuan, lamps worth over 100 
yuan, and imported liquor and cigarettes.  
2) Forbidding certain ‘unhealthy tendencies’155, for example, gift giving in public 
affairs, wasting public funds, cadres’ engagement in trading, excessive 
consumption of liquors and cigarettes at receptions. 
3) Establishing rules and regulations to punish wrongdoers. For example, the Interim 
Provisions Governing Disciplinary Sanctions Against Corrupt Functionaries of 
State and Administrative Organs stipulated the following disciplinary penalties 
for embezzlement: anyone who embezzled more than 5,000 yuan should be 
expelled from office and the money being embezzled should be repaid in full plus 
interest; anyone who embezzled 3,000 – 5,000 yuan or who embezzled money in 
order to make a profit, should receive a disciplinary warning and a penalty up to 
removal from office, with the money being repaid; anyone who embezzled less 
than 3,000 yuan should receive a disciplinary warning or a demotion penalty.156 
 
Cleaning up corporations 
Due to the blurred connection raised by the public between the problem of official 
speculation and the proliferation of state-owned corporations, the party and the State 
Council between 1988 and 1989 issued several important documents. One such 
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document was the ‘Resolution to Clean up Corporations’, aimed at corporations run by 
government agencies. It specified that according to the central authority, these 
corporations should not engage in profit making and required all government agencies 
to separate themselves from business corporations and emphasised that no government 
agencies could take money out of their administrative budget or other government 
grants to invest in business.157 
 
The party leaders not only viewed the damage caused by their profiteering activities to 
the centre’s control over means of production, but also realised that they jeopardised 
the fairness of free competition in the market, as they had a monopoly over important 
materials and products; their buying-selling-reselling activities led to dramatic price 
changes; and most importantly, they affected social morality and the reputation of the 
party and the government.158 As a consequence of this intensified clean-up, according 
to the report, by the end of April 1990, 88.8 percent of some 13,390 companies run by 
party or government agencies were abolished, and the rest were transferred to economic 
sectors.159 
 
In addition to limiting illegal or ill-managed corporations, the party also banned its 
officials from holding concurrent positions in corporations. On February 5, 1989, the 
Party Central Committee and the State Council circulated a notice requiring all the 
cadres who concurrently held positions in government sectors and business 
corporations to quit their positions in business. According to official statistics, one year 
after this notice was made, 96.4 percent of these cadres pulled themselves out of 
business.160 The party further publicised four major cases involving cadres acting as 
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middlemen who took advantage of their concurrent positions both in government and 
corporation to make profit. Ge Datong of the Economic Daily, Chen Kaizhi of the North 
China Industrial Corporation, Zhang Shuchun of the Yanshan Chemical Corporation, 
and Xiang Yan of the Jiangshu Zhenhua Chemical Industrial Corporation, were party 
officials working for newly established government corporations. They took advantage 
of their privileged positions which gave them free access to important products and 
materials, and then made fortunes. They were eventually severely punished.161 
 
It is worth noting that business operating within the military, which received limited 
attention from academic scholars, contributed significantly to the crime of corruption 
that emerged with the reform. Mulvenon presented his work over a decade ago stating 
that military corruption in China was primarily facilitated by two factors: (1) the 
People’s Liberation Army (PLA)’s legal but limited participation in the Chinese 
economy, and (2) a series of structural factors, for example, the PLA’s privileged access 
to infrastructure, transportation, natural resources, and borders as well as its immunity 
from civilian monitoring and prosecution.162 
 
In the spring of 1985, the mighty Chinese army rolled into battle – a battle without 
blood, gunpowder and smoke, but with a mission to storm the commanding heights of 
the country’s booming economy and claim a stake in its prosperity. Instead of charging 
forward with missiles and tanks, officers and soldiers were armed with business plans 
and tax breaks. Enormous efforts and resources were invested to build a vast but loosely 
connected commercial empire extending into almost every corner of the economy.163 
                                                
161 Guangming Ribao (Guangming Daily), March 12, 1990. 
162 James Mulvenon (2001), Soldiers of Fortune: The Rise and Fall of the Chinese Military-Business 
Complex, New York: M.E. Sharp, pp. 138-139. To be noted, these factors are a necessary but not 
sufficient cause of corruption in the PLA, but they are the key permissive factor allowing military 
corruption to survive and proliferate. 
163 See Ellis Joffe (1996), ‘The PLA and the economy: the effects of involvement’, in Chinese Economic 
Reform: The Impact on Security, edited by Gerald Segal and Richard H. Yang, London and New York: 
Routledge, pp. 12-22. 
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Thousands of enterprises were established which earned hundreds of millions of dollars 
annually. They carved out lucrative niches in China’s fastest growing industries such as 
telecommunications, tourism and real estate. They became magnets for the children of 
senior cadres, and the immense interests to whom their business gave rise had corrosive 
effects on the officers.164  The top political authority has increasingly extended its 
powerful voice from the political and national security into the economic realm – this 
is particularly apparent in industries in which the PLA had direct interests. 
 
Within a few months of the approval being given for the PLA’s legitimate engagement 
in business, an appraisal of army backed trading companies had to be conducted in 
order to control rampant economic abuses. Since then, the military organisations and 
authorities commenced a series of actions to limit the spread of malpractices and 
economic crimes by military units and their business partners. Despite regular 
crackdowns, corruption, smuggling, and other abuses became an increasing occurrence 
and huge sums of undeclared benefits and misappropriated assets were illegally 
extorted by individuals and institutional units. Furthermore, the PLA’s troops and 
defence resources were regularly diverted from military moneymaking duties, which 
inevitably impacted on troop’s training and combat readiness.165 Their involvement in 
business also contributed to the outflow of talented and well qualified military 
personnel into higher paid jobs. According to a study conducted in 1993 on military 
salary structures, commercial pilots earned between RMB 2,600 to 7100 monthly 
compared to RMB 500 for pilots working in the air force.166 
 
However, above all, as Cheung summarised, the drawbacks of military commercialism 
                                                
164 Tai Ming Cheung (2001), China’s Entrepreneurial Army, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 1-2. 
165 Ibid, pp. 173-174; 
166 Fulin Chao and Changshui Hu (1993), ‘Yetan Jundui Ganbu Gongzi Zhidu de Gaige’ (Discussions on 
the reform of the Army cadres’ salary structure), Junshi Jingji Yanjiu (Military Economic Research), July 
1993, pp. 51-52. 
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were numerous, complex and deep-rooted; the most serious sins that were of particular 
attention to the authorities were malpractice and economic crimes, such as corruption, 
smuggling, profiteering, misuse of public funds and evasion of tax.167 Indeed, lax 
supervision and the extra-legal status of military units and their immunity from civilian 
law enforcement authority in many ways encouraged these crimes to emerge. 168 
Statistics in the civilian sector suggest that economic malpractice in the armed forces 
spread rapidly from the mid-1980s and economic crime grew sharply at the end of this 
decade and into the beginning of the 1990s. Case numbers brought before military 
courts were 102 in 1989, 341 in 1990, 234 in 1991 and 450 in 1992, which illustrates a 
steady increase of economic crimes between 1989 and 1992.169 Economic violations 
accelerated in the following years, those uncovered by military auditors in the mid-
1990s expanded at record rates which may have been comparable to an annual increase 
of 30 to 40 percent that were registered in the civilian judicial system.170 Of course 
these numbers only represent a tiny fraction of total economic abuses that took place 
within the PLA, given that military units were reluctant to report cases to their higher 
level authorities and consequently these abuses were either covered up or dealt with 
administratively by local party committees or discipline inspection offices.171 
 
Serious abuses became so wide-spread that the political reliability of the PLA and the 
health of China’s economic environment was undermined. This exasperated President 
Jiang Zemin, who in July 1998 eventually ordered all army-backed companies to cease 
their commercial activities. After nearly two decades of profitable but chaotic 
involvement in business activities, military chiefs had admitted that the disadvantages 
                                                
167 Tai Ming Cheung (2001), China’s Entrepreneurial Army, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 174-
175. 
168 See David S. G. Goodman (1996), ‘Corruption in the PLA’, in Gerald Segal and Richard H. Yang, 
Chinese Economic Reform: The Impact on Security, Oxon: Routledge, pp. 35-52. 
169 Zhongguo Falu Nianjian Bianjiwei (China Law Yearbook Editorial Board), Zhongguo Falu Nianjian 
(China Law Yearbook), Beijing: China Law Yearbook Publishing House, annual editions, 1988-1993. 
170 Guanglin Liu (1996), ‘Enforcement of financial regulations and discipline’, Junshi Jingji Yanjiu 
(Military Economic Research), June 1996, p. 71. 
171 Ibid. 
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of moneymaking had finally outweighed its financial rewards.172 Divested of these 
commercial profits, the PLA claims to have finally returned to its pre-1985 days of 
engaging in limited side-line agricultural and industrial activities. 
 
Judicial and supervisory system 
Various institutions had either been set up or resumed through the first decade of the 
economic reform by the CCP, with the aim of more efficiently and effectively regulating 
the market. In the beginning of the reform, the procuratorate system resumed 
functioning in 1978, and the internal party disciplinary body Central Committee for 
Discipline Inspection (CCDI) was re-established in 1979. In 1987, the supervisory 
agency, the Ministry of Supervision, was reinstituted. These three systems were initially 
created to have their own regulatory and investigative functions: the party discipline 
commission dealt with cases of violating organisational disciplinary rules involving 
party members, the supervisory agency dealt with cases of violating administrative 
regulations involving administrative staff of public units, and finally the people’s 
procuratorates dealt with cases involving anyone, either party members or public 
workers, who violates the law. In 1993, the Ministry of Supervision was merged with 
the CCDI and they began to conduct joint investigations.173 
 
The CCDI, from its establishment, was solely designed to strengthen its supervision 
over party members. The Committee for Discipline Inspections were established from 
the provincial to county level, forming a network throughout the country. Even in 
modern China today, the CCDI is a powerful weapon within the Communist Party and 
exclusively deals with party cadres who are under corruption and malfeasance charges. 
The party disciplines and rules appear to have a more deterrent influence on party 
                                                
172 See more at James Mulvenon (2001), Soldiers of Fortune: The Rise and Fall of the Chinese Military-
Business Complex, New York: M.E. Sharp, pp. 138-152. 
173  Official website of Ministry of Supervision of the People’s Republic of China, access at: 
http://english.gov.cn/state_council/2014/09/09/content_281474986284141.htm  
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officials, given the secret internal disciplinary conduct of Shuanggui – at an appointed 
time and place to confess their violation of party discipline, beyond the normal legal 
process. Officials subject to shuanggui are not permitted to have legal counsel and 
contact with family members for a prolonged period. This gives party discipline power 
over public laws in arresting, detaining and investigating party members.174 
 
In addition to combating corruption, the Supreme People’s Procuratorates set up a 
special bureau, Anti-Corruption and Bribery Bureau, within the procuratorates, and it 
oversaw investigating and prosecuting corruption and bribery at various levels. In 1989, 
the first bureau was established in the Guangdong Province. Then in November 1995, 
under the auspice of the Supreme People’s Procuratorates, the central bureau was 
established. By 1996, there were over 1,500 such agencies operating in 26 provinces of 
China.175 
 
Conclusion 
The tremendous economic reform China has undergone has been witnessed globally. 
What the country and the CCP have achieved certainly is worthy of praise. In the first 
ten years since 1978, the country and the CCP have been through a new series of crimes 
never encountered before, and in response, they promulgated the first ever issues of 
Criminal Law and Criminal Procedure Law in the PRC’s history; they publicised 
innumerable customised regulations and rules in order to curb every type of fast 
growing economic crime they have confronted and initiated several anti-crime 
movements. Of course, China’s enormous efforts have been recognised. Nevertheless 
there still were a certain number of issues waiting to be addressed.  
 
                                                
174 See Lihong Xing, Xuebin Li and Enze Liu (2015), ‘Corruption in China’, in Research Handbook on 
International Financial Crime, edited by Barry Rider, Chelteham: Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd, pp. 419-
434. 
175 China Daily, August 13, 1996. 
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Establishing the rule of law is something China has long emphasised, and it is becoming 
more and more important when China stepped upon the world stage. As the discussion 
presented above illustrates, short-lived anti-crime campaigns would not sufficiently 
solve the problem. Where the degree of severity of the crimes and level of punishment 
used to be determined by the policies of the political campaign, it should, in the context 
of market reform, be determined by the law. The status and significance of the law 
should be further emphasised, given that people in the country would not want to accept 
the fact that the anti-corruption campaign gradually became a tool for political struggles 
against rivals.  
 
Corruption is not a pure economic problem. It is a political matter concerning public 
image and political legitimacy of the leading institution.  It is particularly the case that, 
for a party such as the CCP who defeated rivals through its reputation for moral 
rectitude and its military power, it would not tolerate being tarred with the same corrupt 
image as that of KMT in the period before 1949. Amassing a clean and trustworthy 
government requires not only the rule of law, but also an independent monitoring 
system. The cases discussed illustrate how corrosive it was within culprit state 
departments, and regulatory and judicial bodies in a small coastal city where smuggling 
activities were prevalent. This is of course partly due to the single party system and the 
absolute domination of the party and its members, which leads to a further issue – lack 
of judicial independency. 
 
Efforts have been made by the government to balance the power between the party and 
the judiciary. The revised 1982 Constitution provides for independent judicial power.176 
Yet the judicial branch exercised very little independence as it is obliged to follow the 
party’s directives, and the presidents and judges in regional courts are in fact 
subordinates of the party regional secretary. As a result, the provision granting 
                                                
176 Constitution of the People’s Republic of China (1982), article 126. 
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independent judicial power remains a form with little substance. Indeed, China needs 
not only bold plans for economic reform toward a market economy, but also meaningful 
political reforms to bring in effective control over power holders.	
 
  
Chapter 4: Fraud in China: in a Comparative Context 
 
Introduction 
Economic crime, corruption and fraud are not isolated problems within any nation state. 
In today’s society, it is widely believed that the prevalence of economically motivated 
crime is a substantial threat to the development of economies and financial/social 
stability.1  These crimes are deemed to undermine the country’s economic growth, 
disrupt financial order and destroy investors’ confidence. This is particularly so with 
fraud, which has widely been viewed as a key concept of economic crime.2 Literature 
suggests, fraud has been described in many ways as ‘white collar crime’3, ‘financial 
crime’, ‘economic crime’4, ‘deceit’5, ‘forgery’6, and ‘dishonesty’7. The present author, 
seeks in this chapter to present the control of fraud in a comprehensive manner and to 
give emphasis has adopted a comparative analysis with English law. 
 
According to a report published by the UK National Fraud Authority in 2012, fraud 
costs the UK £73 billion a year. Correspondingly, each UK adult over the age of 16 is 
£1441 worse off per annum due to fraud.8 A new report published recently in 2016 
indicates that the cost of fraud on the UK economy has soared to £193 billion a year –
                                                
1 Barry Rider, Haiting Yan, and Lihong Xing (2010), Guoji Jinrong Fanzui Yufang yu Kongzhi (The 
Prevention and Control of International Financial Crime), Beijing: China Financial Publishing House, 
p. 1. 
2 See Gilbert Crentsil (2015), ‘The concept of fraud: a comparative analysis’, in Research Handbook on 
International Financial Crime, edited by Barry Rider, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, 
pp. 15-31. 
3 Edwin H. Sutherland (1968), ‘While-Collar Criminality’, White-Collar Criminals: The Offender in 
Business and the Professions, 1st edition, Atherton Press, p. 40. 
4  This term has been widely used by Professor Barry Rider and other scholars at The Cambridge 
International Symposium on Economic Crime which takes place annually at Jesus College, University of 
Cambridge. 
5 See Sir James Fitzjames Stephen (1883), A History of the Criminal Law of England, Vol. II, MacMillan 
and Co, pp. 121-122. 
6 See Michael Gale, Sarah Gale and Gary Scanlan (1999), Fraud and the Plc, LexisNexis UK, p. 2. 
7 R v Ghosh [1982] QB 1053; see also Gale, Gale and Scanlan Ibid, pp. 1-5. 
8  BBC News (2012), ‘Fraud costing the UK £73bn a year’, 29 March 2012, available at: 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-17548260 
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equating to more than £6,000 lost per second per day.9 The consequences of fraud are 
obvious and the urgency of efficacious action to tackle such misconduct has been 
recognised by countries worldwide. This chapter will focus particularly on the legal 
regimes of China, and to a lesser degree on the UK – as an exemplar and the origin of 
the Common Law system, based on a comparative analysis regarding the law relating 
to fraud. To provide readers with a clear content of comparison, the author will initially 
evaluate English legal textbooks in relation to Chinese codified statutes. 
 
Fraud is a broad concept that is embodied in both civil and criminal law.10 This chapter, 
will firstly provide a brief introduction to the definition of fraud in the UK and China 
under both strands of law. This will be followed by a detailed discussion of fraud within 
civil law under both legal systems; more specifically, it will focus on the law of tort and 
contract. Subsequently, a comprehensive analysis will be presented assessing and 
comparing criminal fraud in the UK and China, through evaluation of the UK Fraud 
Act 2006 and equivalent provisions in the Chinese criminal code. Furthermore, a 
discussion as to the reason why fraud is difficult to monitor will be presented, in 
particular, its complexity, the evidence required and the high level of proof.  
 
The nature and characteristics of fraud 
The definition of fraud in criminal law 
In many legal systems, it seems rather difficult to determine exactly what constitutes 
fraud, although we may naturally recognise fraudulent acts. A general definition, 
defined by the International Monetary Fund, states that fraud is a deception, deliberately 
                                                
9 Annual Fraud Indicator 2016, produced by Experian, PKF Littlejohn and the Centre for Counter Fraud 
Studies, University of Portsmouth, May 2016. Cited in Jane Croft (2016), ‘Fraud costs the UK up to 
£193bn per year, reports say’, Financial Times, May 25, 2016, available at: 
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/fbb5c2e8-21ad-11e6-9d4d-c11776a5124d.html#axzz4DlBuR7s6. 
10 See Jonathan Fisher (2016), ‘Fraud in civil and criminal law’, in Research Handbook on International 
Financial Crime, edited by Barry Rider, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, pp. 315-327; 
see also Barry Rider, Kern Alexander, Stuart Bazley and Jeffrey Bryant (2016), Chapter 6: Fraud and 
financial crime, in Market Abuse and Insider Dealing, 3rd edition, Heywards Heath: Bloomsbury 
Professional, pp. 123-178. 
 
 
142 
practiced, in order to secure unfair or unlawful gain.11 However, the act of fraud is 
developing and changing constantly. One leading law book in common law states “it is 
not easy to give a definition of what constitutes fraud in the extensive signification in 
which the term is understood by the Civil Courts of Justice. The Courts have always 
avoided hampering themselves by defining or laying down as a general proposition 
what shall be held to constitute fraud. Fraud is infinite in variety. The fertility of man’s 
invention in devising new schemes or fraud is so great, that the courts have always 
declined to define it …reserving to themselves the liberty to deal with it under whatever 
form it may present itself. Fraud, in the contemplation of a Civil Court of Justice, may 
be said to include properly all acts, omissions, and concealments which involve a breach 
of legal or equitable duty, trust or confidence, justly reposed, and are injurious to 
another, or by which an undue or unconscientious advantage is taken of another. All 
surprise, trick, cunning, dissembling and other unfair way that is used to cheat any one 
is considered fraud. Fraud in all cases implies a wilful act on the part of any one, 
whereby another is sought to be deprived, by illegal or inequitable means, of what he 
is entitled to.”12 
 
In the context of criminal law, there have always been concerns as to the fairness of 
such vagueness in definition and attempts have been made in many countries to present 
what passes as a universal definition. However, in reality, most judicial bodies do little 
more than recite the manner in which courts have identified a crime as fraudulent.13In 
modern English criminal law, accepted deception offences, under the Theft Act 1968 
and 1978, have been abolished and replaced by the newly enacted Fraud Act 2006, 
enacted on 15 January 2007. The new law, in many respects, broadens the crime of 
fraud, and its objective is, as Judge Alan Wilkie QC stated, to make the law of fraud 
                                                
11 International Monetary Fund website: http://www.imf.org/external/np/leg/amlcft/eng/ 
12 Denis Lane McDonnell, and John George Monoroe (1952), Kerr on the Law of Fraud and Mistake, 7th 
Edition, Sweet & Maxwell, page 1. 
13 See Melvile M. Bigelow (1887), ‘Definition of fraud’, Law Quarterly Review, Vol. 3 No. 4, pp. 419-
428 
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clearer and simpler, and more readily understandable for all jurors, police, victims, 
defendants and lawyers.14 
 
The new fraud offence, to be discussed in detail within this chapter, involves a 
discernable shift from the previous focus on the term of ‘deception’– requiring not only 
that the prosecution prove that the defendant behaved dishonestly and with intent to 
gain or cause loss, but also that there were economic interests imperilled by their 
conduct. Recently, the new focus is towards criminalising conduct which imperils 
economic interests, with greater emphasis on the mens rea of the defendant rather than 
on any actual harm caused.15 The new Fraud Act bases liability on the concept of 
dishonesty as perceived; whether this provides any greater certainty remains to be seen. 
 
The Fraud Act 2006 creates only one offence of fraud which can be committed in three 
broad ways. Firstly, by a false representation, 16  secondly, by failing to disclose 
information regarding whether there is a legal duty to disclose17 and thirdly, by abuse 
of a position in which one is expected to safeguard or refrain from acting against the 
financial interests of another person.18 The offence is committed if the action taken is 
dishonest and with fraudulent intention.19 It is a matter of the state of mind that has 
become the determinant factor in liability. 
 
Definition of fraud in contract law 
Although English law does not provide a general duty to disclose information during 
                                                
14 News from the Law Commission 30 July 2002, report available at: http://lawcommission.justice.gov.
uk/docs/lc276_Fraud.pdf 
15 David Ormerod (2011), Smith and Hogan’s Criminal Law, 13th Edition, Oxford University Press, pp. 
871-872. 
16 The Fraud Act 2006, Section 2.  
17 Ibid, Section 3. 
18 Ibid, Section 4. 
19 David Ormerod (2011), Smith and Hogan’s Criminal Law, 13th Edition, Oxford University Press, pp. 
875-876; see also Andrew Phang (1992), ‘Positivism in the English law of contract’, The Modern Law 
Review, Vol. 55, No. 1, pp. 102-111. 
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the process of contractual negotiation, the process is not left entirely unregulated. A 
duty is imposed to avoid making false statements of fact to the contracting party and 
thereby inducing them to enter into a contract.20 Given the importance of contract law 
in all business and trade relations, it is fundamental to briefly examine the law of 
misrepresentation, which plays a crucial role in curbing fraud throughout contractual 
negotiations. 
 
According to English law, a misrepresentation is an untrue statement of fact made by 
one party within a contract with the other party, which induced the second party to enter 
into a contract.21 A misrepresentation renders a contract voidable and it may also lead 
to a right to damages, depending on the type of misrepresentation that has occurred.22 
For a misrepresentation to be actionable, it has to meet three requirements: it must be a 
statement of fact; the statement must be untrue or misleading and it must have induced 
the other party to enter into the contract. 
 
To constitute a misrepresentation, the statement must be an existing fact, rather than an 
opinion, sales talk or a statement of intention. In Bisset v Wilkinson23, Bisset was selling 
land in New Zealand to Wilkinson, who wanted to utilise it for sheep farming. The land 
had not been used as a sheep farm before, but Bisset expressed, during the negotiation, 
that the land could carry 2,000 sheep if adequately prepared. The judgment held that 
both parties were aware that the land had never been used as a sheep farm, and therefore 
neither could expect the other to know how many sheep it could carry. So a farmer’s 
description of the quality of his land was no more than a matter of opinion instead of 
an existing fact, and thereby could not amount to a misrepresentation.24 
 
                                                
20 Ewan Mckendrick (2011), Contract Law, 9th Edition, Plagrave Macmillan, p. 225. 
21 Ibid p. 226. 
22 Ibid 
23 [1927] AC 177 
24 Ibid, pp. 183-184. 
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Mere ‘sales talk’ between customer and seller is not considered to be a statement of fact. 
In Dimmock v Hallett25, the land for sale was described as ‘fertile and improvable’. This 
was held to be simply sales talk and the court considered that this statement had 
insufficient substance to be classed as misrepresentation. 
 
Finally, a statement of intention is not a statement of fact. However, if the statement of 
future intention falsely represents the actual intention, i.e. it is a wilful lie, then it may 
be treated as a misrepresentation. In Edgington v Fitzmaurice26, directors of a company 
invited the public to subscribe debentures on the basis that money raised was for 
expanding the business. But, in fact, the real purpose of raising the money was to pay 
off company debts. It was held that the directors were guilty of misrepresentation 
because they had disguised their actual intention.27 
 
It is important to note that an untrue statement can be made by conduct rather than being 
written or spoken. A contracting party does not have to open his mouth to make a false 
statement. In Walters v Morgan28, Lord Campbell stated that, while simple reticence 
does not amount to a legal fraud, in the case of a contract sale, whether of goods or land, 
“a nod or a wink, or a shake of the head, or a smile from the purchaser intended to 
induce the vendor to believe the existence of a non-existing fact, which might influence 
the price of the subject to be sold” would be sufficient ground for refusing to enforce a 
contract. 29  Conduct can be as misleading as words; however, difficulties arise in 
identifying the meaning to be attributed to the conduct and in ascertaining the situations 
in which the defendant is under an obligation to redress the meaning expressed by his 
conduct. 
 
                                                
25 (1866) 2 Ch App 21. 
26 [1885] 29 Ch D 459. 
27 Ibid, at 481. 
28 (1861) 3 D. F. & J. 718. 
29 Ibid at 724, Lord Campbell. 
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Generally, mere silence cannot amount to a misrepresentation. In the case of Keates v 
Cadogan30, a landlord who was letting his house did not tell the tenant that it was in a 
ruinous condition. The judgment said this failure to disclose material information was 
held not to be a misrepresentation. In other words, there is no duty for a party who is 
going to enter into a contract to disclose material facts known to that party while not 
known to the other. However, the courts may decide in certain circumstances31, that 
there is a positive duty of disclosure, for example, where there is a contract of utmost 
good faith. Firstly, these exceptional circumstances typically arise where one party is 
in a strong position to know the truth and the other is in a weak position (e.g. contracts 
of insurance), thus the law imposes an obligation to affirmatively disclose all material 
facts relating to the contract. Secondly, where there has been a change due to later 
events or in some cases a change of intention, this would normally require correction. 
Thirdly, where there is a half-truth. If only a half-truth is told, and the result is 
misleading, then the law may impose on the person responsible for the half-truth a duty 
to correct the false impression given. Lastly, where there is a fiduciary relationship. A 
fiduciary relationship, for example, between agent and principal, solicitor and client, or 
doctor and patient, imposes a duty of full disclosure. 
 
The misrepresentation will only be actionable if the statement results in an inducement 
to the other party to finally enter into the contract. The claimant must have known of 
the existence of the statement; and the statement must have affected the claimant’s 
judgment so that they were induced by it or relied upon it.32 
 
Definition of fraud in both criminal and civil law in China 
Compared with English law, Chinese law has been a complex mix of ancient, traditional 
                                                
30 (1851) 10 CB 591. 
31 The four points stated below are from the same source at Stefan Fafinski and Emily Finch (2010), 
Contract Law, 2nd Edition, Harlow: Pearson Education Limited, page 116-117 
32 Ibid Page 119. 
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and western influences, and is based upon civil law legal tradition, where its core 
principles are codified into the Chinese system that serves as the primary source of 
law.33 
 
Fraud in Chinese law is defined under Article 68 of the ‘Opinions of the Supreme 
People’s Court on Several Issues Concerning the Implementation of the General 
Principles of the Civil Law’ as “where a party purposely conveys any false information 
to the other party, or purposely conceals any fact so as to induce the other party into 
making any false declaration of will, such an act shall be determined as a fraudulent 
act.”34 Prima facie, fraud appears to have very much the same definition as in English 
contract law. 
 
The legal term of ‘fraud’ has many different components and characteristics under 
Chinese criminal and civil law. It is worth noting that the English translation of the 
concept of fraud in Chinese criminal and civil laws interchangeably use the words 
‘fraudulent’, ‘defrauding’ or ‘fraud’. However, these words cannot always fully express 
or define what this really means in Chinese. Civil law uses ‘qi zha’ to describe fraud, 
while criminal law uses ‘zha pian’. In Chinese, ‘qi zha’ means to defraud people in sly 
ways while ‘zha pian’ expresses deception and swindle.35 In other words, ‘zha pian’ is 
a much more severe act than ‘qi zha’ as to the degree of harm caused to others’ interests. 
This perception is consistent with the distinction between a less serious civil fraud and 
                                                
33 See more at Chippings Lang (1989), ‘Explicating law: a comparative perspective of Chinese and 
Western legal culture’, Journal of Chinese Law, Vol. 3, No.1, pp. 55-92; and Derk Bodde and Clarence 
Morris (1973), Law in China: Exemplified by 190 Ching Dynasty Cases with Historical, Social, and 
Judicial Commentaries, Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press. 
34 Opinions of the Supreme People’s Court on Several Issues Concerning the Implementation of the 
General Principles of the Civil Law of the People’s Republic of China (Trial Implementation), 
Promulgated 26.1.1988, Article 68. 
35 Henry (Litong) Chen, and Carlo Carani (2010), ‘Civil Fraud v. Criminal Fraud: Criminal Proceedings
 Not a Silver Bullet to Resolve Business Disputes in China’, Bloomberg Law Reports, MWE China Law
 Offices, available at: http://www.mwe.com/info/pubs/Civil%20Fraud%20v.%20Criminal%20Fraud%2
0-%20Criminal%20Proceedings%20Not%20a%20Silver%20Bullet%20to%20Resolve%20Business%2
0Disputes%20in%20China.pdf 
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a more serious criminal fraud.  
 
Returning to the definition of fraud under civil law, Chinese contract law stipulates “a 
contract shall be null and void if a contract is concluded through the use of fraud or 
coercion by one party to damage the interests of the State.”36 , and “if a contract is 
concluded by one party against the other party’s true intention through the use of fraud, 
coercion, or exploitation of the other party’s unfavourable position, the injured party 
has the right to request the people’s court or an arbitration institution to modify or 
rescind the contract.”37 
 
In comparison, China’s 1997 criminal law provision states that “those defrauding 
relatively large amounts of public or private money and property are to be sentenced to 
three years or fewer in prison or put under criminal detention or surveillance, in addition 
to the imposition of a fine.”38 and “whoever, for the purpose of illegal possession, uses 
one of the following means during signing or executing a contract to obtain property 
and goods from the opposite party by fraud, and when the amount of money is relatively 
large, is to be sentenced to not more than three years of fixed-term imprisonment, 
criminal detention and may in addition or exclusively be fined…”39 
 
The subtle difference in Chinese terms defining fraud indicates a distinction between 
civil and criminal fraud. Having looked through relevant articles present in both 
criminal and civil law in China, it is evident that the key difference between them is in 
the intent of the fraudster.40 Civil fraud only requires the wrongdoer to have an intention 
                                                
36 Contract law of the People’s Republic of China, Promulgated by 9th NPC and effective on 1.10.1999, 
Article 52. 
37 Ibid, Article 54. 
38 Criminal Law of the People’s Republic of China (1997), Revised at 8th NPC and effective on 1.10.1997, 
Article 266.  
39 Ibid, Article 224. 
40 Haibo Zhu (2010), ‘Minshi hetong qizha yu hetong zhapian zui’ (Civil fraud and criminal fraud), China 
Law Information, available at: http://article.chinalawinfo.com/Article_Detail.asp?ArticleID=53875 
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of general fraudulence, while criminal fraud requires a much more severe intent of 
illegal possession. Certainly, there are related minor elements that differ from civil and 
criminal fraud. For example, a monetary threshold must be reached in order to file a 
criminal fraud case with the police, where the value of money or property illegally 
possessed must reach at least 5,000 RMB for individuals and at least 50,000 RMB for 
companies.41 This monetary limit does not exist in civil fraud. Briefly, a civil fraud may 
not be serious enough to constitute a criminal fraud, whereas a criminal fraud case 
simultaneously gives rise to a civil fraud offence.  
 
Fraud in the civil law 
Fraud in the law of tort 
As we have seen previously, fraud is a broad concept that can give rise to liability in 
both criminal and civil law. Yet, the dividing line between them, with regards to 
fraudulent activities, has never been clear in English law. Indeed, one of the earliest 
causes of action for deceit involved considerations of an almost penal nature.42 In 
substance the tort of deceit has much in common with the traditional crime of fraud.  
 
At the end of the eighteenth century, Pasley v Freeman43 established the rule that if a 
person knowingly or recklessly (not caring whether it is true or false), makes a 
statement to another with the intention that it shall be relied upon by that person, who 
does rely on it and therefore suffers harm, then an action of deceit will be deemed. In 
the modern law of fraud in the UK, actual reliance and loss are not necessarily required. 
What is important is the state of mind of the defendant. However, in the civil law of 
tort, unless there has been causative loss, there will be no cause of action as there is 
                                                
41 Provisions of Supreme People’s Prosecuting Institute and Ministry of Public Security Bureau on the 
Standard of Prosecuting an Economic Crime, Effective on 05.07.2010, Article 69.  
42 Barry Rider, Kern Alexander, Stuart Bazley and Jeffrey Bryant (2016), Market Abuse and Insider 
Dealing, 3rd Edition, Haywards Heath: Bloomsbury Professional, p. 169. 
43 (1789) 3 TR 51. 
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nothing to compensate.44 
 
It is the need for the claimant to establish that the defendant must either have known 
that the statement was false or must have been reckless as to its truth or falsity.45 If the 
defendant carelessly, but honestly, makes a false statement, he will not be liable for 
deceit. These legal arguments were presented in the leading case of Derry v Peek46, 
where a tramway company provided that it could operate steam-driven carriages with 
the consent of the Board of Trade. The directors issued a prospectus declaring that they 
had the right to use steam, on the faith of which the claimant bought shares in the 
company. The Board of Trade subsequently refused the necessary permission. The 
House of Lords held that there was no action in deceit since the defendants had honestly 
believed that permission was a formality; they had merely been careless.47 In Hedley 
Byrne & Co. Ltd. v Heller & Partners Ltd.48, the House of Lords stated that carelessness 
might, in certain circumstances, give rise to liability for breach of a duty of care in 
negligence.49 Generally, the main difference between suing in deceit and in negligence 
is the remoteness of damages. In deceit, the defendant is liable for all losses following 
on directly from the tort, whether foreseeable or not.50 
 
History illustrates that English law has developed various mechanisms for rendering a 
fraudster liable in the law of tort. In comparison, the Chinese statutory law of tort is 
relatively new. In China, the first comprehensive law of tort51 was adopted in 2010, and 
                                                
44 Barry Rider, Haiting Yan, and Lihong Xing (2010), Guoji Jinrong Fanzui Yufang yu Kongzhi (The 
Prevention and Control of International Financial Crime), Beijing: China Financial Publishing House, 
p. 434. 
45 Simon Deakin, Angus Johnston, and Basil Markesinis (2013), Markesnis and Deakin’s Tort Law, 7th 
Edition, Oxford University Press, p. 468. 
46 (1889) 14 App Cas 337. 
47 Ibid, at 376. 
48 [1964] AC 465. 
49 Ibid, page 502. 
50 Smith New Court Securities Ltd v Scrimgeour Vickers Ltd [1997] AC 254. 
51 Tort Law of the People’s Republic of China, adopted at 11th NPC on 26 December 2009 and came into 
force on 1 July 2010. 
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covered a broad range of activities including medical malpractice, personal injury and 
liability for environmental damage.52 However, the new tort law does not include 
business-related torts such as interference with contracts or business relationships, 
unfair competition or fraud and misrepresentation. Accordingly, it is widely believed 
that Chinese tort law lacks definition of key terms used or alluded to throughout western 
tort law such as negligence, gross negligence, reasonable care, trespass to land and in 
particular, fraud and misrepresentation.53 Only in Article 2 of Chinese tort law, does it 
stipulate: “those who infringe upon civil rights and interests shall be subject to tort 
liability according to this law.” It then lists a range of ‘civil rights and interests’ and 
further uses “… and other personal and property rights and interests”.54 Generally, this 
might be the only indication for those who have been defrauded by others to seek 
compensation from the action of deceit in tort liability, though no such relevant cases 
have yet been reported.  
 
In comparing fraud in English and Chinese tort law, it can be summarised that there are 
clearly major differences. Firstly, Chinese civil code defines and regulates fraud based 
only on general principles of civil and contract law, while fraud is governed by both 
contract and tort law in England. Secondly, although in theory, scholars recognise tort 
liability, Chinese civil codes do not clearly define tort liability of fraud. Yet, fraud 
(action of deceit) is categorised as a recognised independent tort in English law. Thirdly, 
English law has already established mature and detailed principles regarding the 
tortious liability of fraud, but China has yet to follow this example. Fourthly, in many 
cases, English fraud leads to the concurrence of contract liability and tort liability, 
whereas China is facing the problem of how to coordinate the effect caused by fraud on 
both contract liability (claim for unjust enrichment) and tort liability (claim for 
                                                
52 See more at Laura Ascher (2013), ‘Punitive damage under the new Chinese tort liability law’, China-
EU Law Journal, Vol.2, No.3, pp. 185-200; also Liming Wang (2008), ‘On the construction of China’s 
tort liability legal system’, China Legal Science, 4: 003. 
53 See Xiang Li and Jigang Jin (2014), Concise Chinese Tort Laws, Heidelberg: Springer, pp. 35-42. 
54 Ibid Article 2. 
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compensation for damages), and this may result in ambiguities in relevant cases. 
 
The present author believes that China should acknowledge tort liability of fraud, and 
the injured party should have the right to claim for compensation for damages. 
Notwithstanding this, the current law provides the right for the injured party to rescind 
the contract and obtain certain remedies; the acknowledgement of the right for the 
injured party to claim for tort liability does have theoretical and practical significance 
in China.55 It is perhaps, due to the majority of fraud cases in China in the economic 
sphere, that contract law has been the most commonly if not solely used mechanism for 
victims to seek compensation. However, when dealing with fraudulent activity existing 
without a contractual obligation, such as an individual deceived by an untrue story that 
a relative had died and subsequently suffered mental damage, in these circumstances, 
the claimant cannot seek a remedy in accordance with contract law, so seeking justice 
through tortious liability becomes of great significance.  
 
Misrepresentation – inducing a contract 
As discussed previously, an actionable misrepresentation refers to a statement of fact 
stated prior to the contract by one party to the contract to the other, which is false or 
misleading and which induced the other party to enter into the contract.56 The remedy 
provided for those who have suffered as a consequence of relying on a 
misrepresentation varies, depending upon the essence of the misrepresentation, whether 
the misrepresentation was made fraudulently, negligently or innocently, or whether it 
has resulted in a mistake or been incorporated as a term of the contract. In contrast, 
Chinese law relating to misrepresentation is deemed as relatively simple. 
 
                                                
55 See Wei Yang, (2010), ‘Luelun qizha de qinquan zeren – yi hetongfa, qinquanfa dui qizha de butong 
guizhi wei jiaodu’ (Tort liability of fraud – in a view of different regulations from Contract Law and Tort 
Law), Journal of Jinan University (Philosophy and Social Sciences), No.3 2010, pp. 200-206. 
56 See above section: the nature of fraud in contract law. 
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It has been seen in the law of tort that fraudulent misrepresentation has much the same 
meaning as it does in the action of deceit in the UK. However, in terms of remedies in 
the context of contract law, the misrepresentation must induce an eventual contract.57 
Fraudulent misrepresentation is regarded as the most serious misrepresentation, but the 
types of conduct that give rise to an action of deceit have been narrowed down to rigid 
limits. In the case of Derry v Peek58, the House of Lords established that an absence of 
honest belief is essential to constitute fraud (as mentioned in the tort of deceit). Lord 
Herschell, further delivered a more elaborate definition of fraud, saying that it means a 
false statement made (1) knowingly, or (2) without belief in its truth, or (3) recklessly, 
careless whether it be true or false.59 Motive is irrelevant in an action of deceit. Once it 
has been proved that the claimant has acted upon a false representation, liability ensues, 
although the defendant did not believe the representation to be true or may not have 
been actuated by any bad motive.60 The representor is not liable, until the representee 
has acted on the representation and thereby suffered loss.61 
 
The second type of misrepresentation is negligent misrepresentation. Historically, all 
misrepresentations which were not fraudulent were considered innocent, thereby giving 
rise to no cause of action or remedy in common law.62 However, there are now actions 
available for certain non-fraudulent misrepresentations under both common and statute 
law. Negligent misrepresentation at common law was first established by the House of 
Lords in Hedley Byrne & Co. Ltd v Heller & Partners Ltd63, in which it held that in 
some circumstances, an action would lie in tort for negligent misstatement. In this case 
the claimant had entered into advertising contracts on behalf of another company, 
                                                
57 See Peter Cane and Joanne Conaghan (2008), ‘Fraud and misrepresentation’ in The New Oxford 
Companion to Law, edited by Peter Cane and Joanne Conaghan, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
58 (1889) 13 App Cas 337. 
59 Ibid, at 374.  
60 See Foster v Charles (1830) 7 Bing 105. 
61 See Briess v Woolley [1954] AC 333. 
62 Ewan Mckendrick (2011), Contract Law, 9th Edition, Plagrave Macmillan, p. 231. 
63 [1964] AC 465. 
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Easipower. Under the agreement, the claimants were liable if Easipower failed to pay, 
so the claimant clarified Easipower’s creditworthiness, by contacting its bankers. 
Subsequently, the bank provided a reference supporting the financial soundness of 
Easipower. Unfortunately, Easipower defaulted on their payment, so the claimant sued 
the bankers. The claimant lost, since the reference was provided with a disclaimer that 
it was ‘without responsibility’64. However, the House of Lords stated that there could 
be liability for negligent misrepresentation on the normal principles of tort, where there 
was a ‘special relationship’ between the parties.65 It is still not completely clear what a 
‘special relationship’ is, but broadly speaking, it appears that such a relationship will 
only arise where the maker of a false statement has some knowledge or skill relevant to 
the subject matter of the contract, and can reasonably foresee that the other party will 
rely on the statement.66 
 
Further, under English statute, the Misrepresentation Act 1967, section 2(1) provides 
that where one party enters into a contract as a result of a misrepresentation by the other, 
no matter whether fraudulent or not, the innocent party can claim damages, unless the 
other party can prove that at the time the contract was made, they believed the statement 
to be true, and had reasonable grounds for that belief.67 This effectively creates a 
negligent misrepresentation, but with the burden of proof reversed, so that the person 
making the statement has to prove they were not negligent. 
 
Finally, innocent misrepresentation refers to a misrepresentation that is neither 
fraudulent, nor negligent. Following the development in Hedley Byrne and the 
Misrepresentation Act 1967, it states that innocent representation applies to 
misrepresentations that are made entirely without fault or false intent – in the belief that 
                                                
64 Ibid, page 504. 
65 Ibid, page 502. 
66 Catherine Elliott, and Frances Quinn (2011), Contract Law, 8th Edition, Harlow: Pearson Education 
Limited, p. 194. 
67 See Misrepresentation Act 1967, Section 2(1).  
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it is true and there are reasonable grounds for that belief.68 
 
One area that English law considers outside the ordinary law of misrepresentation is 
mistake as to identity. In the case of Cundy v Lindsay69 , the claimants (Lindsay) 
received an order by post of a large number of handkerchiefs from a Mr. Blenkarn of 
37 Wood Street, Cheapside. Mr. Blenkarn rented a room at that address, and further 
down the road at number 123, were the offices of a highly respectable firm, Blenkiron 
& Co. On the order for handkerchiefs, Blenkarn signed his name so that it looked like 
Blenkiron. The claimants sent off the goods to Blenkiron & Co; Mr. Blenkarn purposely 
accepted them and by the time the fraud was discovered, he had sold the goods to the 
defendant, Cundy, who bought them in good faith. The House of Lords held that the 
claimant had meant to deal only with Blenkiron & Co; there could therefore have been 
no agreement or contract between them and Mr. Blenkarn.70 Accordingly, title did not 
pass to Mr. Blenkarn and could not subsequently have been passed on to Cundy and 
they were enforced to therefore return the goods.71 In a typical situation of this kind of 
unilateral mistake, the contract will either be void for mistake, or voidable for fraud. 
Such a distinction depends on the manner in which the contract was made.72 
 
Chinese civil law 
Looking purely at the legal provisions of Chinese law, neither the civil code nor contract 
law contains a single definition of such a legal term of misrepresentation, nor defines 
the various interpretations. In China’s Securities Law, it prohibits any party in the 
securities market (e.g. stock exchange, securities companies, securities trading service 
institutions, and practitioners) from making any misrepresentations or presenting 
                                                
68 Catherine Elliott, and Frances Quinn (2011), Contract Law, 8th Edition, Harlow: Pearson Education 
Limited, pp. 195-196. 
69 (1878) 3 App Cas 459. 
70 Ibid, p. 465. 
71 Ibid. 
72 Catherine Elliott, and Frances Quinn (2011), Contract Law, 8th Edition, Harlow: Pearson Education 
Limited, p. 225. 
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misleading information in the activities of securities issuance and trading.73 This is 
perhaps the unique reflection of the term ‘misrepresentation’ in various Chinese laws. 
However, this does not mean Chinese law has no concern about such misconduct. China 
has its own preferred texts to describe such actions. For example, as the author has 
mentioned in the first section, misrepresentation in Chinese contract law directly refers 
to the definition of fraud and fraudulent activities. 
 
Reviewing the Chinese anti-fraud regime regarding contracts, regulations are governed 
not only in general principles, but also in special laws74. Firstly, Article 58 (3) of the 
General Principle of the Civil Law of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) stipulates 
civil acts shall be null and void where “they are performed by a person against his true 
intentions as a result of cheating, coercion or exploitation of his unfavourable position 
by the other party”, and further provides “civil acts that are null and void shall not be 
legally binding from the very beginning”.75 
 
Contract Law of the PRC is the primary source of legislation in regulating contractual 
fraud, where Article 52 states “a contract shall be null and void if a contract is concluded 
through the use of fraud or coercion by one party to damage the interests of the State”. 
Article 54 states “if a contract is concluded by one party against the other party’s true 
intention through the use of fraud, coercion, or exploitation of the other party’s 
unfavourable position, the injured party has the right to request the people’s court or an 
arbitration institution to modify or rescind the contract”. Article 56 states “a contract 
that is null and void or revoked shall not be legally binding from the very beginning”, 
and finally Article 113 (2) provides “where a merchant engages in any fraudulent 
activity while supplying goods or services to consumers, it is liable for damages in 
                                                
73 Securities Law of the People’s Republic of China, Article 78 
74 Such as contract law, Consumer Protection Law, Securities Law and Insurance Law. 
75 General Principles of the Civil Law of the People’s Republic of China, adopted at 6th National People’s 
Congress, effective on 1.1.1987, Article 58. 
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accordance with the Law of the People’s Republic of China on Protection of Consumer 
Rights”.76 
 
Furthermore, the Law of the PRC on Protection of Consumer Rights stipulates 
“business operators engaged in fraudulent activities in supplying goods or services shall, 
on the demand of the consumers, increase the compensation for the victims’ losses; the 
increased amount of the compensation shall be two times the costs that the consumers 
paid for the goods purchased or services received”.77 
 
Chinese fraud law is primarily inherited from German and French civil laws;78 beyond 
that, it has also made some changes in order to maintain China’s traditions. For instance, 
Article 52 of the contract law clearly states the contract is null and void when it damages 
the state’s interests, to emphasise that national interests are the highest priority, while 
the lack of uniform constitutive requirements results in theoretical inadequacy. For 
example, the China Central Television (CCTV) 12 legal channel once reported a case79, 
where Mr. Li legally sold a house to Miss Hu, but some time after the transaction, Miss 
Hu heard from others that this house was a ‘xiong zhai’ (haunted house)80. Hu sued Li 
for concealing this and cheating during the negotiation, but Li argued that the contract 
was made in good faith; Hu had obtained a surveyor’s report, that convincing 
procedures had been strictly adhered to and Li had not lied presenting the key facts. 
The court held, the fact that Li did not disclose this information did in fact affect Hu’s 
decision on the purchase, which should be considered as fraud, and thereby the contract 
                                                
76 Contract law of the PRC, Article 52, 54, 56, 113. 
77 Law of the People’s Republic of China on Protection of Consumer Rights and Interests, Promulgated 
by 8th NPC and effective on 1.1.1994, Article 49. 
78 See Mingyi Ye (2012), ‘She hetong zhapian de minfa guizhi’ (Civil laws on regulating contract fraud), 
China Legal Science, 2012, No.1; and Xiaodong Wang and Bo Huang (2010), ‘Zhongying hetong qizha 
wenti bijiao yanjiu’ (Research on Chinese and English Contractual Fraud), Market Modernization, June 
2010, total No. 613. 
79 CCTV 12 Legal Channel, ‘Falu Jiangtang’ (legal lecture), 10.2.2010. 
80 In Chinese feudal ideology, ‘xiong zhai’ is generally believed to be a sign of unluckiness which may 
bring misfortune to the host. 
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was null and void. Many argued against the judgment, stating ‘xiong zhai’ is a feudal 
superstition and is clearly not included in the concept of general law, and consequently 
the courts should not support those elements that do not have legal force. Moreover, 
today, many people make a healthy profit on buying and selling ‘xiong zhai’, and 
whether the house is ‘xiong zhai’ should not affect the validity of the contract. However, 
people who support the judgment hold that whatever factors influence a person’s 
decision to enter into a contract should be given weight when considering liability for 
fraud. 
 
From the above case, we can appreciate the difficulties in identifying and remedying 
fraud cases. The law in China does not provide a uniform and integral principle of what 
constitutes fraud, and lacks proper guidance in terms of factors to be considered within 
the scope of related activity. The law in China does not contain a unified definition of 
objective and subjective criterion in respect of defining fraud. Hence there are 
difficulties in identifying and regulating fraudulent activities, and may therefore 
produce varying results of judgments made in different courts, even though the trial 
cases may be similar. Yet when we consider misrepresentation in English law, based 
upon the benefit of case law, it is well established in all aspects of contractual fraud in 
view of historical precedents.  
 
Moreover, it is widely considered that it is a great handicap that contract law in China 
does not contain the concepts of negligent and innocent misrepresentations.81 Adapted 
from civil law legal tradition, Chinese anti-fraud regimes strictly require a defendant’s 
fraudulent intent and do not recognise negligent and innocent fraud, which thereby has 
led to a unique and single type of fraud. In today’s society, an increasing number of 
cases concerning contract fraud have been reported, and in some cases a negligent 
misrepresentation can cause financial loss as much as a fraudulent misrepresentation. 
                                                
81 Xiaodong Wang and Bo Huang (2010), ‘Zhongying hetong qizha wenti bijiao yanjiu’ (Research on 
Chinese and English Contractual Fraud), Market Modernization, June 2010, Total No. 613. 
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Therefore, it is acknowledged that the single recognised definition of fraud in China 
causes problems with respect to a defendant’s liability and the course for remedies. The 
author believes recognising and defining negligent and innocent fraud under Chinese 
contract law, could contribute significantly to ensuring fairness and equality in business 
contracts. 
 
Damages 
In English common law, a contractual claim for damages does not lie in 
misrepresentation, unless it has been subsequently incorporated into the contract as a 
term, in which case, damages can be claimed for breach of contract.82 But damages may 
be recoverable in tort where the misrepresentation was made fraudulently or negligently. 
In the case of fraudulent misrepresentation, the aim is to restore the claimant to the 
position they would have been in if the misrepresentation had not been made.83 The 
claimant can recover damages for all direct loss flowing from the fraudulent 
inducement, regardless of foreseeability. 84  In addition, punitive damages can 
potentially be recovered for fraudulent misrepresentation.85 
 
For negligent misrepresentation, a claim can be made under the principles from Hedley 
Byrne v Heller, as discussed previously, that liability in tort can be established for 
negligent misrepresentation. Unlike deceit in tort, only reasonably foreseeable losses 
may be recovered. Alternatively, under section 2(1) of the Misrepresentation Act 1967, 
damages are assessed on the same basis as fraudulent misrepresentation.86 
 
Regarding innocent misrepresentation, at common law, as for all forms of 
                                                
82 Ewan Mckendrick (2011), Contract Law, 9th Edition, Plagrave Macmillan, p. 238. 
83 Simon Deakin, Angus Johnston, and Basil Markesinis (2013), Markesnis and Deakin’s Tort Law, 7th 
Edition, Oxford University Press, p. 469. 
84 See Doyle v Olby (Ironmongers) Ltd [1969] 2 QB 158. 
85 See Kuddus v Chief Constable of Leicestershire Constabulary [2002] 2 AC 122. 
86 See Royscot Trust Ltd v Rogerson [1991] 2 QB 297. 
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misrepresentation, innocent misrepresentation only gives rise to the right to rescind a 
contract. However, when the Misrepresentation Act 1967 was passed, section 2(2) gave 
the court discretion as to whether it will allow the rescission of a contract, or substitute 
an award of damages in lieu. 87  For this reason, the power to award damages is 
discretionary. 
 
In China, as to the single form of fraud, both general civil principles and contract law 
provide provisions regarding contractual damages. Standing as a basic principle, the 
general civil code states “after a civil act has been determined to be null and void or has 
been rescinded, the party who acquired property as a result of the act, shall return it to 
the party who suffered the loss. The erring party shall compensate the other party for 
the losses it suffered because of the act”88 . Further, contract law provides “after a 
contract has been determined to be null and void or has been rescinded, the property 
acquired as a result of the contract shall be returned; where the property cannot be 
returned or the return is unnecessary, allowance shall be made in money based on the 
value of the property. The party at fault shall compensate the other party for losses 
incurred as a result there from”.89 The rule of punitive damages in China was first 
introduced by the law of consumer protection, stipulating that business operators, 
engaged in fraudulent activities in supplying goods and services, must pay 
compensation of twice the amount the consumer paid for the items.90 
 
Compared with the English law regarding damages, it is clear that the single category 
of fraud has limited the remedies. In English law, the decision to award punitive 
damages, reasonable damages, or the right to rescind the contract, is dependent upon 
the types of misrepresentations being committed. Fraudulent behaviour takes on many 
                                                
87 See Misrepresentation Act 1967, section 2(2). 
88 General Principles of the Civil Law of the PRC, Article 61. 
89 Contract Law of the PRC, Article 58. 
90 Law of the PRC on Protection of Consumer Rights and Interests, Article 49. 
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variables, and this single remedy in Chinese law cannot generally satisfy every 
circumstance in which fraud occurs. As a result, it seems necessary to import the legal 
concepts of English misrepresentation into the Chinese legal framework. 
  
Finally, having discussed the matter of unilateral mistake, English common law and 
equity does not take the simple line of ruling that a contract is void merely because one 
of the parties would not have made it, had the true facts been realised.91 Therefore, 
remedies are not generally available on the grounds of mere unilateral mistakes. 
However, a contract can be voidable from a mistake in Chinese law, if (1) the contract 
was concluded due to a ‘material’ mistake; and (2) the mistake shows that not only was 
the statement false, but also it caused ‘great losses’.92 However, the concept of ‘material 
mistake’ and the consequence of ‘great losses’ have limited the scope of voidable 
contracts, and this in many ways, creates obstacles against the interests of an injured 
party. 
 
Breach of fiduciary duties 
Previous reference has been made to the matter of fiduciary duty in this chapter. In 
English common law, a person who stands in a fiduciary relationship may be obliged 
to carry out a number of duties to his principal. The concept of fiduciary obligation was 
authoritatively set out by Lord Millett in Bristol and West Building Society v Mothew93 
that “a fiduciary is someone who has undertaken to act for or on behalf of another in a 
particular matter in circumstances which give rise to a relationship of trust and 
confidence. The distinguishing obligation of a fiduciary is the obligation of loyalty. The 
principal is entitled to the single-minded loyalty of his fiduciary”94. Accordingly, the 
                                                
91 Michael P. Furmston (2012), Cheshire, Fifoot and Furmston’s Law of Contract, 16th Edition, Oxford 
University Press, p. 292. 
92 See Article 54 of the Contract Law and Article 71 of Opinions of the Supreme People’s Court on 
Several Issues concerning the Implementation of the General Principles of Civil Law. 
93 [1998] Ch 1. 
94 Ibid at 118. 
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main types of relationship accepted by the courts in imposing such a fiduciary duty are 
those for example, between parent and child, solicitor and client, trustee and beneficiary, 
and principal and agent. While the list is not exhaustive, it is always open to a party to 
show that the relationship between them and the other contracting party is such, that 
one party places trust in the other, and that the other therefore has influence over them.95 
However, the courts do not always find such a relationship satisfactory in establishing 
a fiduciary relationship. 
 
Where there is a breach of fiduciary duty in fraud cases, the obligations are strict and 
remedies generally do not depend upon the state of mind of the fiduciary.96  If a 
fiduciary enters into a conflict of interest or takes a secret profit, he will be liable, 
irrespective of whether he was dishonest or not. His breach of stewardship is sufficient 
harm and justification for remedy. As such, his principal will be able to recover either 
equitable compensation or restitution from his fiduciary.97 
 
In civil legal tradition, China has thus far not incorporated the complete legal doctrine 
of fiduciary responsibility. However, such western transplanted legal terms have gained 
increasing popularity in China, in particular in the relationship between directors and 
companies. Fiduciary duty in the context of Chinese society is seen as an inherent 
institution that has a disciplining role; it is also regarded as a general rule of conduct 
among the society members. 98  Such content has been added in the revised 2005 
Corporate Law of the PRC, which stipulates “the directors, supervisors and senior 
executives of a company shall comply with the laws, administrative regulations and the 
                                                
95 Catherine Elliott, and Frances Quinn (2011), Contract Law, 8th Edition, Harlow: Pearson Education 
Limited, p. 189. 
96 Barry Rider, Haiting Yan, and Lihong Xing (2010), Guoji Jinrong Fanzui Yufang yu Kongzhi (The 
Prevention and Control of International Financial Crime), Beijing: China Financial Publishing House, 
p. 437. 
97 Robert Pearce, John Stevens, and Warren Barr (2010), The Law of Trusts and Equitable Obligations, 
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98 See Nanyi Zhang (2008), ‘Jianquan fazhi xia de xintuo zeren’ (Fiduciary duty under a sound legal 
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articles of association of the company and bear the duties of loyalty and due diligence 
towards the company”.99 It also describes directors’ activities, such as the acceptance 
of bribes, misappropriation of company funds and exploitation of company business 
opportunities.100 It is widely acknowledged that the introduction of directors’ fiduciary 
duties in China’s Company Law is a significant achievement. However, insufficient 
regulation regarding such matters have been publicly criticised by academics,101 and 
the vagueness and lack of workability of the provisions on the duties of directors, 
especially the duty of diligence, is considered to be another negative issue.102 Bearing 
in mind the duty between director and company reflects only one fraction of broad 
fiduciary relationship, it remains a concern in all relevant legal provisions in China. 
Indeed, the need for the establishment of a legal concept of fiduciary duty has become 
more apparent in recent times, following the vigorous legal development of China. 
 
Fraud in the criminal law 
Dishonesty and fraudulent intention 
As mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, the Fraud Act 2006, represents the most 
radical change in the law of criminal fraud in the UK since 1968. It abolishes deception 
offences in the Theft Acts 1968 and 1978, and creates a general offence of criminal 
fraud.103 The new fraud law is wide in scope, as emphasised. Dishonesty is the first 
element that must be established, which is regarded as a core protean concept in fraud. 
Dishonesty is a question of fact, not law, so it is the responsibility of those who decide 
                                                
99 Article 148, Company Law of the People’s Republic of China, 2004. 
100 Article 148, 149, Company Law of the PRC. 
101 For example, in Guangdong Xu, Tianshu Zhou, Bin Zeng and Jin Shi (2013), ‘Directors’ duties in 
China’, European Business Organization Law Review, Vol. 14, Iss. 1, pp. 57-95, it is argued that the 
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102 See Peixin Luo, Jian Li, Yingjie Zhao (2010), ‘Woguo gongsi gaoguan qinmian yiwu zhi cailiang de 
shizheng fenxi’ (An empirical analysis of judicial discretion on duty of diligence of senior managers in 
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the facts – the jury. Therefore, according to R v Ghosh104, the proper instruction is where 
the prosecution has proven that what the defendant did was dishonest by the ordinary 
standards of reasonable and honest people, and the defendant is held to be dishonest 
only if he realises he is acting contrary to those standards. It is important to remember 
that it is for the jury to decide what the standards of honesty are and they must consider 
the defendant’s own state of mind at that time. 
 
The concept of honesty and dishonesty appear in China’s written laws, although it is 
generally regarded as a basic moral principle inherited from ancient Confucianism. For 
instance, Article 4 of the General Principle of the Civil Law states: “in civil activities, 
the principles of voluntariness, fairness, making compensation for equal value, honesty 
and credibility shall be observed”;105 Contract law also stipulates that “the parties shall 
observe the principle of honesty and good faith in exercising their rights and performing 
their duties”. 106  Dishonesty in China is more concerned with civil wrongs and 
compared with Common Law tradition, due to a lack of the system of jury, it is 
completely dependent upon the judges’ discretions.107 
 
The second element that must be established is fraudulent intention. For example, a 
false representation offence can be committed without the proof of the defendant 
actually placing any economic interests at risk or even causing a victim to believe the 
representation.108 In fact, for each limb of the fraud offence, it must be proven that the 
defendant intended to make gains for themselves, or for another, or to cause loss to 
another, or expose another to a risk of loss.109 It is to be noted that, in contrast to the old 
                                                
104 (1982) 75 Cr App 154. 
105 General Principles of the Civil Law of the People’s Republic of China, Article 4. 
106 Contract Law of the People’s Republic of China, Article 6, see more articles regarding ‘honesty’ at 
article 42, 43, 60 and 92. 
107 See more details at Hong Chen (1997), ‘Chengxin yuanze yu ziyou cailiangquan’ (The principle of 
honesty and the discretionary power), Faxue Luntan (Legal Forum), 1997, No.2, p. 15. 
108 Simon Farrell, Nicholas Yeo, and Guy Ladenburg (2007), Blackstone’s Guide to the Fraud Act 2006, 
Oxford University Press, p. 7. 
109 See the Fraud Act 2006: section 2(1), section 3(b) and section 4(c). 
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deception offences, the focus of the fraud offence is upon the acts and state of mind of 
the offender, the fact that a gain or loss occurred is irrelevant. It is the defendant’s 
intention that is the determinant. In the context of Chinese criminal law, the fraudulent 
intent is an essential component, but not the determinant factor in processing a criminal 
trial. More detailed discussions will be given in the following section of criminal fraud 
in China. 
 
Fraud by false representation (section 2) 
The offence of fraud is committed in English law if the defendant, with the requisite 
intention, makes a false representation. The representation may be by word or conduct, 
expressed or implied as to fact or law, including the state of mind of the person making 
the representation or another person.110 It will be a false representation if it is untrue or 
misleading and the person making it knows this.111 The Fraud Act also provides that a 
representation may be regarded as made, if it, or anything implying it, is submitted in 
any form to any system or device designed to receive, convey or respond to 
communications, with or without human intervention.112 As we have already noted, 
under the new English law, the focus is shifted to the making of the representation by 
the offender, rather than the effect it has on the victim.  
 
In the majority of cases these changes make no practical difference. However, there are 
three significant areas to consider: 1) the use of payment cards; 2) representations made 
to a machine; and 3) representations made where the victim has been pre-warned of the 
fraud.113 For unauthorised use of a credit card, the merchant who takes the card does 
not rely in any way on the implied representation of the person presenting the card for 
payment that he has the authority to use it, as the merchant will generally be paid either 
                                                
110 Ibid, section 2(3) and section 2(4). 
111 Ibid, section 2(2). 
112 Ibid, section 2(5). 
113 Simon Farrell, Nicholas Yeo, and Guy Ladenburg (2007), Blackstone’s Guide to the Fraud Act 2006, 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 22. 
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way. Under the new Act, it is not necessary for the prosecution to prove that the 
merchant was misled. It is adequate that the defendant falsely represented he had the 
authority. Secondly, in the past, a deception offence was committed, for example, where 
cigarettes were bought with fake coins from a person, but it was not a deception offence 
when they were bought from a vending machine. Today, such issue becomes significant 
with the increasing use of the Internet as a marketplace, but the new fraud offence 
covers this. At the time of entering card details into the website, the individual is making 
a representation that they have authority to use the card, so the offence is clearly 
committed. Thirdly, and by the same token, a merchant participating in a sting operation, 
having been warned by the police, does not need to be deceived. It is enough that the 
defendant makes the false representation. 
 
Fraud by failing to disclose information (section 3) 
A person commits fraud if he dishonestly fails to disclose to another person information 
which he is under a legal duty to disclose, intending thereby to make a gain for himself 
or another, or to cause loss to another or to expose a risk of loss.114 Generally we have 
seen that the law does not place an obligation on an individual, even during the 
negotiation of a contract, to disclose information that he thinks would be influential to 
the other party’s decision.115 The core element of this section is the concept of ‘legal 
duty’, but unfortunately, this critical concept is not defined in the Act, nor in the Home 
Office Explanatory Notes. It is therefore necessary to turn to the Law Commission’ 
Report which states that information should be disclosed if there is a legal duty to do 
so, and such a duty may derive from statute, from the fact that the transaction in question 
is one of the utmost good faith, from the terms of a contract, from the custom of a 
particular trade or market, or from a fiduciary relationship between the parties.116 Again 
                                                
114 The Fraud Act 2006, section 3(1) and section 3(2). 
115 See Barry Rider, Kern Alexander, Stuart Bazley and Jeffrey Bryant (2016), Market Abuse and Insider 
Dealing, 3rd Edition, Haywards Heath: Bloomsbury Professional, p. 139. 
116 The Law Commission, fraud (Law Com No 276, 2002), at 7.28, available at http://lawcommission.ju
stice.gov.uk/docs/lc276_Fraud.pdf 
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under the Act, for liability, it is not necessary for the prosecution to establish that the 
defendant is aware that he is under a legal duty to disclose the information in question. 
Of course, if he did not, he may well be regarded as dishonest. 
 
Fraud by abuse of position (section 4) 
The third example of the general fraud offence is perhaps the most controversial one, 
where a person is guilty of fraud if he occupies a position in which he is expected to 
safeguard, or at least not act against, the financial interests of another person and he 
dishonestly abuses that position, intending thereby to make a gain for himself or another, 
or to cause loss to another, or to expose another to a risk of loss.117 It is further provided 
that a person may be regarded as having abused his position, even though his conduct 
is an omission rather than an affirmative act.118 
 
The critical issue in this section is the concept of ‘position’, namely, what constitutes 
‘position’, and who can properly be said to occupy such a position? Clearly, those in a 
fiduciary relationship, are intended to be included in this definition.119 However, it is 
unclear as to whether it is the victim’s subjective view or a wider, more objective 
perspective that should determine if this relationship exists, and whether the expectation 
is reasonable or not. It appears that it is the government who anticipates it being a 
question of fact for the jury to determine, similar to dishonesty.120 
 
It is worth noting that many public officials are able to safeguard or ignore the financial 
interests of another person (i.e. against the public or the state). So fraud may be proven 
by local or central government officials.121 The abuse of public office is of particular 
                                                
117 The Fraud Act, section 4(1). 
118 Ibid, section 4(2). 
119 Simon Farrell, Nicholas Yeo, and Guy Ladenburg (2007), Blackstone’s Guide to the Fraud Act 2006, 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 32. 
120 Barry Rider, Kern Alexander, Stuart Bazley and Jeffrey Bryant (2016), Market Abuse and Insider 
Dealing, 3rd Edition, Haywards Heath: Bloomsbury Professional, p. 140. 
121 See Simon Farrell, Nicholas Yeo, and Guy Ladenburg (2007), Blackstone’s Guide to the Fraud Act 
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and increasing concern in China today, along with its evolving market spreading all 
over the world. Such issues will be further discussed in the following section. 
 
Criminal fraud in China 
The distinction between civil and criminal fraud in China has been discussed, both of 
which are very similar in the English translation of the legislation, but with different 
contents and characteristics. The major difference lies in the intention of the fraudster 
as well as the consequence of the amount of money or property that is defrauded – 
where criminal fraud strictly requires the intent of illegal possession and the actual 
effect of a relatively large amount of monetary threshold being lost. Compared with the 
UK Fraud Act, where the intent of the offender is sufficient to commit a fraud offence, 
Chinese law still requires both the intention and the consequence. 
 
In the criminal code, fraud is described as “someone, for the purpose of illegal 
possession, in a way of making up the fact or concealing the truth, defrauded relatively 
large amounts of public or private money and property”.122 It does not provide any 
further guidance as to the constitutive requirements in committing a criminal fraud. 
Basically, with respect to the comparison, making a false representation, to some extent, 
has the same meaning as making up a fact and concealing the truth means failing to 
disclose information. As a result, we can find this brief definition covers the offence of 
both section 2 and section 3 in the Fraud Act 2006; however, many scholars have argued 
that the lack of a further detailed explanation makes the law ambiguous, in particular 
with similar offences such as theft, robbery and the crime of forcible seizure.123 
 
The Article further states the criminal punishment for fraudsters is a maximum of life 
                                                
2006, Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 35. 
122 Criminal Law of the PRC (1997), Article 266.  
123 See Yong Dai and Lili Wu (2009), ‘Sifa shijian zhong zhapianzui de lijie yu rending’ (Understanding 
and determination of criminal fraud in judicial practice), Journal of Anhui Vocational College of Police 
Officers, No.19, Vol. 4, 33-36. 
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imprisonment, as well as a fine imposed for those defrauding extraordinarily large 
amounts of public or private money and property.124 The law subdivides the degree of 
money being defrauded as ‘relatively large’, ‘large’ and ‘extraordinarily large’125, upon 
which the sentence depends.  
 
In addition, the criminal code provides a single section specifically in the area of 
financial fraud in its 1997 version, including illegal fund raising, bank loan fraud, 
financial bills fraud, letters of credit fraud, credit card fraud, and insurance fraud.126 
Credit card fraud can be used as an example to compare and contrast the difference with 
English law. The law in China states that whoever uses a forged, voided credit card 
belonging to a third person, or takes out a loan with evil intention, resulting in large 
amounts of money being defrauded, shall commit a fraud.127 In other words, credit card 
fraud will only be committed if the offender (1) used one of the above means to carry 
out fraudulent activities, which in fact (2) led to the consequence of money being stolen. 
Whereas, under the UK Fraud Act, as we have discussed, it is enough for the 
prosecution when a person falsely presents the unauthorized credit card to a merchant. 
It can be seen that the offence is result-based in China while it is conduct-based in the 
UK. 
 
In rare cases, offenders can be subject to the death penalty if they have caused 
extraordinarily heavy financial or other losses to the interests of the state and the 
people.128 In the famous case of Wu Ying129, the defendant was an entrepreneur from 
Dongyang city in Zhejiang Province, and formerly the sixth-richest woman in China. 
                                                
124 Criminal Law of the PRC. 
125 See details in the Explanation of the Supreme People’s Court and Supreme People’s Procuratorate on 
Several Issues Concerning the Laws with Criminal Fraud, effective on 08.04.2011.  
126 Criminal Law of the PRC (1997), Article 192-198. 
127 Ibid, Article 196. 
128 Ibid, Article 199. 
129 Martin Yip (2012), ‘Death for fraud: China debates Wu Ying’s sentence’, BBC News, 24.02.2012, 
available athttp://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-china-17071311. 
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She was convicted of financial fraud (illegal fund raising) and sentenced to the death 
penalty by the Zhejiang Province High Court. However, on 21 May 2012, following 
heated debates among the people and the press, the sentence was overturned by the 
Supreme People’s Court and was reduced to death with a two-year reprieve.130 China 
is tending to be more lenient with economic criminals, and in effect, the majority of 
economic offences, which used to be eligible, have now been banned from the death 
penalty,131 while in the UK, the death penalty was abolished permanently for almost all 
cases in 1969.132 
 
In regard to the offence of abuse of position in China, this has closer links with civil 
law, such as company law, contract law and securities law. The absence of the concept 
of fiduciary duty makes the offence much more ambiguous. In the criminal code, one 
single article provides clearly that “any state personnel who abuses his position or 
neglects his duties and as a result, causes heavy losses to public property, state interests, 
or the people, shall be committing the offence of abuse of position”.133 Other articles 
relating to such misconduct state: “state-owned enterprise staff who engage in abuse of 
position (for the benefit of his friends) or due to gross negligence of his duty, causing 
bankruptcy or serious losses to the state-owned enterprise, or causing heavy losses to 
the state interest, shall be liable.”134 We can see, those articles are clearly made to 
regulate civil servants, and there must be a causal link between the conduct of abuse 
and the consequence of losses. The discussion of the issue of abuse of position has been 
heatedly debated recently, and it is regarded as a particularly important component in 
                                                
130 Xuequan Mu (2012), ‘Death-sentenced businesswoman receives lighter penalty following heated 
debates’, Xinhua News, 21.05.2012, available at: http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2012-
05/21/c_131601890.htm. 
131 Chris Hogg (2011), ‘China ends death penalty for 13 economic crimes’, BBC News, 25 February 2011, 
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terms of power-for-money trade and corruption.135 
 
If we compare this to English law, section 4 of the Fraud Act does not narrow the scope 
to public civil servants only, but refers to anybody that may have a particular 
relationship with another, whereas China, based on its socialist system, only includes 
personnel to whom such criminal offences may apply. Another point that is worthy of 
noting is that we can find many words such as ‘state’, ‘state-owned enterprise’, ‘state 
interests’ and ‘public property’ in Chinese laws, but we can barely find any such phrases 
in English law. This perhaps is quite an obvious distinction between a socialist country 
and a capitalist country.  
 
Why is it so difficult to deal with fraud? 
Complexity 
As early as the 1980s, the Roskill Committee pointed out “the public no longer believes 
that the system… is capable of bringing the perpetrators of serious fraud expeditiously 
and effectively to book. The overwhelming weight of evidence laid before us suggests 
that the public is right.”136 Many years later, the issue seems to remain, although 
innumerable initiatives have been launched against such misconduct by both UK and 
Chinese governments, and for that matter, the international community. The rapid 
development in business globalisation and new technology has brought many positive 
effects of integrating markets, but it has also made crime global. Funds can be 
transferred between banks in various countries immediately and stock shares can be 
traded globally within seconds. All this has made the nature of fraud much more 
complex.  
 
In terms of the challenges faced by investigators, taking an example of corruption 
                                                
135 Shaomu Tan (2006), ‘Lanyong Zhiquan zhi Fali Tantao’ (Exploring the Legal Theory of the Abuse of 
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within the police, who may abuse their position destroying evidence in order to protect 
high profile individuals; in particular, this may include the destruction of documentary 
and computer records. Further challenges become increasingly apparent with the ever-
evolving sophisticated methods of transferring money, whether in a physical form or 
through tokens.137 In practice, a fraudster or money launderer is far more likely to 
obscure their transactions by layering or adopting a multiplicity of identities, and hide 
their ill-gotten gains in foreign bank accounts. 
 
Document 
Most so-called ‘white collar’ crimes involve the manipulation or misuse of documents 
and records. This is particularly the case in respect of fraud and financial crime. The 
relevant documents, for example, a forged cashier’s check, will often be used to 
facilitate and substantiate the crime. Consequently, such documents represent highly 
important material evidence. While documentary evidence may exist longer than many 
other forms of evidence and be capable of being preserved, it must be remembered that 
a document will need to be ‘proven’.138 Evidence will need to be produced establishing 
the document’s relevance to the crime; that the defendant was responsible for the 
document; the circumstance of its existence and retention and that it has not been 
interfered with from where it was seized. This, in itself, is a challenge for many 
authorities investigating a fraud.  
 
Secret profit 
A complex fraud case often involves secret profit, and this often causes considerable 
difficulty for investigators. For example, cases involving company directors, who have 
abused their position and secretly transferred large amounts of money into personal 
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accounts; this could be offshore, or another corporate entity. This money may be used 
to fund a lifestyle of luxury cars, houses, antiques, paintings, or five-star hotels. Secret 
profits may also involve the transfer of funds from investors’ accounts to the perpetrator 
of the fraud. Often the money chain is difficult to trace, it could move around the world 
into a number of Swiss bank accounts and in and out of tax havens. In a recent Chinese 
high-profile case, Zhang Shuguang139, director of the transportation bureau and deputy 
chief engineer at the Ministry of Railways, was accused of fraud, abuse of position and 
corruption. He owned three luxury mansions in the US and had bank account savings 
worth as much as $2.8 billion in the US and Switzerland. 
 
Standard of proof 
The tremendous importance of the standard of proof arises from the fact that fraud, by 
its very nature, is something that the perpetrator wishes to conceal.140 Thus, a high 
standard of proof can be another discouraging factor in prosecuting fraudsters. It is the 
case that English courts demand a higher standard of proof in criminal cases than in 
civil cases, but this is subject to the qualification that there is no absolute standard in 
either case.141 It has been emphasised that the more serious the allegation the stronger, 
in terms of reliability and persuasive effect, the evidence must be.142 For a criminal 
prosecution and administrative proceedings involving the imposition of essentially 
criminal penalties, the standard of proof is ‘beyond all reasonable doubt’. If there is 
more than a remote possibility of the defendant’s innocence, he should be acquitted. 
This again, brings substantial barriers to the prosecution of serious fraud cases. 
 
The new UK fraud law disregards technicalities, but has been criticized for creating 
                                                
139 Malcolm Moore (2011), Chinese rail crash scandal: ‘official steals $2.8 billion’, The Telegraph, Sha
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offences which rely too much on dishonesty and the danger is that one jury might find 
conduct dishonest whilst another does not, due to those complex issues.143 It is believed 
that establishing dishonesty to the satisfaction of the traditional criminal process is one 
of the main stumbling blocks in securing increased convictions. The UK government 
intended to bring forward a stand-alone bill to permit non-jury trials in a limited range 
of serious and complex fraud cases in November 2006, however, it cannot be brought 
into force without the resolution of both Houses of Parliament. 144  In similar 
circumstances, the proof of intent of illegal possession is also regarded as a main barrier 
to secure criminal fraud convictions in China’s criminal justice system. The defendants 
often state that they have a wish to return the defrauded property. Indeed, the issue of 
what illegal possession exactly means, and how long the illegally possessed property 
was held, without consent from the claimant, could lead to such intent, remains a moot 
point. Moreover, highly specialised judges are required, particularly in China, as, unlike 
common law tradition, Chinese courts do not have a binding principle and the judgment 
is made based on each individual case. Thus, this may potentially bring difficulties and 
uncertainties that similar fraud cases may result in inconsistent sentences in different 
courts. 
 
Conclusion 
In comparing English and Chinese law, it is not difficult to view the distinction between 
these two legal traditions – in common law and civil law. In terms of fraud, English 
case law is in many respects superior to the Chinese approach: its long history of 
precedents, where senior judges in higher courts have been able to examine specific 
facts on individual cases, has provided a rich collection of case law that continues to 
assist judges in lower courts, hearing and analysing fraud cases. In China, however, 
judgments are given based on each individual case with reference only to codified 
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legislation. This often creates debates among the public when considerable variations 
in judgments of similar serious fraud cases are given by different judges. What is more, 
in China, the courts are geographically spread out, where district and lower courts may 
be in remote areas. Distant from the close supervision of central government, abuse of 
position by local officials is widespread, where power-for-money trade as well as 
corruption, is rife.  
 
Having made a comparative analysis of the law relating to fraud in the UK and China, 
it appears that China has not yet fully realised the significance and urgency of regulating 
and controlling fraud. Firstly, China’s comprehensive statutory tort law adopted 
recently, does not contain a single article that directly relates to misrepresentation or 
fraud. Secondly, in contract law, the lack of a uniform and integral principle of what 
constitutes civil fraud brings substantial difficulties in identifying, and regulating 
fraudulent activities. Further, a unique and single type of fraud, without recognition of 
negligent and innocent misrepresentations, is problematic with respect to a defendant’s 
liability and the types of remedies available. Finally, for criminal fraud, compared to 
the comprehensive Fraud Act 2006 in the UK, Chinese criminal law is too broad, with 
excessive emphasis placed on financial fraud whereas other relevant areas are given 
limited attention. 
 
In today’s society, the sophisticated world of banking and financial sectors are often 
involved with fraudulent activities, with even more elaborate methods of carrying out 
such criminal activities constantly being developed. As a result, even the most sweeping 
laws are not always sufficient. Enhancing the investigating and prosecuting procedures 
becomes crucial and highly specialised and experienced police officers, judges and 
prosecutors will be the key in the next stage of controlling fraud.
Chapter 5: Protecting the Victims of Economic Crime in 
China 
 
The Criminal Justice system in China – a brief historical review 
Before the foundation of the People’s Republic of China 
To develop a deep understanding of contemporary Chinese law and the legal system, it 
is imperative to fully appreciate the social, cultural, political, and historical aspects of 
China’s legal tradition. Contemporary social control in China is rooted in the Confucian 
period during the Imperial Era. The ideas originated from Confucius have had an 
enduring effect on people’s daily lives, and provided the foundation for maintaining 
social order through much of China’s history.1 Confucians believed in the essential 
goodness of man and called for rule by moral persuasion in line with the traditional 
concept of li2 - a set of socially accepted values or norms of behaviour. However, li was 
enforced by society rather than by courts, and education was considered the key 
ingredient for maintaining social order, whereas codes of laws (fa) were designed only 
to supplement it, not to replace it.3 Confucianism emphasised li represents positive 
methods for preventing crime, while fa serves as a measure of punishment that only 
encourages people to evade the law rather than to do what is essentially right.4 
 
Moreover, Confucians believed that pure codified law was inadequate to provide 
meaningful guidance for the entire panorama of human activity, but they were not 
against using laws to control the most disorderly behaviour in society. The first recorded 
criminal code was promulgated sometime between 455 and 395 B.C. Civil statues were 
                                                
1 See Zhongguo Fazhi Jianshi (Brief History of Chinese Legal System), Faxue Jianming Jiaocai (Official 
material for legal studies), 1983, Shijiazhuang: China Law Press. 
2 ‘理’ in Chinese, meaning virtue or propriety. 
3 See more at Yongping Liu (1998), Origins of Chinese Law: Penal and Administrative Law in its Early 
Development, Chapter 3: Li: Confucius and the theory of natural li, pp. 87-110, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
4 Albert HY Chen (2011), An Introduction to the Legal System of the People’s Republic of China, Fourth 
Edition, LexisNexis, p. 38. 
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also promulgated although most were concerned with land transactions. 5  It is 
interesting to note that under the ideals of Confucianism, taking civil action, for 
example, against your neighbour, is seen as a result of incapacity to negotiate.6 
 
As has been discussed, legalism, a competing concept during the Warring States period 
(475-221 B.C.), upheld that man was by nature evil and had to be controlled by means 
of a strict, clear, and public legal code and uniform justice.7 One of the famous points 
that the Legalists argued is that a ruler could not govern effectively without a set of 
laws.8 Legalist philosophy had its greatest impact during the first Imperial dynasty, the 
Qin dynasty (221-207 B.C.). Following Qin, the Han dynasty (206 B.C. – 220 A.D.) 
retained the basic legal system established under Qin, but modified some aspects in 
accordance with the Confucian philosophy of social control, according to ethical and 
moral persuasion. The majority of legal professionals at that time were not lawyers but 
generalists trained in philosophy and literature.9  The classically trained Confucian 
gentry played a vital role as arbitrators and handled almost all local disputes. Overall, 
such basic legal philosophy remained in effect for the duration in Imperial China. Until 
the final years of the Qing dynasty (1644-1911), reformist in the government adopted 
certain aspects of the modernised Japanese legal system, which originated from 
Germanic judicial precedents.10 
 
                                                
5 See more at Hugh T. Scogin (1994), ‘Civil law in traditional China: history and theory’ in Civil Law in 
Qing and Republican China, edited by Kathryn Bernhardt and Philip C. C. Huang, Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, pp. 13-41. 
6 The concept of ‘losing face’ plays an important role in Chinese society, and is deeply rooted in 
Confucianism. The concept of face is akin to status, and people will go to great lengths to avoid ‘losing 
face’. To be proven wrong or incompetent is a great humiliation. See more at generally Richard King and 
Sandra Schatzky (1991), Coping with China, Oxford: Blackwell Pub, pp. 112-113.  
7 See Benjamin I. Schwartz (1985), The World of Thought in Ancient China, Harvard: Belknap Press, pp. 
321-343. 
8 As noted by Vitaly A. Rubin (1976), the law of the Legalist was “intended to serve the despot, not to 
limit him”, in his book Individual and State in Ancient China: Essays on Four Chinese Philosophers, 
Columbia: Columbia University Press, p. 70. 
9 See more at Karen Turner (1992), ‘Rule of law ideals in early China’, Journal of Chinese Law, Vol. 6, 
No. 1, pp. 1-3. 
10 Ibid. 
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Although the dynasties were replaced by the Republic from 1912 to 1949 and thereafter 
by the Communist regime, the ethos of Confucius remains alive and in practice in 
Chinese society today. Even though government officials and party leaders have 
changed over time and some have attempted to abandon the effect of Confucius, the 
people, however, continue to revert to the conservative values of Confucianism’s 
respect for authority, pursuit of privilege, and social harmony.11 
 
During and post 1949 
In 1949 after the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) defeated the Kuo Ming Tang 
government, including its judicial organs and the entire body of laws, the CCP issued a 
Directive Regarding the ‘Abolition of the Kuo Ming Tang’s Entire Book of Six Codes’12 
and the ‘Affirmation of the Legal Principles in the Liberated Areas’. In September 1949, 
the CCP directive was incorporated into the ‘Common Programme of the Chinese 
People’s Political Consultative Conference’, which was regarded as the basic law of the 
PRC, temporarily until 1954. The Common Programme Article 17 clearly stipulates, 
“All laws, decrees, and judicial systems of the Kuo Ming Tang reactionary government, 
which oppress the people, shall be abolished; laws and decrees protecting the people 
shall be enacted and the people’s judicial system shall be set up.”13 Commentators have 
noted that the new Chinese government since then, has begun to experiment with the 
establishment of formal, Soviet style judicial organs, such as people’s courts and 
people’s procuratorates.14 
 
                                                
11 See Weng Li (1996), ‘Philosophical influences on contemporary Chinese law’, Journal of Indiana 
International & Comparative Law Review, Vol. 6, No. 2, pp. 321-335. 
12 This term is used to describe the whole body of laws established by Kuo Ming Tang, including 
Constitution, Commercial Law, Civil Code, Criminal Code, Civil Procedure Code, and Criminal 
Procedure Code, that are modelled on European legal codes. 
13 The Common Programme of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference, adopted by the 
First Plenary Session of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference on 29th September 1949, 
in Beijing, Chapter 2, article 17. 
14 Tao-tai Hsia and Wendy Il Zeldin (1987), ‘Recent legal development in the People’s Republic of China’, 
Harvard International Law Journal, Vol. 28, No. 2, pp. 249 – 287. 
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From 1949 to 1953, 148 important laws and regulations were promulgated, most of 
which were in experimental or provisional form,15 the purpose being to strengthen the 
new order and restore economic and social stability in the country. However, the 
government noticed a new challenge – lack of experienced legal personnel. Since the 
PRC was founded, many judicial personnel, including judges, prosecutors, court clerks, 
and prison administrators, who had served under the Nationalists were initially allowed 
to continue to hold their offices.16 Yet, the nationwide legal reform campaign that was 
launched in 1952, resulted in the removal from office, or condemnation as counter-
revolutionaries, of many of these legal personnel.17 In fact, while the government had 
made persistent efforts to promote the skills of judicial officials, in particular after 
China opened its door to the rest of the world, the problem of inadequate numbers of 
experienced judicial personnel remained.18 
 
The period between 1954 and mid-1957, under the huge influence of legal concepts and 
models imported from the Soviet Union, was regarded as the ‘golden era’ of legal 
development since the foundation of the PRC, due to the considerable progress that had 
been made in creating a formal legal system within the country.19 The framework of the 
legal system was established along with the promulgation of the first PRC Constitution 
in the autumn of 1954.20 The Constitution was soon supplemented by organic laws for 
the courts and the procuratorates, largely based upon Stalin’s 1936 Constitution in the 
                                                
15 For a brief list of pre-1949 Communist laws, see Quanpu Lan (1980), Sanshi Nianlai Woguo Fagui 
Yange Gaikuang (Development of the laws and regulations in the last thirty years), Beijing; Qunzhong 
Publishing House; for a description of the important laws and regulations enacted by the Council of the 
Central Government, see Zhongyang Renmin Zhengfu Faling Huibian, 1949-1950 (Collection of laws 
and decrees of the Central People’s Government, 1949-1950), Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 1982. 
16  See Jerome Alan Cohen (1966), ‘The criminal process in the People’s Republic of China: an 
introduction’, Harvard Law Review, Vol. 79, No. 3, pp. 469-533. 
17 Ibid. 
18 See for example, in January 1980, Deng Xiaoping said that China still needed at least one million 
trained judicial personnel. Selected works of Deng Xiaoping (1983). 
19 See more at Weng Li (1996), ‘Philosophical influences on contemporary Chinese law’, Journal of 
Indiana International & Comparative Law Review, Vol. 6, No. 2, pp. 327-329. 
20 Constitution of the People’s Republic of China, Adopted on September 20, 1954, by the First National 
People’s Congress of the People’s Republic of China at its First Session. 
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Soviet Union.21 Substantive work on the drafting of an official criminal and civil code 
also commenced. 
 
Until a dramatic political change led by Mao Zedong took place in 1957, which 
shattered the Soviet-Chinese alliance, China’s top leaders were determined to abandon 
the Soviet legal mode. Between 1957 and 1965, a short period of political fallout, many 
liberal jurists, legal scholars and legal authorities demanded changes to the judicial 
system, including adherence to western legal concepts such as judicial independence, 
equal justice before the law, presumption of innocence and due process of the law.22 
However, the reform movement came to a sudden halt when an Anti-Rightist movement 
was launched and, significantly, the liberal reformers were condemned as rightist with 
anti-socialist views attempting to use the law against the party and to negate the class 
nature of law.23 Furthermore, in 1959, during the course of the Anti-Rightist campaign, 
the Ministry of Justice was disbanded, and a number of law schools were dissolved. 
Recommenced attempts to draft civil and criminal codes in the early 1960s also failed.24 
 
The situation however, deteriorated during the years between 1966 and 1976 – the 
‘Cultural Revolution decade’ – known as the dark age of legal development in the 
history of the PRC.25 No laws were enacted and no legal books or journals were 
published; law schools and research institutions were shut down and law professors and 
                                                
21 See more at Jizeng Fan (2014), ‘Constitutional transplant in PRC: the communism Russian legacy and 
globalized era challenge’, Federalismi, No. 20, 2014. 
22 See more at Tao-tai Hsia (1967), Guide to Selected Legal Sources of Mainland China: A listing of laws 
and regulations and periodical legal literature: with a brief survey of the administration of justice, 
Michigan: University of Michigan library. 
23 For legal articles condemning the liberal jurists as rightists, see ibid. See also Wenqiu Mei (1957), ‘The 
Reactionary Nature of Yang Zhaolong’s Negation of the Class Nature of Law’, Faxue (Jurisprudence), 
No. 28, 1957; Zhaolong Yang, a Harvard-educated jurist, was among a number of prominent liberal 
jurists condemned as rightist. 
24 Dasheng Jiang (1980), ‘The Disparagement of Liu Shaoqi’s Brilliant Thought of Completing the 
Socialist Legal Shall not be Tolerated’, Faxue Zazhi (Law Journal), No. 1, July 1980, pp. 5-8. 
25 See more at Tao-tai Hsia and Wendy Il Zeldin (1987), ‘Recent legal development in the People’s 
Republic of China’, Harvard International Law Journal, Volume 28, No. 2, pp. 249 – 287. 
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researchers were sent to the countryside for re-education. 26  During this period, 
lawlessness was openly accepted, and the ‘Gang of Four’27 encouraged Red Guards to 
“smash the police organs, procuratorates, and courts.” 28  Revolutionary morality 
dominated political ideology, and the Party and the mass organisation of the people, 
ruled the country. 
 
In 1976, with the death of Mao and the fall of the ‘Gang of Four’, a new China began 
to emerge, and the legal institutions that had constituted the judicial system from 1954 
to 1957 were gradually restored and evolved under the new policy of ‘strengthening the 
legal system’ and ‘creating a legal system with Chinese characteristics’. 29  The 
resumption of legislative activity and the adoption of various legal codes, in particular 
the first Criminal Code and Criminal Procedure Code of the PRC in 1979, corrected a 
conspicuous gap in Communist Chinese legislation. What new changes had the 
leadership decided upon, and what exactly were ‘Chinese Characteristics’? The 
following section will explore this further. 
 
Disciplinary and legal institutions on combating economic crime 
Commission for Disciplinary Inspection under the CCP 
China’s ruling party, the CCP, as in other Communist states, had its own disciplinary 
mechanism that was specifically designed to regulate its members.30 Legal institutions, 
however, have traditionally been weak, inefficient, and marginal under China’s single-
party system. Even though, since the late 1970s, China has carried out legal reform 
                                                
26 See more at Shouyi Chen (1984), ‘Thirty years of Chinese legal science’, in Zhongguo Faxue Wenji 
Volume 1 (Collected essays on Chinese Legal Science), Beijing: China Law Press, pp. 16-17. 
27 Gang of Four was a political faction composed of four Chinese Communist Party officials who played 
prominent role during the Cultural Revolution and were later charged with a series of treasonous crimes. 
The gang’s members are Jiang Qing, Zhang Chunqiao, Yao Wenyuan and Wang Hongwen.  
28 ‘In Praise of Lawlessness’, Renmin Ribao (People’s Daily), Jan. 31, 1967, p. 6. 
29 Deng Xiaoping (1983), Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, p. 319. 
30 See more information on a historical review on China’s party disciplinary inspection at Ting Gong 
(2008), ‘The party discipline inspection in China: its evolving trajectory and embedded dilemmas’, 
Crime, Law and Social Change, Vol. 49, No. 2, pp. 139-152. 
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where a re-emerged legal system tended to function successfully in civil and criminal 
matters, the CCP was in complete control over matters concerning direct interests of 
the party, including corruption and malfeasance committed by its members. 
 
Differing from many other jurisdictions in the rest of the world, as demonstrated above, 
the party disciplinary inspection played an important role in crime prevention, and was 
a key component within the structure of the CCP, which set up committees at each local 
level of government, named ‘Committee for Disciplinary Inspection (CDI)’, to be in 
charge of disciplinary matters against local members of the CCP.31 Its highest level, the 
Central Committee for Discipline Inspection (CCDI), established within the 
administration of the ruling party in Beijing, is seen as a unique weapon in fighting 
corruption.  
 
The CCDI operated under the Central Committee, and the local CDIs operated under 
the dual leadership of the party committees at the corresponding levels, and the next 
higher commissions for discipline inspection. The objective of the CDIs, at all levels, 
was to improve the party’s general work and ensure that it was clean and honest.32 The 
CDIs were responsible for upholding the Constitution of the PRC and rules and 
regulations of the party, examining the implementation of the principles, policies and 
decisions and supporting the respective level of party committees in improving the 
party’s style of work, organising and coordinating work against misuse of public office. 
Moreover, the CDIs were empowered by the Constitution of the PRC, to provide 
education for party members in their duty to obey party discipline; to supervise party 
members holding leading positions in exercising their power; to examine and handle 
important cases of violation of the Constitution or other statutes and to initiate or 
rescind disciplinary measures against party members involved in such cases and handle 
                                                
31 See Jean-Pierre Cabestan (1988), ‘Communist party discipline and the law in the People’s Republic of 
China’, No.21, XXXth European Conference of Chinese Studies Proceedings, pp. 29-37. 
32 See more at its official website: http://www.ccdi.gov.cn/. 
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complaints and appeals forwarded by party members.33 
 
The party control system was initially inspired by Soviet institutions, most notably the 
Central Control Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.34 Even though 
the Soviet Party Control Committee was founded to solve its Party’s bureaucracy, it 
evolved into a political tool wielded by top politicians.35 Nonetheless, the Chinese 
disciplinary system was not empowered to the same level as its Soviet counterpart, 
which was largely due to Chairman Mao favouring mass mobilisation and ideological 
campaigns over party disciplinary measures in order to prevent non-conformist actions. 
Liu Shaoqi and Dong Biwu, for example, who shared the Soviet fascination with 
organisational self-correction, did not share their obsession with ‘scientific 
administration’.36 
 
The CCDI was re-established at the 3rd Plenary Session of the 11th Central Committee 
in December 1978 after the Cultural Revolution. The disciplinary system had existed 
previously under the name ‘Central Control Commission’ for a brief period in 1927 and 
again between 1955 and 1968, and also under its present name between 1949 and 1955. 
It was dismissed during the period of the Cultural Revolution.37 Despite the fact that 
the commission was, in theory, independent of the Party’s executive bodies such as 
Central Committee and its Politburo, historically, the function of the CCDI had been 
hugely influenced by China’s top politicians. Yet, since the commencement of Mr. Hu 
Jintao’s term as President and General Secretary of the CCP in 2002, and, following Xi 
Jinping’s direction since his presidency in November 2012, the commission has 
                                                
33 Ibid. 
34 Larence R. Sullivan (1984), ‘The role of the control organs in the Chinese Communist Party’, 1977-
83, Asian Survey, Vol. 24, No. 6, pp. 597-617, at p. 598. 
35 Ibid, at p. 599. 
36 Ibid, at p. 598. 
37 ‘Zhongyang Jilu Jiancha Weiyuanui Lishi Yange’ (History of the Central Commission for Discipline 
Inspection), People’ Daily, Central Committee of the CCP, accessed at: 
http://cpc.people.com.cn/n/2013/0904/c75234-22804679.html. 
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undergone significant reforms, leading to more independence from party movement 
below the Central Committee.38 
 
Corruption 
Given the nature of China’s socialist system, corruption is committed mainly by state 
functionaries, abusing their power for personal gain. In recent years, before the offence 
of corruption was extended to the private sector,39 it had been limited to the public 
sector and was mostly carried out by members of the CCP. In the meantime, the CCP, 
as the constitutionally entrenched ruling party, monopolised state power and its 
members occupied almost all vital positions in state institutions. Therefore, corruption 
occurring under the CCP and the state largely overlap, and the party disciplinary 
commission is, in practice, the leading anti-corruption agency in China. 
 
The CDIs also enjoyed the right of exercising disciplinary measures to any member of 
the party who violated party rules. According to the nature and the seriousness of the 
offender, the punishment varied from (1) warning; (2) serious warning; (3) removal 
from party posts; (4) probation within the party and (5) expulsion from the party. Those 
members who seriously violated the criminal law of the PRC would be expelled from 
the party directly. 
 
In fact, within the country, an investigation of major corruption cases is now almost 
impossible without involvement of the CCDI, partially because of the engagement of 
high-ranking party officials over whom the CCDI has exclusive jurisdiction; it is also 
                                                
38 See more at Hualin Fu (2015), ‘Wielding the sword: President Xi’s new anti-corruption campaign’, in 
Greed, Corruption, and the Modern State: Essays in Political Economy, edited by Susan Rose-Ackerman 
and Paul Lagunes, Gheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, pp. 134-160. 
39 See for example, Joe Zhang (2014), ‘Private-sector corruption with Chinese characteristics’, August 
12, 2014, Financial Times, accessed at: https://www.ft.com/content/ec7d6c62-2147-11e4-a958-
00144feabdc0; and also Keira Lu Huang (2015), case studies of China’s largest corporation like Dalian 
Wanda, Alibaba, Baidu etc., at ‘China’s private sector joins the nation’s battle against corruption’, 16 
July, 2015, South China Morning Post, accessed at: http://www.scmp.com/news/china/policies-
politics/article/1840674/chinas-private-sector-joins-nations-battle-against. 
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because of the weakening capacity of local and regional anti-corruption institutions in 
taking effective controls over the increasingly collective and syndicated nature of 
corruption.40 Indeed, today a local corruption case is likely to involve higher level party 
officials (i.e. at central level). As some scholars observed, the corrupt network now 
stretches vertically to higher levels – just as organised crime offenders seek official 
protection, local officials seek protection from a higher level to the degree that local 
investigation cannot be effectively initiated and carried out by the CDIs.41 Fu further 
indicates that the most drastic change in China’s corruption in the past 30 years is that 
money can purchase power from very high levels; if the society and economic forces 
cannot influence decision-making processes through the voting system, they do so 
through bribes.42 
 
The issue of independence 
The long-standing question concerning the independence of local CDIs can be seen as 
another factor for their underperformance. The political structure makes it clear that 
local CDIs, work under the leadership of the CCP committee at the same level, even 
though the CCP committee’s leadership over the CDI is shared with the CDI or the 
CCDI at its next-higher level. The party has made efforts, in recent years, to strengthen 
the leadership within the disciplinary inspection system, to ensure that the local CDIs 
have more independent power from the respective local CCP committees. 43 
Nevertheless, all evidence shows that the control by the CCP at local level was superior 
to that from the higher-level CDI. The CCP even openly admits that, due to the CDI’s 
                                                
40  See more at Hualing Fu (2013), ‘The upward and downward spirals in China’s anti-corruption 
enforcement’, in Comparative Perspectives on Criminal Justice in China, edited by Mike McConville 
and Eva Pils, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, pp. 390-410. 
41 Xiaogang Deng, Lening Zhang and Andrew Leverentz (2010), ‘Official corruption during China’s 
economic transition: historical patterns, characteristic, and government reactions’, Journal of 
Contemporary Criminal Justice, Vol. 26, No. 1, pp. 72-88, at p. 72. 
42 Hualin Fu (2013), ‘The upward and downward spirals in China’s anti-corruption enforcement’, in 
Comparative Perspectives on Criminal Justice in China, edited by Mike McConville and Eva Pils, 
Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, at p. 401. 
43 Ting Gong (2008), ‘The party discipline inspection in China: its evolving trajectory and embedded 
dilemmas’, Crime, Law and Social Change, Vol. 49, No. 2, pp. 139-152. 
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subordinate position within the political hierarchy, the CDI, is “dependent, lacks 
authority and cannot supervise the Party Committee to which the CDI is responsible. 
In many places, the CDI is almost a phantom organisation.”44 Furthermore, Gong 
argued that, as subordinates in the CCP hierarchy and with their appointment, 
promotion, and personal welfare essentially governed by leading officials of local party 
committees, CDI members confronted enormous difficulties performing their 
independent supervisory duty.45 
 
Shuanggui 
The secret internal disciplinary conduct of shuanggui, has become increasingly popular 
among western media in recent years, along with the new anti-corruption wave initiated 
by President Xi in late 2012. The Chinese term ‘shuanggui’ means ‘at an appointed time 
and place’, where ‘shuang’ means double and ‘gui’ means appointed or designated. The 
term is an abbreviation of codified disciplinary processes within the party, which 
stipulates that “a CCP member must be present at a designated time and a designated 
location,” – the ‘double designation’, “… to provide explanations on issues related to 
an ongoing case.”46 
 
Both the CCP discipline inspection organs regulation 47  and the Administrative 
Supervision Law of the PRC48 provided that they (CDIs) “order state personnel under 
investigation for suspicion of violating administrative disciplines to make explanations 
of the matters under investigation at an appointed time and place.” They also provided 
a controversial point that “personnel under investigation shall not be detained in any 
                                                
44 Changfa Cui and Yongyuan Zhai (2010), Fanfu Changlian Jianshe Xuexi Duben (Textbook on Anti-
Corruption Framework), Beijing: State Institute of Administration, p. 102. 
45 Ting Gong (2008), ‘The party discipline inspection in China: its evolving trajectory and embedded 
dilemmas’, Crime, Law and Social Change, Vol. 49, No. 2, pp. 139-152. 
46 Zhongguo Gongchandang Jilu Jiancha Jiguan Anjian Jiancha Gongzuo Tiaoli (Regulations of Chinese 
Communist Party Disciplinary Inspection Organs), Promulgated by Central Committee for Discipline 
Inspection, on 25 March 1994, Article 28(3). 
47 Article 28 (3). 
48 Article 20 (3). 
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manner.”49 The personnel in extreme cases, however, may still be detained or even hurt. 
A good example was on 9th April 2013, when the China Daily reported: “An official 
from a state-owned enterprise in Wenzhou, Zhejiang province, died accidentally while 
in the shuanggui process in the morning of April 9, 2013.”50 
 
Shuanggui reflects the most drastic power that the CCP has, unconstrained by law. Such 
extra-legal power allows the CCP to place its members in detention for interrogation. 
Under shuanggui, a party member can be detained indefinitely, without any contact 
from the outside world, and isolated from any form of legal counsel or even family 
visits. Therefore, as Xiang observed, appeal or review against any decision made by the 
CDIs is generally not available, even though there is a complicated interlocking 
approval procedure to ensure that a CDI’s decision is monitored by both the CCP 
committee at the same level and the CDI at the next higher level.51 
 
The system of shuanggui has been widely regarded not only as an efficient way to root 
out corruption and malpractice within the party, but also as depriving its subjects of 
basic legal rights, even though there have been constant reports of shuanggui subjects 
being tortured to make forced confessions.52 There are also comments on the CCP 
managing corruption cases, according to its political expedience, where legal 
considerations are marginalised in the decision making process. Sapio argued that 
shuanggui is designed by the party to “avoid the shame that would be caused by a 
thorough investigation on corruption” to the CCP and to “channel the people’s feeling 
of distrust and betrayals on carefully handpicked officials”.53 Indeed, limited statistics 
                                                
49 Ibid. 
50 ‘Wenzhou official dies after being disciplined,’ 09.04.2013, China Daily, accessed at: http://usa.china
daily.com.cn/china/2013-04/09/content_16387746.htm. 
51 Xiang Xiang (2009), Tansuo: Zhongguo Gongchandang Jilu Jiandu Lun (Exploring: Disciplinary 
Inspection in the Chinese Communist Party), Beijing: Central Party School Press. 
52 See for example, Andrew Jacob (2012), ‘Accused Chinese party members face harsh discipline’, The 
New York Times, accessed at: http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/15/world/asia/accused-chinese-party-
members-face-harsh-discipline.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 
53 Flora Sapio (2008), ‘Shuanggui and Extralegal Detention in China’, China Information, Vol. 22, Iss. 
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illustrate that most cases are internalised and end up with internal disciplinary action, 
where only 3 to 4 percent of the offenders were referred for criminal prosecution.54 
 
The People’s Procuratorate 
The people’s procuratorates were established after the PRC was founded. The Organic 
Law of the Central People’s Government of the PRC 55  stated that a Supreme 
Procuratorial Organ of the Central People’s Government needed to be established, 
together with local people’s procuratorial organs. The first Constitution of the PRC and 
the Organic Law of the People’s Procuratorate56 both provided for the establishment of 
a Supreme People’s Procuratorate, local procuratorates and special procuratorates. 
Later, during the ten-year period of the ‘cultural revolution’ which began in the mid 
1960s, procuratorial departments were dissolved. In March 1978, the First Session of 
the Fifth National People’s Congress (NPC) re-established the people’s procuratorates, 
and further in July 1979, the Second Session of the Fifth NPC revised the Organic Law 
of the People’s Procuratorates. Since then, the people’s procuratorates started its crucial 
role in maintaining the unity and dignity of the state legal system and ensuring the 
smooth progress of China’s socialist modernisation. 
 
As Articles 129-133 under the current Constitution of the People’s Republic of China57 
indicate, the people’s procuratorates are components of the Chinese judicial system, 
and they are state organs for legal supervision; they exercise statutory duties of (1) 
                                                
1, p. 1; see also Flora Sapio (2010), Sovereign Power and the Law in China, Leiden, Boston: Brill. 
54 Hualin Fu (2013), ‘The upward and downward spirals in China’s anti-corruption enforcement’, in 
Comparative Perspectives on Criminal Justice in China, edited by Mike McConville and Eva Pils, 
Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, pp. 399-400. 
55 Adopted by the First Session of the Chinese Political Consultative Conference on September 27, 1949. 
56 Adopted by the First Session of the First National People’s Congress in September 1954. 
57 Constitution of the People’s Republic of China, adopted at the Fifth Session of the Fifth National 
People’s Congress and promulgated for implementation by the Announcement of the National People’s 
Congress on December 4, 1982. Amended in accordance with the Amendments to the Constitution of the 
People’s Republic of China adopted respectively at the First Session of the Seventh National People’s 
Congress on April 12, 1988, the First Session of the Eighth National People’s Congress on March 29, 
1993, the Second Session of the Ninth National People’s Congress on March 15, 1999, and the Second 
Session of the Tenth National People’s Congress on March 14, 2004. 
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approving the arrest of suspects by police forces; (2) prosecuting; (3) investigating 
criminal cases of corruption, bribery and malfeasance of functionaries of the state; and 
(4) supervising the investigation, judgment and execution of penalties. The Chief 
Procurator, who ranks at the same level of the Chief Justice, equal to vice premier, is 
elected by the NPC and is obliged to report to them. 
 
According to its Organic Law58, the people’s procuratorates have the power to exercise 
procuratorial authority. They (1) deal with cases endangering state and public security, 
damaging economic order and infringing citizens’ personal and democratic rights and 
other severe criminal cases; (2) examine cases arranged for investigation by the public 
security organs, and decide on whether a suspect should be arrested and whether a case 
shall be further pursued or exempted; (3) institute and assist public prosecution in 
criminal cases and (4) oversee the general activities of public security agencies, 
people’s courts, prisons, houses of detention and reform-through-labour institutions. It 
is interesting to note that the functions of the procuratorates were initially to perform 
similar duties to a prosecutor in the United States, where it oversees investigations 
carried out by the public security organs. However, the 1983 amendment of the Organic 
Law of the People’s Procuratorates extends its oversight beyond the investigation, to 
supervision of legal activities of the people’s courts and similar legal institutions. As a 
result, the people’s procuratorate and public security organ both execute judicial power, 
although their judicial functions are limited.59  
 
The people’s procuratorates are divided into four levels, corresponding with the 
                                                
58 Organic Law of the People’s Procuratorates of the People’s Republic of China, adopted at the Second 
session of the Fifth National People’s Congress on July 1, 1979, promulgated by Order No.4 of the 
Chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress on July 5, 1979 and effective as 
of January 1, 1980; amended according to the Decision on the Revision of the Organic Law of the 
People’s Procuratorates of the People’s Republic of China adopted at the Second Meeting of the Standing 
Committee of the Sixth National People’s Congress on September 2, 1983. 
59 See more at William H. Byrnes and Robert J. Munro (2016), Money Laundering, Asset Forfeiture and 
Recovery and Compliance – A Global Guide, LexisNexis, Chapter on China. 
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people’s courts, namely basic people’s procuratorates (at town level), intermediate 
people’s procuratorates (at city level), higher people’s peocuratorates (at provincial 
level) and supreme people’s procuratorate (at national level). There are in total over 
3700 prosecution services in the country with more than 280,000 state functionaries, of 
which approximately 140,000 are public prosecutors. The Supreme People’s 
Procuratorate (SPP) is the highest procuratorial organ of the state and represents the 
state independently in implementing the right of prosecution. It is responsible for the 
Standing Committee of National People’s Congress, and its primary tasks are to 
exercise leadership over local people’s and special people’s procuratorates 60  in 
implementing their supervision functions and ensure the unity and rightful 
implementation of state laws.61 
 
Furthermore, although the practicality of the procuratorial independence remains 
arguable, the Constitution made it clear that “the people’s procuratorates shall exercise 
their own authority in accordance with the law, independent of interference from any 
other administrative organ, civil organisation and individual”.62 For cases of corruption 
and bribery, people’s procuratorates have total control while public security only plays 
a limited assisting role.63 
 
Cases concerning corruption and bribery 
As we have noted, the people’s procuratorates have direct responsibility in investigating 
and prosecuting criminal cases of corruption and bribery perpetrated by official abuse, 
                                                
60  For example, Military Procuratorate, Railway Transportation Procuratorate and Maritime 
Procuratorate, China established special people’s procuratorates at many other vital and technical 
departments. 
61 See more about Supreme People’s Procuratorate at its official website: http://www.spp.gov.cn/ 
62 Article 131 of the Constitution of the PRC; The Criminal Procedure Law and the Organic Law of the 
People’s Procuratorates of the PRC also have the same provisions. 
63  Guanyu Shishi Xingshi Susongfa Ruogan Wenti de Guiding (Regulations on Several Issues 
Concerning the Implementation of the Criminal Procedure Law), promulgated by Supreme People’s 
Court, Supreme People’s Procuratorate, Ministry of Public Security, Ministry of State Security, Ministry 
of Justice, and the Legislative Affairs Commission of the Standing Committee of the National People’s 
Congress, effective on 01.01.2013. 
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along with other duty-related crimes committed by Chinese officials.64 The reasons for 
such cases being out of security organs’ hands are, as the then deputy director of Anti-
Corruption and Bribery Bureau Guan Fulin stated, firstly, the criminals committing 
corruption and bribery offences are state personnel, most of whom have a degree of 
administrative power and some are even senior officials. They may have close social 
relations in administrative organs and can be protected by other officials. The organs 
for investigating their crimes should only be special, not among the administrative 
organs. Secondly, offenders normally have a high level of educational and professional 
knowledge and often take advantage of their legal capacities. These cases are more 
covert and cunning than other criminal cases. Thirdly, due to the complexity of those 
cases, it sets high demands on personnel’s knowledge concerning the law. The 
procurators in China are carefully selected, and based on the provisions of the Public 
Procurator Law, they must all at least be university graduates.65 It should be noted that 
this speech was given in the late 1990s, when university graduates were far less 
common than they are today. 
 
The current internal department within the people’s procuratorates, namely the Anti-
Corruption and Bribery Bureau (ACBB) is specifically set up to deal with cases of 
official corruption and bribery. Tracing back to the early 1980s, to fulfil the powers of 
investigating corruption cases, the SPP created a special department at all levels of the 
people’s procuratorates around China, which was labelled the Economic Crimes 
Procuratorial Department.66 However, due to the rampant incidences of corruption in 
the 1980s, and to support the needs of general anti-corruption programmes in the 
                                                
64 Article 18 of the Criminal Procedure Law of the PRC; see also at Yuzhong Dai (2000), ‘China: 
Responsibilities of the Procuratorate and the Necessity for Cooperation in Combating Economic Crime’, 
Journal of Financial Crime, Vol. 7, No. 4, pp. 348-350. 
65 Fulin Guan (1999), ‘The Position and Role of Chinese Procuratorial Organs in Criminal Justice’, 
Resource Material Series No. 53, UNAFEI, United Nations Asia and Far East Institute for the Prevention 
of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders. 
66 Wei Xiao (2009), Fan tanwu huilu: Wei fanfu changlian zuochu jiji gongxian (Anti-corruption and 
bribery: Making contribution to a clean government), Procuratorate Daily, 11.09.2009, available at: 
http://newspaper.jcrb.com/html/2009-09/11/content_26307.htm. 
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country, the SPP reformed the Economic Crimes Procuratorial Department and 
established ACBBs at all levels of the people’s procuratorates in China.67 Ever since 
the establishment of the ACBB, the procuratorates have become the sole judicial organ 
that specialises in investigating and prosecuting corruption cases in China. 
 
In accordance with the Criminal Procedure Law of the PRC, the ACBBs hold the power 
to (1) detain; (2) arrest; (3) exercise the necessary measures of issuing a warrant to 
compel an appearance order to the defendant, obtain a guarantor pending trail and 
subject the defendant to residential surveillance; (4) initiate a special investigation and 
(5) search and seize.68 
 
The ACBB holds very similar powers to the Serious Fraud Office (SFO) in the United 
Kingdom, a specialist prosecuting authority combating top level or complex fraud, 
bribery and corruption. The SFO views itself as unique as, in comparison with the 
ACBB, “they both investigate and prosecute their cases”.69 Yet, the scope of the cases 
that can potentially trigger both institutions are slightly different. The SFO’s current 
director, Mr. David Green, has stated that under his leadership, the SFO will only focus 
on the most complex fraud and corruption cases, such as serious fraud which could 
undermine confidence in the City of London; serious fraud, bribery and corruption 
cases that involve a high actual or potential financial loss, significant actual or potential 
economic harm, or an important public interest element.70 Contrastingly, under Chinese 
law, neither the director of the ACBB nor even the chief procurator of the SPP has such 
discretionary power. The ACBBs instituted at various levels of the people’s 
procuratorates are responsible for every single case involving abuse of public office. 
                                                
67 Ibid. 
68 Article 162-166, Criminal Procedure Law of the PRC. 
69 Serious Fraud Office official website, available at: https://www.sfo.gov.uk/about-us/. 
70 Ibid, SFO official website; see more at OECD (2013), Specialised Anti-Corruption Institutions: Review 
of Models, Second Edition, OECD Publishing, pp. 133-138, available at: 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264187207-en 
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The internal relationship 
In the struggle against economic crime, namely corruption, the CDIs and the ACBBs 
have a common aim. However, the relationship between the party’s disciplinary 
mechanism and the ACBB has not been clearly stipulated. The CDI investigates 
misconduct of CCP members and the ACBB is solely an institution in charge of 
investigating the crime of corruption. In the 1980s, both the CDI and the ACBB worked 
side by side, cooperating in matters regarding corruption and official misbehaviour.71 
In 1992, the CCP at its 14th National Congress declared that the CDI should play a 
leadership role in coordinating anti-corruption work; the investigation of major 
corruption cases should directly be carried out by the CDI, with cooperation and support 
of the ACBB.72 For example, if an ACBB and a relevant CDI have simultaneously 
started an investigation, the ACBB is required to suspend its investigation, and under 
CCP internal rules, any investigation concerning certain ranks of CCP members must 
first be endorsed by the CCP Committee – a rule that suffocates any independent 
investigation of senior officials. Generally, the CCP’s disciplinary system since the mid-
1990s has authoritatively appropriated China’s anti-corruption enforcement.73 
 
Even though it is clear that the CDI plays a primary role in the fight against corruption, 
in some major investigations, the ways in which they cooperate with the ACBB may 
vary. Under normal circumstances, ACBB is seconded to the CDI to assist with 
investigations together with the police and investigators from other relevant 
governmental departments. The CDI and the ACBB produce their respective reports 
where the CDI prepares evidence for disciplinary action and the ACBB pieces together 
                                                
71 Melanie Manion (2004), Corruption by Design: Building Clean Government in Mainland China and 
Hong Kong, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, pp. 89-135. 
72  Database of all previous Chinese Communist Party National Congress, Report of 14th National 
Congress, accessed online at: http://www.generexpo.com/GB/64162/64168/64567/index.html. 
73 Melanie Manion (2004), Corruption by Design: Building Clean Government in Mainland China and 
Hong Kong, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, p. 135. 
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evidence for a possible criminal prosecution; a criminal prosecution after the 
disciplinary action may follow. There are also cases where CDI send their investigators 
to the ACBB, to assist and support investigations initiated by the ACBB.74 
 
Although the political and legal institutions in fighting corruption have their respective 
functions, the CCP ‘interferes’ significantly with anti-corruption work whereas the law 
plays a relatively limited role. This is captured and commented on by former President 
of the Supreme People’s Court, Xiao Yang: “Some leading officials are so used to the 
Party Committee approval system (in anti-corruption investigation) … They interfere 
with case filing, investigation and decision-making; they give instructions, set 
perimeters and demand procuratorial organs to handle cases according to their wishes. 
When the procuratorial organs handle cases based on law and deviate from political 
instructions, they could be reprimanded for ‘competing with the Party Committee’, 
‘objecting to Party leadership’, or even asking questions as ridiculous as ‘who is more 
powerful, you the procuratorate or me the Party Secretary?’”75 
 
This is a well-accepted truth for all prosecutors. According to Song, it is suggested that 
more than 80 percent of corruption cases are initiated by the CDI before the 
procuratorate takes over; more specifically, for cases involving officials at xian/chu 
level (town level), more than 96 percent are first investigated by the CDI; and for cases 
involving officials at sheng/bu level (provincial/ministerial level), all cases are initiated 
by the CCDI.76 It is clear that in cases relating to corruption, political power has, in 
many ways, gone far beyond the law. 
 
                                                
74 See Feng Ye (2007), Combating Corruption: A Chinese Perspective, PhD thesis, University of London. 
75 Yang Xiao (2008), Fantan Baogao: Gongheguo Diyige Fantanwu Huilu Gongzuoju Dansheng de 
Qianqian Houhou (Anti-Corruption Report: The Birth of the First Anti-Corruption Administration in the 
Republic), Beijing: Law Press, p. 135. 
76 Tao Song (2007), ‘Fanfu zoujin zhongjiwei moshi’ (Anti-corruption is moving towards the CCDI 
model), Dangzheng Luntan (Party/Government Forum), 2007, No.6, at p. 9. 
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Ministry of Supervision 
The Ministry of Supervision was established after the founding of the PRC as the 
People’s Supervisory Commission in October 1949. It took on its present name, the 
Ministry of Supervision (MOS) in September 1954. It was abolished in April 1959 and 
re-established in July 1978 at the 6th National People’s Congress.77 The supervisory 
organ at central government, under the State Council, is named the MOS; the 
corresponding organ at provincial level is named the Department of Supervision; and 
others at local level are called the Bureau of Supervision. All supervisory organs operate 
under the Administrative Supervision Law of the PRC78. 
 
As Article 18 of the Administrative Supervision Law stipulates, the statutory duties of 
government supervisory organs include (1) examining compliance and enforcement of 
laws, regulations, and decisions and orders of the government; (2) receiving reports of 
violations of administrative discipline by state administrative organs, civil servants, and 
other persons appointed by state administrative organs; (3) investigating and handling 
the violations of administrative discipline by state administrative organs, civil servants, 
and by other persons appointed by administrative organs; (4) handling complaints 
against decisions of administrative punishments imposed by administrative organs as 
well as other complaints as prescribed by the laws and administrative rules. 
 
Even though, as acknowledged, the CDI are party internal organs who deal with 
disciplinary matters under the party rules and regulations, and the supervisory organs 
(i.e. MOS) are executive organs that handle administrative cases involving civil 
servants according to administrative laws, these two institutions are on many occasions, 
performing similar supervisory duties, in particular when dealing with cases of 
corruption. As a result, in 1993, the Central Committee of the CCP and the State Council 
                                                
77 See more at the State Council’s official website: http://english.gov.cn/state_council/2014/09/09/conte
nt_281474986284141.htm. 
78 Adopted at the 25th Meeting of the Standing Committee of the 8th National People’s Congress of the 
PRC on May 9, 1997, promulgated by President Jiang Zemin.  
 196 
decided that the CDI and the supervisory organs under the MOS should combine into a 
single body to deal with official cases and fulfil their common supervisory functions.79 
Thus, the two institutions as well as their local branches at a corresponding level share 
one office with two names with overlapping staff and jurisdiction. They also share the 
same official website.80 
 
National Bureau of Corruption Prevention 
The National Bureau of Corruption Prevention (NBCP) is a relatively new department 
that was established in 2007, in response to the United Nations Convention against 
Corruption, under the direct administration of the State Council, and with an objective 
of improving government transparency, developing and improving the mechanisms on 
corruption prevention and coordinating anti-corruption efforts.81 Though it does not 
have the power of investigating individual cases, it is specifically set up to take overall 
responsibility for the work of corruption prevention, and its major responsibilities 
include planning on organising and coordinating the national work of corruption 
prevention; formulating relevant policies; coordinating and directing the work of 
corruption prevention in enterprises, public institutions, social groups, intermediate 
agencies and other non-government organisations and taking charge of international 
cooperation and technical assistance in this regard.82 
 
The NBCP also set up an information centre for monitoring the flow of suspicious assets 
and suspicious corruption activities, as reported on it inauguration day, by establishing 
an information-sharing system among prosecuting organs, people’s courts, police 
                                                
79 See more at Zengke He (2000), ‘Corruption and anti-corruption in reform China’, Communist and 
Post-Communist Studies, Vol. 33, Iss 2, pp. 243-270. 
80  See official website for both the Central Committee for Discipline Inspection and Ministry of 
Supervision at: http://www.ccdi.gov.cn/. 
81 Xinhua News Agency (2007), ‘Establishment of the National Corruption Prevention Bureau’, 13 
September 2007. 
82 See more information at its official website: http://www.nbcp.gov.cn/, see also at International Associ
ation of Anti-Corruption Agencies website at: http://www.iaaca.org/AntiCorruptionAuthorities/ByCoun
triesandRegions/C/Chinajigou/201202/t20120209_801305.shtml. 
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authorities and banks.83 What is more, upon its inauguration, the Bureau set up a 
website which not only publicises events and corruption-related news, but also provides 
citizens with a forum to directly submit complaints of corruption and opinions on the 
government’s work. Interestingly, within hours of its launch, the site crashed due to the 
unexpected volume of complaints. 84  Nonetheless, the initiation of NBCP’s online 
reporting system has clearly made far more significant impact than expected, 
particularly when we consider the proportion of corruption cases that were first 
discovered through online complaints. 
 
Ministry of Public Security 
Public security branches lead and direct the people’s police. They are responsible for 
maintaining order and state security, as well as conducting investigations, arrest and 
preliminary hearings in criminal cases.85 An established department under the Ministry 
of Public Security, namely the Economic Crime Investigation Bureau (ECIB), deals 
with economic crime such as money laundering, commercial corruption, insider dealing, 
securities fraud and market manipulation. Its primary responsibilities are to: (1) 
investigate, collect, research and analyse the data regarding the incidence of nationwide 
economic crime; (2) formulate policies, measures and plans in controlling nationwide 
economic crime; (3) draft regulations, administrative rules and enforce terms on 
combating economic crime; (4) examine, lead and supervise investigation of major 
economic crime cases and (5) organise cross-province extremely serious or major 
economic crime cases.86 The ECIB also set up several sub-departments such as the 
money laundering crime investigation department and the financial crime investigation 
department. 
                                                
83 The State Council of the People’s Republic of China (2007), ‘China Establishes National Corruption 
Prevention Bureau’, 13.09.2007, available at: http://www.gov.cn/english/2007-09/13/content_748148.ht
m. 
84 Shanghai Daily (2007), ‘Anti-corruption Website Breakdown as Masses Log On’, December 9, 2007. 
85 See more at Ministry of Public Security official website: http://www.mps.gov.cn/. 
86 See Economic Crime Investigation Bureau of the Ministry of Public Security at its official website: 
http://www.mps.gov.cn/n2256207/n2256209/c4109244/content.html. 
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Given the specialty of the Bureau, it has close internal ties with financial institutions in 
the economic sector in China. For example, the Bureau works closely with the central 
bank, the People’s Bank of China, as well as other major commercial banks, in 
monitoring potential illegal transaction that relate to economic crime such as money 
laundering and bribery. As its then director Zheng Shaodong stated: “commercial 
corruption commonly occurred in the fields of construction, land acquisition, 
pharmaceutical sales, government procurement, resource development, securities and 
futures, bank loans, energy, commercial insurance, telecommunications and 
environmental protection. The police, in particular the ECIB, must intensify corruption 
investigations in these fields, to crack down on major commercial cases quickly and 
curb the high frequency of bribery.”87 He further emphasised that in the 21st century, 
police have recorded thousands of cases concerning bribery in the private sector.88 
 
The financial regulators 
China’s financial regulators have an overall responsibility to combat crime of money 
laundering. China enacted its Anti-Money Laundering (AML) Law89 in 2006, in which 
Articles 3 and 4 provide the central bank, the People’s Bank of China (PBOC), is the 
overarching organ that oversees the administration of the AML regime at national level. 
Under Article 4 of the Law of the People’s Republic of China on the PBOC90, the PBOC 
was delegated the responsibility of “directing and disposing of the AML work of the 
financial industry and being responsible for capital supervision and measurement over 
AML.” 
                                                
87 Xinhua News Agency (2006), ‘China orders police to step up probes into commercial corruption’, BBC 
Morning Asia Pacific, 15 June 2006; see also Yanni Chen (1999), ‘Centre set up to fight economic 
offences’, China Daily, 30 January 1999. 
88 Ibid. 
89 Anti-Money Laundering Law of the People’s Republic of China, adopted at the 24th Meeting of the 
Standing Committee of the Tenth National People’s Congress of the People’s Republic of China on 
October 31, 2006, is promulgated by President Hu Jintao and take on effect on January 1, 2007. 
90 Adopted on March 18, 1995, at the Third Session of the Eighth National People’s Congress of the 
People’s Republic of China, issued by President Jiang Zemin. 
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Furthermore, in 2004, the PBOC established the Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU), 
which is composed of two departments: the Anti-Money Laundering Bureau – 
responsible for investigation, dissemination and policy oversights; and the China Anti-
Money Laundering Monitoring and Analysis Centre, with functions of collecting, 
analysing and broadcasting suspicious currency transactions. This was widely seen as 
a significant accomplishment in developing the legal and regulatory framework for 
countering money laundering in the banking sector.91 
 
The China Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC) was established by the Chinese 
government in 2003, taking over the role previously performed by the PBOC and acting 
as the main regulator of the Chinese banking sector.92 The CBRC was authorised to 
supervise and regulate banks, asset management companies, trusts and investment 
companies, as well as other deposit-taking financial institutions. 93  The CBRC’s 
objectives were maintaining market confidence in the Chinese banking system, 
promoting public awareness and reducing financial crime through prudential and 
effective supervision. To be more precise, setting rules and standards for banks to follow, 
ensuring accuracy of loan classification, adequacy of loss provisions, true and fair 
reporting of profits and loss and meeting capital adequacy requirements – to overall 
increase the accuracy and transparency of the Chinese banking system and protect 
customers from financial risk. This said, the primary authority in terms of enforcement 
of AML remains with the PBOC and the Ministry of Public Security. 
 
                                                
91 See more at William H. Byrnes and Robert J. Munro (2016), Money Laundering, Asset Forfeiture and 
Recovery and Compliance – A Global Guide, LexisNexis, Chapter on China; see also at Wouter H. Muler, 
Christian H. Kalin and John G. Goldsworth (2007), Anti-Money Laundering: International Law and 
Practice, Chichester: John Wiley & Sons Ltd, pp. 707-708. 
92 See more of the evolvement of the CBRC at James R. Barth, Zhongfei Zhou, Douglas Arner, Berry 
F.C. Hsu and Wei Wang (eds), Financial Restructuring and Reform in Post-WTO China, 2007, Dordrecht: 
Kluwer Law International. 
93 See its official website: www.cbrc.gov.cn. 
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The China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) was founded in October 1992, 
set up to jointly supervise and regulate the behaviour of securities and futures market 
with the State Council Securities Commission.94 These two securities regulators were 
merged afterwards, and the surviving CSRC was vested with the exclusive authority to 
regulate the securities market in April 1998.95 It is also responsible for disclosing and 
supervising information to the capital market, and exploring and punishing activities, 
such as insider trading, that violate security regulations.96 
 
The China Insurance Regulatory Commission (CIRC) was established in November 
1998, with the aim of governing and regulating China’s insurance market.97 The CIRC 
also assists the PBOC in supervising the industry’s compliance with AML regulations. 
In 2008, it set up an AML Department under its Enforcement Bureau to particularly 
deal with all related AML work. 
 
Together with the PBOC as the central bank, these three highly specialised and mutually 
independent regulatory commissions make up China’s financial regulatory framework, 
collectively referred to as Yihang Sanhui (One bank, Three commissions). Generally, 
China’s institutional regulatory scheme is very specific and sectorial based, while the 
four bodies, the PBOC, CBRC, CSRC and CIRC are correlated and coordinated to 
create a stable and effective supervisory force. However, a long-standing problem of 
the lack of regulatory independence has again in many ways hindered the development 
of China’s financial system. Even though the PBOC law seeks to preserve a certain 
degree of independence for the PBOC, it is essentially a ministry-ranking constituent 
department under the direct leadership of the State Council. Article 5 the PBOC law 
                                                
94 See more at its official website: www.csrc.gov.cn. 
95 Hui Huang (2006), International Securities Market: Insider Trading Law in China, London: Kluwer 
Law International, pp. 18-19. 
96 Further reading can be found at Hui Huang (2005), ‘The regulation of insider trading in China: A 
critical review and proposals for reform’, Australian Journal of Corporate Law, 2005, No. 17, pp. 1-42. 
97 See more at its official website: www.circ.gov.cn. 
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explicitly stipulates that “the PBOC must obtain the approval of the State Council 
before it is able to take actions on certain important matters such as the annual supply 
of currency, interest rates and foreign exchange rates”.98 
 
The CBRC, the CSRC and the CIRC, three specialist regulatory commissions, may 
have even less independence from the government. For example, the CBRC is formally 
an instrument of the central government and the relevant law has referred the CBRC as 
“the banking supervision institution of the State Council”. 99  Furthermore, all the 
chairpersons of the CBRC are appointed by the State Council and are accountable to 
the Premier.100 This is also the case with the CSRC and CIRC. 
 
The UK financial regulator – the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) – is, however, an 
additional model worth considering. The FCA is a private company discharging a public 
function, operating independently of the UK government but accountable to the 
Treasury and Parliament, with the main objectives of protecting consumers and 
financial markets, and promoting competition. 101  More interestingly, it is entirely 
financed by charging fees to the firms they regulate as opposed to the state budget. This 
relationship inevitably builds up a special sense of trust between the regulator and 
private firms, while China, who regards itself a socialist country, could find this rather 
difficult to implement.102 
 
 
 
                                                
98 PBOC law of the PRC, Article 5 
99 Law of the PRC on Banking Regulation and Supervision, adopted at the 6th session of the Standing 
Committee of the 10th National People’s Congress of the PRC on 27 December 2003, amended on 31 
October 2006, Article 2. 
100 See for example, Daqi Zhu (2007), Jinrong Fa (Financial Law), Beijing: China Renmin University 
Press. 
101 Financial Conduct Authority, available at: https://www.fca.org.uk/about/the-fca. 
102 See more discussions at Hui Huang (2010), ‘Institutional structure of financial regulation in China: 
lessons from the global financial crisis’, Journal of Corporate Law Studies, Vol. 10, No. 1, pp. 219-254. 
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Improving the Law 
Basic laws 
As noted, the Criminal Law of the PRC was revised in 1997, almost twenty years after 
its first promulgation in 1979. 103  The provisions of the new Criminal Code on 
corruption and bribery were significantly amended, to meet the anti-corruption 
movement and the new policy. It also added many recent crimes such as financial fraud 
and economic crime, as has been examined in the previous chapter. 104  The new 
Criminal Law has separated the crimes of corruption and bribery and introduced a 
specific chapter: chapter eight – the crime of corruption and bribery, containing 15 
articles. Article 382 to 396 define 12 charges and their punishments, including: the 
crime of corruption (Article 382); the crime of embezzling public funds (Article 384); 
the crime of state functionaries receiving bribes by taking advantage of their positions 
(Article 385); the crime of state organisations receiving bribes (Article 387); the crime 
of state functionaries receiving bribes by taking advantage of other state functionaries’ 
positions (Article 388); the crime of offering bribes to state functionaries (Article 389); 
the crime of offering bribes to state organisations (Article 391); the crime of introducing 
bribes to state functionaries (Article 392); the crime of offering kickbacks or 
commission charges to state functionaries for the purpose of securing illegitimate 
benefits (Article 393); the crime of state functionaries accepting gifts which are worth 
relatively large amounts of money in the activities of domestic or international services 
(Article 394); the crime of state functionaries failing to explain the source of enormous 
wealth or failing to report their overseas savings (Article 395) and the crime of state 
organisations and judicial and administrative law enforcement organs misdealing with 
collective or state assets, or confiscated assets (Article 396). 
 
Compared with the 1979 model, the new Criminal Law has expanded both the scope 
                                                
103 First adopted at the Second Session of the Fifth National People’s Congress on July 1, 1979, Revised 
at the Fifth Session of the Eighth National People’s Congress on March 14, 1997. 
104 See Chapter 4 of the thesis on Fraud in China. 
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and the variety of the crime of corruption. While the old version was mainly provided 
to regulate and punish government party officials, the new code has extended this to 
state functionaries, which includes all persons connected to the state. Article 93 of the 
Criminal Law provides that “state functionaries as mentioned in the law, refers to 
persons who perform a public service in state organs; those who are employed by state-
owned companies, enterprises, public institutions and collective organisations and those 
who are assigned by state organs, state-owned companies, enterprises, public 
institutions and collective organisations that are not owned by the state to perform 
public service but shall be regarded as state functionaries.” 105  This is indeed 
strengthened by adding individuals who manage state owned assets. The amendments 
can also be found in, for example, the threshold amount leading to a criminal 
punishment which has increased due to economic growth. 
 
From 1993 to 1997, China’s prosecution service followed the slogan ‘to execute laws 
strictly and grasp cases firmly’, regarding the investigation and prosecution of cases 
concerning economic crime as a most important role in promoting economic 
reconstruction.106 In this period, nearly 60,000 cases were successfully investigated and 
prosecuted by the prosecution services each year, of which 30,000 were defined as 
serious cases and 2,000 grave cases. In total between 1993 and 1997, 313,033 cases and 
357,235 people were placed on file for investigation, and the prosecution services 
confiscated 22.92 billion Chinese yuan. The number of cases investigated doubled 
compared to the years between 1982 and 1987, and the number of serious cases 
increased five-fold, with the number of grave cases increasing by six.107 
 
                                                
105 Article 93, Criminal Law of the PRC. 
106 Siqing Zhang (1994), Speech on the Meeting of Chief Procurators’ Work of China, December 22, 
1994. 
107 According to the Working Reports of Supreme People’s Procuratoratein at the National People’s 
Congress given respectively by Yichen Yang, Fuzhi Liu and Siqing Zhang, the Chief Procurator, at the 
Fifth Meeting of the Eighth National People’s Congress. 
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Some other major laws 
In 2006, the Chinese government adopted the AML Law108, which is not only deemed 
to control the crime of money laundering, but also to address its predicate offences, 
including corruption.109 The AML law allows China to enhance its internal control 
system and increase transparency of officials’ accounts, to monitor suspicious financial 
transactions and identify anonymous or pseudonymous accounts and beneficiaries of 
these suspicious transactions. Chinese AML law and its international co-operation in 
terms of proceeds recovery intends to deter corrupt officials who purposely launder 
their ‘dirty’ money into legitimate money laundering activity, although the effectiveness 
of the AML law is questionable. 
 
The Constitution offers protection to victims and whistle blowers. Article 41 provides: 
“citizens have the right to make to relevant state organs a complaint and charges against, 
or exposures of, violation of the law or dereliction of duty by any state organ or 
functionary… In case of complaints, charges or exposures made by citizens, the state 
organ concerned must deal with them in a responsible manner after ascertaining the 
facts. No one may suppress such complaints, charges and exposures, or retaliate against 
the citizens making them. Citizens who have suffered losses through infringement of 
their civil rights by any state organ or functionary have the right to receive 
compensation in accordance with the law.”110 Whistle blowers protection can also be 
found in the Criminal Law111 and the Criminal Procedure Law112. 
 
In line with the Constitution and state laws, the local organisations and departments 
have also enacted and issued their own local and departmental regulations. The 
                                                
108 Anti-Money Laundering Law of the PRC, became effective on January 1, 2007. 
109 See Article 191 of the Criminal Law of PRC, and the Criminal Law Amendment XI, which added 
corruption and other financial crimes as predicate offence for money laundering. 
110 Article 41 of the Constitution of the People’s Republic of China. 
111 See Article 254, Criminal Law of the People’s Republic of China. 
112 See Article 84, 85, Criminal Procedure Law of the People’s Republic of China. 
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Administrative License Law regulates the establishment and implementation of 
administrative licenses, and guarantees and supervises the effective administration of 
administrative organs.113 The Law on Public Servants concerns the management of 
public servants and provides supervision over them.114 The Government Procurement 
Law, Anti-Monopoly Law and Bidding Law also supervise administrative discretion 
and the market’s fundamental role in allocation of resources, in order to effectively 
prevent corruption related crime.115 
 
The CCP itself has also enacted a series of intra-party rules and regulations. The 
‘Guidelines of the CCP for Party Member Leading Cadres to Perform Official Duties 
with Integrity’ in 1997, revised in 2010, is the party’s fundamental rule in regulating 
the behaviour of leading cadres. It prohibits leading cadres from engaging in profit-
making activities and seeking illegitimate gains by taking advantage of their 
positions.116 In 2007, the CCDI issued the ‘Regulation on Strict Prohibition of Seeking 
Illegitimate Gains by Misuse of Office’, in order to curb rent-seeking practice.117 
‘Regulation of the Executives of State-owned Enterprises for Performing Management 
Duties with Integrity’, released in 2009, was forwarded to prohibit leading officials in 
state-owned enterprises from seeking illegal profit through misuse of office for either 
themselves or other related parties, which in turn undermines the interests of the 
                                                
113 Administrative License Law of the People’s Republic of China, adopted at the 4th Session of the 
Standing Committee of the Tenth National People’s Congress on August 27, 2003, promulgated by 
President Hu Jintao. 
114 Law of the People’s Republic of China on Public Servants, adopted at the 15th Meeting of the Standing 
Committee of the Tenth National People’s Congress on April 27, 2005, promulgated by President Hu 
Jintao. 
115 The Government Procurement Law of the People's Republic of China, Adopted at the 28th Meeting 
of the Standing Committee of the Ninth National People's Congress on June 29, 2002; The Anti-
Monopoly Law of the People's Republic of China, adopted at the 29th meeting of the Standing 
Committee of the Tenth National People's Congress of the People's Republic of China on August 30, 
2007; The Bidding Law of the People's Republic of China, adopted by the Standing Committee of the 
Ninth National People's Congress at the 11th Session on August 30, 1999. 
116 The Information Office of the State Council, China’s cabinet, China’s Efforts to Combat Corruption 
and Build a Clean Government, available at: http://www.gov.cn/english/official/2010-12/29/content_17
75353.htm. 
117 Ibid. 
 206 
enterprises.118 
 
The ‘Regulation on Implementing the System of Registration for Gifts Received in 
Domestic Social Activities by Functionaries of Party and State Organs’ prohibits state 
functionaries from accepting any gifts or grants that might influence their impartial 
performance of official duties 119 . The ‘Regulation on Leading Cadres' Report of 
Relevant Personal Matters’ requires senior public officials to honestly report their 
incomes, housing and investment owned by themselves, their spouses and children 
living with them, and the employment status of their spouses and children. There is also 
an ‘Interim Regulation on Strengthening Management of State Functionaries whose 
Spouses and Children Have Emigrated Abroad’. 120  Even though the rules and 
regulations are clearly written on paper, the question remains in its efficiency. There 
have been provisions requiring officials to report their assets, but how many cadres 
have followed this ruling? The relatively recent investigation into ‘naked officials’121 
brings hope to the people and this trend has spread from the southern provinces to 
Beijing, but the consequence and the extent to which the discipline authority is effective 
remains unknown.122 
 
Punishment 
In terms of criminal punishment, China has enacted substantive criminal and 
administrative regulations to punish economic crime offenders. The Criminal Law 
                                                
118 Ibid. 
119 Ibid. 
120 Ibid. 
121 Luoguan in Chinese, describing Chinese bureaucrats whose family members have emigrated while 
they are still in public positions. The party has issued ‘The ordinance of the work of selecting and 
appointing cadres of the party and country’, which clearly stipulates ‘Naked officials’ will not be 
considered for promotion as they are high risks that their ability to escape overseas could make them 
more inclined to engage in corruption. 
122  See ‘China investigation finds 1,000 ‘naked officials’ in Guangdong’, 07.06.2014, BBC News, 
available at: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-china-27747097, and Demetri Sevastopulo 
(08.06.2014), “China cracks down on ‘naked officials’”, Financial Times, available at: 
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/9d1f3a88-ef01-11e3-acad-00144feabdc0.html#axzz37jmdiWKd. 
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provides harsh punishment for corrupt officials, stipulating anyone who embezzles 
more than 100,000 Yuan (£11,900) will receive more than ten years imprisonment, a 
life sentence, or even the death penalty should the offence be deemed serious enough 
and the personal asset shall be confiscated.123 Indeed, China’s top politicians once urged 
that “when there is a choice to kill or not to kill, choose to kill,” when they faced a surge 
of economic crimes at the beginning of the economic reform in the early 1980s. Former 
party leader, President Hu Jintao also stated that “any crime that the law regards as 
serious should certainly receive serious penalties, and any crime that is punishable by 
the death penalty according to the law, should certainly receive the death penalty.124 
During these periods, criminals who committed economic crime received no mercy in 
their sentencing. 
 
However, in recent years, China has started to adopt new punishing guidelines of 
‘justice tempered with mercy’ and ‘kill fewer, kill cautiously’. 125  More and more 
suspended death penalties have been applied, even though the value of the bribe is 
extremely large. For example, the former manager of the China National Petroleum 
Corporation Jiang Jiemin, took a bribe worth £20 million, but received the death penalty 
with a suspension for two years.126 These convicted officials can escape execution by 
not committing any other crime in prison during this two-year period, where 
subsequently their sentences will be transferred to life imprisonment, or 25 years if 
‘meritorious service’ is demonstrated. 
 
For less serious offences, China provides intra organisational rules as well as party 
                                                
123 Article 383 of the Criminal Law of PRC. 
124 Amnesty International (1997), People’s Republic of China – The Death Penalty in China: Breaking R
ecords, Breaking Rules, Strike Hard – Yanda, available at: http://www.refworld.org/pdfid/45b84b772.pd
f. 
125 Ibid. 
126  Benjamin Haas and Aibing Guo (2013), ‘China Widen Anti-Graft Drive as Petrochina Ousts 
Managers’, Bloomberg Business, available at: http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-08-28/china-
widens-anti-graft-drive-as-petrochina-ousts-managers-4-.html. 
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disciplines on imposing penalties. For example, the ‘Regulation on the Punishment of 
Civil Servants in Administrative Organs’127 specifies the principles, power limit, types 
of misconduct and the punishment standards, including explicit warning, recording of 
demerit, recording of major demerit, demotion, dismissal from post and discharge from 
office. The party’s own disciplinary rules also give five measures for enforcing party 
discipline, as explored, including explicit warning, stern warning, removal from post 
within the party, probation within the party, and expulsion from the party.128 
 
Taking the Profit out of Crime 
Introduction 
Confiscation in economic crime case is an indispensable tool to further ensure that 
criminals do not benefit from their illegal conduct. It could be a supplement to 
imprisonment and sometimes could be implemented in isolation. Indeed, the recovery 
and restitution of proceeds of corruption practices is made absolutely clear to be one of 
the principal objectives of the United Nations Convention Against Corruption. 129 
However, the records in most countries in actual forfeiture or confiscation of proceeds 
of economic crime, is far from impressive. For example, in the UK, the amount of 
criminal property that has been confiscated is a tiny proportion of the expected 
whole.130 Even in relatively clear-cut cases of drug related crimes, it is assumed that the 
UK confiscates less than 0.001 percent of the suspected wealth involved.131 
 
                                                
127 Adopted at the 173rd executive meeting of the State Council on April 4, 2007, promulgated by Premier 
Wen Jiabao. 
128 The Information Office of the State Council, China’s cabinet, China’s Efforts to Combat Corruption 
and Build a Clean Government, available at: http://www.gov.cn/english/official/2010-12/29/content_17
75353.htm. 
129 Articles 1 and 51 of the UNCAC. 
130 The UK National Audit Office estimated in the UK confiscation of criminal assets was no more than 
26 pence in every £ 100 of criminal property and that in only two per cent of cases is the full amount of 
the confiscation order actually collected, NAO Confiscation Orders, 17 December 2013. See also Report 
of the House of Commons Committee of Public Accounts, Confiscation Orders, 21 March 2014, SO. 
131 See Barry Rider (1996), ‘Taking the Profit out of Crime’, in Money Laundering Control, edited by 
Barry Rider and Michael Ashe, Dublin: Sweet & Maxwell; and Barry Rider (2016), ‘Proceeds of crime 
– A bridge too far?’, Editorial, Journal of Money Laundering Control, Vol. 19 Iss 1. 
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As Professor Rider stated, the acquisition of and control over wealth is the motivation 
for most serious crimes that involve premeditation.132 This is particularly so when 
criminal activity operates as an enterprise requiring capital to fulfil its ambitions. 
Consequently, the money, or rather wealth, is not only the goal but it is the lifeblood of 
criminal enterprises. Therefore, until the profits of crime are eradicated from criminal 
behaviour, there is little chance of discouraging abusive and illegal conduct that 
produces great wealth. 
 
It is obvious that by definition, public sector corruption is a crime that deals with the 
powerful and while individuals remain in positions of authority, it is extremely difficult 
for the ordinary legal system and its law enforcement agency to interfere, let alone 
prosecute. In the common law tradition and in the context of the obligation of 
fiduciaries to be accountable for the taking of ‘secret profits’, many precedented 
principles have been applied not only to those in private relationships but also those in 
positions of trust in government.133 A number of common law jurisdictions have held 
that the imposition of a constructive trust shall apply where the money ends up. For 
example, a Singapore appeal court had invoked such a principle in regard to the 
proceeds of corruption that took place in Indonesia held in a Japanese bank in 
Singapore.134  
 
There are commonly two forms of profits of corruption existing in China, one is 
property profit and the other one is non-property profit, such as promotion. It is 
understandable in the case of property profits, as has been demonstrated by the PRC 
                                                
132 Barry Rider (2007), ‘Recovering the proceeds of corruption’, Journal of Money Laundering Control, 
Vol. 10 Iss 1, pp. 5-32, at p. 9. See also Anthony Kennedy (2007), ‘An evaluation of the recovery of 
criminal proceeds in the UK’, Journal of Money Laundering Control Vol. 10 Iss 1, pp. 33-46. 
133 See generally Robert Pearce, John Stevens and Warren Barr (2010), The Law of Trusts and Equitable 
Obligations, 5th Edition, Oxford: Oxford University Press; and Andrew A. Burrows (2011), The Law of 
Restitution, 3rd Edition, Chapter 26, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
134 Sumitomo Bank Ltd v. Karitika Ratna Thahir (1993) 1 SLR 735. 
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Criminal Law, the necessity of the confiscation of criminal assets.135 It is indeed, a 
controversial topic in the common law world as to the ability of the law to trace the 
proceeds of corruption and fraud.136 Nevertheless, English courts in common with 
many other common law countries, through the development of a series of cases 
involving corruption and breaches of fiduciary duty, have now been prepared to trace 
such property and impose a constructive trust upon the breach.137 
 
Such a situation, however, becomes much simpler and straightforward in the law of 
China. According to the law regarding property ownership, no matter how many times 
or into what forms the criminal property is transferred, ownership remains with the 
State as long as it lawfully originated from the state, given that the profits of corruption 
crime are appurtenance to the property, the ownership should not change.138 As a result, 
taking away the proceeds of corruption is seen to be merely recovering original 
ownership of illegally obtained property. 
 
The Criminal Law of the PRC provides two ways of seizing the profit of corruption 
crime; firstly, the property that has been misappropriated including the profits generated 
from it, shall be recoverable by its original department (i.e. state organs or public 
institutions); secondly, ill-gotten property resulting from embezzlement and bribery, 
including other properties, shall be confiscated by the Treasury.139 
 
Non-property profit corruption obviously renders the case more complicated. Based on 
                                                
135 Article 383 of the Criminal Law of the PRC. 
136 See Attorney General for Hong Kong v. Reid (1994) 1 All ER 1 contra Sinclair Investments (UK) Ltd 
v. Versailles Trade and Finance Ltd (2011) 3 WLR 1153. 
137 See a detailed analysis at Barry Rider (2014), ‘A simple approach to justice’, Editorial, Journal of 
Financial Crime, Vol. 21, Iss. 4; and in particular the recent case FHR European Ventures LLP v. Cedar 
Capital Partners (2014) UKSC 45. 
138 Property Law of the People’s Republic of China, adopted at the 5th Session of the 10th National 
People’s Congress of the PRC on March 16, 2007, promulgated by President Hu Jintao. 
139 Article 59 of the Criminal Law of the PRC. 
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the ‘Civil Servant Law’140, ‘Supervision Law’141 and the ‘Work Regulations for the 
Promotion and Appointment of Leading and Party Government Cadres’, “any 
promotions of jobs or positions should be proceeded through a lawful procedure by 
lawful means, it is unfair if a promotion is received by violating the laws and rules; and 
to maintain a just, fair and open competition in society it is vital that the corrupt official 
be deprived of the benefit of this crime.” In China, non-property profit can be taken 
away through degrading the position to the original office, and disqualifying the civil 
servant. However, there are still debated views on certain types of non-property profit, 
for example, sexual bribery, where the profit of corruption is a sexual service.142 In 
practical terms, the law is uncertain; the criminals normally receive disciplinary 
punishment such as expulsion from the party or fines. Nevertheless, it is widely 
accepted that it is not in every case that the benefit of corruption can be appropriately 
removed – this is something that relevant law enforcement agencies are still working 
on at present. 
 
In the context of China 
Taking profit out of crime is nothing new in China, while in Chinese written laws, the 
confiscation of property is a rather more widely used term. The laws relating to the 
confiscation of criminal property can be found in criminal, administrative and even 
business law. In China, there are two means to undermine a criminal’s wealth; the first 
one is the discussed term of confiscation of property, which has been utilised in the past, 
both in ancient and modern China; the other is to impose fines or orders of financial 
contribution and retraction and even deprivation of an official post to discipline 
                                                
140 Civil Servant Law of the People's Republic of China, adopted at the 15th session of the Standing 
Committee of the Tenth National People's Congress of the People's Republic of China on April 27, 2005, 
came into effect on January 1, 2006. 
141 Law of the People's Republic of China on Administrative Supervision, adopted at the 25th Meeting 
of the Standing Committee of the Eighth National People's Congress on May 9, 1997 and promulgated 
by Order No. 85 of the President of the People’s Republic of China on May 9, 1997. 
142 See more discussions at Supreme People’s Procuratorate’s Research Committee (2007), Xinxing 
Shouhui Fanzui de Rending yu Chufa (Determination and Punishment of New Types of Bribery Crime), 
Beijing: Law Press. 
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criminals.  
 
Throughout China’s dynasties, emperors who took away a criminal’s illegal possession 
in many dynasties in China, attached great importance to their economic base, as the 
nature of law at that time was to repress people, and the best way to repress people was 
to weaken their economic status.143 The nature of law, subsequently, under the feudal 
society maintained autocratic governance. For serious criminals, taking away the 
proceeds of their crimes was a necessary method to diminish their potential threat to 
the stability of public order.144 
 
From the 1970s to the 1990s, China has enacted many provisions on taking the profit 
out of corruption crime, covering areas of criminal law, criminal procedure law, legal 
explanations, administrative law and business law, which indicated the government’s 
determination in erasing corruption in all sectors in the country. The first Criminal Law 
promulgated in 1979 contained 23 articles in relation to confiscation, and it sanctioned 
confiscation for the crimes of smuggling, market manipulation, speculation, and 
counterfeit currency. Ever since then, the confiscation of property was formally 
established as a supplementary punishment in Criminal Law, and was widely used in 
property related crimes such as economic crime, drug trafficking and in particular 
corruption. The Standing Committee of the NPC on 8 March 1982 promulgated the 
‘Decision on Severely Punishing Crimes on Sabotaging the Economy’ and on 21 
January 1988, ‘Supplementary Provision on Punishing Embezzlement and Bribery 
Crimes’ was passed. These two documents, as previously discussed, were the two major 
documents in the 1980s concerning the punishment of corruption and bribery. 
 
The Criminal Procedure Law of the PRC was revised in 1996, in which it provides 
                                                
143 See more detailed discussion at Feng Ye (2007), Combating Corruption: A Chinese Perspective, PhD 
thesis, University of London, pp. 137-142. 
144 Ibid. 
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detailed procedure in taking the profit out of crime, including corruption. 145  It 
empowers the people’s courts and people’s procuratorates to be leading institutions of 
enforcement.146 In 1997, the NPC revised the 1979 version of Criminal Law, where a 
special chapter on Confiscation of Property was added, containing 59 articles. 147 
Furthermore, in March 1999, the Supreme People’s Court and Supreme People’s 
Procuratorate issued associated regulations, providing that the courts and prosecution 
departments should give priority to grave cases of bribery and especially those 
involving large sums of money from bribes taken by party officials and judiciary 
members. China has indeed made tremendous efforts in implementing state laws and 
regulations in taking away the proceeds of crime. Nevertheless, as we can see in today’s 
borderless world, corrupt officials become experts in moving their ill-gotten gains 
beyond the reach of domestic courts and hiding their bribes in foreign bank accounts. 
Indeed, the call for international cooperation is, and will continue to be, essential. 
 
Related international conventions 
The international community has also realised the danger of corruption and attached 
great importance in combating it, having witnessed its rapid development across the 
borders. Indeed, the subject of taking away the profit of corruption related crime is 
nothing new. It has in fact appeared in many international contentions tracing back to 
the 1990s. For example, in 1996, the Inter-American Convention against Corruption 
was promulgated, and its Article 15 stipulates “in accordance with their applicable 
domestic laws and relevant treaties or other agreements, that may be in force between 
or among them, the States Parties shall provide each other the broadest possible 
measure of assistance in the identification, tracing, freezing, seizure and forfeiture of 
property or proceeds obtained, derived from or used in the commission of offences 
established in accordance with this Convention.”148 On January 27, 1999, the Criminal 
                                                
145 See Criminal Procedure Law of the PRC, Article 173, 280, 281. 
146 Article 262, Criminal Procedure Law of the PRC. 
147 See Section 8 Confiscation of Property, Chapter III Punishment, Criminal Law of the PRC. 
148 Article 15, Inter-American Convention against Corruption, adopted at the third plenary session, held 
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Law Convention on Corruption was adopted by the Council of Europe, of which Article 
23 provides detailed measures to facilitate the gathering of evidence and the 
confiscation of proceeds.149 In Africa, the African Union Convention on Prevention and 
Combating Corruption was passed in 1999, where Article 8 provides that state parties 
should adopt necessary measures to establish, under the law, an offence of illicit 
enrichment, and adopt necessary measures to take away the profit of corruption. In the 
United Nations, Article 13 of the United Nations Conventions against Transnational 
Organised Crime requires international cooperation for the purposes of confiscation, 
and Article 14 provides clauses regarding disposal of confiscated proceeds or 
property.150 The final, but certainly not the least important policy, the United Nations 
Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC), has been acting as the most influential legal 
and international convention and it is the first global legally binding anti-corruption 
instrument.151 The convention was signed by 140 countries and entered into effect in 
2005. It provides measures for direct civil recovery and mechanisms for recovery of 
proceeds through international cooperation. It is indeed a milestone for the international 
community in issues of tracing the proceeds of economic crime.152 
 
China has not been slow in realising this and entered and ratified the UNCAC at the 
earliest stage. It is true that taking away the profit of corruption crime is not only a 
requirement of domestic criminal law, but also a matter of international commitment. 
The Chinese government assigned the Supreme People’s Procuratorate as the central 
authority that is responsible for dealing with requests regarding mutual legal assistance 
                                                
on March 29, 1996. 
149 Criminal Law Convention on Corruption, Strasbourg 27.01.1999 – treaty open for signature by the 
member states and the non-member states which have participated in its elaboration and for accession by 
other non-member states and by the European Union, entry into force on 01.07.2002. 
150 United Nations Convention against Transnational Organised Crime, adopted by General Assembly 
resolution 55/25 of 15 November 2000, is the main international instrument in the fight against 
transnational organised crime. 
151 UNODC’s Action against Corruption and Economic Crime, available at: http://www.unodc.org/unod
c/en/corruption/index.html. 
152 See Frank Vogl (2004), ‘The UN Convention against Corruption: A Milestone on the Road to Curbing 
Global Bribery’, UN Chronicle, September-November 2004. 
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including taking away, recovering and returning profit from transnational crime.153 
 
The future 
Protection of the victim of economic crime has never been an easy task. The more 
diversified forms of bribe have increased in monetary value and has made investigation 
more challenging. Research and reports have also indicated the increasingly common 
phenomenon of group corruption, which is a corruption scandal involving many more 
officials and the corruption syndicate extends horizontally to different departments at 
the same level. This will be further examined in the next chapter. Indeed, this has in 
various ways made investigation and prosecution more difficult. 
 
Lawyers, in many countries, certainly excluding China, are playing an important role 
in protecting victims of economic crime. However, the primary duty of lawyers in 
China is still a duty to the state. The ‘Provisional Regulations for lawyers of the People’s 
Republic of China’154 , which became effective on January 1, 1982, provided that 
lawyers were legal workers of the country, whose primary responsibility was to protect 
the correct implementation of state law; whereas the protection of the interests of 
individual clients was secondary. Over the years even though we have seen an evolution 
of Chinese lawyers in the areas of, for example, intellectual property and commercial 
disputes, the situation has not changed much in cases involving the party in power. 
Indeed, the status of lawyers should be further promoted and of course, the lawyers 
themselves should put themselves forward in ensuring involvement in major cases 
concerning the masses’ interests.  
 
                                                
153 See more at Nihal Sri Ameresekere (2011), UN Convention against Corruption to Combat Fraud & 
Corruption: A Cancerous Menace with Mere Rhetoric Subverts UN Convention, Milton Keynes: 
AuthorHouse, pp. 68-69; see also the then Chief Procurator Jia Chunwang’s speech at annual meeting of 
International Association of Anti-Corruption Authorities (IAACA) in 2007, available at: 
http://www.spp.gov.cn/site2006/2007-11-22/0002116179.html. 
154 Adopted by the 15th Session of the Standing Committee of the 5th National People’s Congress on 
August 26, 1980. 
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The internationalisation of wealth and the more sophisticated financial derivatives have 
also complicated the situation. However, China is not slow in realising that it cannot 
deal with all these issues in isolation. The country has in various situations expressed 
its willingness on international cooperation and put itself forward in signing up to the 
UNCAC. The former President, Hu Jintao, even gave his personal support to the 
establishment of the International Association of Anti-Corruption Agencies. In the next 
chapter, the author will attempt to provide a detailed examination and analysis 
specifically on international cooperation against transnational economic crime.
Chapter 6: The Enforcement of Economic Crime in China 
with particular reference to International Co-operation 
 
Introduction 
Despite differing cultural backgrounds and economic conditions, economic crime exists, 
to varying degrees and with diverse characteristics, in every country, whether 
developing or developed. Along with the dramatic development of the world economy 
and the increase in international communications, domestic economic crime has, and 
certainly will continue, to be transnational. Many criminals now flee abroad, and 
wrongdoers try every means possible to transfer and ‘launder’ their illicit gains outside 
their home country. Misappropriation of state property, a particularly common crime in 
China, with this international trend, has resulted in making China’s enforcement body 
more vulnerable.1 
 
Given the principle of mutual respect for sovereignty, judicial jurisdiction and mutual 
non-interference in other countries’ internal affairs, transnational economic crime can 
hardly be controlled effectively without judicial cooperation. A nation’s law and judicial 
system can only be effective within its own territory. As a result, when a state 
encounters economic crime that is related to other countries, it can only guarantee 
effective punishment for internal economic crime with judicial assistance and mutual 
cooperation from other relevant nations. Essentially, it is necessary not only to maintain 
state sovereignty and judicial power, but also to cope with economic crime and keep 
channels open for international communication.2 
                                                
1 See Lei Chen (2012), Fanfubai Guoji Hezuo Lilun yu Shiwu (Research on Theory and Practice of Anti-
Corruption of International Cooperation), Beijing: China Procuratorate Press; see also Xiang Li (2011), 
Fanfubai Guoji Xingshi Hezuo Jizhi Yanjiu (Research on Anti-Corruption Mechanisms of International 
Cooperation), Beijing: Beijing University Press; see also Wujun Liu (2005), ‘Waitao tanguan yindu 
kunnan chongchong’ (The difficulties in extraditing fled corrupt officials), Zhongguo Guoqing Guoli 
(China National Conditions and Strength), published by National Bureau of Statistics, 2005, No. 9, pp. 
60-61. 
2 See more at Harry Leroy Jones (1952), ‘International judicial assistance: procedural chaos and a 
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The then executive director of the Anti-Corruption and Bribery Bureau of the Supreme 
People’s Procuratorate once voiced that internal economic crime has always been 
commonplace in all countries; it prevents social stability and economic development 
and it impairs the normal operation of social and political systems and the 
implementation of the law. It is essential to strengthen international cooperation and 
mutual judicial assistance across the world in order to combat such crime.3 He further 
pointed out that great importance has been attached to international judicial cooperation 
by the Chinese government since the 1980s, and China has already and is willing to 
sign up to further treaties with nations across the globe. 4  Nonetheless, despite 
encouraging mutual and international assistance on combating economic crime, the 
issues arising in enforcing the law and regulation can be more important, even within 
its domestic territory. 
 
The enforcement issues 
The law and its administration 
Even though rules have a general influence in that they set out standards and define 
barriers between what is acceptable and what is not, in the real world, if they are not 
capable of enforcement, or in other words, not enforced, they will have far less impact. 
Their status and legality may be brought into question. Philosophers distinguish 
between different types and layers of rules and regulations, ranging from social customs 
to ‘hard’ law. Yet, not all these have determinant and predictable sanctions. The breach 
of customs may bring social criticism and disapproval, yet this often is undefined and 
unpredictable – at least in its consequences.  
 
                                                
program for reform’, Yale Law Journal, Vol. 62, No. 4, pp. 515-562; and also Jenny S. Martinez (2003), 
‘Towards and international judicial system’, Stanford Law Review, Vol. 56, No. 2, pp. 429-529. 
3 Yuzhong Dai (2000), ‘China: responsibilities of the procuratorate and the necessity for cooperation in 
combating economic crime’, Journal of Financial Crime, Vol. 7, Iss. 4, pp. 348-350. 
4 Ibid. 
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It has been brought up by jurists that the test of a rule of law is whether there is an 
identified and predictable sanction upon the breach.5 In the context of economic and 
financial crime, such a problem should not be distinct, as almost all defined economic 
offences carry a specific penalty. Nonetheless, there has been a tendency to 
‘decriminalise’ certain offences that are merely technical and mainly of regulatory 
concern. For example, the laws relating to the preparation and filing of financial 
statements have, in many jurisdictions, been rather emasculated.6 
 
There are also many other factors subject to debate. For example, it has been argued 
that the approach of the previously named Financial Services Authority, today’s 
Financial Conduct Authority in the United Kingdom, to regulate through principles 
instead of carefully drafted rules, has made the boundaries ambiguous between what is, 
and what is not the law. This is exacerbated by the consequences of sanctions after the 
violation, including, in extreme cases, criminal penalties. Lawyers have argued that this 
is not in line with the rule of law and notions of natural justice, and conduct which may 
be sanctioned by the courts, with penalties and stigma, should be clearly articulated and 
defined – otherwise uncertainties can often lead to injustice.7  
 
Indeed, in addition to these theoretical difficulties that contribute immense uncertainties 
into the regulatory system, the real and practical problems can be significant. 
 
 
                                                
5 Henry Melvin Hart, Albert Martin Sacks, William N. Eskridge and Philip P. Frickey (1994), The Legal 
Process: Basic Problems in the Marketing and Application of Law, Westbury, New York: Foundation 
Press; see also Maimon Schwarzschild (2007), ‘Keeping it private’, San Diego Law Review, No. 44, P. 
686. 
6 See more discussions at Barry A. K. Rider, Haiting Yan and Lihong Xing (2010), Guoji Jinrong Fanzui 
Yufang yu Kongzhi (The Prevention and Control of International Financial Crime), Beijing: China 
Financial Publishing House, pp. 108-112; and also Rob McQueen (2001), ‘The corporate image – the 
regulation of annual reports in Australia’, Macquarie Law Journal, Vol. 1, No. 1, pp. 93-128. 
7 Andromachi Georgosouli (2007), ‘The nature of the FSA policy of rule use: a critical overview’, Legal 
Studies, Vol. 28, No. 1, pp. 119-139. 
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Crimes of the powerful 
In considering certain criminal activities and crimes committed by the ‘powerful’, it is 
important to recognise practical realities. As analysed previously, complex crime, such 
as economic crime, by its very nature, is often committed by persons who are in 
positions of influence and who may already have disproportionate authority due to their 
scant regard for the law and fair governance. Indeed, blue-collar workers may engage 
in burglary of stock and equipment, but it would be the clerks who would engage in 
fraud. It is true that complex and sophisticated criminal activities require safeguarding 
from those holding powerful positions – they will do whatever is necessary to protect 
their interests as well as their associates. This inevitably creates obstacles in 
successfully arresting and prosecuting them – much to the regret of the law. 
 
Criminologists and legal commentators often described economic crime as ‘elite 
crime’.8 In the real world, to be able to perpetrate such offences it is necessary for the 
perpetrators to be in a position to dispose of assets, or at least have a certain degree of 
influence.9 For example, undeniably, there would be little point in bribing someone who 
did not have influence over the matter in which the briber hoped to secure some 
advantage or privilege. Taking the simplest example of police fraud in a domestic 
context, it can become quite complex where influential individuals within the state are 
involved who can protect themselves, perhaps by means of corruption. What follows 
are issues of securing evidence, particularly documentary and computer records, which 
is under the control of those criminals; this can be of great significance in rendering 
them within the realms of prosecution. Consequently, as we have seen, the majority of 
economic crimes are pertinent to those who are holding an influential position, whether 
                                                
8 See more discussions at Lawrence M. Salinger (2004), Encyclopedia of White-Collar & Corporate 
Crime, Vol. 1, 1st Edition, SAGE Publishing; and also Barry A. K. Rider, Haiting Yan and Lihong Xing 
(2010), Guoji Jinrong Fanzui Yufang yu Kongzhi (The Prevention and Control of International Financial 
Crime), Beijing: China Financial Publishing House, pp. 28-30. 
9 See more at Leonid Fituni and Irina Abramova (2015), ‘Crimes of the powerful and legitimisation’, in 
Research Handbook on International Financial Crime, edited by Barry Rider, Cheltenham, UK and 
Northampton, USA: Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, pp. 51-53. 
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in the public or private sector. 
 
Elite and collective criminals  
It is clear that there are many global examples of elite prosecutorial and investigative 
agencies, established specifically to spear-head the fight against corruption and 
economic crime, themselves becoming tainted by the evils they are dealing with. We 
need only consider the famous scandal of the Commercial Crime Unit in Hong Kong 
and its corrupt director, Warwick Reid. As Lord Templeman, then a distinguished judge 
in the Privy Council noted: “bribery is an evil practice which threatens the foundations 
of any civilised society. Bribery of policemen and prosecutors brings the administration 
of justice into disrepute … in this case the amount of harm caused to the administration 
of justice in Hong Kong … cannot be quantified”.10  Sadly there are plenty more 
examples. 
 
For China, it would be disastrous if judges and prosecutors colluded with leading 
officials in various governmental departments. Latterly, research and reports in China 
have shown a tendency towards collective corruption; scandals that involve a relatively 
large number of public officials holding positions in various disciplines. 11  As 
previously discussed, smuggling scandals in Xiamen city and Jiangmen city involved 
hundreds of middle-ranking and senior government officials12 – corruption scandals in 
Shenyang city implicated almost the entire top echelon of the political and 
governmental departments. 
 
China’s judicial department has been an arena that breeds corruption. Recently, a series 
of investigations of judicial corruption in Wuhan city, Hunan province and Guangdong 
                                                
10 Attorney General for Hong Kong v. Reid [1994] 1 All ER 1. 
11 Ting Gong (2002), ‘Dangerous collusion: corruption as a collective venture in contemporary China’, 
Communist and Pot-Communist Studies, Vol. 35, No. 1, pp. 85-103. 
12 See more details at, for example, Shawn Shieh (2005), ‘The rise of collective corruption in China: the 
Xiamen smuggling case’, Journal of Contemporary China, Vol. 14, No. 42, p. 67. 
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province demonstrated that judicial corruption often involved dozens of judges in the 
same court. 13  A more recent investigation in the city of Maoming in Guangdong 
province, led to the collapse of the city’s party secretary, the Secretary of the Politics 
and Law Committee, involving two deputy mayors, and numerous officials in the city’s 
political and legal establishment.14 
 
As has been acknowledged, being a country that runs a single-party political system, 
the most radical change in the past decades in China is the appearance of ‘money for 
power trade’.15 At the time when corruption became a collective force, there is a visible 
upward spiral illustrating that senior CCP officials became increasingly involved.16 In 
particular, in recent years, hundreds of senior officials at or above provincial and 
ministerial level, have been placed under investigation for abuse of their powers since 
2013, after the newly elected President Xi Jinping initiated the anti-corruption 
campaign. This wave has implicated offenders at an unprecedented level. The former 
member of the top decision-making body, the Politburo Standing Committee – Zhou 
Yongkang, who once headed the party’s Central Commission for Discipline Inspection 
and China’s Ministry of Public Security, was found guilty of corruption and sentenced 
to life imprisonment.17 Zhou was the first Politburo Standing Committee member and 
the most senior-ranked official since the founding of the People’s Republic of China, to 
                                                
13 See more at: Ping Li (2000), ‘Corruption in China’s Courts’, in Judicial Independence in China: 
Lessons for Global Rule of Law Promotion, edited by Randall Peerenboom, New York: Cambridge 
University Press, pp. 196-220; also Ping Li (2011), ‘The production’ of corruption in China’s courts – 
the politics of judicial decision-making and its consequences in a one-party state’, Journal of Law & 
Social Inquiry, Vol. 37, No. 4, pp. 848-877. 
14 See more at Zhong Wen (2011), ‘“Four Representatives” in Corruption in Maoming’, Hong Kong 
Economic Newspaper (Xin Bao), 5 March. 
15 Hualing Fu (2013), The upward and downward spirals in China’s anti-corruption enforcement, in 
Comparative Perspectives on Criminal Justice in China, edited by Mike McConville and Eva Pils, 
Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, p. 401. 
16  Ibid, pp. 400-404; see also Melanie Manion (2004), Corruption by Design: Building Clean 
Government in Mainland China and Hong Kong, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, p. 85. 
17 Damien Grammaticus (2014), ‘Zhou Yongkang: China investigates ex-security chief’, BBC News, 
29.07.2014, available at: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-28544428; and James T. Areddy (2015), 
China’s former security chief sentenced to life in prison, The Wall Street Journal, available at: 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/chinas-former-security-chief-zhou-yongkang-sentenced-to-life-in-prison-
1434018450. 
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be tried and convicted of corruption and its related crimes.18 
 
Even though there have been constant corruption convictions concerning high-profile 
officials, compared to the size of the CCP members implicated, it is far from adequate. 
As noted, the unique political structure of the CCP allows the CDI a degree of 
independence since, as with the CCP Committee, its members are elected through Party 
Congress. Thus, it has a higher status than other working departments under the CCP. 
However, the CCP Constitution makes it clear that the CDI works under a duo 
leadership, the CCP Committee at the same level and the CDI at a superior level. In 
recent years, efforts have been made to strengthen the vertical leadership within the 
disciplinary inspection system, in order to ensure that local CDIs have a certain degree 
of independence from respective local CCP Committees.19 However, evidence shows 
that control by the CCP Committee at local level is far superior to that from their higher-
level disciplinary departments. 20  In various ways, this introduces tremendous 
difficulties in the process of investigating and prosecuting criminals associated with the 
party committee, together with the influence of the high-ranking party officials at local 
committee on so-called independent but in reality, not so independent people’s 
procuratorates and people’s courts. 
 
Under the direct leadership of the local party committee, the effectiveness of a local 
CDI depends largely upon the support of the local CCP chief. For example, if political 
power corrupts at the core, the CDI would be ineffective, and it could even degenerate 
into a corrupt institution that eventually supports the corrupt political authority. There 
are many examples where whistle blowers are themselves placed under shuanggui or 
                                                
18 Cary Huang (2014), ‘Xi Jinping boosts clout with Zhou Yongkang takedown, but what next?’, South 
China Morning Post, July 29, 2014, available at: http://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/1561990/xi-
jinping-boosts-clout-zhou-yongkang-takedown-what-next. 
19 Ting Gong (2008), ‘The party discipline inspection in China: its evolving trajectory and embedded 
dilemmas’, Crime Law and Social Change, Vol. 49, No. 139, p. 145. 
20 See more at Changfa Cui and Yongyuan Zhai (2010), Fanfu Changlian Jianshe Xuexi Duben (Textbook 
on the Fight against Corruption), Beijing: State Institute of Administration, pp. 102-103. 
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subjected to other types of punishment, where the CDI plays the role of conspirator.21 
 
On the other hand, given the new tendency towards the syndicated nature of scandals, 
a detailed investigation into a high-profile case in China is costly and can only be 
possible if it is centrally coordinated. Statistics have shown that 49 investigators are 
required to investigate a ministerial level official and it may take more than 1,000 
investigators in large-scale cases, for example, the smuggling cases in Zhanjiang and 
Xiamen. 22  This is another factor that can potentially make the investigation and 
prosecution of such collective corruption cases more difficult. 
 
The perpetration of such ‘elite criminals’ is particularly damaging to governments in 
terms of respect and confidence, which skews and therefore brings their suitability to 
remain in such influential positions into issue. The state that allowed such individuals 
to assume positions, which they now abuse for their own personal gain, appears, if not 
corrupt, to be at least unfair and inefficient. In societies where there is a clear line 
between people who have the authority, whether this is due to of class, ethnicity, tribal 
or family connections, the perception that those in a privileged position are unfairly 
benefiting from their positions, promotes even greater social and cultural pressures and 
unrest. Perhaps much more common in newer economies, where there has not been a 
long tradition or process for the determination of those who hold power in government 
and business, there is an inevitable tendency that those in power will employ their kin 
and close associates into positions of authority, the former thereby acting as their 
protective umbrella. This has widely seen as a human response to uncertainty, and such 
a phenomenon has unfortunately not been confined to the developing world, as has been 
seen in recent allegations of nepotism in the Blair Government (UK) and the Bush 
                                                
21 Kean Wang (2004), My Opinion on “Where is the Committee of Disciplinary Inspection”, People’s 
Daily, 9 July. 
22 Hualing Fu (2013), The upward and downward spirals in China’s anti-corruption enforcement, in 
Comparative Perspectives on Criminal Justice in China, edited by Mike McConville and Eva Pils, 
Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, p. 404. 
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family (US).23 Most importantly, however, when these issues were tainted and fuelled 
by allegations of self-dealing and corruption, it created wider political and social unrest. 
Many recent successful and failed revolutions and rebellions in developing and former 
Soviet dominated countries have been ‘justified’ by allegations of corruption and 
similar economic crimes. 
 
The perceived level of such crime is of real interest to those who are concerned with 
the nation’s stability and security. Allegations of corrupt officials on the part of a 
country’s government may well justify domestic and international investigation, with 
the development of civil society and organisations such as the Transparency 
International and Amnesty International. Condemnation can be far more effective and 
internationally expressed. Moreover, inter-governmental organisations have also 
recognised the importance of upholding integrity. This chapter will examine the various 
initiatives of such bodies, such as the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) and the World Bank and International Monetary Fund. It should 
also be noted that the United Nations Convention against Corruption places 
considerable emphasis on facilitating those who wish to combat corruption and 
economic crime. If those in positions of authority in other jurisdictions are under 
investigation, this support will enhance effective enforcement.24 
 
International initiatives 
It has been emphasised in this study that in our modern inter-dependent world, effective 
and efficient international cooperation is paramount, not only in the sense of enforcing 
criminal law, but also in facilitating the role of regulatory agencies. Tremendous efforts 
                                                
23 See more at Richard Reeves (2003), ‘Nepotism: is it back?’, New Statesman, 29 September 2003, 
available at: http://www.newstatesman.com/node/158389. 
24 See more discussions at C. Fijnaut (2000), ‘Transnational crime and the role of the United Nations in 
its containment through international cooperation: a challenge for the 21st century’, European Journal 
of Crime, Criminal Law and Criminal Justice, Vol. 8, Iss. 2, pp. 119-127; and Jean-Germain Gros (2003), 
‘Trouble in paradise: crime and collapsed states in the age of globalization’, The British Journal of 
Criminology, Vol. 43, Iss. 1, pp. 63-80. 
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have been taken in recent years, across a broad range of issues, to promote international 
cooperation. States are traditionally determined to maintain their own sovereignty and 
thus protective of their territorial integrity. History, however, records many successful 
examples of independent state collaboration in fighting economic crime.25 
 
Obligations on countries to take affirmative action to provide legal assistance to another 
state are invariably pursuant to the agreement to do so, through a treaty or convention. 
It is always open to a state to offer unilateral assistance to another, in the exercise of its 
own sovereignty and within the scope of its laws, regardless of reciprocity. However, 
this is not always an efficient or predictable approach since, for example, the surrender 
of fugitives through rendition or extradition will be pursuant to bilateral rendition or 
extradition treaty.26 By the same token, many other forms of mutual legal assistance 
such as search, freezing and seizure of evidence, the execution of requests and orders 
and the recognition of judgments will be based on the obligations imposed by an agreed 
treaty that has been duly implemented by domestic law.27 
 
In the past thirty years it has become policy for many countries to seek to engage in full 
mutual legal assistance treaties on a bilateral basis. Similar to cooperation between the 
commonwealth countries, there has been a long tradition of ‘schemes’ that have been 
agreed upon, by consensus, between commonwealth governments who attempt to 
provide various degrees of standardisation in terms of legal cooperation across a broad 
                                                
25 See for example, Sundaresh Menon and Teo Guan Siew (2012), ‘Key challenges in tackling economic 
and cyber crimes: creating a multilateral platform for international co-operation’, Journal of Money 
Laundering Control, Vol. 15 Iss. 3, pp. 243-256; see also at Mario Serio (1998), ‘Italy: cconomic crime 
and international cooperation’, Journal of Financial Crime, Vol. 6 Iss. 2, pp. 189-190. 
26 David A. Sadoff (2016), Bring International Fugitives to Justice: Extradition and its Alternatives, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 42-43. 
27 See an example of UK law: United Kingdom – National Procedures for Mutual Legal Assistance on 
Laundering, Search, Seizure and Confiscation of Proceeds of Crime, ETS No. 141, updated 01.11.2016, 
available at: https://rm.coe.int/16806b5f24; see also Extradition Law of the People’s Republic of China, 
Order of the President of the People’s Republic of China No. 42, adopted at the 19th meeting of the 
Standing Committee of the Ninth National People’s Congress on December 28, 2000, by President Jiang 
Zemin. 
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range areas, from the exchange of information to the extradition of convicted 
criminals.28 These Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties (MLATs) generally provide legal 
cooperation across a broad spectrum of issues. Although such instruments, once 
implemented into domestic law, play a vital role in fighting transnational crime and in 
particular, many aspects of economic crime, the resources required to negotiate, enforce 
and administer such complex and comprehensive arrangements are substantial. Even 
the US State and Justice Departments are strictly limited in the number of such treaties 
they can be involved in at any point in time. 29  Smaller and less well-resourced 
jurisdictions have more limitations. 30  The burden placed upon small states in 
developing a workable web of such treaties and then administering them, is 
considerable and in many circumstances seen to be impractical. 
 
Moreover, apart from bilateral or multilateral treaties between sovereign states, there 
are also international instruments and agreements, which may or may not impose 
obligations recognised in international law. These agreements are often referred to as 
Memoranda of Understanding (MoU) and have become increasingly common in recent 
years.31 They are mainly concerned with the exchange of information and intelligence 
and intentions to provide optimum cooperation and assistance. It is not unusual to find 
in specific domestic laws, that certain acts and interventions are lawful if carried out 
                                                
28  See details at for example, Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters within the Commonwealth 
(Enactment and Enforcement) Act, an Act to make legislative provision to give force of law to the scheme 
for Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters within the Commonwealth, 1998 No. 13. 
29 See Alan Ellis and Robert L. Pisani (1985), ‘The United States treaties on mutual assistance in criminal 
matters: a comparative analysis’, The International Lawyer, Vo. 19, No. 1, pp. 189-223; see also Julian 
M. Joshua, Peter D. Camesasca and Youngjin Jung (2008), ‘Extradition and mutual legal assistance 
treaties: cartel enforcement’s global reach’, Antitrust Law Journal, Vol. 75, No. 2, pp. 353-397. 
30 See for example Ethan A. Nadelmann (1985), ‘Negotiations in criminal law assistance treaties’, The 
American Journal of Comparative Law, Vol. 33, No. 3, pp. 467-504. 
31 MoUs in international relations fall under the broad category of treaties and should be registered in the 
United Nations treaty collection, see United Nations Treaty Collection, at: https://treaties.un.org/. See 
also some insight into the determination of the legal status of a document provided by the International 
Court of Justice in the landmark case of Qatar v. Bahrain, 1 July 1994, see Maritime Delimitation and 
Territorial Questions between Qatar and Bahrain, International Court of Justice, at: http://www.icj-
cij.org/docket/index.php?p1=3&p2=1&PHPSESSID=66a15edfa6bb89698b26627e76c1d56b&case=87
&code=qb&p3=4/.  
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according to such an agreement. Accordingly, many financial regulators have 
agreements with one another to foster cooperation in the handling of their own 
supervisory and regulatory obligations and under their own laws.32 It is also not unusual 
to find such agreements within jurisdictions between financial regulators and the police 
or the intelligence community.33 Indeed, these provide a certain degree of consistency, 
continuity and regularity in providing assistance and exercising discretion in both 
domestic and international contexts. However, it is also important to note that such 
agreements can only amount to contracts that regulate the relationships of these two 
agencies – with the absence of special legal provisions in statute or other relevant laws, 
they cannot, as a matter of law, influence directly on the rights of the third party.34 
 
There are many advantages to the development of multilateral and bilateral agreements 
in promoting cooperation in legal and regulatory matters. However, there are also areas 
of concern. For example, the process of negotiation and implementation between 
countries can be time consuming and resource intensive.35 Further, it may be difficult 
for a government to guarantee effective implementation, or find resources and expertise 
to adequately administer the provisions and respond to requests effectively.36 It is also 
                                                
32 See for example, Memorandum of Understanding Concerning Cooperation and the Exchange of 
Information in the Context of Supervising Covered Firms, between United States Commodity Futures 
Trading Commission and United Kingdom Financial Conduct Authority, October 6, 2016, available at: 
https://www.fca.org.uk/publication/mou/fca-cftc-mou-covered-firms.pdf; and many other international 
MoUs, see full list at: http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/about/Pages/mous/default.aspx. 
33 See for example, Memorandum of Understanding between the Financial Conduct Authority and the P
rudential Regulation Authority, at: http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/about/Documents/mous/prastatutor
y/moufcapra.pdf; and MoU between National Audit Office and the Bank of England, at: http://www.ban
kofengland.co.uk/about/Documents/mous/statutory/mouforboeandnao.pdf; see full domestic MoU list a
t: http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/about/Pages/mous/default.aspx. 
34 See more discussions on International Monetary Fund Working Paper, Marco Arnone and George Iden 
(2003), Primary Dealers in Government Securities: Policy Issues and Selected Countries’ Experience, 
Monetary and Exchange Affairs Department. 
35 See for example, ‘Treaty Making Process’, Australian Government Department of Foreign Affairs and 
Trade, available at: http://dfat.gov.au/international-relations/treaties/treaty-making-process/pages/treaty-
making-process.aspx; and also ‘Treaties’, Factsheet P14 Procedure Series, revised August 2010, House 
of Commons Information Office, available at: https://www.parliament.uk/documents/commons-
information-office/p14.pdf. 
36 See more discussions at International Criminal Law, Third Edition, Volume II: Multilateral and 
Bilateral Enforcement Mechanisms, edited by M. Cherif Bassiouni (2008), Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff 
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worth noting that international agreements have the effect of formalising cooperation, 
while future cooperation depends upon whether the relevant agencies are competent in 
securing cooperation and assistance within their own jurisdiction. This is far from the 
case in almost every country. As a result, MLATs and MoUs are indeed no panacea and 
must be placed carefully in context. As discussed, there are more dramatic and 
substantial measures being taken within the European Union, in the creation of a single 
criminal jurisdiction and the facilitation of cooperation on judicial and prosecutorial 
matters. 
 
The development – A periodical review 
As China has opened its economy and become more engaged with the global economy, 
the country and the government have been enforced to be more responsive to the 
concerns of the international community. The criticism that China is inundated with 
economic crime, corruption in particular, along with concerns about China’s human 
rights issues, has spurred the ruling party and the government to take action and become 
a major player in the world stage in the fight against fraud and corruption. This is to be 
seen in the context of China’s wish to be truly competent and competitive in world trade. 
 
In the 1970s 
Meaningful international initiatives against corruption can be traced back to the mid-
1970s, where the United Nations (UN) became the first international organisation 
working on the development on such matters. The UN raised its concern about the 
problem of corruption as far back as 1975, when the matter was discussed at the 
quinquennial UN Congress on the ‘Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of 
Offenders’.37 The fifth congress, held in Geneva in 1975, focused specifically on the 
crimes of business, with particular attention on organised crime, white collar crime and 
                                                
Publishers. 
37 Guido Bertucci (1998), International Conventions: Status Action Panel Presentation on the United 
Nations, 2nd April 1998. 
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corruption. Its working paper ‘The Changes in Forms and Dimensions of Criminality – 
Transnational and National’,38 observed the increasing threat posed to countries by 
economic crime and corruption. The report also noted that, for most countries, the 
economic and social consequences of economic criminality are much greater than that 
of the traditional forms of crime, such as violence and crime against property.39 In the 
congress, the UN provided another working paper ‘The Emerging Roles of the Police 
and Other Law Enforcement Agencies, with Special Reference to Changing 
Expectations and Minimum Standards of Performance’. This was in response to the 
huge problem of corruption occurring in high-level places, and when those who are 
expected to maintain social order are asked to maintain different standards by their 
superiors. 40  Moreover, the UN General Assembly, in Resolution 3453 at the 23rd 
plenary meeting on 9th December 1975, requested the committee on Crime Prevention 
and Control to formulate a draft code of conduct for law enforcement officials, which 
was subsequently submitted to the General Assembly.41  
 
Following this, the UN General Assembly adopted Resolution 3514 on ‘Measures 
against Corrupt Practices of Transnational and Other Corporations, Their 
Intermediaries and Others Involved’. The plenary meeting, held on 15 December 1975, 
condemned all corrupt practices including bribery, by transnational corporations, their 
intermediaries and other persons involved in violation of laws and regulations in host 
                                                
38 Fifth United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, ‘Changes 
in Form and Dimensions of Criminality – Transnational and National’, Working Paper, prepared by the 
Secretariat, A/CONF.56/3, available at: https://www.unodc.org/documents/congress/Previous_Congress
es/5th_Congress_1975/013_ACONF.56.3_Changes_in_Forms_and_Dimensions_of_Criminality.pdf. 
39 Ibid. 
40 Fifth United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, ‘The Eme
rging Role of the Police and Other Law Enforcement Agencies, with Special Reference to Changing Ex
pectations and Minimum Standards of Performance’, Working Paper, Prepared by the Secretariat, A/CO
NF.56/5, available at: https://www.unodc.org/documents/congress/Previous_Congresses/5th_Congress_
1975/015_ACONF.56.5_The_Emerging_Roles_of_the_Police_and_Other_Law_Enforcement_Agencie
s.pdf. 
41 United Nations (1975), Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment of Punishment in 
Relation to Detention and Imprisonment, United Nations General Assembly, Resolution 3455 (XXX), 
NR000166, 1975; the draft code was to be based on the proposal presented to, and the conclusions 
reached by, the Fifth UN Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders. 
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countries.42  It further reaffirmed the right of any state to adopt legislation and to 
investigate and take appropriate legal action complying with its national laws and 
regulations in combating such corrupt practices, and called on all governments to 
cooperate with each other in the fight against corruption and bribery.43 
 
Between 21st June and 2nd July 1976 in New York, the fourth session of the Committee 
on Crime Prevention and Control of the Economic and Social Council produced, based 
on the proposals presented to and conclusions reached by the Fifth Congress, a draft 
code of conduct for submission to the UN General Assembly. In 1977, the General 
Assembly set up a working group of the Third Committee to reach a consensus. In 
finalising the code, great attention was given to the issues of police professionalism and 
accountability, referring to: “Corruption being intolerable in all phases of life, 
particularly in the public service agencies. Governments cannot expect to enforce the 
law among their citizens if they cannot, or will not, enforce the law against their own 
agents and agencies; it is incumbent upon law enforcement officials to rigorously 
oppose and pursue all acts of corruption coming to their attention”. Two years later, in 
1979, the UN General Assembly adopted the Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement 
Officials at the 106th plenary meeting on 17 December, which was sent to governments 
with the recommendation that favourable consideration should be given to its use within 
the framework of national legislation or practice, as a body of principles for observance 
by law enforcement officials.44  
 
The fight against economic crime and corruption also attracted the attention of 
international non-governmental organisations. The first of this kind was the 
                                                
42 United Nations (1975), Measures against Corrupt Practices of Transnational and Other Corporations, 
Their Intermediaries and Others Involved, United Nations General Assembly, Resolution 3514 (XXX), 
NR000227, 1975. 
43 Ibid. 
44 Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials, United Nations General Assembly, adopted by 
General Assembly resolution 34/169 of 17 December 1979.  
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International Chamber of Commerce (ICC). In 1975, the ICC set up a ‘blue-ribbon’ 
committee, chaired by Lord Shawcross, the former Attorney General of England and 
Wales. The committee issued a ground-breaking report two years later, calling for 
complimentary action against corruption by international organisations, national 
governments, and the business community. It also called for the UN to adopt a special 
convention in prohibiting extortion and bribery. 45  Further, it promulgated the 
revolutionary ICC Rules of Conduct on Extortion and Bribery in International Business 
Transactions. The rules specifically state “what companies must do to combat 
corruption” and have since then served as a model for numerous corporate compliance 
polices. The ICC rules also reflected the fundamental premise that “governments alone 
cannot overcome corruption: the business community must get its own house in 
order”.46  
 
Such efforts made by the ICC were particularly welcomed by the Commonwealth 
Secretariat, who soon launched its own initiative against economic crime in 1980 after 
a meeting of Law Ministers from over fifty-three commonwealth countries in 
Barbados. 47  This subsequently led to the establishment of the Commonwealth 
Commercial Crime Unit under Barry Rider. This was the first international agency 
responsible for not only providing assistance and promoting international cooperation, 
but also developing intelligence and conducting transnational investigations. 
 
Nonetheless, the first independent country, as opposed to the international organisation, 
that initiated international cooperation and the fight against corruption at an 
                                                
45 ‘Business backs UN’s Anti-Corruption Day’, International Chamber of Commerce, online news on 09
/12/2003, available at: https://iccwbo.org/media-wall/news-speeches/business-backs-uns-anti-corruptio
n-day/. 
46 Fritz Heimann (2003), Vice Chair of the International Chamber of Commerce Commission on Fighting 
Corruption, Presented by the ICC at the High-Level Political Conference for the Signature of the United 
Nations Convention against Corruption, Merida, Mexico, 11 December 2003. 
47 See details at 1980 Meeting of Commonwealth Law Ministers, Barbados, 28 April – 2 May 1980: 
Memoranda, Published by The Commonwealth Secretariat, London: Commonwealth Secretariat 
Publications. 
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international level was the United States.48 After the Watergate Scandal49 , the US 
congress proposed a Bill in 1975, specifically to prohibit the corrupt use of mail and 
other instrumentalities of interstate commerce by US corporations, whether directly or 
indirectly, to offer bribes to foreign officials, foreign political parties or candidates from 
foreign political office.50 The Bill was enacted two years later in 1977, and was named 
the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act. Even though it does not extend to areas relating to 
‘grease’ or facilitating payments, it did signal that the United States was prepared to 
stand-alone and lead the world in making it a crime to bribe foreign officials in their 
own jurisdictions.51 
 
In the 1980s 
The fight against corruption continued in the 1980s. International activity was relatively 
slow and cooperation almost failed in recriminations between industrialised and 
developing countries, where they blamed each other for the spread of corruption and 
rejection to acknowledge a shared responsibility to combat the problem. Consequently, 
a mechanism of an international anti-corruption conference was forwarded in 1981, by 
the Inspector General of the District of Columbia, the Chief Investigator of the New 
York City Department of Investigation, the Executive Director of the Chicago Office 
of Municipal Investigation and the Commissioner and other officials of the Hong Kong 
Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC). Their goal was to liaise and 
facilitate the flow of information between agencies and others concerned with the 
prevention and investigation of corruption.52 
                                                
48 See Jean-Francois Arvis and Ronald Berenbeim (2002), Implementing Anti-Corruption Programs in 
the Private Sector, Lessons from East Asia, Washington D.C.: World Bank. 
49 See the full story of Watergate Scandal at ‘Watergate: The Scandal that Brought Down Richard Nixon’, 
available at http://watergate.info/. 
50 See Legislation history of Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, 95th Congress, 1st session, Report 
No. 95-640, September 28, 1977. 
51  See Houston Putnam Lowry and Peter W. Schroth (1999), Survey of 1998 Developments in 
International Law in Connecticut, 73 Connecticut Bar Journal 399 (1999). 
52 Joyce Blalock (1981), International Anti-Corruption Conference: Present at the Beginning, included 
in The Journal of Public Inquiry, Fall/Winter 2001. 
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In total, four such conferences took place over the course of the 1980s. The first, entitled 
‘International Conference on Corruption and Economic Crime against Government’, 
was held between 5th and 14th October 1983 in Washington DC., and was attended by 
delegates from 21 relevant agencies from across 13 countries.53 Two years later, the 
second conference, with the same title from 7th to 11th October 1985 in New York, was 
attended by more than 200 delegates, involving 60 from 32 countries.54 Following the 
success of the first two conferences and increasing awareness of the importance of 
mutual legal assistance against corruption, the title of the third conference was amended 
to the ‘International Anti-Corruption Conference’, and was hosted by the Hong Kong 
Government from 2nd to 6th November in 1987, where there were more than 250 
delegates participating, of which 105 were from overseas representing 72 relevant 
agencies from 32 countries.55 The fourth conference was hosted towards the end of the 
1980s in November 1989 in Sydney by the Australian government.56 
 
At the same time, the United Nations, whilst assisting in the implementation of the 
previously mentioned ‘Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials’, also devoted 
substantial time and effort to proposing practical steps so that states could devise and 
implement strategic plans and reforms. In December 1989, the UN Crime Prevention 
and Criminal Justice branch, in cooperation with the UN Department of Technical 
Cooperation for Development, organised an inter-regional seminar on corruption in The 
Hague, held by the Netherlands government.57 The seminar was participated by high 
                                                
53 Preface, The Third International Anti-Corruption Conference Report, Printed by the Government 
Printer, Hong Kong, 1988, pp. 1-6. 
54 See Feng Ye (1996), Anti-Corruption for Social Stability and Development: the Collected Works of the 
Seventh International Anti-Corruption Conference, Beijing: Red Flag Publishing House, p. 1625. 
55 Preface, The Third International Anti-Corruption Conference Report, Printed by the Government 
Printer, Hong Kong, 1988, pp. 1-6. 
56  The Fourth International Anti-Corruption Conference: Attorney General’s Department, by 
International Anti-Corruption Conference, Canberra: Australian Government Publication Service, 1990. 
57  Department of Technical Cooperation for Development and Centre for Social Development and 
Humanitarian Affairs, Corruption in Government: Report of an Inter-Regional Seminar, The Hague, 
Netherlands, 11-15 December 1989, New York, 1990, TCD/SEM.90/2-INT-89-R56.
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level governmental officials from 18 developing countries from all regions of the world, 
as well as by observers from 8 developed countries, non-governmental organisations, 
academic institutions, independent anti-corruption bodies and Ombudsman’s offices. 
The seminar held in-depth discussions on the forms of corruption, its causes, 
consequences, connections with organised crime, and also assessed existing measures 
in dealing with corruption, as well as appropriate actions to be taken at regional, 
national and international levels. 58  The role of international cooperation in the 
prevention, detection, investigation, prosecution and sanctioning of corrupt practices 
and enforcement in the public management system was highlighted, and the need for 
sustained information and expertise, in order to facilitate mutual assistance through 
technical cooperation in developing countries, was also underlined. The possibility of 
an international convention dealing particularly with transnational corruption and a 
code of ethics at an international level for public services was also proposed.59 
 
The 1980s witnessed the growth of a new emerging force in combating corruption: the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). The OECD 
placed international cooperation to combat corruption on its agenda at a very early stage, 
in which it involved two basic objectives: fighting corruption in international business 
and helping to level the competitive playing field for companies.60 In addition, the 
‘Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises’ were published by the OECD in 1989, which 
called upon enterprises to refrain from bribing public officials over the course of 
operations. It states: “Enterprises should not, directly or indirectly, offer, promise, give, 
or demand a bribe or other undue advantage to obtain or retain business or other 
improper advantage. Enterprises should also resist the solicitation of bribes and 
extortion”.61 The Guidelines, since its first launch, have been amended and updated 
                                                
58 Ibid. 
59 Ibid. 
60 Bribery and Corruption, Topics, the OECD website: http://www.oecd.org/corruption/. 
61 See VII. Combating Bribery, Bribe Solicitation and Extortion, Guidelines for Multinational Enterpris
es, the OECD, 2011 version, p. 47, available at: http://www.oecd.org/daf/inv/mne/48004323.pdf. 
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regularly with the latest version published in 2011. They are recommendations, 
addressed by governments, to multinational enterprises operating in or from adhering 
countries and they provide non-binding principles and standards for responsible 
business conduct in a variety of areas, involving employment and industrial relations, 
human rights, the environment, information disclosure, competition, taxation, and 
science and technology. The aim was to ensure that operations of these enterprises were 
in line with government policies, strengthening the basis of mutual confidence between 
enterprises and the societies in which they operate, improving foreign investment 
climate, and enhancing the contribution to sustainable development.62 The Guidelines 
are the only multilaterally agreed and comprehensive code of responsible business 
conduct that governments have committed to promoting.63 
 
In the 1990s 
The 1990s witnessed a further development of international cooperation against 
corruption. In the early 1980s, corruption was a subject that governments invariably 
avoided in international disclosure and the word ‘corruption’ was rarely expressed in 
official circles. Corruption, at that time, was considered purely a domestic issue. It was 
from the 1990s, particularly after the end of the Cold War and the evolving economic, 
political and information globalisation, that the global community became increasingly 
concerned about the menacing consequences caused by corruption. Systematic efforts 
have been made by both domestic institutions and international organisations, initially 
at a technical level, followed by a political level, to place the fight against corruption 
on a global agenda. 
 
1) UN  
By the end of 1991, the UN General Assembly adopted a ‘Statement of Principles and 
                                                
62 The OECD, Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, 2011 version, Foreword, pp. 3-4, available at: 
http://www.oecd.org/daf/inv/mne/48004323.pdf. 
63 Ibid. 
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Programme of Action’, annexed to Resolution 46/152, at its 77th plenary meeting on the 
18th December 1991.64 During the meeting, the UN Crime Prevention and Criminal 
Justice Programme proposed to assist the international community in meeting the 
pressing needs in the field of crime prevention and to provide countries with timely and 
practical assistance in dealing with both national and international crime.  
 
In the following year, a new functional inter-regional agency, the UN Commission on 
Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice, was formally established. Immediately 
following this, the Commission organised the ‘Ninth UN Congress on the Prevention 
of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders’, held between 29th April and 8th May 1995 in 
Cairo, in which an anti-corruption strategy was one of the main topics under discussion. 
Under the Commission’s Guidance, the ‘International Code of Conduct for Public 
Officials’ was adopted by the UN General Assembly at its 82nd plenary meeting by its 
resolution 51/59 on the 12th December 1996, which was then recommended by the 
General Assembly to the member states as a tool to guide their efforts against 
corruption.65 Subsequently, in its 51/191 resolution of the 16th December 1996, the 
General Assembly adopted the ‘UN Declaration against Corruption and Bribery in 
International Commercial Transactions’, urging member states to take concrete action 
to combat all forms of corruption, bribery and related illicit practice in international 
commercial transactions.66 
 
Moreover, Resolution 1997/25, the ‘International Cooperation against Corruption and 
Bribery in International Commercial Transactions’, was adopted by the UN Economic 
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65 United Nations (1996), Action against Corruption, Annex: International Code of Conduct for Public 
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and Social Council at the sixth session, 28th April – 9th May 1997,67 and then, by the 
General Assembly in Resolution 52/87, at its 70th Plenary meeting on 12th December 
1997.68 It contained 7 articles and specifically urges member states that have not yet 
done so, to implement relevant international declarations and to ratify, where 
appropriate, international instruments against corruption. 
 
Resolution 53/176 on the ‘Action against Corruption and Bribery in International 
Commercial Transactions’ was adopted by the General Assembly at its 91st plenary 
meeting on the 15th December 1998. Consisting of 6 articles, it requested the UN 
Conference on Trade and Development and other competent bodies of the UN system, 
within their respective mandates and agreed work programmes, to assist member states. 
Upon request, they would implement national programmes to strengthen accountability 
and transparency and by implementing the relevant conventions, declarations and 
instruments, to combat corruption and bribery in international commercial 
transactions.69 
 
In 1999, the UN General Assembly adopted Resolution 54/128, ‘Action against 
Corruption’ at its 83rd plenary meeting on the 17th December. This resolution declared: 
• the strengthening of national laws and regulations to criminalise corruption in 
all forms; 
• the amendment of anti-money laundering provisions to ensure they cover bribes 
and the proceeds of corruption, and provisions concerning the prevention and 
detection of corruption and related money laundering offences; 
                                                
67 United Nations (1997), International Cooperation against Corruption and Bribery in International 
Commercial Transactions, UN Economic and Social Council, Resolution 1997/25, 1997, available at: 
http://www.un.org/documents/ecosoc/res/1997/eres1997-25.htm. 
68 United Nations (1997), International Cooperation against Corruption and Bribery in International Co
mmercial Transactions, UN General Assembly, Resolution 52/87, 1997, available at: http://www.un.org
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69 United Nations (1998), Action against Corruption and Bribery in International Commercial Transacti
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• the improvement of transparency, vigilance, and monitoring of financial 
transactions and the limitation of bank and professional secrecy in cases 
involving criminal investigation; 
• the promotion of coordination between relevant agencies and international 
administrative and judicial cooperation in matters involving corruption; 
• the enactment of legislation and establishment of programmes promoting the 
participation of civil society in efforts to fight corruption; 
• the provision of extradition and mutual assistance in cases involving corruption 
and money laundering, in line with relevant international instruments and 
domestic legislations.70 
 
Resolution 54/205 on the ‘Prevention of Corrupt Practices and Illegal Transfer of Funds’ 
was also adopted in 1999, by the General Assembly at its 87th plenary meeting on the 
22nd December. It called for further national and international strategies to deal with 
corrupt practices and bribery in international transactions, and devise ways and means 
for international cooperation to prevent and address illegal transfers, as well as 
repatriating illegally transacted funds to their countries of origin.71  Following the 
institutional reform within the UN, anti-corruption matters are now handled entirely by 
the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC).  
 
The UN issued a series of resolutions throughout the 1990s to deal specifically with 
corruption and money laundering. However, how these resolutions were actually 
enforced by the member states is questionable, given the complicated national and 
international conditions at that time.72 
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2) OECD  
Over the course of the 1990s, the OECD introduced a series of recommendations and 
conventions to fight corruption and bribery. ‘Recommendation of the Council of the 
OECD on Bribery in International Business Transactions’ was adopted by the Council 
at its 829th session on the 27th May 1994, consisting of 9 articles. It presented general 
principles on handling bribery of foreign public officials; domestic action; international 
cooperation; relations with non-members and international organisations and follow-up 
procedures. This was the first milestone in the OECD’s effort to combat international 
bribery.73 
 
The provisions of the follow-up procedures of the Recommendation instructed the 
Committee on International Investment and Multinational Enterprises to set up a 
Working Group on Bribery in International Business Transactions, in order to monitor 
implementation and follow-up this Recommendation.74  The duties of the Working 
Group were fivefold: (i) to carry out regular reviews of steps taken by member countries 
to implement this Recommendation and to make proposals, as appropriate, to assist 
member countries in their implementation; (ii) to examine specific issues relating to 
bribery in international business transactions; (iii) to provide a forum for consultation; 
(iv) to explore the possibility of associating non-members with this work; and (v) in 
close cooperation with the Committee on Fiscal Affairs, to examine the fiscal treatment 
of bribery, including the issue of tax deductibility of bribes.75 
 
Two years later, the Council of the OECD adopted the ‘Recommendation of the Council 
of the OECD on the Tax Deductibility of Bribes to Foreign Public Officials’ at its 873rd 
                                                
73 OECD (1994), Recommendation of the Council on Bribery in International Business Transactions, C 
(94)75/Final, 1994, available at: http://www.oecd.org/investment/anti-bribery/anti-briberyconvention/19
52622.pdf. 
74 Ibid, Article VIII, Follow-up Procedures. 
75 Ibid. 
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session on 11th April 1996. Complementary to the 1994 Recommendation, the latter 
called upon those member countries who permitted bribes paid to foreign public 
officials to be treated as tax-deductible business expenses, to re-examine this treatment 
with the aim of abolishing it. It stated that bribes paid to foreign officials should be 
treated as illegal.76 
 
This was followed by the 1997 ‘Revised Recommendation of the Council of the OECD 
on Combating Bribery in International Business Transactions’, which was adopted on 
the 23rd May 1997. In addition to the 1994 version, the Revised Recommendation pulled 
together analytical work on anti-corruption measures and commitments undertaken 
over previous years in the fight against corruption and bribery in international business 
transactions, and invited member countries to take effective measures to deter, prevent 
and combat international bribery in a number of areas. The key provisions included the 
criminalization of bribing foreign public officials; the addressing of the tax deductibility 
of bribes paid and the needed improvement of transparency and efficiency within 
relevant agencies.77 
 
Also in 1997, one of the most important legal documents of the OECD, the OECD 
‘Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International 
Business Transactions’,78 was adopted by the Negotiating Conference of the OECD on 
the 21st November 1997. The Convention had, for the first time, established legally 
binding standards to criminalising bribery of foreign public officials and provided a 
host of related measures that made this effective. It is the first and only international 
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anti-corruption instrument focused on the ‘supply side’ of bribery transaction.79 
 
Article 3 of the Convention dealt at length with the issues of sanctions, which required 
that the offence of bribery by a foreign public official be punished with “effective, 
proportionate and dissuasive” penalties. These penalties included imprisonment and 
were to be of a similar severity to those applicable to the bribery of officials in their 
own countries. In cases where a member country does not provide for criminal liability, 
lawyers should be subject to effective, proportionate and dissuasive civil or 
administrative penalties, including monetary penalties. The proceeds of the bribery of 
foreign public officials, or alternatively, a comparable amount of monetary value, were 
to be subject to seizure or confiscation.80 
 
The OECD, comprising developed nations with advanced economic systems and 
democratic institutions, provided a more realistic platform for effective implementation 
of moral principles with enforcement instruments for combating corruption. As of now, 
41 countries have ratified and signed the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention.81 The OECD 
also monitors the progress of the signatories in legislating bribery as a criminal offence, 
and monitors the effectiveness and implementation of relevant laws in its member states. 
 
Over the years the OECD Convention has proven to be surprisingly successful, 
primarily due to its rigorous peer review system. Under this system, members of the 
OECD Convention must, at regular times, submit to an extensive and invasive peer 
review and members cannot veto or prevent disclosure of the resulting reports. 
According to the latest report in 2014, 427 foreign bribery cases have been filed since 
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the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention entered into force in 1999. The report also found 
that two thirds of the cases between February 1999 and June 2014 occurred in only four 
sectors: extractive (19%); construction (15%); transportation and storage (15%); and 
information and communication (10%).82 The OECD system also contributed to steady 
progress in strengthening enforcement, which has been tracked and illustrated in annual 
progress reports on the state of OECD enforcement, produced by Transparency 
International. 
 
3) Transparency International  
Transparency International (TI) was established in 1993, and is regarded as the first 
specialist international non-governmental organisation in combating corruption. Its 
mission was clearly stated as: “to stop corruption and promote transparency, 
accountability, and integrity at all levels and across all sectors of society. Our Core 
Values are transparency, accountability, integrity, solidarity, courage, justice, and 
democracy.”83 TI attracted massive global attention through its Corruption Perception 
Index (CPI), a comprehensive survey and composite index on corruption, listing the 
scores (from 10 – extremely clean, to 0 – highly corrupt), and ranks most countries or 
regions worldwide in respect of the degree to which corruption is perceived among their 
public officials and politicians.  
 
The CPI commenced in 1995 and was widely used and cited by economists, academics, 
business people, journalists, and politicians, both in research and public debate 
worldwide. Over the past 20 years, TI has published its CPI ranking of countries (176 
countries in 2016) using an ‘expert’ approach – a combination of polls drawing on 
corruption related data collected by a variety of reputable institutions, to prevent the 
difficulty of measuring actual corruption and the expense of running broad national 
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surveys.84 
 
One of the greatest strengths of the CPI is that it brings the issues of corruption and its 
causes to the attention of the press and to investors, who see the ratings as a first 
indication of the level of corruption in a country. As Charles Garofalo et al. suggested, 
the self-sustaining nature of corruption requires a strong supervision from external 
sources such as CPI’s rankings and subsequent world media exposure.85 Indeed, as is 
generally understood, when top managers are part of a corrupt system, radical change 
requires the involvement of outsiders. 
 
TI also set up the TI Quarterly Newsletter in 1995, Bribe Payers Index in 1999, and its 
official website in 7 languages, all of which have received broad global recognition. 
Moreover, TI has been playing an active role in the drafting of international legal 
instruments, and engaging in consultation, participation and organisation for 
international projects and conferences relating to corruption.86 
 
4) Council of Europe  
The Council of Europe (CoE) also formally placed it stance against corruption on its 
agenda in 1994, and made the control and elimination of the issues of corruption one 
of its key priorities. Having upheld the fundamental values that the pre-eminent 
European institutions should not be destroyed, the CoE launched its initiative against 
corruption at the Malta Conference of the European Ministers of Justice, between 14th 
and 15th of June 1994.87 The Multidisciplinary Group on Corruption within the CoE, 
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the first specialist agency in response to threats posed by corruption, was established in 
September 1994 under the resolution adopted by the Malta Conference.88 Following its 
foundation, the Group started work under the supervision of the European Committee 
on Crime Problems and the European Committee on Legal Co-operation, with the task 
of preparing international programmes of action and examining the feasibility of 
drafting anti-corruption legal instruments, as well as elaborating a follow-up 
mechanism to implement action.89 
 
Results have been fruitful. Between 1994 and 2001, the Multidisciplinary Group on 
Corruption has (i) organised six European Conferences of Services Specialised in the 
Fight against Corruption; (ii) drafted several legal instruments, including, the 
‘Programme of Action against Corruption’ (1996)90, the ‘Twenty Guiding Principles 
for the Fight against Corruption’ (1997)91 , the ‘CoE Criminal Law Convention on 
Corruption’ (1998)92, the ‘CoE Civil Law Convention on Corruption’ (1999)93 and the 
‘Recommendation on Codes of Conduct for Public Officials’ (2000) 94  and (iii) 
monitored the observance of the Twenty Guiding Principles for the Fight against 
Corruption and the implementation of the international legal instruments. 95  The 
Multidisciplinary Group on Corruption was replaced by the Group of States against 
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Corruption (GRECO), on 1st May 1999 by Resolution 99(5).96 
 
The GRECO, a specialist anti-corruption agency and a flexible and efficient follow up 
mechanism of the CoE, is set up to improve the capacity of its members in the fight 
against corruption by monitoring their compliance with CoE anti-corruption standards, 
through a dynamic process of mutual evaluation and peer pressure. It helps to identify 
shortages in national anti-corruption strategy, prompting the necessary legislative, 
institutional and practical reforms. In addition, GRECO provides a platform for 
countries to share their best practice in the prevention and detection of corruption.97 
 
5) World Bank  
A speech at the World Bank in 1996 formally triggered its fight against public 
corruption, in which James D. Wolfensohn, then President of the World Bank, publicly 
committed the Bank to fighting corruption, the ‘cancer’ of developing countries, with 
measures ranging from public sector reform to debt cancellation, at the World Bank – 
IMF Annual Meeting on 1st October 1996.98 During the meeting, a working group was 
set up under the Development Economics Vice Presidency of the World Bank to 
develop an integrated anti-corruption strategy. The final report, ‘Helping Countries 
Combat Corruption: The Role of the World Bank’, along with the guidelines of 
accompanying staff, was supported by the World Bank’s Board of Executive Directors 
on 2nd September 1997.99 
 
Furthermore, the World Bank institutions included a specialist team named the 
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Governance and Anti-Corruption Team. It was made up of more than 20 experts and 
led by Daniel Kaufmann, who was regarded as a leading expert, researcher and advisor 
on governance and development, pioneering with his colleagues new empirical and 
survey methodologies.100 
 
6) The Asian Development Bank  
The Asian Development Bank (ADB), similar to other international organisations, 
established its own Anti-Corruption Unit in 1998, under the direct leadership of the 
Office of the Auditor General, to deal with all matters related to allegations of fraud and 
corruption. Prior to its foundation, the Office of the Auditor General was designated as 
the initial point of contact for allegations of fraud and corruption among ADB’s staff 
and projects. After the ADB’s first special anti-corruption document, the Anti-
Corruption Policy was approved in July 1998, and the Anti-Corruption Unit was 
established within the Office of the Auditor General.101 
 
There has been constant evolution of the anti-corruption organisation within the ADB 
ever since its initial foundation in the 1990s. In December 2004, the Anti-Corruption 
Unit was upgraded to an Integrity Division with expanded power to deal with the 
growth in volume and complexity in investigations of fraud and corruption.102 On 1st 
October 2009, the newly established Office of Anti-corruption and Integrity (OAI) 
presided over all work related to fraud and corruption, which aligned with ADB’s 
broader commitment to combat corruption and improve governance as a core strategic 
objective of ADB Strategy 2020, and the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness of 
2005.103 
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The New Millennium 
As the world entered the 21st century, many governments began to accept the notion 
that fighting corruption in the global context was essential to their own interests. The 
rising economic giant in the Far East, the Country of China, following its successful 
entrance into the World Trade Organisation (WTO), had become an increasingly active 
member on the world stage in the fight against economic crime and corruption. The 
international community has eventually, achieved much after a long and slow struggle. 
 
1) International level conferences (ongoing) 
Having observed a series of specifically designed international units and organisations 
established throughout the 1990s, since the 21st century, global conferences and forums 
have become another important mechanism with regards to international cooperation 
in the fight against transnational criminal activities. These, as observed, are deemed 
essential to exchange information and experiences between the increasing number of 
relevant institutions involved.104 
 
The International Anti-Corruption Conference 
A range of regional and international anti-corruption conferences, hosted by 
governments, international organisations and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) 
have taken place since 2000. Legal experts, scholars, officials and even heads of 
governments and international organisations have taken the opportunity offered at the 
plethora of specialist international anti-corruption forums, to exchange ideas and call 
for cooperation in fighting economic crime. 
 
The International Anti-Corruption Conference (IACC) was convened in 1983, and takes 
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place every two years in a different region of the world. The IACC aims at advancing 
the anti-corruption agenda by raising awareness and stimulating debate. In various ways 
it fosters networking, cross-fertilisation and the world-wide exchange of idea and 
experience. The conference also promotes international cooperation among 
government, civil society, the private sector, and citizens in providing the opportunity 
to face dialogue and direct liaison between agency representatives and participating 
organisations.105 
 
The IACC has successfully held 17 conferences, with current preparations for the 18th, 
which will be held in Copenhagen, Denmark, in October 2018. China, in the meantime, 
has also taken an active role in this, with Beijing, supported by the Supreme People’s 
Procuratorate, organising the 7th IACC entitled ‘Fighting Corruption for Social Stability 
and Development’, between the 6th and 11th October 1995.106 The then President, Jiang 
Zemin, was present at the opening ceremony, where he stated, with the opening of 
China’s economy over a decade ago, to maintain a stable social order and to develop 
the economy, the struggle with corruption had to be tackled with firmness.107 Further to 
this, Mr. Wang Hanbin, then Vice President of the Standing Committee of the National 
People’s Congress, added, during the closing remarks, that China had invested great 
energy into strengthening its socialist democracy and legal system, and had undertaken 
serious measures to combat corruption, whilst developing its economy; China, in this 
matter, was willing to cooperate with any country and any region, in particular those 
advanced countries with extensive experience.108 
 
The influence of the IACC is unlimited, not only in its host country but also on the rest 
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of the world. For example, China during the 7th IACC hosted in Beijing, passed the 
‘Regulation on the Income Declaration by the Leading Cadres above the Provincial 
Level within the Party and the Government Institutions’, which is unique in regulating 
governmental officials’ income in China. The IACC has also issued a series of 
Declarations in the past, for example, the relatively recent ‘Putrajaya Declaration: Zero 
Tolerance for Impunity’, which hailed the world’s attention by stating “impunity feeds 
grand corruption, the abuse of high-level power that benefits the few at the expense of 
the many, causing serious and widespread harm to individuals and society”.109 Indeed, 
the IACC has proven itself to be the premier global forum for communication and cross-
fertilization that is indispensable to effective global and national advocacy and action. 
 
The Asian Development Bank (ADB) and OECD Regional Anti-Corruption Conference 
for Asia and the Pacific 
The ADB and the OECD have co-hosted eight regional anti-corruption conferences for 
Asia and the Pacific. The 1999 conference, the first in this series, was held in Manila, 
the Philippines, from 29th September – 1st October, entitled ‘Combating Corruption in 
Asia and Pacific Economies’110. The workshop was sponsored by the ADB and OECD, 
with an objective of raising awareness of the seriousness of the issue of corruption and 
to identify effective anti-corruption strategies. There were more than 200 participants 
from over 36 countries who shared their views and experiences throughout the event 
and assessed the effectiveness of translating international anti-corruption instruments 
and programmes into national policies. The conference provided assistance for anti-
corruption initiatives at sub-regional, national, and international levels and identified 
workable future actions in both the public and private sector, including strategies to 
promote (i) stronger law enforcement; (ii) greater integrity and transparency in 
institutional government structures and (iii) the role of business ethics programmes and 
                                                
109 International Anti-Corruption Conference (2015), Putrajaya Declaration: Zero Tolerance for Impunity, 
16th IACC, Malaysia, available at: http://16iacc.org/blog/2015/09/04/putrajaya-declaration/. 
110 See more detail at OECD website, ADB/OECD Anti-Corruption Initiative for Asia-Pacific, available 
at: https://www.oecd.org/site/adboecdanti-corruptioninitiative/. 
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codes of conduct in the private sector.111  
 
The success of the 1st regional conference, or rather workshop, was soon to be followed 
by the 2nd regional conference held in Seoul, South Korea, the following year, during 
which the serial Regional Anti-Corruption Conference was formally established.112 
China, again, was present. With the assistance of the Chinese government, the 5th 
Regional Anti-Corruption Conference was hosted in Beijing, China, on the 28th – 30th 
September 2005. The conference brought together governments, international 
organisations, donor agencies, the NGOs, trade unions, the private sector and the media 
from the initial 25 members as well as ADB members and state parties of the OECD 
Anti-Bribery Convention. The event raised particular awareness of strengthening 
regional cooperation, fostering the exchange of knowledge and experience and building 
synergies and networks.113 
 
To date, 31 countries and economies from Asia and the Pacific have endorsed the 
ADB/OECD anti-corruption plan and agreed on means to achieve its standards. The 
latest serial conference, held in Cambodia in 2014, shifted its focus to ‘restoring trust’ 
in government, the private sector and civil society by intensifying efforts to combat 
corruption and prevent illicit financial flows.114 This is in response to the doubts arisen 
among citizens about the control that governments have over events, and their role as 
competent stewards of the public interest, in light of the global economic crisis.  
 
These series of conferences, held within a narrower and more specific but highly 
                                                
111 ADB/OECD Anti-Corruption Initiatives, 1st Regional Anti-Corruption Conference for Asia and the 
Pacific, Conference conclusions and recommendations, 1999. 
112 See details at ADB/OECD Anti-Corruption Initiatives, 2nd Regional Anti-Corruption Conference for 
Asia and the Pacific, Conference conclusions and recommendations, 2000. 
113 ADB/OECD Anti-Corruption Initiatives, 5th Regional Anti-Corruption Conference for Asia and the 
Pacific, Conference Conclusions and Recommendations for Future Actions, 2005. 
114 ADB-OECD Conference on fighting corruption and building trust in Asia and the Pacific, 8th Regional 
Anti-Corruption Conference for Asia and the Pacific, 3-4 September 2014. 
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correlated region, and with the most up to date issues debated, provide an excellent 
opportunity for in-depth exchange of experiences, regional cooperation and progress 
evaluation across all the relevant sectors in the fight against corruption. 
Correspondingly, there are many similar regional conferences that have taken place in 
other parts of the world.115 
 
Conferences under the UN Convention against Corruption 
In response to a request from the General Assembly, Resolution 55/61 on the 4th 
December 2000, concerning a legal instrument against corruption, the UN commenced 
work on a UN independent convention regarding fighting corruption, separate from the 
UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime. 116  The Meeting of the 
‘Intergovernmental Open-ended Expert Group to Prepare Draft Terms of Reference for 
the Negotiation of a Future Legal Instrument against Corruption’ was held in Vienna, 
between the 30th July and 3rd August 2001, with participation of representatives from 
97 member states and UN organisations, institutes of the UN Crime Prevention and 
Criminal Justice Programme network, intergovernmental organisations and NGOs.117  
 
This was followed by an ‘Informal Preparatory Meeting of the Ad Hoc Committee on 
the Negotiation of a Convention against Corruption’ in Buenos Aires between the 4th 
and 7th December 2001, which established the basis for the UN Convention against 
Corruption.118 The ad hoc committee held in total seven sessions, in which: the first two 
                                                
115 For example, Anti-Corruption Network for Eastern Europe and Central Asia, OECD; OECD/African 
Development Bank Initiative (AfDB) to Support Business Integrity and Anti-Bribery Efforts in Africa, 
joint initiative by OECD and AfDB; European Conferences of Services Specialised in the Fight against 
Corruption, hosted by the Council of Europe; Southeast Europe Regional Programme on Strengthening 
the Capacity of Anti-Corruption Authorities and Civil Society to Combat Corruption and Contribute to 
the UNCAC Review Process, Regional Anti-Corruption Initiative, Funded by the Austrian Development 
Agency. 
116 See United Nations (2000), General Assembly Resolution 55/61, 81st plenary meeting on 4 December 
2000, available at: http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/un/unpan010993.pdf. 
117 United Nations (2001), Report of the Meeting of the Intergovernmental Open-ended Expert Group to 
Prepare Draft Terms of Reference for the Negotiation of a Future Legal Instrument against Corruption, 
UNODC, full details available at: https://www.unodc.org/pdf/crime/expertmtg_corruption/2E.pdf. 
118 United Nations (2001), Informal Preparatory Meeting of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Negotiation 
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sessions concluded the first reading of the draft convention; the third and fourth sessions 
completed the second; the fifth session reached a preliminary agreement on a significant 
number of the provisions and the final two sessions finalised the convention.119 The 
Convention was finally signed by member states at the High-level Political Conference 
for the Purpose of Signing the United Nations Convention against Corruption, in 
Merida, Mexico, 2003.120 
 
2) Adoption of the United Nations Convention against Corruption 
On the 31st October 2003, the first major international anti-corruption treaty of the new 
millennium, the United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC), was 
adopted by the UN General Assembly in Resolution 58/4.121 It is a milestone for global 
efforts to fight corruption. The 9th December, marking the date of signature of the 
convention, is the annual UN International Anti-Corruption Day, and more importantly, 
on the same day, the UN provides a shared platform for signed countries to raise 
awareness and evaluate progress on the Convention and global efforts to combat 
corruption. During the High-level Political Conference, for the Purpose of Signing the 
UN Convention against Corruption in 2003, 95 nations signed, and, as of today, the 
number has risen to 140.122 Given the importance of the UNCAC, it is imperative to 
present an overview of this treaty, in which five fundamental areas have been covered 
in the convention, which in itself consists of eight chapters and 71 articles.  
 
                                                
of a Convention against Corruption, UNODC, full details available at: https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en
/treaties/CAC/background/adhoc-preparatory.html. 
119 United Nations (2003), Report of the Ad Hoc Committee for the Negotiation of a Convention agains
t Corruption on the work of its first to seventh sessions, UNODC, available at: https://www.unodc.org/p
df/crime/convention_corruption/session_7/422e.pdf. 
120 United Nations (2003), High-level Political Conference for the Purpose of Signing the United Nation
s Convention against Corruption, UNODC, full details available at: https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/tre
aties/CAC/background/adhoc-committee-merida.html. 
121 United Nations (2003), UN General Assembly Resolution 58/4, United Nations Convention against 
Corruption, available at: http://www.un-documents.net/a58r4.htm. 
122 According to United Nations Convention against Corruption Signature and Ratification Status as of 
12 December 2016, full list available online at: https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/treaties/CAC/signatori
es.html. 
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The first area is prevention. The importance of prevention in the fight against corruption 
is widely accepted, and past experience indicates that a comprehensive ‘three-pronged’ 
strategy (i.e. investigation, prevention and education) could contribute to a successful 
anti-corruption policy.123 To improve the ability of states’ preventive measures, the 
UNCAC dedicates an entire chapter (Chapter II) to provide a comprehensive model for 
preventive policies in both the public and private sectors, such as the establishment of 
anti-corruption bodies, enhancing transparency in the financing of election campaigns 
and political parties, suggested preventive measures in the judiciary and in the public 
procurement as well as measures to prevent money laundering.124 
 
The second area is criminalisation. Tackling corruption as a crime is of great importance. 
In order to aid member states to establish criminal offences, Chapter III of the UNCAC 
defines a wide range of acts of corruption, such as bribery of national public officials, 
bribery of foreign public officials and officials of public international organisations; 
embezzlement, misappropriation or other diversion of property by a public official; 
illicit enrichment; laundering of the proceeds of crime; concealment and obstruction of 
justice.125 This chapter continues with in depth considered preventive measures and 
procedures to deal with these actions. 126  It also addresses specialist authorities, 
suggestions for cooperation with law enforcement, cooperation between national 
authorities and the private sector.127 
 
Chapter IV focused on the third area, international cooperation, in which it emphasises 
                                                
123 See for example, experience from Hong Kong IACA, Tony Scott, Alastair Carstairs and Doug Roots 
(1988), ‘Corruption prevention: the Hong Kong approach’, Asian Journal of Public Administration, Vol. 
10, Iss. 1, pp. 110-119; see also Sofie Arjon Schutte (2012), ‘Against the odds: anti-corruption reform in 
Indonesia’, Public Administration and Development, Vol. 32, Iss. 1, pp. 38-48; see also Nyaga Isaiah, K. 
Ng’etich, E. K. Bor and M. M. Theuri (2014), ‘Suggested modifications in the implementation of the 
three-pronged anti-corruption strategy in Nairobi county, Kenya’, International Journal of Economics, 
Commerce and Management, Vol. 2, Iss. 9, pp. 2-23. 
124 Chapter II, Article 5-14, UNCAC. 
125 Chapter III, Article 15-25, UNCAC. 
126 Chapter III, Article 25-35, UNCAC. 
127 Chapter III, Article 36-39, UNCAC. 
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the significance of enhanced procedures and broader mutual legal assistance, including 
extradition, transfer of sentenced persons, transfer of criminal proceedings, law 
enforcement cooperation, joint investigations and special investigative techniques.128 
 
Fourthly, asset recovery, the return of assets obtained through corruption, is recognised 
as a fundamental principle in this Convention. Chapter V affords the widest possible 
measures on cooperation and mutual legal assistance in returning state embezzled 
public funds and the proceeds of corruption. They include measures for the direct 
recovery of property; mechanisms for recovery of property through international 
cooperation; confiscation; international cooperation for the purposes of confiscation; 
special cooperation; return and disposal of assets; the creation of financial intelligence 
units and bilateral and multilateral agreements and arrangements.129 This is regarded as 
a landmark achievement. The UNACA is the first global anti-corruption instrument that 
provides the recovery of funds transferred abroad by corrupt officials, it sends a strong 
and clear signal to corrupt parties that there will be no place to hide their illicit gains.130 
 
Finally, the fifth area UNACA is concerned with is the mechanisms for implementation. 
The adoption of the Convention is only a new beginning – it is its implementation that 
can provide vital momentum. It must be admitted that the mechanisms provided in 
UNACA cannot ensure its effective implementation – this is an inevitable consequence 
of the international negotiation process. However, it does set up a series of rigid 
implementation mechanisms in Chapter VIII, covering not only implementation and its 
entry into force, but also matters concerning the settlement of disputes.131 
 
                                                
128 Chapter IV, Article 43-50, UNCAC. 
129 Chapter V, Article 51-58, UNACA. 
130  United Nations Secretary-General (2003), Secretary-General's statement on the adoption by the 
General Assembly of the United Nations Convention against Corruption, 31 October 2003, available at: 
http://static.un.org/sg/en/content/sg/statement/2003-10-31/secretary-generals-statement-adoption-
general-assembly-united. 
131 Chapter VIII, Article 65-71, UNACA. 
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In general, with 71 articles, the UN Convention is a comprehensive treaty on corruption 
and has aided the creation of a common framework for promoting cooperation amongst 
all nations in fighting this malaise. It is an important step in achieving a universal 
agreement, despite the lack of an efficient and workable mechanism to promote 
compliance and monitor it.132 
 
What has China done? 
President Xi Jinping, in his first public speech after taking over the presidency and the 
party chief in late 2012, robustly called upon the party to fight fraud and corruption. He 
stated, “inside the party, there are many problems that need to be addressed, especially 
the problems among party members and officials of corruption and taking bribes, being 
out of touch with the people, undue emphasis on formalities and bureaucracy and other 
issues.”133 The campaign, since it started, has investigated a large number of high-
profile corruption cases. General Xu Caihou, Vice-Chairman of the Central Military 
Commission and top-ranking General of the People’s Liberation Army, along with Zhou 
Yongkang, a former member of the Politburo Standing Committee, who once headed 
the party’s Central Commission for Discipline Inspection and China’s Ministry of 
Public Security, were both found guilty of corruption.134 President Xi left no one in any 
doubt as to how serious the new leadership considered the situation. This campaign, 
compared to previous ones, has placed far more emphasis on international initiatives 
due to the accelerated pace of globalisation. 
 
                                                
132 See discussions at Mel D. Powell (2017), ‘International Efforts to Combat Corruption’, 2017 Annual 
Conference American Society for Public Administration, Atlanta, Georgia, March 17-21, 2017, at pp. 4-
5; and Philippa Webb (2005), ‘The United Nation against corruption: global achievement or missed 
opportunity?’ Journal of International Economic Law, Vol. 8, Iss. 1, pp. 191-229. 
133 Jinping Xi (2012), English version of the full text of President Xi Jinping’s speech at his inauguration 
is available at: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-china-20338586, the speech was given on 15 
November 2012. 
134 See Yamei Wang (30.06.2014), “Flash: Xu Caihou expelled from CCP for graft probe”, Xinhua News, 
available at: http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2014-06/30/c_133449642.htm; and Damien 
Grammaticus (29.07.2014), “Zhou Yongkang: China investigates ex-security chief”, BBC News, 
available at: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-28544428. 
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Fox Hunt Operation 
Following President Xi’s anti-corruption drive, the international ‘Fox Hunt Operation’ 
was launched by the Ministry of Public Security (MPS) of the People’s Republic of 
China in 2014, vowing to track down fugitives who had fled overseas and bring them 
to justice. As the state agency Xinhua News reported, Chinese officials have been ‘lining 
their pockets’ and ‘skipping the country’ since the 1980s, while the problem has now 
reached staggering proportions.135 By the end of 2014, in a 5-month period of the 
operation, 680 suspects of economic crime from 69 different countries were returned to 
China, of which 280 related to cases involving over 10 million Chinese Yuan (£1.14 
million) and 117 have been abroad for over 10 years.136 
 
The return of suspected criminals was mainly through extradition or repatriation, 
indicating that China has, during this operation, made remarkable inroads in 
international legal cooperation. This is particularly so with Southeast Asian countries, 
including Thailand, the Philippines, Malaysia, Vietnam, Laos, Burma and Indonesia, 
where 229 of the suspects, taking up 34 percent of the total number, were successfully 
arrested and deported.137 Some other countries, such as the US, France and Australia, 
have also expressed their willingness to assist and support China’s anti-corruption 
movement – if not through formal extradition treaties, to do so through informal 
mutually agreed measures. 138  Determination has already been made clear: “the 
                                                
135 Fei Chen and Mengda Wu (2014), ‘Gonganbu Bushu ‘Liehu 2014’ Jibu Xingdong Jianzhi Zaitao 
Jingwai Jingji Fanzui Xianyiren’ (Ministry of Public Security Initiating Foxhunt Operation Targeting 
Suspects of Economic Crime Who Have fled Abroad), in Chinese, Xinhua News Agency, 22.07.2014, 
available at: http://www.sc.xinhuanet.com/content/2014-07/22/c_1111747031.htm. 
136 Cheng Yang (2015), ‘Ministry of Public Security: ‘Fox Hunt Operation’ Arrested 680 fled Suspects o
f Economic Crime’, People’s Daily, 01.01.2015, available at: http://legal.people.com.cn/n/2015/0108/c4
2510-26348438.html. 
137 Ibid. 
138 See for example, China Daily (2014), ‘France to assist in hunt for corruption suspects’, China Daily, 
04.12.2014, available at: http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/cndy/2014-12/04/content_19021525.htm; 
Simon Denyer (2016), China’s most-wanted corruption suspect repatriated from U.S. after 13 years on 
the run, The Washington Post, 17.11.2016, available at: https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/chinas-
most-wanted-corruption-suspect-repatriated-from-us-after-13-years-on-the-run/2016/11/16/b0f58b0a-
abfd-11e6-8410-7613f8c1dae8_story.html?utm_term=.f760280e6f0b; and also NetEase (2014), China 
and Australia making joint efforts on asset recovery, NetEase, 21.10.2014, available at: 
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economic fugitives seem like the crafty foxes who have fled overseas to avoid 
punishment, but we, the wise hunters, will nail them, no matter where they are, or who 
they are.” – stated Liu Dong, deputy director of the economic crime unit at the Ministry 
of Public Security.139 
 
Skynet Operation 
In April 2015, following the success of the ‘Fox Hunt Operation’, the CCP announced 
the initiation of an upgraded multi-agency operation, ‘Skynet Operation’, with 
cooperation between the MPS, the Central Organisation Department, the Supreme 
People’s Procuratorate, and the People’s Bank of China. ‘Skynet Operation’ was set up 
not only to cover the sequential ‘Fox Hunt Operation 2015’ operated under the MPS, 
but enjoyed a much wider objective, that of “clearing up a batch of forged passports 
and personal documents; striking a batch of underground banks; recovering a batch of 
stolen assets; extraditing a batch of fled officials”.140 The ‘Skynet Operation’ extended 
its target to both the fugitives and those who help them. As the old Chinese idiom says, 
‘the sky may look thin and sparse, but it is vast and will not let you escape’. 
 
Achievement – an ongoing process 
Fruitful results have been observed, and the determination of the ruling party’s zero 
tolerance on corruption has been applauded by both China’s own citizens and the rest 
of the world. This is certainly an ongoing process. The Chinese government has 
published a list of 100 fugitives who are on Interpol’s red notice, and brought 27 of 
them to justice with the assistance of Interpol and relevant countries.141 Furthermore, 
                                                
http://news.163.com/14/1021/11/A930H7PR00014AED.html. 
139  Tom Phillips (2014), ‘China launches global ‘fox hunt’ for corrupt officials’, The Telegraph, 
25.07.2014, available at: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/china/10991255/China-
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140 Xiaobo Chen and Lie Fang (2015), 2015 nian zhongguo fanfu mizhi zhuitao ‘tianwang’ (2015 China’
s anti-corruption campaign is weaving ‘Skynet’), Xinhua News, in Chinese, available at: http://news.xin
huanet.com/politics/2015-12/31/c_1117638373.htm. 
141  Shuxian Huang (2016), Anti-Corruption Summit in London 2016, China Country Statement, 
presented by the Minister of Supervision of the PRC. 
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according to a recent meeting held by the MPS and the CCDI in March 2017, the 
‘Skynet Operation 2016’ has returned a total of 1,032 fugitives and a sum of 2.4 billion 
Chinese Yuan (£272 million) to China.142 The meeting also deployed a detailed plan on 
‘Skynet Operation 2017’, and made it crystal clear that “the anti-corruption work will 
never end, nor will work in capturing fugitives and recovering stolen assets”.143  
 
China is probably the most dynamic economy in today’s world. Since the opening of 
China’s economy, the system of government and its instructions, along with the party 
in power (CCP), has had to adapt, to address new risks and challenges. This is an 
ongoing process. Today, the Chinese economy has become far more diversified and 
international and together with political, social and economic changes, the situation is 
complex. It is promising that China understands that it cannot handle all these issues in 
isolation. 
 
China has long been an active character within the international community in the fight 
against corruption. The country has put itself forward in signing up to the United 
Nations Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC) and has voluntarily initiated, 
participated and organised a series of international level conferences and served as the 
chair of anti-corruption working groups of APEC and the G20. The former President, 
Hu Jintao, even gave his personal support to the establishment, with China’s own 
money and personnel, of the International Association of Anti-Corruption Agencies, 
with the aim of promoting the effective implementation of UNCAC.144 
 
Remarkable success has been made by the Chinese government in establishing 
                                                
142 Jie Meng (2017), China launches ‘Skynet 2017’ to hunt down corrupt suspects abroad, Xinhua News, 
available at: http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2017-03/08/c_136113421.htm. 
143 Ibid. 
144 See Lihong Xing, Xuebin Li and Enze Liu (2015), ‘Corruption in China’, in Research Handbook on 
International Financial Crime, edited by Barry Rider, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, p. 
432. 
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cooperative relationships with foreign countries. However, the lack of mutual 
extradition treaties and the difficulty in concluding one have been publicly observed. 
There are various reasons. The differences in the political system and the distrust of the 
Chinese legal system in ensuring justice are perhaps the prominent reasons. For 
example, the death penalty, which has been abolished in many countries, still exists in 
China, and this inevitably frustrates extraditing conditions of Chinese corrupt officials. 
Nonetheless, according to the Global Times, China has been working very closely with 
the US Department of Justice into seeking effective ways of ensuring asset recovery 
and implementing extradition treaties, discussing the possible conditions of a proceeds-
sharing regime.145 It is believed that China has provided a list of over 1,000 Chinese 
‘wanted suspects’ that are currently living in the US.146 
 
It remains to be seen whether the complex apparatus of the state can address these issues 
with sufficient vigour and alacrity to retain public confidence. Indeed, reform is vital in 
certain areas of China’s legal system. In the next concluding chapter, possible solutions 
and recommendations will be explored in a bid to strengthen control and prevent 
economic crime in China.
                                                
145 ‘Zhongfang yixiang Meifang Kaichu Chaoguo 1000 Waitao Tanguan Mingdan’ (China has provided 
the US with over 1000 fled corruptive officials’ name list), 12.5.2014, Global Times. 
146  The ‘most wanted’ people list is available at CCDI website at: 
http://www.ccdi.gov.cn/xwtt/201504/t20150422_55183.html.  
Chapter 7: Conclusions and Recommendations for 
Improved Control and Prevention of Economic Crime in 
China 
 
This thesis, following the key timeline of China’s history, examines the issues of 
economic crime with particular reference to corruption throughout China’s 
development as a global force. Focus on China is not due to the country being 
particularly prone to this malevolent phenomenon. Corruption exists in every society, 
and has been a stubborn by-product of economic development since ancient times. 
However, it is the case that China, a socialist country with a long history of bureaucratic 
control, is unique in its approach to understanding, identifying and preventing 
corruption. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP), the party in power, has placed many 
constraints on the bureaucracy, while, on the other hand, it continues to rely heavily on 
this system to manage the centrally planned and hierarchically ordered economy. 
Although determination to enact economic reform and opening its door to the world 
seems to be a solution, newer and even greater challenges arise in this unstable 
transitional period. 
 
Corruption, in the sense of abuse of public office, has been a serious crime for thousands 
of years in China. Numerous methods have been employed by emperors in ancient 
China to counteract this problem and a series of anti-corruption campaigns, with 
different emphasis, objectives and results, have been observed in differing eras in 
China’s modern history. Indeed, the CCP has recognised that corruption undermines 
the credibility of its own objectives ever since its foundation, and has launched 
innumerable initiatives against corruption and self-dealing and devoted considerable 
resources to the problem.1 Much has been done, but much more needs to be done. The 
                                                
1 See Barry Rider (2013), ‘When Chinese Whispers Become Shouts!’ Editorial, Journal of Financial 
Crime, Vol. 20, Iss: 2. 
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government and the CCP understand that short-lived campaigns cannot fulfil their 
objective; a much stronger systematic anti-corruption regime must be implemented. 
 
Economic crime is by no means a domestic issue in today’s society. With the 
accelerated speed of globalisation, economic crime, money laundering and corruption 
have gone far beyond the control of the domestic justice system. This is more so in 
China than in any other country, the most expanding economy in the world, and is 
widely predicted to be the dominant economy in the next ten years. The country’s 
reputation and moral standards will be of key importance if China desires to sustain its 
attraction to foreign investment, as well as assume its indispensable role on the world’s 
stage. Indeed today, China’s every move towards curbing economic crime will 
influence international business ethics and legal standards.  
 
The issue of economic crime is a dynamic point of interest. Since the ‘opening’ of 
China’s economy, the system of government and its delegation of power, together with 
the CCP, has addressed new risks and challenges – this is an ongoing process. China 
however, is not slow in realising that it cannot deal with all these issues in isolation. 
Corrupt officials have become far more intelligent and moved their ill-gotten gains 
beyond the reach of the domestic power and hidden their bribes and thefts in foreign 
bank accounts.  
 
This study has illustrated how, historically, corruption varies between periods and 
societies. When seeking to devise an appropriate strategy for combating corruption in 
China, consideration must be given to its economic, legal, political and cultural contexts. 
An effective and efficient approach must be tailored to the unique environment in which 
corruption occurs. This chapter, based on the author’s personal views, aims to provide 
general recommendations, several already explored throughout this thesis, for a tighter 
control of economic crime and corruption in China. 
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The legislative work 
Ever since the economic reform in the late 1970s, China has enacted a large volume of 
legislation. In the realm of economic crime, more study and action needs to be 
completed, both theoretically and practically. The law relating to fraud (covered in 
Chapter 4), illustrates the lack of a uniform constitutive requirement in terms of the 
definition of fraud which can lead to theoretical inadequacy in related trial cases. The 
single recognised type of fraud, with the absence of the concepts of negligence and 
innocent misrepresentation in Civil Law, causes problems with respect to a defendant’s 
liability. The remedies available, therefore, result in inequality and unfairness in 
business contracts. Furthermore, compared to English common law, the incorporation 
of legal doctrine of fiduciary duty has also become necessary. 
 
There is much to learn from the UK’s legal practice. It recently re-enacted the Criminal 
Finances Act 2017, providing greater powers for law enforcement agencies in tackling 
economic crime, including tax evasion, money laundering, corruption and terrorist 
financing. Its newly introduced regime of Unexplained Wealth Orders (UWO)2 is of 
particular importance, where it requires an individual to demonstrate the nature and 
extent of interest in a property specified in an order and explain how the property was 
obtained. This is vital in cases where a person’s income does not explain ownership of 
that property. 
 
The High Court, under English law, is empowered to grant a UWO in terms of property 
(which has to be valued at more than £50,000) upon request by a number of agencies 
including the Serious Fraud Office and the Financial Conduct Authority. It further states 
that, in order for the application for UWO to be made legally, the court need to be 
satisfied that either there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that the respondent (or 
a person connected with the respondent) is, or has been, involved in serious crime, or 
                                                
2 Section 1, Criminal Finances Act 2017. 
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that the respondent is an overseas ‘politically exposed person’ (an individual who has 
been entrusted with prominent public functions by an international organisation or a 
State outside of the UK or the European Economic Area, or a close relative or associate 
of such a person). The UWO, as referred to by the executive director of Transparency 
International, Robert Barrington, can be used as a valuable tool “which will empower 
the UK law enforcement agencies to target corrupt money flowing into the UK and 
more easily return it to those from whom it has been stolen”.3 
 
Section 10 of the Prevention of Bribery Ordinance in Hong Kong has also created a 
statutory presumption that any wealth over and above the lawful remuneration of a 
public official is the proceeds of corruption. Similar provisions can also be found in 
many other Commonwealth countries. Indeed, relevant laws and regulations, with 
respect to unexplained wealth, would be invaluable if they were incorporated into 
China’s legal framework in its current war against public corruption. In addition, further 
laws on preventive measures should be considered, especially on the allocation and 
operation of state powers and the regular examination of officials’ income; laws on the 
organisation and the powers of administrative, judicial, and in particular, military 
departments need to be further specified. Specific rules should be placed on the 
departments that have close ties with business-related operations such as licensing and 
procurements.  
 
Much emphasis has been placed on the ‘demand’ side of corrupt practices in the context 
of China. Western experience has illustrated that by increasing the risk of being exposed 
on the ‘supply’ side of corruption, this can also be an effective preventative measure. 
The United States Foreign Corrupt Practice Act is a good example, where one of its 
primary objectives is to prevent US associated persons and companies from offering 
                                                
3 Transparency International (2017), ‘Unexplained wealth orders as significant in fighting corruption as 
the Bribery Act’, 27.04.2017, Transparency International, available at: http://www.transparency.org.uk/
press-releases/unexplained-wealth-orders-as-significant-in-fighting-corruption-as-the-bribery-act/. 
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bribes to foreign officials. Indeed, relevant laws and regulations should be imposed and 
more importantly, enforced in China on the company’s compliance system; if they fail 
to file regular reports and meet the requirement, they will be punished, both in monetary 
terms and through damaged company reputation. There eventually will become a point 
at which the costs are just too great and are disproportionate to any assumed rewards.4 
 
Further to this, the need to regulate newly developed facilitative mechanisms on 
economic crime have raised increasing public concern. For example, underground 
banking is an effective mechanism for corrupt officials to launder their illicit gains. 
China’s newly initiated anti-corruption international operation ‘Skynet Operation’ has 
sought assistance from the central bank, the People’s Bank of China, with a specifically 
assigned objective to strike underground banks. The current laws relating to the 
operation of underground banking in China are ambiguous. Generally, the operation 
lies under the crime of illegal business operations. However, one of the requirements in 
such a crime, is criminal intent to acquire illegal profits, however this may not be 
reflected in the transaction of ‘black’ money and exchange of foreign currencies 
operated by underground banks, which only amounts to illegal use of business license 
and is liable for less serious administrative redress. Furthermore, as underground 
banking services often involve money laundering activities, there are academics 
proposing to define underground banking as a money laundering offence.5  Yet in 
practice, to be qualified for a money laundering offence, proof is required that the 
money has derived from seven predicate offences, namely smuggling, drug trafficking, 
organised crime, terrorist activity, disrupting the financial order, financial fraud and 
corruption. Individuals may only use the underground service to obtain an investor visa 
                                                
4 See more discussions at Barry Rider (2015), ‘Strategic tools – for now and perhaps the future?’ in 
Research Handbook on International Financial Crime, edited by Barry Rider, Cheltenham: Edward 
Elgar Publishing Limited, pp. 748-749. 
5 See Lei Zhang (2017), ‘Daji dixia qianzhuang jixu pojie falu shiyong nanti’ (The urgency to break the 
bottleneck of application of the law relating to underground banks), China News, 10.03.2017, available 
at: http://news.china.com/news100/11038989/20170317/30336418_all.html. 
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and the money they earned can be completely legitimate. Indeed, the implementation 
of such laws in relevance to newly emerging economic crime is worthy of considerable 
attention.  
 
Additional laws on the supervision of government officials should also be considered. 
Laws should include requests for officials to report their legal income and gifts accepted, 
anti-corruption authorities should have more power to examine officials and their 
families’ bank accounts and personally or jointly owned properties in the context of 
unexplained wealth, when necessary. Moreover, laws relating to other sectors have the 
potential capacity to attract the media, ‘whistle blowers’ and bounty hunters need also 
to be considered.6 A 1.4 billion population can obviously have a huge impact on the 
prevention of public corruption. 
 
Empowering the citizen 
In western countries, there has long been a suggestion to empower their citizens, who 
have suffered loss as a consequence of public corruption, to raise claims. In most cases, 
their damage is a result of what the corruption has facilitated rather than the corrupt act 
itself. For example, those who lost relatives or sustained injury after a major road bridge 
collapse in China, due to the failure of inspectors to sufficiently monitor its construction. 
While in most cases, those who have been harmed will not, under domestic law, have 
a clear claim for compensation, this concentrates on claims for damage and loss that 
have resulted from the corrupt act, rather than restitution of illicit payments. The United 
Nations Convention Against Corruption places an obligation on states to facilitate such 
actions. However, without a litigation friendly environment, with the possibility of class 
actions and contingent attorney fees, it is difficult to see that this would be a meaningful 
and viable strategy in many countries. A positive move can be gleaned from the United 
                                                
6 Further reading can be found at Richard Alexander (2005), ‘The role of whistleblowers in the fight 
against economic crime’, Journal of Financial Crime, Vol. 12, Iss. 2, pp. 131-138; and Caroline Bradley 
(2015), ‘Rewards for whistleblowing’, in Research Handbook on International Financial Crime, edited 
by Barry Rider, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing Limited. 
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States False Claims Act, in which it has enabled citizens to bring civil claims on behalf 
of the state, based on allegations of fraud and misconduct against the government, and 
the litigants and their lawyers, who are then, if successful, permitted to share in the 
recovery. 
 
The Chinese government and its party disciplinary organ, the Committee for 
Disciplinary Inspection (CDI) have, in various situations, expressed their willingness 
to work with the public. Beijing, with the recent establishment of a whistle blower 
internet platform, under the official website of the Central Committee for Disciplinary 
Inspection (CCDI), appears to be taking a positive path in recruiting the general public 
and gaining their support and alliance. The collapse of the formal deputy head of the 
National Development and Reform Commission Liu Tienan emerged from an online 
report, written by a well-known journalist.7 More impressively, former Chongqing 
District Party Secretary Lei Zhengfu was sacked by the party only 63 hours after his 
indecent video was uploaded online, via the popular Chinese microblog Sina Weibo.8 
 
The government, the supervisory authority, should continue to utilise newly developed 
information technology. Article 41 of the Constitution has granted citizens the right to 
criticise the work of the government and its officials, and the right to accuse or report 
misconduct. Recruiting the general public to assist in monitoring public officials is a 
welcome tendency, which can be a win-win strategy. To some extent, it tempers 
jealousy in society between the populace and the governing officials, as well as aiding 
the effectiveness of the party’s built-in supervisory bodies. To this end, special 
guidelines on how to ‘blow the whistle’ should be made public and strongly emphasised. 
The protection of the whistle blower should also be strengthened in serious cases of 
corruption involving allegations against those still in office and law enforcement, and 
                                                
7  BBC News (2013), ‘China sacks top economic official Liu Tienan’, BBC news, 9 August 2013, 
available at: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-china-23628085.  
8 Yong Han (2013), ‘Officials being convicted since the 18th CCP National Congress’, Sina News, 
12.11.2013, available at: http://news.sina.com.cn/c/sd/2013-11-12/110828687589_2.shtml. 
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strict regulations on openly dealing with public reports should be properly supervised. 
Moreover, compared with western countries, where the media is a major player in 
monitoring the integrity of government officials, China’s media sector is still under state 
influence which mainly derives from the local governments, who are concerned about 
their ‘face’ (governmental image). Accordingly, it is necessary to publish laws and 
regulations to protect the independence of the media in its vital role as a public 
supervisor. 
 
The legal authority 
To remain firmly within the rule of law, the role of the prosecutorial department is vital, 
not only constitutionally in terms of due process, but also in achieving a fair and focused 
investigation tailored to the production of admissible evidence. Sadly, judicial 
independence and, prosecutorial independence, have long been a debatable topic in 
China. Lessons can be learnt from China’s Special Administrative Regions, Hong Kong. 
The Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC), established in 1974, has 
been helping Hong Kong to transform from a city plagued with syndicate corruption to 
one now upheld among the cleanest in the world.9 The ICAC is directly accountable to 
the Governor, now the Chief Executive of Hong Kong. Its absolute independence from 
the government was one of its greatest strengths when it was founded, and this 
continues to give it credibility. Regarding business operations, this body has set clear 
divisions between the business and political worlds, and maintained a clear standard in 
the way entrepreneurs are able to relate to government officials without soliciting unfair 
benefits or aiding their personal interests. 
 
Anti-corruption bodies in China refer to the Anti-Corruption and Bribery Bureau 
(ACBB) under the People’s Procuratorate and the ruling party’s built-in supervisory 
                                                
9  Independent Commission Against Corruption official website, Message from the Commissioner, 
available at: http://www.icac.org.hk/en/c/msg/index.html; also more discussions can be found at 
Shaomin Li (2004), ‘Can China learn from Hong Kong’s experience in fighting corruption?’, Global 
Economic Review, Vol. 33, No. 1, pp. 1-9. 
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organ, the Commission for Discipline Inspection (CDI). However, as examined in 
Chapter 5, the dividing line between these two bodies has been rather indistinct, even 
though they were established with a common aim. Based on previous experience, while 
the People’s Procuratorates, provided by law, have direct responsibility in investigating 
and prosecuting criminal cases of corruption and bribery, CDIs are, in practice, playing 
a leadership role in the detention and investigation of corrupt officials.10 The law needs 
to be clearer in terms of their respective functions and cooperative work. In addition, 
procedures regarding CDI’s operation, in particular its secret internal disciplinary 
conduct ‘shuanggui’, should be reported and updated regularly with the public, as 
rumours and criticisms have intensified in recent years concerning the human rights 
issue within the organisation. 
 
It is provided in the Constitution that the People’s Procuratorate has exclusive 
jurisdiction on prosecution, including the jurisdiction to investigate corruption and 
independent interference from any other administrative organ, civil organisation and 
individual.11 In the practical world, however, this is almost impossible, mainly due to 
its dependent status under the administration of the government. The leaders and 
prosecutors of the People’s Procuratorates were chosen and appointed by respective 
local governments and their financial budgets were distributed by relevant finance 
departments under local government control. To gain an independent status, at the very 
least, they should have the power to make decisions on appointing leaders and approve 
the financial budgets – this could be under the discretion of the relevant higher-level 
People’s Procuratorates. Indeed, this has also been the case with China’s specialised 
financial regulators, namely the CBRC, the CSRC and the CIRC, as discussed in 
Chapter 5. 
 
                                                
10 See more detailed discussion in Chapter 5, section ‘The internal relationship’. 
11 See Article 131 of the Constitution of the PRC; The Criminal Procedure Law and the Organic Law of 
the People’s Procuratorate also have similar provisions. 
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The cadre’s promotion system in China, in the author’s view, is also prone to cadre and 
department dependency and as a result, breeds corruption. China is apparently using a 
rank-based system rather than a sector-based system – which means if you have reached 
a certain level in your department, you will be a potential candidate to gain promotion 
to other departments if there are vacancies. For example, the current President of the 
Supreme People’s Court (SPC) Zhou Qiang, who spent over a decade working in the 
Communist Youth League, then moved to Hunan Province and was promoted to 
minister level, serving as Hunan Provincial Secretary before assuming his current role 
as President of the SPC.12 Similarly, the current General Secretary of the CCDI, Wang 
Qishan, who studied history at University and began his career as a historian researcher 
at the China Academy of Social Science, moved to the financial sector, the China Rural 
Development Trust Investment Corporation, Bank of China, and then became the 
Governor of one of China’s largest state-owned commercial banks, the People’s 
Construction Bank of China before his current post at the CCDI. Wang’s experience 
derives from the Guangdong Province, Hainan Province and Beijing City.13 Of course, 
extensive experience may be regarded as a bonus in the role of the candidate, and can 
also reduce or even eliminate, if relevant, any long-standing corrosive tendencies within 
the department. However, relevant experience and a deep understanding of the role, 
especially the leadership role, is also important, particularly in the legal sector. This 
mixed level-based promotion system also encourages cadres to nurture social 
connections and cultivate relationships with the leadership of other departments and 
influential leaders within the government for the sake of their own careers. This has 
resulted in the independence of legal authority being much more vulnerable and such a 
promotion system remains unshakable in the present realms of leadership. 
 
Fighting corruption is highly demanding; it requires not only a sound legal education 
                                                
12 Resume of the President of the Supreme People’s Court, Zhou Qiang, National People’s Congress, 
available at: http://www.npc.gov.cn/npc/dbdhhy/12_1/2013-03/15/content_1785440.htm. 
13 Resume of the General Secretary of Central Committee for Disciplinary Inspection, Wang Qishan, 
available at CCDI website: http://www.ccdi.gov.cn/xxgk/ldjg/wqs/201307/t20130717_44942.html. 
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but also experience and ability in problem solving, which can only be gained through 
years of legal practice. The People’s Procuratorates should have overall control of the 
recruitment and promotion of their prosecutors, as well as widen their sight to not only 
recruit college law students (currently the main method – through entry examination), 
but also experienced legal practitioners such as private lawyers and company 
accountants. The People’s Procuratorates should also increase the salary for those 
working at ACBBs, to inspire and attract individuals, in particular with China’s current 
war against corruption, and perhaps negotiate a proceeds-sharing scheme with the 
central government on the assets recovered from a successful prosecution of a 
corruption case. Also, the Procuratorial department should devote increased man-power 
to deal with public reports, under the current trend of ‘working with the public’, and 
respond quickly; the ICAC in Hong Kong integrated a ‘48-hour response to the reporter’ 
into their policy.  
 
Education – unhealthy tendency 
Education can be as important as prosecution in the sense of preventing future criminal 
activities. Indeed, education is viewed as the final step of the ICAC’s three-pronged 
strategy on combating corruption, combined with detection and prevention. ICAC 
offers Corporate Ethics Programmes in the business sector along with a series of tailor-
made preventive education services to the public sector, non-governmental 
organisations, youth and schools. 14  The CCP has also realised the significance of 
education and in particular, educating its own members. Only a month after President 
Xi’s succession, on 4th December 2012, he presided over a meeting at the Political 
Bureau of the Central Committee of the CCP and issued an ‘eight-point code’, with the 
aim of reducing the ‘unhealthy tendency’ within the party. The code was issued in a 
rather educational directive, but with disciplinary actions, and pertains to curbing 
bureaucratic practices and eradicating pomp and ceremony, to limit sumptuary 
                                                
14 See more detail at ICAC website: http://www.icac.org.hk/en/cpd/index.html. 
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behaviour among officials. Each level of the government units was required to host 
regular educational seminars to ensure their member officials fully understood the 
significance of the code. In this educational move, thousands of party members were 
punished due to the violation of the code. It is ironic that due to this newly issued 
principle negating the waste of public funds, certain industries in China struggled to 
survive. For example, the demand for expensive wines for high-end restaurants dropped 
dramatically, and several luxury restaurants closed. Business owners told journalists 
that they have lost so many customers from the public sector due to this move against 
the party’s unhealthy tendency.15 
 
In today’s world, with advanced technology, the means of education can be manifold. 
The traditional methods, by publishing tedious articles and books, are seen to be 
inefficient and time consuming. Society, in particular the younger generation, are used 
to gaining news and knowledge through television and the internet. The party has 
followed this wave and attracted rave reviews worldwide after they produced the eight-
episode TV programme ‘Yongyuan zai lushang’, with its English translated name 
‘Never ending for anti-corruption struggle’. The programme, produced and filmed by 
the Propaganda Department of the CCDI and the China Central Television, generally 
describes China’s endless efforts in combating corruption after the new leadership came 
to power at the 18th National People’s Congress in 2012. Following face-to-face 
interviews with dozens of minister-level corrupt officials who had been prosecuted and 
sentenced, the educational significance it brings, not only to party members, but every 
individual in society, is huge. Facing the camera, the convicted officials tearfully 
expressed their regrets for betraying the country, the party and the people. They form 
their political careers as symbolic lessons and describe in-depth, the first bribe they 
accepted, the major cases they were involved in and how they struggled over the years 
                                                
15 Xi Wang (2013), ‘Sida Hangye bei Fanfuquan Jizhong’ (Four industries were punched by anti-corrupt
ion trend), 02.12.2013, People’s daily, available at: http://finance.people.com.cn/n/2013/1202/c1004-23
709209.html.  
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and eventually placed themselves in such a vulnerable position (in prision). They finally 
called upon the people to believe in the country and the CCP and warned party members 
to never touch upon any interests that do not and will never purport to them, and to 
always put public interest first! 
 
The recently produced and first ever Chinese TV drama series on the subject matter of 
politics and anti-corruption, ‘Renmin de mingyi’ (it may also be described as Chinese 
‘House of Cards’), has broken the long-standing audience rating since it premiered in 
March 2017. The story focused on the political battle between a province’s entire top 
echelon and its People’s Procuratorate, in particular, the Anti-Corruption and Bribery 
Bureau, ending up with the corrosive circle, that has existed for so long, being destroyed. 
Indeed, China should continue with such pace and education as an important component 
in the prevention of economic crime. Further community events are also proposed and 
the public can even be invited to the policy making process – making them active 
participants. More public lectures should be encouraged by the party and the judicial 
department, taking place in public spaces and universities; this can be particularly 
important in the education of code of ethics before university graduates commence on 
their careers. 
 
International perspective 
With the rapid development of globalisation, information technology and transportation, 
economic crime and corruption is becoming more complex and transnational. China, as 
the largest emerging market, is concerned about its international reputation more than 
ever before. We can see from Chapter 6, that innumerable initiatives have been 
undertaken by the government in recent years. Also, a number of intra-party rules have 
been enacted by the CCP – many have shifted the focus to the preventive measures on 
a much wider international perspective, given the fact that many corrupt officials are 
transferring their assets and fleeing overseas. A good example is the party’s crackdown 
on ‘luoguan’ (‘naked officials’) – a word describing Chinese bureaucrats whose family 
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members have emigrated while they are still holding public positions. The CCP issued 
‘the Ordinance of the Work of Selecting and Appointing Cadres of the Party and 
Country’, in which it clearly stipulates ‘naked officials’ will not be considered for 
promotion16, as they are seen to potentially have high risks and their ability to escape 
overseas could make them more inclined to engage in corrupt activities.17 Fang Xuan, 
as one of the first examples, has taken early retirement from his position of deputy chief 
of the Guangzhou city party committee.18 
 
It can be of great significance, as the United Nations Convention Against Corruption 
provided, to establish a direct and close relationship between financial intelligence units 
and anti-corruption authorities in the war against economic crime and corruption, in 
particular, in the inquiry for information, obtaining evidence, confiscating illicit 
property and the extradition of suspects. China has, in recent years, made remarkable 
progress in promoting international cooperation. Up to February 2017, China has 
liaised with 70 countries, with a total of 135 agreements or treaties on mutual legal 
assistance, asset recovery, extradition and combating terrorism, of which 48 are 
mutually signed extradition treaties.19 However, there is still much work to be done. 
Parties that have signed extradition treaties with China are mainly developing countries, 
while with criminals’ favourite destinations, such as the United States, Australia and 
Canada, conclusions have yet to be reached. Main obstacles include the stance towards 
the death penalty, the protection of human rights in the procedure of investigation and 
of course, resources. However, the successful extradition of the principle criminal in 
                                                
16 ‘The ordinance of the work of selecting and appointing cadres of the party and country’, Chapter 5, 
Article 24(4), Promulgated on 15.01.2014, by Central Committee of the CCP. 
17 Paul Carsten (2014), ‘China corruption fight turns on ‘naked officials’ with family overseas’, Reuters,
 22.05.2014, available at: http://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-corruption-idUSBREA4L0HW20140
522. 
18 Demetri Sevastopulo (2014), ‘China cracks down on ‘naked officials’’, Financial Times, 08.06.2014, 
available at: http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/9d1f3a88-ef01-11e3-acad-00144feabdc0.html#axzz37jmdiWK
d. 
19 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘Agreements and treaties on mutual legal assistance and extradition’, full
 list available at: http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/web/ziliao_674904/tytj_674911/wgdwdjdsfhzty_674917/t12
15630.shtm. 
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the Yuanhua smuggling case, Lai Changxing, who fled to Canada for over 10 years, is 
regarded as an inspiring achievement. Undeniably, negotiations and agreements on a 
case by case basis can produce valuable results and should certainly be further 
encouraged.  
 
In further promoting a cross-border law enforcement network to strengthen 
transnational anti-corruption in the region of the Asia-Pacific, China undertook an 
active role and issued the ‘Beijing Declaration on Fighting Corruption’ at the Asia-
Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Ministerial Meeting at the end of 2014 in 
Beijing. In ‘Declaration’, 21 APEC members pledge to eliminate corruption through 
extradition and judicial assistance and adapt more flexible measures to recover the 
proceeds of corruption within the law of APEC economies. It is true that the efforts of 
China’s new leadership, both domestically and internationally, has brought raucous 
applause. China has expressed its willingness in various situations, as provided in 
Chapter 6, to open its channel in reaching further cooperative agreements on matters of 
economic crime. 
 
Today, the continuous and never-ending struggle against corruption, has been described 
as another short-lived campaign by commentators. The anti-corruption warrior however, 
Wang Qishan, a member of CCP Political Bureau Standing Committee and the General 
Secretary of the CCDI, has emphasised that time limits are not inherent within the plan. 
The anti-corruption drive has to be internalised as part of the culture and moral code of 
officials across the country. Of course, it may take some time to restore public 
confidence, but this is certainly something worthy of the wait! 
 
It has been seen that scholars have examined corruption in its various forms, in all 
regions of the world, and produced a voluminous body of work. Researchers are also 
continuing to debate the prominence of ethical behaviour, to create a professional public 
workforce, and consider whether the carefully crafted laws and regulations, as the 
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backbone of the compliance system, can effectively foresee deviant behaviour in a 
continuing circle of laws and regulations, in the search for a competent administrative 
state. Nevertheless, the ambition, in the author’s view, may extend to the establishment 
of a system of ethical management which blends both reinforcement of integrity and 
ethical behaviour in governmental departments and compliance systems, that are 
responsible for maintaining the control of the pervasiveness of greed. Critical to such 
success, however, is leadership – not only the leadership of the People’s Republic of 
China, but a universal recognition of the significance of moral values among leaders of 
the world. 
List of Statutes and Statutory Instruments 
Please note Chinese Characters have only been included to assist referencing of ancient 
material or document not widely available 
Ancient China 
Mo Xing (Ink Penalty), Yao Shun Yu period (2356-2101 B.C.) 
Xia Shu (Book of Documents of Xia), Xia Dynasty (2070-1600 B.C.) 
Guan Xing (Officer’s Code), Shang Dynasty (1600-1046 B.C.) 
Lu Code (Criminal Punishments of the Marques Lu), Western Zhou (1100-771 B.C.) 
Classic Law of Li Kui, Wei State in Warring States period (475-221 B.C.) 
Qin Code/Qin Lu (Rules of Qin), Qin Dynasty (221-260 B.C.) 
Xiao Lu (Rules of Efficacy), Qin Dynasty 
Administrative Law on Supervision, Qin Dynasty 
Rules on Appointment of Officials, Qin Dynasty 
Rules on Removal of Officials, Qin Dynasty 
Anti-Corruption Decree, Han Dynasty (206 B.C. – 220 A.D.) 
Wei Code, 229 A.D. Wei-Jin and Southern and Northern Dynasty (220-589 A.D.) 
Jin Code, 267 A.D. Wei-Jin and Southern and Northern Dynasty (220-589 A.D.) 
Kai Huang Code, 589 A.D. Sui Dynasty (581-618 A.D.) 
Tang Code, Tang Dynasty (618-907 A.D.) 
Penal Code of Song Dynasty, Song Dynasty (960-1279 A.D.) 
General Act of Yuan, Yuan Dynasty (1271-1368 A.D.) 
Code of Great Ming Empire, Ming Dynasty (1368-1644 A.D.) 
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Code of Great Qing Empire, Qing Dynasty (1636-1912 A.D.) 
Modern China 
Rules of Officials Committing Corruption 1921, Bei-Yang Government 
Decree of Anti-Corruption 1932, KMT Government, Republic of China 
Provisional Rules of Anti-Corruption 1938, KMT Government 
Rules of Anti-Corruption 1943, KMT Government 
Mandate of Anti-Corruption and Anti-Waste, Mandate No. 26, Communist Party, 1933 
Provisional Rules of Anti-Corruption of the Shandong Province 1940 
Provisional Rules against Embezzlement of Public Grains 1943 
Provisional Rules of Anti-Corruption of Northwest of Shanxi Province 1941 
Provisions on Recovering Stolen Money and Properties 1942 
Supplemental Rules of Anti-Corruption of Jin Cha Ji Regions 1942 
Provisional Measures of Anti-Corruption of Bohai Sea Region 1943 
Provisional Rules of Anti-Corruption of Northeast Liberated Area 1947 
Rules of Honouring Economy and Anti-Corruption of Northern Jiangsu Area 1949 
People’s Republic of China 
Common Programme of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference 1949 
Resolution on Better Staff and Simpler Administration, Production Increase and 
Austerity 1951 
Provisions on Handling Corruption and Waste and Overcoming Bureaucratic Mistakes 
1952 
Provisions on the Establishment of the People’s Courts in the Three Anti’s Campaign 
1952 
Act of Corruption Punishment of the People’s Republic of China 1952 
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Provisions on Recovering Stolen Money and Properties 1952 
Rules on Punishing Corruption of the People’s Republic of China 1952 
Reforming the system of special supplies for high-ranking officials and prohibiting 
backdoor dealing 1960, Central Committee. 
Administrative License Law of the People’s Republic of China 2003 
Administrative Supervision Law of the People’s Republic of China 1997 
Anti-Money Laundering Law of the People’s Republic of China 2007 
Anti-Monopoly Law of the People’s Republic of China 2007 
Bidding Law of the People’s Republic of China 1999 
Civil Servant Law of the People's Republic of China 2006 
Company Law of the People’s Republic of China 1999 
Company Law of the People’s Republic of China 2004 
Constitution of the People’s Republic of China 1954 
Constitution of the People’s Republic of China 1978 
Constitution of the People’s Republic of China 1982 
Constitution of the People’s Republic of China 2004 
Contract Law of the People’s Republic of China 1999  
Criminal Law of the People’s Republic of China 1979 
Criminal Law of the People’s Republic of China 1997 
Criminal Procedural Law of the People’s Republic of China 1979 
Criminal Procedural Law of the People’s Republic of China 1997 
Extradition Law of the People’s Republic of China 2000 
General Principles of the Civil Law of the People’s Republic of China 1987  
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Insurance Law of the People’s Republic of China 1995 
Law of the People’s Republic of China on Banking Regulation and Supervision 2003 
Law of the People’s Republic of China on Protection of Consumer Rights and Interests 
1994 
Law of the People’s Republic of China on Public Servants 2005 
Law on the Organisation of People’s Prosecution Services 1979 
Ordinance on Arrest and Detention 1979 
Organic Law of the Central People’s Government of the People’s Republic of China 
1949 
Organic Law of the People’s Procuratorate of the People’s Republic of China 1954 
Organic Law of the People’s Procuratorate of the People’s Republic of China 1979 
Organic Law of the People's Courts of the People's Republic of China 1979 
Property Law of the People’s Republic of China 2007 
Securities Law of the People’s Republic of China 1998 
Sino-Foreign Joint Venture Law 1979 
The Government Procurement Law of the People’s Republic of China 2002 
The Law of the People’s Republic of China on the People’s Bank of China 1995 
Tort Law of the People’s Republic of China 2010 
Answers to Several Questions by the Supreme People’s Court, 1985. 
Decision on Severely Punishing Crimes on Sabotaging the Economy, promulgated by 
the Standing Committee of the NPC on March 8, 1982. 
Decision on the Question of Approval of the Death Penalty, adopted on June 10, 1981. 
Decisions on the Severe Punishment of Serious Economic Criminals, 22nd Plenary 
Session of the 5th National People’s Congress, 8 March 1982. 
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Explanation of the Supreme People’s Court and Supreme People’s Procuratorate on 
Several Issues Concerning the Laws with Criminal Fraud, effective on 08.04.2011. 
Guidelines of the CCP for Party Member Leading Cadres to Perform Official Duties 
with Integrity, promulgated in 1997, revised in 2010. 
Interim Regulation on Strengthening Management of State Functionaries whose 
Spouses and Children Have Emigrated Abroad. 
Opinions of the Supreme People’s Court on Several Issues Concerning the 
Implementation of the General Principles of the Civil Law of the People’s Republic of 
China (Trial Implementation) 1988. 
Provisional Regulations for lawyers of the People’s Republic of China, adopted by the 
15th Session of the Standing Committee of the 5th National People’s Congress on August 
26, 1980. 
Provisions of Supreme People’s Prosecuting Institute and Ministry of Public Security 
Bureau on the Standard of Prosecuting an Economic Crime 2010. 
Regulation of the Executives of State-owned Enterprises for Performing Management 
Duties with Integrity, 2009. 
Regulation on Implementing the System of Registration for Gifts Received in Domestic 
Social Activities by Functionaries of Party and State Organs. 
Regulation on Leading Cadres' Report of Relevant Personal Matters. 
Regulation on Strict Prohibition of Seeking Illegitimate Gains by Misuse of Office, 
issued by the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection, 2007. 
Regulation on the Income Declaration by the Leading Cadres above the Provential 
Level within the Party and the Government Institutions, 1995. 
Regulation on the Punishment of Civil Servants in Administrative Organs, adopted at 
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